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This thesis deconstructs the bases of enduring Francoist myth that General Queipo de Llano 
heroically conquered Seville with a handful of soldiers. Having established the full ramifications 
of that conquest, it goes on to assess the political, social, economic and cultural implications of 
the Spanish Civil War in Seville, the largest urban centre to fall to the military rebels at the 
beginning of the conflict. 
 
Chapter I examines the nature and infrastructure of the military conspiracy against the 
democratic Republic developed in response to the Popular Front electoral victory of February 
1936. Chapter II scrutinises the career of General Queipo, in particular his metamorphosis from 
a marginal figure in the conspiracy into a rebel secular saint. 
 
Chapter III dismantles the legend that Queipo directed a small group of soldiers that 
miraculously conquered Seville and examines how the myth was exploited to legitimise 
political repression. Chapter IV demonstrates how the bloody pacification of Seville by nearer 
to 6,000 men exemplified the conspirators’ determination to eliminate the Republic by 
extreme violence. It shows how the use of the most brutal methods of colonial war was 
employed against civilians all over rebel-controlled territory. 
 
Chapter V analyses the painful transition from insurrection to civil war from a novel 
perspective: fundraising campaigns. It quantifies the devastating consequences of Nationalist 
economic repression. Finally, Chapter VI demystifies the legend of a Catholic Church 
persecuted by a ‘Judeo-Masonic’ conspiracy. It concludes that anticlericalism was a popular 
form of protest that pre-dated the establishment of the II Republic by analysing/quantifying 
patterns of religiosity, revealing that only 1.44% of the local population regularly attended 
Church in 1930s Seville; and investigating the development of the Catholic Church into the 
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From coup de main to coup d’état: the conspiracy against the II Spanish 
Republic (February-July 1936) 
 
Introduction: the 16 February general elections and events of 17-19 February 1936 
The 17-18 July 1936 military coup d’état, which degenerated into the bloody Spanish Civil War 
of 1936-39, was the single most defining event in XX-Century Spanish History.1 It was the most 
traumatic too, so much so that the country is still trying to come to terms with its painful 
legacy. Ironically, the rebellion that shaped modern Spain was never supposed to have taken 
place. Precisely six months before the outbreak of the insurgency - 17 February 1936 - some of 
its key figures attempted to quietly put the II Spanish Republic to death.  
 
Following the narrow victory of the leftist Popular Front in the hotly-contested 16 February 
1936 general elections, the different factions of the right might have disagreed with regard to 
the future political outlook of Spain, but were unanimous in their opposition to the new 
government.2 Indeed, had the insurrectionary wishes of General Francisco Franco Bahamonde 
and José María Gil Robles (the leader of the strongest party of the political right, the CEDA3) 
been endorsed by the interim Prime-Minister, the conservative Manuel Portela Valladares, 
there would have been no need for the July rebellion. So determined were Franco and Gil 
Robles to annul the vote that at 3:15am of the night of 16-17 February Gil Robles woke up 
Portela (who had concluded his workday at 1:00am) and insisted on a meeting with him. The 
CEDA leader was hoping to pressure the Prime-Minister into declaring martial law and 
postponing his planned resignation. This would in turn allow the army, under the overall 
command of General Franco, to seize power and annul the elections (all under a veneer of 
legality). Portela rejected both of Gil Robles’ demands, but agreed to decree a state of alert 
                                                          
1
 17 July in Spanish Morocco; 18 July in mainland Spain. 
2
 Electoral results in Seville (capital): Popular Front: 61,5%; Right: 35,8%; Falange 0,7% (total: 97,4%). 
Electoral results in the province of Seville: Popular Front: 32,7%; Centre-right: 26,5% (total: 59,2%). 
Gómez Salvago, José, La Segunda República, pages 222-23. Electoral results in Spain: Electores: 
13,553,710; Votantes: 9,864,783 (72%). Popular Front (Popular Front + Centre in Lugo): 4,555,401 + 
98,715 (34,3%). Centre-Right: 2,636,524 (33,2%). Tusell, Javier, Las elecciones del Frente Popular en 
España, vol. 2, pages 13 and 24-28. For electoral fraud in Granada see pages 123-91. 
3
 Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas. See: Montero, José Ramón, La CEDA, 2 vols.; 
Robinson, Richard, The origins of Franco’s Spain. For the memoirs of its leader see: Gil Robles, José 
María, No fué posible la paz.   
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(estado de alarma). Another even more dramatic meeting was imposed on the Prime-Minister 
by Gil Robles at 8:30am on 19 February under a pine tree on the outskirts of Madrid, just 
before Portela tendered his resignation. Moreover, General Franco twice met Portela and 
twice was shunned by the Prime-Minister.  
 
Franco had already failed to convince the Director-General of the Civil Guard, General 
Sebastián Pozas Perea, to join forces with himself and Gil Robles. On the night of 17 February, 
the Chief of the General Staff of the Spanish Army met with Portela to offer his services to 
restore public order in Spain. The offer was rejected and, during the cabinet meeting of that 
same day (just a few hours after the first Gil Robles-Portela Valladares meeting), the Prime-
Minister persuaded President Niceto Alcalá-Zamora into signing an order proclaiming martial 
law, which was to be put in use only in case of emergency. Not one to take rejection lightly, 
General Franco took matters into his own hands and persuaded several military garrisons into 
declaring martial law, which amounted to a coup de main. To complete the circle of right-wing 
forces attempting to suffocate the yet-to-be inaugurated Popular Front government, on the 
night of 18 February José Calvo Sotelo, representing the monarchist party Bloque Nacional, 
also paid a visit to the Prime-Minister. The following morning, a fatigued Portela Valladares 
tendered his resignation and handed power to Manuel Azaña Díaz, leader of the moderate 
left-wing Izquierda Republicana (IR) party.4  
 
Not everyone was willing to concede defeat just yet. When General Manuel Goded Llopis 
heard of Azaña’s ascension to power, he headed straight to the Montaña Barracks in Madrid 
and attempted to organise an impromptu rebellion against the Republic. The impulsive general 
                                                          
4
 For the events that followed the 16 February elections, including photographic evidence of the 
declaration of martial law in Zaragoza see: ABC (Madrid), 19 February 1936 (as far as ABC was 
concerned, the new government would seek to “legitimar la revolución”). Its edition of 20 February 
edition fronted a photograph of Portela Valladares with the comment “crisis total” (in reference to the 
Prime-Minister’s resignation). However, Portela Valladares clarified the situation regarding a possible 
declaration of martial law: “queda autorizado el presidente para declarar el estado de guerra donde sea 
necesario”, ABC (Madrid) 17 February 1936. For the failed coup de main see: Gil Robles, José María, No 
fué posible la paz, pages 492-98; Alcalá-Zamora y Torres, Niceto, Memorias, page 347; Maíz, B. Félix, 
Alzamiento en España, page 37; Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, General Queipo de 
Llano, page 82; Portela Valladares, Manuel, Memorias, pages 175-85; Preston, Paul, The coming of 
Spanish Civil War, pages 242-44; Preston, Paul, Franco, pages 115-119. 
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failed to persuade the local officers into accepting his bizarre proposal and eventually 
abandoned the garrison, in his own words, “asqueado y rabioso”.5 
 
The political right learned several invaluable lessons from the 16-19 February events: a) that 
the Republic would not surrender without a fight; b) that the army was divided in its 
sympathies, which compromised the possibility of a swift coup d’état; and c) that the battle-
hardened Civil Guard would play a key role in any subversive enterprise. Indeed, the Director-
General of the Civil Guard had almost single-handedly dismantled Franco’s attempt to seize 
power surreptitiously by strategically stationing civil guard units outside army barracks; an 
action that dissuaded many officers from siding with the Chief of the General Staff. Finally, the 
CEDA had at last – by abandoning its tepid democratic commitment - harmonised tactics and 
purpose and aligned itself with the rest of the political right.  Up until the February elections, 
Gil Robles’ ultimate goal had been to dismantle the Republic from within, via the ballot box. 
The CEDA’s strategy was enthusiastically endorsed by the right-wing press which, by either 
hyperbolising or simply fabricating public disorder stories, presented Spain as a failed state and 
therefore created a propitious atmosphere for a rebellion.6 In other words, the February crisis 
crudely exposed, a full six months before the 18 July rising, the absence of a democratic right 
in Spain. Unlike its political adversaries, the Republic did not dwell on the crisis. So much so 
that General Franco’s open act of sedition went unpunished. 
 
The usual suspects 
After failing to sabotage the Popular Front government even before its inauguration, a group 
of high-ranking army officers met secretly in Madrid on 8 March 1936. Among those present 
were recurrent plotters Generals Goded and José Enrique Varela Iglesias and other military 
heavyweights such as Generals Franco and Emilio Mola Vidal and Colonel Valentín Galarza 
                                                          
5
 Goded, Manuel, Un “faccioso” cien por cien, page 27. For Goded’s ‘rebellion’ in Madrid see pages 15-
21 and 26-27. Regarding his reactionary past and his actions during General Sanjurjo’s failed coup of 10 
August 1932 (Sanjurjada): “en Sevilla funcionaban activamente a nuestro lado el Comandante Acedo 
[Colunga], el Teniente Coronel Delgado y otros varios decididamente nuestros” (page 18). On the night 
of 16-17 February 1936, Goded asked Portela to remain neutral in the event of a rebellion (page 26) and 
when power was handed to Azaña, the general became so desperate that he attempted to stage a one-
map coup with the support of the Falange (pages 26-27). For the ideological thinking of Felipe Acedo 
Colunga see Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, Contra el olvido, pages 79-92. In 1957, Colunga wrote a 
biography of Calvo Sotelo: Acedo Colunga, Felipe, José Calvo Sotelo. 
6
 For an example see ABC (Madrid), 17-20 February 1936. 
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Morante.7 They all agreed to set up a subversive network and overthrow the government 
should the present administration show signs of radicalisation or in the event of Francisco 
Largo Caballero, the ageing leader of the Socialist trade-union UGT8, ever becoming Prime-
Minister. The extremist faction within the military pressed for immediate action, but was 
momentarily overruled by a pragmatic majority. A few days later, most of those present at the 
meeting left Madrid to assume command of new military posts assigned by the Popular Front 
government. The recently-inaugurated administration was distrustful of the loyalty of many 
high-ranking officers. Subsequent events would prove it right.9  
 
Pro-Francoist historiography has since claimed, with much rhetoric but little substance, that 
the July rebellion had consisted of a pre-emptive strike to save Spain from an impending 
Communist coup.10 President Manuel Azaña described this “propaganda” as an “arma de 
                                                          
7
 Lieutenant-Colonel Galarza was a key figure in the conspiracy: “y todos los hilos de los enlaces y 
contraenlaces pasaban por las manos del teniente coronel de Estado Mayor don Valentín Galarza, 
residente en Madrid.” Aznar, Manuel, Historia militar de la guerra de España, page 85. Of similar 
importance were Lieutenant-Colonel Alberto Álvarez-Rementería and Major Bartolomé Barba 
Hernández (page 88).  
8
 Unión General de Trabajadores. 
9
 Rodríguez del Barrio was supposed to act as a liaison officer but fell seriously ill with cancer. 
Cabanellas, Guillermo, La guerra de los mil días, page 302; Preston, Paul, Franco, page 122; Preston, 
Paul, The coming of Spanish Civil War, pages 247-48; Payne, Stanley G., The collapse of the Spanish 
Republic, page 200.  
10
 Reports of an imminent Communist coup in Spain alarmed several foreign correspondents, such as 
Captain Francis McCullagh. McCullagh, Captain Francis, In Franco’s Spain. Being the experiences of an 
Irish war-correspondent during the Great Civil War which began in 1936. Another correspondent - 
Arthur Loveday - was deceived by a number of documents produced by the Nationalists, including a 
report on a planned Communist rebellion scheduled to erupt in Lora del Río. Loveday, Arthur, World 
War in Spain, pages XX, 179-83 and appendix II. Cecil Gerahty also presented a ‘document’ found in a 
flower-pot in Triana. Gerahty, Cecil, The road to Madrid, pages 214-18. For flower-pot story see page 
41. Also, the rebels doctored photographic evidence of Nationalist violence and presented it as 
Republican violence. Arrarás Iribarren, Joaquín, Historia de la Cruzada Española, vol 3, Tomo XI; Salas, 
Nicolás, Sevilla fue la clave. Salas’ manipulation of photographic evidence has been exposed by 
Espinosa Maestre. Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, La columna de la muerte, pages 434-37. On 29 August 
1936, General Franco released a decree tightening censorship for photographers working in the 
Nationalist zone (in reply to the release of photographic evidence of the massacre of Badajoz. That very 
same day Franco sent a telegram to General Queipo informing him that: “Algunos periodistas han 
obtenido fotografías de algún material de guerra y como este debe evitarse a toda costa ruego V.E. 
reitere debe tenerse muy presente la prohibición absoluta que ninguna persona ni periodistas 
nacionales ni extranjeros obtengan fotografías de cualquier clase de material de guerra para lo cual 
debe ejercerse constantemente muy activa vigilancia”. Archivo General Militar (Madrid), Zonal 
Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 6, Carpeta 2. Historian Herbert Southworth has dismantled several major 
Francoist myths, most notably the legend of the impending Communist coup. See Southworth, Herbert 
Rutledge, Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War. The revolutionary nature of Southworth’s work 
compelled the Franco regime to set-up in 1963 a special department (Sección de Estudios sobre la 
Guerra de España) to wage an intellectual war against Southworth (more specifically against his ground-
breaking work El mito de la cruzada de Franco) and recycle several Nationalist myths of the 
1930/1940s. See also: Preston, Paul, We saw Spain die, pages 413-28. 
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guerra equivalente a los gases tóxicos”.11 According to the rebel rationale, the hiatus between 
February-July had consisted of a probationary period during which the would-be rebels had 
magnanimously conceded an opportunity for the Popular Front to prove its political 
moderation. In reality, the plotters never willingly allowed the government to govern the 
country; rather, the 18 July coup represented the personal failures of both Franco and Gil 
Robles to dismantle the Republic from within. Indeed, on 17 February Major Eduardo Álvarez-
Rementería took so seriously the rumour of a mutiny organised by the anti-Republican UME12, 
that he waited until dawn at the Infantry barracks Granada nº6 (which he was assigned to take 
over) in Seville for the arrival of a general from Madrid who never made an appearance. It was 
the day after the electoral victory of the Popular Front. As far as the political right was 
concerned, the Republic had signed its death sentence on 16 February 1936.13 
 
The prominence of a Praetorian army 
In the midst of all the uncertainty surrounding the anti-Republican conspiracy, two factors 
became clear to the political right: a) that the coup would necessarily need to be extremely 
violent and b) that the army would have to assume the leading role in the entire affair. The 
different factions of the right were much quicker - and eager - to accept the need for violence 
than recognise the prominence of the army. 
 
The era of pronunciamientos, in which the military would simply ‘pronounce’ against a 
government, leading to its rapid and bloodless collapse, had come to a conclusion after the 
downfall of the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera of 1923-30.14 The enfranchisement of 
                                                          
11
 Azaña, Manuel, Causas de la guerra de España, page 22. 
12
 Unión Militar Española. The UME was a secret military society formed in 1933 by Falangist Lieutenant-
Colonel Emilio Rodríguez Tarduchy and Captain Bartolomé Barba Hernández. UME cells were 
established in military garrisons all over Spain. The UME functioned as a liaison organisation bringing 
together rebel officers of different political persuasions. For example: the aristocratic aviator Juan 
Antonio Ansaldo y Vejerano (also a monarchist and – paradoxically - a Falangist), who was trusted with 
flying General Sanjurjo from his exile in Estoril (Portugal) to Spain; was a member of the UME. Ansaldo 
was also part of the Africanista generation and obtained the Cruz Laureada de San Fernando in 1924 
(Spain’s highest military decoration for bravery). Preston, Paul, Franco, pages 151-52. 
13
 Guzmán de Alfarache, ¡18 de julio en Sevilla!, pages 34-35. Shortly before the 16 February elections, 
the UME sent a courier to Seville to inform the local subversive cell that a rebellion would break out 
should the Popular Front win the vote. Guzmán de Alfarache was the pseudonym used by Enrique Villa, 
journalist of the ultra-conservative El Correo de Andalucía (Seville). Villa also collaborated with FE 
(Seville). See also: Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, General Queipo de Llano, pages 
82-83. 
14
 For the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera see: Ben-Ami, Shlomo, Fascism from above: the dictatorship 
of Primo de Rivera in Spain, 1923-1930. 
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large segments of the population had created a vast reservoir of support towards the Republic, 
which would not stand idle in the event of an attempt to overthrow the government. 
Furthermore, the anti-Republican extreme-left, especially the aggressive Anarchist 
organisations CNT and FAI15, would never tolerate the imposition of a reactionary regime 
without a fight. 
 
The issue of military supremacy was a sensitive one. The right feared that if it assigned the 
leading role in the uprising to the army, the latter would inevitably have the ultimate say in the 
future political outlook of Spain or worse, usurp power for itself. On the other hand, only a 
section of the military was disloyal to the Republic, mostly concentrated around the officer 
caste that had experienced the savage colonial war of 1920-27 in Morocco. This group, known 
as the Africanistas, had forged a unique esprit de corps, detached from the remainder of the 
army, which revolved around abstract notions of extreme nationalism and messianic violence. 
The Africanistas believed themselves to be the maximum exponent of patriotism and were 
willing to oppose, preferably by violence, any perceived attack against the Patria. Its most 
prominent members were Generals Sanjurjo, Franco, Mola, Goded and Varela. The Africanista 
mind-set re-awoke the military’s longstanding Praetorian tradition of using its self-appointed 
right to veto any government.16 During a subversive meeting in February in Seville, Lieutenant-
Colonel Francisco Bohórquez Vecina (auditor de Guerra) exposed with brutal sincerity the 
Africanista’s political messianism:  
“y esta situación, señores, no puede liquidarla más que el Ejército, que tiene por misión la 
defensa exterior; pero también la interior, de la Patria, contra sus enemigos de todas clases; y 
el que se sienta dentro del Ejército con verdadero espíritu militar, no puede prestar 
acatamiento a esta gentuza, que, adueñada del mando, llevará de manera evidente a la nación 
a un estado desastroso y caótico.”17   
 
The CEDA and the Bloque Nacional  
                                                          
15
 Confederación Nacional de Trabajo. See Peirats Vall, José (edited by Ealham, Chris), The CNT in the 
Spanish Revolution. Federación Anarquista Ibérica. See Stuart, Christie, We, the anarchists!. 
16
 For the Africanistas and the colonial war in Morocco see: Balfour, Sebastian, Deadly Embrace: 
Morocco and the road to to the Spanish Civil War. 
17
 Guzmán de Alfarache, ¡18 de julio en Sevilla!, page 36. Following the meeting, Captain Carrillo was 
sent to Madrid, Zaragoza and Navarra to check on the development of the conspiracy in those 
provinces, page 37. 
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The first political groups to resign themselves to accepting the supremacy of the army were Gil 
Robles’ CEDA and José Calvo Sotelo’s Bloque Nacional, for two very different reasons: the 
mass-based CEDA had placed all its bets on an electoral victory and failed; whereas the Bloque 
Nacional still revolved around a small clique of wealthy aristocrats and viewed military 
intervention as the only route to monarchical restoration in Spain. It was a question of same 
purpose, different motivations. In the end, both men used parliament as a platform for 
incitement to sedition. 
 
The CEDA entered a profound existential crisis immediately after its electoral defeat.18 Gil 
Robles was fatally wounded politically. No longer able to defend the interests of its supporters 
by legal means, the CEDA leader took his party’s descent into oblivion with stoicism and 
accepted that the legal road to a corporative state was blocked. Defeat at the February 
elections had a double-negative effect for the CEDA leader: it discredited him in the eyes of his 
supporters, while at the same time the extreme-right could never forgive him for his failure to 
dismantle the Republic from within. Calvo Sotelo now became the new darling of right-wing 
politics and the vast social network of the monarchist élites both in Spain and abroad would 
prove useful for the plotters.19 
 
Still, Gil Robles’ role in politics was not yet exhausted. He contrived a final temporising tactic: 
to reveal that democratic coexistence was no longer possible in Spain. The CEDA leader used 
his parliamentary interventions to destabilise the Republic. The climax of this campaign was Gil 
Robles’ 16 June parliamentary address in which the CEDA leader read out a list of murders, 
church-burnings, strikes and various other public disorder cases and placed the blame entirely 
on the shoulders of the government.20 Prime-Minister Santiago Casares Quiroga was the first 
political figure to denounce Gil Robles’ speech and Calvo Sotelo’s repeated incitements to 
rebellion. He addressed parliament that same day, explaining his reasons for contravening 
protocol and anticipating his scheduled intervention: “el Sr. Calvo Sotelo ha pronunciado esta 
                                                          
18
 Tusell Gómez, Javier, Las elecciones del Frente Popular en España, vol. 1, pages 316-25. 
19
 Southworth, Herbert Rutledge,  ntifalange  estudio cr tico de  Falange en la guerra de  spa a, la 
unificaci n y  edilla  de a imiano  arc a  enero, page 101. Alfonsine monarchists lacked a mass 
party and were military irrelevant, but central in foreign relations. They also financially supported the 
rebels (for instance, they financed both Sanjurjo and Franco’s flights to mainland Spain). Franco and 
Mola’s emissaries to Fascist Italy were all, with the exception of Luis Zunzunegui, Alfonsine monarchists. 
They were: Luis Bolín and Luca de Tena (Franco); Goichoechea, Sáinz Rodríguez and Luis Zunzunegui 
(Mola). Escobar, José Ignacio, Así empezó, pages 55-146. Escobar later stated that General Queipo’s 
‘miracle’ in Seville inspired him during his meeting with the German ambassador in Paris (page 70). 
20
 Preston, Paul, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War, pages 255-57. 
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tarde, aquí, palabras tan graves.”21 Casares Quiroga made Calvo Sotelo accountable for any 
future political turmoil in Spain. He concluded his speech by speaking directly to the Bloque 
Nacional leader:  
“No basta por lo visto que determinadas personas, que yo no sé si son amigas de S.S., pero 
tengo ya derecho a empezar a suponerlo, vayan a procurar levantar el espíritu de aquellos que 
puede creerse que serían fáciles a la sublevación, recibiendo a veces por contestación el 
empellón que los arroja por la escalera; no basta que algunas personas amigas de S.S. vayan 
haciendo folletos, formulando inducciones, realizando una propaganda para conseguir que el 
Ejército, que está al servicio de España y de la República, pese a todos vosotros y a todos 
vuestros manejos, se subleve (Aplausos); no basta que después de habernos gustar las 
‘dulzuras’ de la Dictadura de los siete años, S.S. pretenda ahora apoyarse de nuevo en un 
Ejército, cuyo el espíritu y ano es el mismo, para volvernos a hacer pasar por las mismas 
amarguras.”22  
 
As for Gil Robles’ inflammatory speech, the Prime-Minister was equally clear. He saw the CEDA 
leader’s infamous list as part of a wider campaign aimed at presenting Spain as a failed state. 
As far as the moderate left was concerned, Gil Robles and Calvo Sotelo formed a pincer 
movement against the Republic.23 Indeed, as early as May, Gil Robles had told Associated Press 
reporter Edward Knoblaugh that “something big” was about to happen in Spain.24 
 
As the time for the coup drew nearer, the CEDA grew bolder in its collaboration with the 
rebels. Gil Robles donated party funds to General Mola and ordered CEDA members 
unconditionally to throw in their lot with the military. He even paid a visit to Manuel Fal Conde 
in Navarre to try to persuade the Carlist leader into adopting a more conciliatory approach in 
his negotiations with General Mola. Later, during his exile in Lisbon, the CEDA leader organised 
the purchase of arms and provided financial assistance to the insurgents.25  
                                                          
21
 Casares Quiroga, Santiago (edited by Grandío Seoane, Emilio), Discursos politicos (1931-1936), page 
268. 
22
 Ibid, page 269. 
23
 Ibid, page 271. 
24
 When Knoblaugh asked Gil Robles whether he should go on vacation or stay in Spain, Gil Robles 
advised him to postpone his holidays. Knoblaugh deduced that the rebellion would break out sometime 
around mid-August. Knoblaugh, Edward, Correspondent in Spain, pages 2 and 20-23.  
25
 Gil Robles, José María, No fué posible la paz, pages 728-33 and 801-2 (Gil Robles later tried to present 
himself as a moderate, pages 500-07); Franco Salgado-Araujo, Francisco, Mi vida junto a Franco, pages 




Falange Espãnola de las J.O.N.S. 
The more militant factions of the political right, the Falange Española de las J.O.N.S.26 - Spain’s 
version of a fascist party - and the neo-medievalist Comunión Tradicionalista (also known as 
the Carlist Party or Traditionalist Party), were in no better position to direct a rebellion. The 
Falange had benefitted immensely from the collapse of the CEDA’s temporising tactics and 
experienced an explosion in membership to the point that its leadership lost control over the 
lower echelons of the party, now structurally unrecognisable. Nonetheless, the Falange still 
remained numerically irrelevant. It had collected a mere 0.7% of the vote at the February 
elections (Primo de Rivera gathered 942 and Sancho Dávila 857 ballots in Seville).27 As a 
terrorist organisation, however, the Falange reigned supreme. As far as the paramilitary group 
was concerned, politics had never been a question of votes: it considered parliamentarism a 
symptom of the wider social degeneracy of Spain. The electoral defeat of the right only served 
to confirm this theory. Even before the implantation of the Republic, the aristocratic lawyer 
and party founder and leader José Antonio Primo de Rivera y Sáenz de Heredia (the son of the 
late dictator Miguel Primo de Rivera), had emitted his final verdict on democracy:  
“Pero si la democracia como forma ha fracasado, es más que nada porque no nos ha sabido 
proporcionar una vida verdaderamente democrática en su contenido. No caigamos en las 
exageraciones extremas, que traducen su odio por la superstición sufragista, en desprecio 
hacia todo lo democrático. La aspiración a una vida democrática libre y apacible será siempre 
el punto de mira de la ciencia política por encima de toda moda.”28  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Civil War, pages 265-66. Arrarás confirmed that Gil Robles handed 500,000 to Mola for “gastos de la 
conspiración.” Arrarás, Joaquín, Historia de la Segunda Republica Española vol. 2, page 317.  
26
 Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista. 
27
For the electoral results of the Falange in Seville see: Parejo Fernández, José Antonio, Señoritos, 
jornaleros y falangistas, page 85. For electoral results in Spain see Payne, Stanley G., Fascism in Spain 
1923-1977, page 183. In La Falange en la Sierra Norte de Sevilla (1934-1956), Parejo Fernández 
concluded that the majority of new party members following the outbreak of the civil war joined the 
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A decapitated structure 
On 14 March 1936, José Antonio was arrested for the illegal possession of firearms. It was the 
most serious of an endless list of indictments against the leader of the Falange, including one 
for defamation against the Director-General de Seguridad, Alonso Mallol, whom he accused of 
being a cuckold - possessing “cuernos”.29 Upon hearing his sentence, José Antonio threw a 
tantrum. He insulted the judge, ripped his toga and threw a few punches and an inkpot at a 
court-official’s head. His fame as a seducer preceded the good-looking Jefe: during the 
courtroom fracas, Primo de Rivera was joined by his supporters and from a total of 9 arrested, 
8 were females.30 Primo de Rivera’s incarceration was a terrible blow for his organisation, 
heavily-centred on the party leader and his family. The Jefe’s cousin, the equally aristocratic 
Sancho Dávila Fernández de Celis, extended the Falange to Seville on 13 February 1934. The 
local organisation was embroiled in controversy as early as 14 April, during the celebrations of 
the 3rd anniversary of the Republic. In the middle of the military parade, Falangists greeted the 
Civil Guard by performing the fascist salute and shouting anti-Republican slogans. The 
provocation did not pass unnoticed. Enraged Republican sympathisers reacted, triggering a riot 
in which a crowd attempted to assault the Falange’s headquarters while an excited Dávila, gun 
in hand, told a police officer that his men would disperse the protesters within five minutes. 
The police detained over a hundred people and closed the offices of the newly-founded 
party.31 In July of that same year, the local Falange was again involved in a violent incident 
after an exalted group of party members met with the civil governor of Seville to demand the 
re-opening of their organisation’s headquarters. According to Dávila, “El gobernador que se 
sintió cogido perdió la serenidad y gritó: Esto es una chulería que no estoy dispuesto a tolerar. 
A lo que yo hube de responder: Aquí el único chulo es Vd., que se esconde tras el cargo de 
gobernador civil para insultarnos. Y como el poncio pálido y ya del todo desconcertado 
volviese a gritar y no llamase verduleras, Martín Ruiz adelantó unos pasos y el pobre 
gobernador derribando en su huída una carpeta llena de papeles se refugió detrás de la 
robusta mesa y de una timbrada llenó el despacho de guardias de Seguridad.”32  
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Just over a year later (August-September 1935), the distressed mother of Sancho Dávila, the 
Countess of Villafuente Bermeja, contacted José Antonio to demand her son’s transfer to 
Madrid on the grounds of a possible attempt on his life. Dávila, who was unaware of his 
mother’s request, was moved to the capital following the disastrous performance of the 
Sevillian Falange at the February elections and was not involved in the conspiracy against the 
Republic. Joaquín Miranda was eventually appointed Jefe Territorial for Andalucía as a 
replacement for Dávila, who in turn was promoted to the Junta Central. However, Miranda 
spent most of his time in and out of jail. Hence, the main problem affecting the Falange – a 
decapitated structure - was replicated at a regional level.33 Furthermore, the party only 
enjoyed residual support in the south of Spain. On the eve of the rebellion, the Falange 
possessed around 9,000 affiliates in Andalucía (1,200 in Seville).34 Starved of popular support, 
Spain’s version of a fascist party imposed itself in the political scene by means of violence. 
 
The dialectics of violence 
Following his trial and imprisonment, José Antonio Primo de Rivera was left with no other 
option but to direct his party from his cell, first in Madrid and from 5 June in Alicante 
penitentiary.  Under such circumstances, it was impossible for the party to emancipate itself 
from its military overlords. For instance, the Sevillian branch of the Falange’s Military 
Committee (headed by Major Álvarez-Rementería) dominated the civilian structure and acted 
independently from official party policy.35  
 
The devastating political consequences of Primo de Rivera’s incarceration were palliated by lax 
prison security, to the extent that weapons were smuggled inside his cell and the Jefe 
managed to communicate with the outside world with ease. It was precisely during his sojourn 
in prison that Primo de Rivera released his famous Carta a los militares Españoles of 4 May 
1936. This letter, an explicit incitement to rebellion, reaffirmed Falangist propaganda myths 
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and exposed the party’s elitist roots: it denounced both the external danger posed by the 
Soviet Union and the internal threat of Basque and Catalan regionalisms. Primo de Rivera also 
established a bizarre parallel between free love and the collective prostitution of working-class 
females. Shortly afterwards (19 May), the Jefe sent Rafael Garcerán Sánchez to establish 
contact with General Mola.36 A month later (24 June Circular), José Antonio desperately 
attempted to enforce party discipline and avoid its complete subordination to the military. He 
threatened with expulsion all party members that participated in the conspiracy without prior 
approval from the central command structure. Only provincial leaders were allowed to 
negotiate with regional military commanders (29 June Circular). In addition, the Jefe ordered 
that no more than one-third of Primera Línea militants be put at the disposal of the rebel 
army. The remainder of the Falange would act autonomously and still only under the condition 
that regional military commanders would not hand power back to a civilian government for at 
least three days following the outbreak of the rebellion. This order was set to expire on 10 
July.37 Unsurprisingly, the rebel leadership was not distressed by the successive circulars 
released by Primo de Rivera. General Mola calmly informed another of José Antonio’s envoys, 
Manuel Hedilla Larrey, that he accepted the conditions presented by the Jefe.38 
 
José Antonio Primo de Rivera briefly entertained the idea of a joint uprising with the 
Traditionalists, but this venture came to nothing. The wishful thinking of José Antonio 
possessed very realistic foundations: the fear that the army would use the Falange as a shock 
unit without taking into consideration any of its political aspirations. However, there was little 
Primo de Rivera could do to extract further concessions from the military rebels. The 
minuscule numerical strength of the Falange was aggravated by the growing difficulty of its 
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leader in controlling his own subordinates.39 Events in Seville exposed the subaltern role of the 
Falange vis-à-vis the army:  
“El Comité de Sevilla mantuvo en todo momento el criterio de que el movimiento habría de 
ser, para su mayor éxito, exclusivamente militar, contando con el apoyo de Falange, para 
evitar precisamente que los oficiales que no figurasen en esta organización se consideraran 
apartados del mismo, con evidente peligro de ir a un fracaso.”40  
 
In the end, Primo de Rivera became a victim to his own schizophrenic discourse: on the one 
hand the Falange presented itself as an apolitical, proletarian-oriented movement; while on 
the other, it was dominated by the cream of Spanish society and was immersed in a vicious 
underground war against the leftist trade-unions (what Dávila termed “maniobras 
punitivas”).41 Whether by frequently engaging in fistfights, calling for direct action or even 
throwing inkpots at court-officials, the Jefe led by example. But for José Antonio’s politics had 
never been a question of numbers, but of violence; what he termed during the Falange’s first 
public meeting at the La Comedia theatre on 29 October 1933: “the dialectics of fists and 
pistols.”42 The comedy was over and the Jefe was now losing control over his own rank-and-
file, especially among those enrolled in the Falange’s frontline organisation, the ominously-
named Falange de la Sangre; always eager to draw first blood. 
 
The Comunión Tradicionalista 
The Comunión Tradicionalista was infinitely more resourceful than his extremist rival, the 
Falange. For a start, it possessed its own militia - the Requeté – which dated back to the first 
Carlist War of 1833-40. The Requeté was a potent paramilitary organisation that had been 
expertly restructured by the hyperactive Andalusian General Varela, who had travelled 
incognito around Navarre disguised as a Catholic priest. Varela wrote the Ordenanza del 
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Requeté (1934), which reorganised the Carlist army into a modern fighting force divided in 
Tercios (battalions). Furthermore, in March 1934 a joint Carlist/Monarchist delegation signed a 
pact with Mussolini in which the Fascist leader pledged to provide financial and material 
assistance to both organisations. As a result, Requeté officers began receiving military training 
in Italy.43 When the rebellion erupted, a report filed in Seville’s Military Archive described the 
Requeté as a paramilitary organisation “sometida a una disciplina férrea y voluntaria”, used as 
“fuerzas de choque” and “poseídas del mayor entusiasmo y patriotismo […] voluntarios que se 
baten por un ideal.”44  
 
The Comunión Tradicionalista possessed a robust organisational structure centred on a 
charismatic leader, would-be priest turned lawyer Manuel Fal Conde. Fal Conde’s decision to 
abandon ecclesiastic studies and embrace politics (the May 1931 church burnings in Seville 
made a deep impression on him) could have only been regarded as divine by the deeply-
religious Carlist rank-and-file, elated by the sudden resurgence of the movement.45 The 
Traditionalist credo was founded on a theocratic conception of politics and encapsulated in the 
party’s motto: Dios, Patria, Fueros y Ley. Moreover, the Comunión Tradicionalista advocated a 
rival claim to the Spanish throne and abhorred the values of the Enlightenment, which it had 
combated repeatedly on the battlefield throughout the XIX-Century. Thrice it challenged the 
Spanish state (1833-40, 1846-49 and 1872-76) and thrice it was defeated. By 1931 Carlism, 
plagued by internal feuds, was a movement on the verge of extinction. It was an historic relic, 
deeply embedded in the cultural fabric of one particular province of Spain: Navarre. The 
advent of the II Republic, its anticlerical legislation and the tireless labour of Fal Conde 
achieved nothing short of a miracle. Nonetheless, ideological inconsistencies persisted; in 
particular, the question of dynastic succession and how to put into practice a theocratic regime 
in Spain. But this was a minor concern for the Traditionalist rank-and-file, impatient to fight a 
modern-day crusade.46 
 
A fanatical minority 
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Manuel Fal Conde reorganised the Carlist party in such spectacular fashion that he even 
managed to lead it into virgin territory: Andalucía. This process culminated on 15 April 1934 
with a military parade in Quintillo, on the outskirts of Seville. Shortly afterwards, Fal Conde 
was appointed Secretary-General of the Comunión Tradicionalista. Fal Conde’s ‘miracle’ must 
nevertheless be put in perspective. In February 1936, Traditionalist membership in Andalucía 
stood at an unimpressive 1,210, disproportionately concentrated on the more affluent strata 
of society.47 Fal Conde’s rise to his party’s leadership was meteoric; however, Carlism 
remained an influential political force only in Navarre, Álava and parts of the Basque Country. 
Still, the Secretary-General managed to conjure yet another miracle. With membership outside 
Navarre centred on the economic élites, Fal Conde turned disadvantage into strength by 
mustering strong financial support to back his party’s initiatives, including plans for a fourth 
armed uprising.48 The Traditionalist leader was not one to shy away from a challenge and 
throughout the spring of 1936 Major Luis Redondo could be found in the sierras of Huelva 
making arrangements for (yet) another Carlist rebellion. Fal Conde’s plan was to rebel 
simultaneously in Navarre, the Sierra de Gata (Cáceres) and another unspecified location near 
the Portuguese border. This venture enjoyed the backing of several high-ranking military 
officers, including Generals Sanjurjo and Varela.49 However, it proved to be a bridge too far for 
the Comunión Tradicionalista. In the end, the Traditionalists were left with no option but to 
recognise their own limitations and negotiate with the military rebels. A paradox prevailed: 
that of a numerically weak party outside Navarre, but nevertheless boasting a fanatical and 
extremely professional militia that could prove decisive in the event of a coup. Fal Conde 
would prove to be every bit as inflexible as the ideology of the party whose interests he 
passionately sought to defend. This led to protracted negotiations between the military and 
the Traditionalist leaderships that pushed General Mola to the brink of despair, even 
contemplating suicide.50 
 
                                                          
47
 Ortiz Villalba, Juan, Del golpe militar a la guerra civil: Sevilla 1936, page 72. 
48
 Fal Conde was clearly aware of the need for propaganda. In Seville, the Traditionalists controlled 
newspaper La Unión (another periodical - El Correo de Andalucía - was also ideologically close to the 
Carlist party). The Comunión Tradicionalista was dominated by the local oligarchy: in 1934 Seville, only 
2,1% of party members were “obreros”. In 1937 Cádiz, the proportion was even lower: 1%. Álvarez Rey, 
Leandro, “El Carlismo en Andalucia durante la IIª Republica (1931-1936)” in Braojos Garrido, Alfonso; 
Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, Sevilla, 36: Sublevación fascista y repression. 
49
 La Unión (Seville), 18 July 1937; García Venero, Maximiano,  a Falange en la guerra de  spa a  la 
unificaci n y  edilla, page 123. 
50
 García Venero, Maximiano,  a Falange en la guerra de  spa a  la unificaci n y  edilla, page 130; Del 
Burgo, Jaime, Conspiración y guerra civil, pages 532-35 and 538-39; Maíz, B. Félix, Alzamiento en 
España: de un diario de la conspiración, page 150. 
20 
 
General Emilio Mola Vidal 
On 14 March, General Mola assumed command over both the Gobierno Militar (Military 
Government) and the 12th Infantry Brigade in the most reactionary provincial capital in Spain: 
Pamplona (Navarre).51 He also became the Director of the conspiracy. Mola was an introvert, 
enigmatic character who adopted a structured approach to work with obsessive attention to 
detail.  Félix Maíz, who worked as the Director’s chauffeur during the conspiracy, described 
him as: “un hombre muy alto, muy serio”, a man of few words “que le agradaban las 
contestaciones cortas y claras” and who interrupted Maíz whenever a conversation deviated 
minimally from the point. Maíz added that “El General Mola es minucioso en detalles cuando 
le es interesante la seguridad que trata de obtener por medio de ellos.[…] Da pocas 
explicaciones, pero es verdad que tampoco pide muchas.” In conclusion, and despite spending 
weeks in Mola’s company, Maíz knew very little about the general’s private life: “Es difícil 
penetrar en la vida, siempre reservada, del General Mola y llegar a un sondeo que descubra 
con claridad sus intenciones a toda persona que no cultive de cerca la confianza con que 
puede ser correspondido.”52 Mola’s neurotic approach to work bore fruit. He planted a spy 
inside the Dirección-General de Seguridad that kept him informed of any governmental action 
against the conspiracy. On 3 June, the Dirección-General de Seguridad raided Pamplona but 
found no evidence linking Mola with an alleged plot against the regime. Worse, the Republic 
ignored the extent of the conspiracy or even who was El Director.53 
 
The date of Mola’s nomination as leader of the conspiracy remains a mystery, partly because 
of subsequent efforts on the part of pro-Francoist historiography directed at minimising the 
figure of the Director in order to inflate the importance of Franco. Falangist militant and 
historian Maximiano García Venero suggested that Mola had been placed in charge of the 
rebellion as early as March. He added that the Director used the UME to help him establish a 
subversive network and used Lieutenant-Colonel Alberto Álvarez-Rementería of the Engineer 
Corps (brother of Major Eduardo Álvarez-Rementería) as his collaborator in Madrid.54 On the 
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other hand, Socialist leader Indalecio Prieto put forward the date of 29 May.55 However, Mola 
signed his first Secret Instruction as Director in April and it is almost certain that he assumed 
command of the conspiracy sometime between March and April. As for General Franco, the 
recently-appointed military commander of the Canary Islands did not join the conspiracy until 
the very last minute. Franco’s dilatory tactics enraged the rebels, who bestowed on him the 
nickname “Miss Canary Islands 1936”.56 
 
The extremist element within the military 
Ironically, the single greatest challenge to Mola’s authority originated from within the army. 
Impatient monarchists, with little preparation but much vitriol, made arrangements for a rising 
planned for the spring/summer of 1936, the amateurish nature of which could not - and did 
not - pass unnoticed. When news of the plot reached the cabinet in April, Generals Varela and 
Luis Orgaz Yoldi were incarcerated in San Fernando (Cádiz) and the Canary Islands respectively. 
They were both inveterate conspirators, as were Generals Villegas, Goded and Fanjul.57 The 
primary targets of this and other puerile ventures directed at overthrowing the Republic were 
the garrisons of Madrid and Valencia; whereas Mola astutely focused his attention on the 
more reactionary garrisons of the north.58 The arrests of uncontrollable generals came as a 
blessing in disguise to Mola, since it eliminated the possibility of a premature rebellion along 
the lines of the Sanjurjada of 10 August 1932, named after its leader, General José Sanjurjo 
Sacanell. Sanjurjo was king for a day before the government managed to suffocate his coup a 
day after it erupted in Seville. The rising was so badly prepared that it turned into a farce. For 
instance, General Goded, a key figure of the Sanjurjada in Madrid, was found taking a nap as 
events unfolded in the capital.59  In deep contrast, General Mola was of a different 
temperament altogether from the bon vivant Sanjurjo who, according to reporter Henry 
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Buckley, was “a hard-drinking, woman-loving officer with bravery and few brains” that 
embarked on “an improvised rising decided over a few dinner tables.”60  
 
Africanismo and Africanistas 
The Spanish army was an antiquated and inefficient fighting force that was crushed by the US 
military in the brief yet traumatic Spanish-American War of 1898, in which Spain lost the 
remnants of her colonial empire: Cuba, Puerto Rico, Philippines and Guam. Extremist elements 
within the army proposed to correct this humiliation by recreating a new empire, starting in 
Morocco, while at the same time crushing internal dissent.61 The military had therefore aligned 
themselves with the political right, which claimed that the dilapidation of the Spanish Empire 
was an external manifestation of the country’s interior degeneracy and identified the left as 
the ‘traitor’ within. This was a convenient excuse that exonerated the army from any 
responsibility in the 1898 debacle. For the proponents of this view, the political left had, via its 
importing of degenerate, un-Spanish foreign ideologies (namely Democracy and Socialism); 
brought about the decadence of the Patria. Hence, the true essence of Spain was to be found 
in a return to its medieval past. A vicious cycle ensued: the military became increasingly 
detached from civil society and developed a siege mentality. Mental seclusion was 
complemented by physical segregation when a generation of newly-graduated officers went to 
Morocco in search for action, rapid promotion and redemption from the 1898 defeat. They 
were the Africanistas. 
 
General Mola, like Sanjurjo, was part of the officer caste that served in Morocco. He might 
have been less effusive in displaying his aversion to the Republic than the extrovert Sanjurjo, 
but was equally determined to exterminate it. In his first meeting with Félix Maíz, Mola could 
not have been more direct: “Vamos contra un enemigo que no es español y que ya está 
incrustado en la mayor parte de los organismos vitales de nuestra Patria.”62 Mola’s Manichean 
conception of society – going to the extreme of regarding Republicans as foreigners (“no es 
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español”) - was shocking, but unsurprising if taking into account that the Director was an 
Africanista. 
 
The Moroccan war had an enormous impact on General Mola. It was a key formative period in 
his life, central in shaping both the man and the general. When José Ignacio Escobar, Marqués 
de Valdeiglesias and director of right-wing newspaper La Época, met Mola in 1936, he noted 
that the Director “Nos habló […] de su actuación en África y de la suma de pequeños detalles 
de los que podía depender el éxito o el fracaso de una operación.”63 While reminiscing on his 
time in Africa, Mola’s discourse often descended into an unintelligible monologue, which 
Escobar labelled as “esotérico.”64 However, what Escobar dismissed as “esotérico”, the 
Africanistas viewed as paramount: abstract conceptions of Patria and moral superiority, 
replacing rationality with emotion; all congealed in a vision of the army as fulfilling a messianic 
duty of saving Spain from imaginary internal enemies and eventually restoring the Patria to its 
long-lost medieval splendour.65 
 
Nostalgia for the Moroccan war and difficulty in readapting to a nonviolent reality not only 
aggravated the collective trauma of a generation of army officers, but also allowed the 
importing of the Africanista mind-set to mainland Spain. The Africanistas regarded society as 
its own enemy and cherished their own role as a Praetorian force. At the same time, 
corporatism bred a macrocephalic officer corps at the same time as endogamy ensured that 
the military became the single most destabilising force in Spain. When Franco first arrived in 
Morocco in the 1910s, the army’s 80,000 soldiers were commanded by 24,000 officers of 
whom 471 were generals.66  
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Since it regarded itself as the embodiment of Spanish values, any perceived attack against the 
army would be regarded as direct assault on Spain; a useful pretext for protecting corporate 
privileges. Hence, when the Republic tried to tackle one of Spain’s structural problems - the 
military – it created a lifelong enemy. The new regime re-opened a taboo subject: the 
‘responsibilities’ issue in Africa, pertaining to the disastrous military policy pursued in Morocco 
in the early 1920s. This was complemented by a decree reviewing promotions during the 
Moroccan conflict (3 June 1931). At the same time, the Republic arrested a number of officers 
for their role in the repression of the failed Republican coup of December 1930. Among those 
detained was General Mola (arrested on 21 April 1931). The Africanistas were mortified. 
Military reform was a sensitive topic and the issue of responsibilities over the Rif campaign had 
already brought about a military dictatorship in Spain: just as the Picasso report concerning the 
Moroccan war was about to be dissected in parliament, General Miguel Primo de Rivera seized 
power in a bloodless coup on 13 September 1923.67  
 
General Franco was, alongside Sanjurjo and Millán-Astray, the most celebrated officer of the 
Africanista generation.68 In 1934, Franco declared that the Asturias campaign – waged in the 
only Spanish region to resist the Moorish invasions of the VIII-Century – was a “frontier war” 
and denounced Socialism as the enemy within.69 The traumatised Africanistas tended to 
establish parallels between their own experience in Morocco and events in Spain. In December 
1931, a general strike in the impoverished village of Castilblanco (Badajoz) resulted in the 
shooting of a demonstrator and the brutal lynching of four civil guards. The Director-General of 
the Civil Guard, General Sanjurjo, upset that the incident had made him miss a big society 
banquet in Zaragoza, compared the locals to the Moroccan rebels of the 1920s: “Yo no sabía 
que quedaban en España pueblos salvajes.”70 Later, at the funeral of the murdered civil guards, 
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he also declared that “la Guardia Civil está siempre al lado del gobierno de la República.” 71 A 
few months later, Sanjurjo attempted to overthrow the government.  
 
Crossing the Rubicon: Asturias 1934 
The reasons for the deployment of the Army of Africa in Asturias were not based on abstract 
or even ‘esoteric’ notions of Patria. The colonial troops were the only truly professional 
fighting force in the Spanish military, mainly formed by badly-trained conscripts led by poorly-
paid officers. However, the Army of Africa – composed by the Foreign Legion and the 
Moroccan Regulares - was not a just an élite military force. In fact, it was anything but 
standard. Luis Bolín, Franco’s chief of press during the civil war and an avid admirer of the 
Legion, described its soldiers as:  
“misfits, gaol-birds, old soldiers […] They were a noisy rabble, panting for adventure, and they 
landed in Morocco with the force of a hurricane, scattering everything before them. Some 
were idealists, eager to fight for a worthy cause, some wished to atone for past misdeeds, 
others were hungry. A few had been crossed in love.”72  
 
The Army of Africa first crossed the Spanish Rubicon – the straits of Gibraltar - in October 
1934, when it was employed by the Radical-CEDA coalition government to crush the Asturias 
rising. Predictably, the affair resulted in a bloodbath. General Franco, informally placed in 
command by Minister of War Diego Hidalgo (Radical Party), swiftly removed ‘problematic’ 
officers from positions of authority. One of them, Lieutenant-Colonel López-Bravo, was 
deemed untrustworthy because he expressed hesitation at firing at civilians. President Alcalá-
Zamora and his acolyte, General Queipo de Llano, opposed this modus operandi.73 Regardless, 
López-Bravo was replaced by a protégé of Franco, Africanista Colonel Juan Yagüe Blanco. 
Yagüe’s actions during the 1934 rising earned him the nickname the ‘Hyena of the Asturias’. 
For the duration of the military campaign, the Army of Africa shelled residential districts and 
indulged in looting, torture, rape and murder. These were not novel tactics; they had already 
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been employed in Morocco for the best part of the 1920s (the leader of the Asturian 
mineworkers spoke of the “odio africano” of the colonial army).74  
 
Elated by their recent success in drowning the Asturias revolution in blood, a group of army 
officers entertained the idea of following it up with a coup d’état. Gil Robles consulted 
Generals Franco, Fanjul, Varela and Goded; however, all were intimidated by the real prospect 
of nationwide working-class unrest and Civil and Assault Guard resistance.75 
 
One of the central tragedies of 1930s Spain was the importation of the Africanista mentality to 
mainland Spain; in other words, the concept of a civilising mission, of educating ‘primitive’ 
cultures by military means. Indeed, during one of his very first statements following the 
outbreak of the rebellion, General Mola declared that the rebellion “hemos de iniciarla 
exclusivamente los militares: nos corresponde por derecho propio, porque ese es el anhelo 
nacional, porque tenemos un concepto exacto de nuestro poder.”76 By 1936, the ‘barbarians’ 
had metamorphosed from Moroccan natives to Spanish workers; in the same way as military 
priorities shifted away from the remaking of the Spanish Empire to the interior colonisation of 
the motherland.77  
 
General Queipo de Llano 
 General Mola’s appointment to Navarre was part of a wider policy of reshuffling military posts 
in the hope of placing loyalist officers in positions of power and posting suspect ones where it 
was hoped they could do little damage. As a complementary measure, the government 
established close surveillance on those officers it deemed politically dangerous. As a result, 
planning the rebellion turned into a hazardous and protracted affair, full of unexpected twists 
and turns. But not even the meticulous Mola could have foreseen the outcome of his 
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unwanted meeting in Pamplona in the Comandancia de Carabineros, with the flamboyant 
Inspector-General of Border Guards (Carabineros), General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano.  
 
After much pressure and calling in of favours, and thanks to a reference from the Barcelona 
branch of UME, General Queipo managed to schedule a meeting with Mola for April.78 To 
Mola’s astonishment, Queipo, a known Republican who had conspired incessantly against King 
Alfonso XIII, now offered his services to the Director. Mola remained impenetrable, possibly 
fearing a trap. According to Maíz: “En estos últimos días, la relación entre el General Mola con 
el General Queipo de Llano no dejaba ver claridad en cuanto a confianza. Y no creo que la 
desconfianza naciese por parte del General Queipo.”79 In his usual forceful manner, Queipo 
attempted to extract information from the Director, but it was not until their second meeting 
that Mola first disclosed his plans; a sensible option, given Queipo’s track-record of ever-
shifting loyalties. Furthermore, relations between both men were strained ever since Mola 
occupied the post of Director-General de Seguridad during the Monarchy of Alfonso XIII and 
Queipo presided over a Military Committee entrusted with organising a Republican coup that 
resulted in a monumental fiasco (the 1930 Cuatro Vientos affair in Madrid).80 This was but one 
of many feuds that General Queipo de Llano maintained with fellow high-ranking officers.  
 
When both generals met for the second time (1-2 June), Mola had already given much thought 
to the sincerity of Queipo’s proposal to join the conspiracy (Colonel Francisco García Escámez 
was also present at the meeting). The Director proposed to Queipo de Llano that he lead the 
coup in Seville. This conflicts with General Queipo’s personal testimony, in which he presented 
Mola as an insecure and defeatist leader, only willing to pursue the conspiracy should the 
Carabineros leader obtain the adhesion of Republican General Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer 
(leader of the V Division, based in Zaragoza). In addition, General Queipo also claimed that he 
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had travelled around 25,000 km during the spring/summer of 1936 after being ordered by 
General Fanjul to liaise with the subversive network in Andalucía.81  In reality, Fanjul and Mola 
did not select Queipo because of his endurance to long journeys, but rather because of his 
military position as Inspector-General of Border Guards, which allowed him to travel 
unsuspected around Spain. Furthermore, Queipo’s vast network of contacts (he befriended 
many loyalist officers during his Republican days), represented a new window of opportunity 
for the conspirators’ proselytising efforts at targeting high-ranking officers.82 Mola had in mind 
not only Cabanellas, but also General Villa-Abrille (leader of the II Division, based in Seville). 
However, Queipo’s incorporation into the conspiracy was problematic, not least because of his 
political notoriety. Indeed, when the Carabineros leader visited Cádiz, he received a cold 
greeting from General Varela. General López-Pinto was more agreeable. He had recently 
arrived in Cádiz after being transferred away from Cartagena due of his conflictive relationship 
with the local Popular Front administration and his commitment to the rebellion was beyond 
doubt. However, Queipo’s visit was of little consequence: López-Pinto had already pledged his 
allegiance to the conspiracy to Major Cuesta and Captain Escribano. General Queipo also 
visited Córdoba, where the local Military Commander (Comandante Militar de la Plaza), 
Colonel Ciriaco Cascajo, enthusiastically embraced the insurrectionary cause. In Málaga, both 
Generals Patxot and Llanos agreed to take up arms against the regime but feared the loyalist 
inclinations of the local garrison. In Seville, all military leaders, with the exception of Colonel 
Santos Rodríguez Cerezo of the Artillery Corps, refused to meet with the Inspector-General of 
Border Guards. Lastly, and to Queipo’s chagrin, the leader of the II Division, General Villa-
Abrille, declined his offer to join the conspiracy.83 
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Mola vs. Queipo 
On 23 June, Queipo de Llano met Mola to report on his tour of south-western Spain. An 
impatient Queipo complained about the lack of preparation of the Andalucían conspiratorial 
cells. His uncharacteristic pessimism was explicable: the emotional general yearned to lead the 
coup in his native province of Valladolid, a reactionary stronghold.84 It was at this point that 
Mola insisted on Queipo leading the uprising in Seville, an act for which the latter would never 
forgive the former. However, on 23 June Queipo did not argue with Mola; rather, he simply 
replied: “Está bien. No lo discuto. A Sevilla.”85 
 
According to Queipo’s official biographer José Cuesta Monereo, General Mola initially 
acquiesced in the Carabineros leader’s wish to lead the rebellion in Valladolid in early June 
only to change his mind later that month.86 General Queipo not only claimed that he had been 
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initially posted to Valladolid, but also provided a profoundly-narcissistic account of the entire 
affair: “Galarza me contestó con los que Dios me diese a entender; pero que el comité juzgaba 
que el único general capaz de sublevar a Andalucía y ponerla a nuestro favor era yo.”87  
General Queipo de Llano just came short of openly accusing the Director of plotting his death 
by posting him to Seville, when in reality Mola had rescued Queipo from the political 
wilderness. In truth, Queipo de Llano rewrote History for three reasons: a) cement the myth of 
the taking of Seville88, b) claim a central role in the conspiracy, and lastly, c) settle old scores 
with General Mola.  
 
What Queipo ‘forgot’ to mention in his memoirs was that his reputation was at such a low 
point in early 1936 that he had become the object of ridicule among his fellow officers. His 
extravagant behaviour did little to improve his standing. Immediately after earning Mola’s 
trust, the Carabineros leader decided to embark on a proselytising tour of northern Spain that 
astonished his colleagues. Queipo not only decided to embark on this venture on his own 
initiative (without even consulting Mola), but he also did it in his usually exuberant style, which 
did not bode well for a plot that was supposed to be secret. Needless to say, all officers 
rejected the general’s proposal that they join the conspiracy. Queipo later claimed that he had 
been the victim of a “campaña calumniosa.”89 General Mola tried to minimise the damage by 
ordering Manuel Hedilla to follow Queipo and reassure the unsettled garrisons of the 
subversive commitment of the Carabineros leader:  
“Recayó en Hedilla otra misión, más delicada y significativa. El general don Gonzalo Queipo de 
Llano participaba en el Alzamiento. Se ofreció con su característica vehemencia e impulsado 
por ésta, antes de que se le dieran tarea y puesto concretos, se dedicó a hacer propaganda por 
su cuenta, lo cual no dejaba de suscitar riesgos. Por otra parte, los oficiales jóvenes y algunos 
jefes que conocían, sobradamente, la actitud de Queipo en los años anteriores, no parecían 
dispuestos a escucharle y mucho menos a creerle. El general había conspirado contra la 
Dictadura; se sublevó, sin ninguna forma, en Madrid el mes de diciembre de 1930; más tarde 
fue jefe de la Casa Militar del presidente de la República […] Su inesperada decisión de alzarse 
contra el mismo régimen que él había servido, podía promover sospechas.[…] Hedilla recibió el 
encargo de visitar las guarniciones por las que pasaba Queipo, en su viaje por el norte de 
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España; tenía que informar a los enlaces militares de que el general estaba ya de acuerdo con 
Mola.”90 
  
General Mola was not only unimpressed with Queipo’s tour of northern Spain, but also 
remained suspicious about the eccentric general’s pessimistic report on the development of 
the conspiracy in Andalucía. He requested a second opinion from the more reliable García 
Escámez.91 In the meantime, and courtesy of the indiscretions of several rebel officers 
(including Queipo), on 14 July the rumour broke out in Madrid that Mola had been arrested. 
Three days later, the Army of Africa mutinied against the Republic.92   
 
A question of violence 
One of the key issues troubling Mola was the need to include as many officers as possible in 
the conspiracy while at the same time not leaking out any information. This was simply 
unattainable, given the appetite of many officers – including Queipo – for gossip and panache. 
One of the official historians of the Francoist regime, Manuel Aznar, exposed with disarming 
sincerity the conundrum faced by Mola: “Toda España sabía, con más o menos seriedad y 
exactitud, que determinados jefes muy prestigiosos de nuestro Ejército venía preparando un 
Alzamiento general, y que esos jefes mantenían estrechas conexiones con los delegados y 
representantes de algunos partidos políticos.”93 Since “toda España” knew of the conspiracy, it 
is evident that the Popular Front administration was also aware of the existence of a plot to 
overthrow the Republic; nonetheless, the government was unaware of its extent, of its 
bellicosity and even of the identity of the Director.94 Another consequence of General Mola’s 
need to accommodate multiple, often conflicting, interests in his project was a vague post-
rebellion political project. On 5 June, he wrote that “Tan pronto tenga éxito el Movimiento 
Nacional, se constituirá un Directorio, que lo integrarán un presidente y cuatro vocales 
militares.” The coup’s main objectives were clearly outlined: the suspension of the 1931 
Constitution, the dissolution of the Cortes (parliament) and its replacement by a reactionary 
Republican dictatorship. Mola maintained the principle of the separation of Church and State, 
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a policy that infuriated the Carlists. Moreover, the Military Directorate would be headed by 
General Sanjurjo and civilian input restricted to an advisory role (Consejeros técnicos).95 The 
worst fears of the political right materialised: the military had just announced its intentions to 
seize the state apparatus.  
 
On 9 July, the would-be leader of the Military Directorate wrote a letter to General Mola in 
which he openly acknowledged the lack of a political program (“Comprendo que no desarrollo 
toda una política a seguir”). Still, Sanjurjo shared Mola’s belief that the army should hijack 
power (“El Gobierno tiene que constituirse en sentido puramente apolítico, por militares”).96 
Uncertainty over the ideological framework of rebel Spain was caused by the existence of deep 
rifts within the conspiratorial alliance, including disagreements over which flag to adopt (the 
choice being between the Republican tricolour and the monarchist bicolour). However, there 
was unanimity over one key topic: the need to dismantle democracy in Spain. In other words, 
the different rebel factions agreed on what they rejected, but failed to find common-ground 
on the ideological foundations of the future regime. For that reason, the rebellion was 
fundamentally based on negativist principles: it was anti-leftist, anti-liberal and anti-
parliamentarian. 
 
Political disunion was compensated by the outlining of a very precise modus operandi, clearly 
explained in the Director’s first Secret Instruction (Instrucción Reservada nº1), released in April: 
“Las circunstancias gravísimas por que atraviesa la Nación, debido a un Pacto electoral que ha 
tenido como consecuencia inmediata que el Gobierno sea hecho prisionero de las 
organizaciones revolucionarias, lleva fatalmente a España a una situación caótica, que no 
existe otro medio de evitar más que mediante la acción violenta.”97  
 
Mola optimistically put forward a 20-day deadline for sedition to explode in Spain.98 The most 
important section of Mola’s First Reserved Instruction was his over-quoted but under-analysed 
directive:  
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“la acción ha de ser en extremo violenta para reducir lo antes posible el enemigo, que es 
fuerte y bien organizado. Desde luego serán encarcelados todos los directivos de los partidos 
políticos, sociedades o sindicatos no afectos al movimiento, aplicándose castigos ejemplares a 
dichos individuos para estrangular los movimientos de rebeldía o huelgas.”99  
 
Put in their original context, these shocking orders gain even greater significance. By the end of 
April 1936, plans for a rebellion were still in embryonic stage. The scheme of action was still 
vague: General Mola proposed a temporary military dictatorship followed by a civilian regime 
whose political outlook he fails to specify. Nevertheless, he harboured few doubts concerning 
the need for extreme violence, euphemistically described as “exemplary punishments” 
(castigos ejemplares). Throughout the civil war, with Spain already divided between the rebel 
(Nationalist) and Republican factions, the Nationalist high-command would repeatedly 
describe the massacres perpetrated by the rebel columns en route to Madrid as “castigos 
ejemplares”.100 Mola reaffirmed the rebel’s military method in his Instrucción Reservada nº3: 
“Se tendrá en cuenta que la acción ha de ser en extremo rápida, para apoderarse lo más 
pronto posible de los puntos clave y reducir al enemigo, que es fuerte y bien organizado, 
deteniendo desde el primer momento a todos aquellos que pudieran constituir un peligro para 
el triunfo de nuestro movimiento, estrangulando desde primera hora, los intentos de huelga y 
los movimientos de rebeldía.”101  
 
Yet again, Mola recognised the potency of left-wing trade-unions and stressed the need to 
“suffocate” brutally both strikers and all forms of “movimientos de rebeldía”. In other words, 
the Director regarded as rebels anyone who opposed the rebellion. Hence, the concept of 
justicia al revés (“reverse justice”) or as Suero Serrano put it: “monstruosidad jurídica”, one of 
the founding pillars of Francoism, was not developed by General Franco and his sinecures, but 
by Mola.102 The same goes for the Pacto de Sangre (Pact or Fellowship of Blood), established 
by the Director in his Instrucción Reservada nº5 of 20 June, in which Mola abolished the 
concept of neutrality:  
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“Ha de advertirse a los tímidos y vacilantes que aquel que no está con nosotros, está contra 
nosotros, y que como enemigo será tratado. Para los compañeros que no sean compañeros, el 
movimiento triunfante será inexorable.”103  
 
The modus operandi of the rebellion was clear: extreme violence to paralyse the enemy, 
followed by the extermination of the political left. On 24 June, the Director released his 
instructions for Morocco. He was crystal-clear regarding the strategic use of violence: “El 
movimiento ha de ser simultáneo en todas las guarniciones compremetidas; y, desde luego, de 
una gran violencia. Las vacilaciones no conducen más que al fracaso.”104 For the Africanistas, 
the rebellion was to be modelled on the Moroccan war: a fight to the death with complete 
disregard for human life. Confirmation of this came during the Director’s emotional goodbye to 
his younger brother – Ramón Mola -, which took place a mere two days (15 July) before the 
outbreak of rebellion. Mola told his sibling: “Esta noche, en el rápido, vuelve a tu puesto, 
Ramón. No dudo que sabrás defenderlo hasta morir, como un caballero.” 105 Infantry Captain 
Ramón Mola was posted in Barcelona, a Republican bastion.106  He committed suicide when 
the rising failed and General Emilio Mola reacted to his brother’s death with typical Africanista 
brutality, an obsessive desire for revenge revealed by his advocacy of a level of violence never 
seen before in Spain.107 
 
Absolute belief in the impossibility of reaching a political modus vivendi in Spain was accepted 
as axiomatic by the Africanistas. For instance, on 25 July 1936 Queipo ridiculed a hypothetical 
offer from Azaña to end all hostilities and form a centre-right government with General Mola 
as Minister of War.108 A few days later (31 July), General Mola declared during a radio speech 
at the microphones of Radio Castilla:  
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“Yo podría aprovechar nuestras circunstancias favorable para ofrecer una transacción a los 
enemigos; pero no quiero. Quiero derrotarlos para imponerles mi voluntad y para 
aniquilarlos”.109  
 
Mola vs. Fal Conde 
The greatest thorn in Mola’s side was – ironically - the Comunión Tradicionalista, a group that 
was as keen to destroy the Popular Front government as the Director. Mola confided to Maíz 
that striking a deal with the political parties “Es la gran dificultad.”110 To the Director’s chagrin, 
both the Falange and the Carlists were initially adamant to pursue their own subversive 
agendas and negotiations with the Traditionalists proved particularly testing to Mola’s 
patience. The first meeting with Fal Conde did not occur until very late into the conspiracy, on 
15 June, at the Monastery of Irache. Predictably, both men failed to reach an agreement. 
According to the testimony of the Delegado Nacional de Requetés, José Luis Zamanillo, a 
heated argument erupted over the question of the flag. Fal Conde demanded the use of the 
Monarchist bicolour whereas Mola wanted to keep the Republican tricolour. A storm had been 
gathering ever since the Carlist leader presented, via an envoy, a list of unreasonable demands 
to the Director on 11 June. At Irache, Fal Conde replied icily to Mola’s refusal to accede to his 
requests: “Mire usted, general; a nosotros nos siguen los carlistas porque sostenemos tres o 
cuatro principios esenciales. De lo contrario, no dejarían solos. Si usted quiere, nos 
pronunciamos usted y yo, pero nos quedaremos solos.”111 Mola remained silent during the 
entire return journey to Pamplona and succumbed to a bout of depression during the 
following days, considered abandoning the leadership of the rebellion and even contemplated 
suicide.112 It was precisely at this time that Queipo met Mola to deliver his negative report on 
Andalucía. Hence, the Carabineros leader subsequently manipulated a temporary state of 
affairs – the Mola vs. Fal Conde standoff – to magnify his marginal role in the conspiracy.113 
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The sagacious Fal Conde was acutely aware that the military potential of the Requeté, which 
had gone as far as assembling its own bomb factories in Navarre, provided him with 
exceptional leverage power during negotiations.114 To make matters worse, Mola was a public 
relations disaster. His blunt rejection of the offer of Don Juan de Borbón (the heir to the 
Spanish throne) to fight on the rebel side epitomised his proverbial lack of tact.  Don Juan was 
so enthusiastic about the rebellion that he abandoned his exile in Cannes and headed for Spain 
on 31 July - the very same day that his wife gave birth to the Infanta Pilar. Upon entering the 
rebel zone, he was unceremoniously escorted back to the French border on Mola’s orders. The 
Alfonsine Monarchists were not amused.115  
 
Incapable of bridging his differences with Fal Conde, Mola decided to appeal directly to the 
would-be rebel head of state, General Sanjurjo, for mediation. The Director’s choleric reaction 
to Sanjurjo’s reply (11 July), provoked the breakdown of negotiations with the Traditionalists 
and, a mere three days before the outbreak of the rebellion, “Las relaciones entre el General 
Mola y la Jefatura superior del Partido Tradicionalista están en punto muerto.”116 The 
uncompromising Mola was exasperated by Sanjurjo’s Solomon-like decision to allow the 
Carlists to use the bicolour flag, while the army would keep the Republican tricolour. The 
Director claimed that the letter was a forgery, an accusation that deeply offended the 
Traditionalist leadership. Luckily for Mola, he could count on the radicalism of the Carlist 
Navarrese Junta, now entering on a direct collision course with Fal Conde. Shortly after reading 
Sanjurjo’s reply, the Carlist leader entered into a heated argument with the Inspector-General 
of the Requeté, retired Lieutenant-Colonel Ricardo Rada, who was eager to join the rebellion. 
Fal Conde skilfully cut short a sterile discussion by claiming that he could not take a definite 
decision without consulting first with the Carlist regent to the throne, Prince Javier de Borbón-
Parma. Rada’s explosive reaction was to be expected: he was an Africanista who had served in 
the Foreign Legion during the Rif campaign.117  
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The warmongering predisposition of the Navarrese Junta pushed Manuel Fal Conde to the 
verge of a nervous breakdown. Already on 2 July, Carlist militant  Esteban Ezcurra told Jaime 
Del Burgo “-Si no convencemos mañana al general saco las bombas yo solo.”118 Fal Conde was 
eventually overruled by the Navarrese Junta, no longer in the mood for restraint, which sided 
with the Director in exchange for minimal political concessions.119 The Carlist leader was also 
pressured by Gil Robles. On 16 July, Fal Conde informed Mola that he had received the visit of 
the CEDA leader, who urged him to strike a deal with the Director.120 Increasingly isolated and 
fearing a schism, Fal Conde succumbed to pressure and signed a pact with General Mola.  
 
A divided Left 
While the political right conspired, the left was consumed by Byzantine internal rivalries. The 
most destructive feud pitted Largo Caballero against Indalecio Prieto for the control of the 
Socialist Party (PSOE). Prieto was a passionate advocate of cooperation with the Republican 
left in the hope of forming a solid democratic structure in Spain; whereas Caballero proposed a 
revolution sine die along populist lines. The UGT leader suffered a minor humiliation when his 
bluff was called by a genuinely extremist movement, the CNT. During its May 1936 Congress in 
Zaragoza, the CNT proposed a conditional revolutionary pact to Caballero that included a full 
rejection of parliamentarism. As expected, the UGT leader declined the offer; nevertheless, 
Caballero’s irresponsible rhetoric sowed panic among the political right. Ultimately, Largo 
Caballero’s puerile recklessness did irreparable damage not only to the Republic, but also to 
his own party. At the same time as Mola perfected the final details of his master plan, 
Caballero felt so overconfident about the combative power of the leftist trade-unions that he 
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headed a UGT representation to the Congress of the International Federation of Trade Unions 
in London. Caballero did not return to Spain until the eve of the rebellion (16 July).121  
 
The nadir of the intestine struggle destroying the PSOE occurred in May 1936, during a 
Socialist rally held at Écija’s bullring (Seville) that Prieto was scheduled to address. A crowd of 
Caballero supporters (Caballeristas) disrupted the event, which degenerated into a mass 
brawl. Shots were fired as the PSOE leader fled the scene under a hail of “pedradas y 
botellazos”. The obese PSOE leader managed miraculously to squeeze himself between two 
bodyguards in the backseat of a car. A policeman was stabbed in the head. Prieto later 
described the entire affair as a “cacería” and a “brutal agresión”.122 This was the second time 
that the PSOE leader had defied physics: in 1934 he fled Spain in the boot of a Renault. In the 
end, Indalecio Prieto might have escaped unhurt, but his party did not. When Largo Caballero 
threatened to veto Prieto’s ascension to the premiership that same month, the latter refused 
to challenge the UGT leader. Party Secretary Juan-Simeón Vidarte repeatedly urged Prieto to 
call Caballero’s bluff, but his exhausted mentor dismissed his request violently: “Que se vaya 
Caballero a la mierda.” 123 
 
The Caballero-Prieto rivalry was only matched by Manuel Azaña’s acerbic relationship with 
Niceto Alcalá-Zamora, Prime-Minister and President respectively. In May, Azaña carefully 
plotted both the impeachment of Alcalá-Zamora and his own ascension to the presidency. 
General Queipo de Llano was with Alcalá-Zamora on the night of his impeachment (10 May).124 
Azaña’s ultimate goal was to persuade Prieto to take over the premiership in order to create a 
strong Republican-Socialist coalition that would bring about much-needed structural reform to 
Spain. However, the Azaña’s timing could not have been worse. On 16 May, Largo Caballero 
was elected president of the PSOE parliamentary minority and blocked his nemesis’ rise to 
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power. Azaña was forced to improvise. He invited the seriously ill Santiago Casares Quiroga 
(Izquierda Republicana) to assume the post of Prime-Minister, which he did on 19 May.125 
 
The political agony of Santiago Casares Quiroga 
Following the outbreak of the 17-18 July coup, Casares Quiroga was ridiculed and vilified in 
equal measure by the political left. The leader of the Communist Party (PCE) Dolores Ibarrurí 
labelled his tenure as Prime-Minister as “una prueba de la inconsciencia e irresponsabilidad de 
los dirigentes de la República.”126 Also, the Socialist Deputy and prominent Prietista Julián 
Zugazagoitia dedicated three chapters of his monumental Guerra y vicisitudes de los españoles 
to the character assassination of Casares Quiroga: “Para los que buscaban ser justos con él era 
un frívolo que había disimulado, con bromas y chanzas, la debilidad de su carácter, merecedor, 
en un Estado de exigencias elementales, de un castigo ejemplar” … “Aquel Ministerio […] es 
una casa de locos, y el más furioso de todos es el ministro. No duerme, no come. Grita y 
vocifera como un poseído. Su aspecto da miedo, y no me sorprendería que en uno de los 
muchos accesos de furor se cayese muerto con el rostro crispado por una última rabia no 
manifestada. No quiere oir nada en relación con el armamento del pueblo y ha dicho, en los 
términos más enérgicos, que quien se propase a armarlo por su cuenta será fusilado”.127  
Casares himself, his body undermined by tuberculosis, had not relished the task set before 
him. He however could never refuse a request coming from his party’s leader: his admiration 
for Azaña bordered on the obsessive.128 The volatility described by Zugazagoitia was visibe in 
the fact that he repeatedly denounced those plotting against the Republic, declaring that 
“contra el fascismo el Gobierno es beligerante”, yet doing little to restrain the plotters.129  The 
Prime-Minister made repeated amd vain invitations for the extreme-left to embrace 
democracy.  Casares Quiroga warned the parliamentary parties that he would remain in power 
only for as long as he enjoyed the full backing of the Popular Front coalition. Lastly, the Prime-
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Minister also ridiculed the solutions to the law and order issue proposed by both Gil Robles 
and Calvo Sotelo: “es que esto iba a corregirse en dos días y a testarazos?”130  
 
Casares Quiroga’s comments were inevitably ignored by the conspirators. Still, the Prime-
Minister attempted to forestall the rebellion by extending an olive branch to the army. This 
conciliatory approach alienated most of his political allies, including Indalecio Prieto, who paid 
constant visits to the Prime-Minister to alert him about the impending military coup. The 
inexperienced Casares Quiroga genuinely believed that he could placate the aggressive 
Africanistas. For instance, he told parliament on 16 June that the military would not rise 
“mientras esté yo al frente de él.”131 However, both the political left and the Africanistas 
perceived Casares Quiroga’s appeasing policy as a sign of weakness. When on 12 June the 
Prime-Minister was confronted with irrefutable evidence that Colonel Yagüe was conspiring 
against the Republic, he summoned the Africanista to Madrid, dismissed him from the 
command of the Segunda Legión, and offered a transfer to a desirable post in mainland Spain 
or as a military attaché abroad. Rather than feeling relieved at escaping a court-martial, Yagüe 
told Quiroga that he could never leave the Legion and would rather burn his uniform than 
accept a transfer. The Prime-Minister yielded and returned Yagüe to his post. Last but not 
least, Casares Quiroga brushed aside rumours that General Queipo de Llano was involved in a 
plot against the Republic by dismissing him as an “imbécil.”132  
 
Ultimately, the intolerable pressure faced by the Popular Front alliance led to the straining of 
both personal and political relations. The most notable disagreement occurred between 
Casares Quiroga and Indalecio Prieto whose constant warnings about an imminent military 
coup irritated the Prime-Minister.  In a moment of exasperation, Casares Quiroga told the 
PSOE leader that his anxiety was the “producto de la menopausia”. Prieto exploded. Deeply 
offended by the perceived insult to his manhood, the PSOE leader would not speak with the 
Prime-Minister again until after the outbreak of the rebellion.133  
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Unfortunately for Casares Quiroga, the main threat to the Republic was not Prieto’s 
‘menopause’, but a ‘birth’. On 16 July the Director, now adopting the nom de plume of “Juan”, 
passed a coded message to General Goded: “El pasado día 15 dió a luz Elena un hermoso niño, 
a las cuatro de la madrugada.” It meant that the rebellion was scheduled to initiate at 4:00am 
of 19 July.134  
 
Two days before the expected ‘delivery’, 17 July, the impatient Africanistas rose up in arms 
against the government in Spanish Morocco and initiated the interior colonisation of Spain. On 
the projected date of 19 July, General Mola rebelled in Pamplona. The usually composed 
Director was overwhelmed with joy.135 That same day, General Franco landed in Morocco to 
assume command of his beloved Army of Africa, while the unpredictable Goded flew to his 
defeat and eventual death in Barcelona. The following day (20 July), a small aircraft 
transporting the would-be leader of the rebellion, General Sanjurjo, crashed during take-off at 
a rocky inlet named A Boca do Inferno (“The Mouth of Hell”) in Cascais (Portugal), where 
Sanjurjo’s body was carbonised after the plane caught fire.136 Lastly, Seville also witnessed a 
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Constructing the myth: General Queipo de Llano and the conspiracy in 
Seville (February-July 1936) 
 
Introduction 
From 18 July 1936 onwards, the history of Seville became inextricably entangled with Gonzalo 
Queipo de Llano y Sierra, courtesy of the legend that was constructed around the figure of the 
dissident general. In reality, the tale that the city was irremediably lost for the rebels was the 
brainchild of Queipo and his panegyrists. However, a contradiction emerged within the 
general’s narcissistic discourse: on the one hand, the capital of Andalucía was certain to 
remain loyal to the Republic; while on the other, it was also vital for the success of the coup. 
Indeed, General Mola trusted Seville with the most critical assignment of the rebellion: the 
deployment of the Army of Africa in mainland Spain. In the gap between truth and fabrication, 
a myth was erected: the legend of General Queipo de Llano and his soldaditos.   
 
A rebel without a cause 
Queipo de Llano’s rebellious temperament, as well as his infatuation with violence, manifested 
itself early in his life. He staged his first mutiny while still a teenager training for the 
priesthood.   Juez de Villa Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y Sánchez and his wife Mercedes Sierra y 
Vázquez de Novoa hoped that their son would embrace a prestigious ecclesiastical career, 
especially since young Gonzalo had abandoned school prematurely. Nonetheless, the austerity 
of seminary life was not to Queipo de Llano’s liking and he was often subjected to disciplinary 
action, with no tangible results.137 Aged fourteen, he abandoned religious training in 
spectacular fashion, jumping the seminary wall and stoning the persecuting priests during his 
escape. Mercedes Sierra was devastated by her son’s antics, but Gonzalo’s father took the 
news pragmatically and concluded that his son was simply too “arrogante” to ever become a 
priest. The unruly adolescent was eventually admitted to the Cavalry Academy at Valladolid, 
but struggled whenever his intellect was put to the test. He twice failed his Physics exam, but 
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luckily for him there was a shortage of Cavalry officers in the colony of Cuba.138 Hence, the one 
lesson that Queipo absorbed during his time as a cadet was that all shortcomings could be 
compensated with aggression, or what his first biography euphemistically termed “raza”.139 
This was a concept that he put into practice until the very end of his life. On 24 October 1948, 
aged 73, Queipo wrote a violent letter to Franco’s brother-in-law, Ramón Serrano Súñer: 
“Cuando hablamos de las víboras, en general, lo hacemos con indiferencia y repugnancia; 
pero, si nos encontramos frente a una de éstas, sentimos, instintivamente, el deseo de 
aplastarla.  Por eso ha sido una suerte que este diálogo se haya desarrollado por escrito, 
porque, frente a Vd., el instinto me hubiera impelido a pretender aplastarlo.”140     
 
Formative and confirmative years: Cuba and Morocco 
Queipo de Llano found himself embroiled in controversy even before setting foot in Cuba, on 
26 May 1896. During the boat journey to the Caribbean island, the recently-graduated 
Lieutenant was taunted by a fellow officer about his well-known aversion to study. Queipo did 
not hesitate to respond: “El rostro del chistoso probó la fortaleza de los puños de Queipo. 
Total, una ceja partida. La intervención de los compañeros evitó que la cosa pasara a 
mayores.”141 Once in Cuba and following a heavy-drinking session, he again became violent 
and threw a fellow passenger out of his horse-carriage while at full speed. Believing that his 
victim was dead, Queipo went into hiding as an infuriated crowd attempted to exact revenge. 
While on duty, the fiery Lieutenant showed a penchant for antiquated and bloody cavalry 
charges. This married perfectly with the Spanish army’s veneration of its medieval heritage. As 
a result, Queipo amassed war decorations, compensating for his intellectual limitations in the 
process, which were constantly exposed by a chronic inability to grasp modern war tactics. As 
a result, the young officer developed an obsession for aggressive action as the only route to 
feeding his insatiable ambition. Any hiatus in military activity invariably spelled trouble for 
both himself and the institution he was supposed to serve. In 1898, during a lull in the Cuban 
war, the recently-promoted Captain decided to combat his tedium by sniping at bulls and 
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almost got himself killed by one, but was saved thanks the intervention of an attentive friend. 
His boredom was eventually put to an abrupt end when the United States entered the Cuban 
conflict on 18 April 1898 and crushed the Spanish army.142 
 
The Cuban War of Independence held immense significance for Queipo: it represented his 
personal crossing of the Rubicon. It was during Queipo’s sojourn in the Caribbean island that 
the hyperactive captain embarked on his first open act of sedition, as Spain attempted to bring 
the conflict to a dignified conclusion. The dissident Captain was neutralised, but the fact that 
his actions went unpunished spurred him on to further outbursts of violence.143 Not even 
marriage, to Genoveva Martí in October 1901, mellowed Queipo’s bellicose nature and when 
the opportunity to return to war arrived, he grabbed it with both hands. He landed in the 
recently-created Spanish protectorate of Morocco on 6 October 1909.144  
 
Morocco might have represented a key formative period for an entire generation of army 
officers (including Franco), but for Queipo de Llano it held an entirely different connotation: 
the Moroccan war was not formative but confirmative.145  In other words, it represented the 
consolidation of his Cuban experience. To Queipo’s jaundiced eyes, the Rif rebellion 
corroborated (via his amassing of war decorations) that violence was the natural conduct of an 
army officer. This was a feeling shared by many junior officers. For instance, even Queipo was 
shocked by the satisfaction with which Franco presided over the cruel beatings of Moorish 
soldiers punished for minor infractions.146 In addition, Morocco also served to strengthen 
Queipo’s belief that military interests stood above politics, meaning that he fervently 
supported the army’s self-appointed role as a Praetorian force protecting Spain from both 
external and internal enemies. Above all, the Moroccan war also consolidated Queipo de 
Llano’s profound narcissism, elevating it to a pathological level. He once told a war 
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correspondent that his greatest fear was to die prematurely in the battlefield, for the sole 
reason that it would take away from him the opportunity of attaining military glory.147 As 
Queipo ascended through the ranks, his ego became increasingly difficult to control. His 
ambition reached such unrealistic heights that he came to regard the denial of even the most 
insignificant of his caprices as veiled attempts aimed at sabotaging his predestined rise to 
fame. In the meantime, the volatile officer forced his way into military history by means of 
violence. In 1913, Queipo led one of the last cavalry charges in the history of the Spanish army 
at Alcazarquivir, a location of great symbolic significance where in 1578 the Portuguese Empire 
lost not only a decisive battle, but also its King Sebastião I. Queipo de Llano commanded a 
sable-led charge which degenerated into an “infernal” hand-to-hand combat.148 Violent action 
only further stimulated Queipo’s craving for recognition, most notably for Spain’s greatest 




Queipo de Llano’s infatuation with the brutal Morrocan campaign, led him to establish the 
Revista de Tropas Coloniales in January 1924. Queipo authored the first editorial, where he 
revealed that his entire thinking revolved around the belief that the military should function as 
a Praetorian force protecting Spain from itself. He indulged in a bizarre historical proposition:  
“Tras de haber llegado al más alto grado de su esplendor en época en que «el Sol no se ponía 
en sus dominios», España empezó su marcha decadente, como obedeciendo a una ley fatal 
que parece regir los destinos de los pueblos.”  
 
Queipo de Llano harboured few doubts about the causes for Spain’ decline, and blamed the 
“legislación de legisladores”, “caciquismo”, “políticos a veces más atentos al desarrollo de 
intereses personales que a los de la Patria”, “elementos anárquicos” that triggered the 
“marcha decadente, hasta tal punto que España se encontraba al borde de un abismo de 
anarquía”. Simultaneously, Spain was being regenerated by “unos cuántos hombres de 
corazón que, arriesgándolo todo, afrontaron la ardua tarea de hacer resurgir el espíritu 
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español”; and reserved special praise for both King Alfonso XIII and the “Directorio” headed by 
Miguel Primo de Rivera. Queipo clearly regarded himself as part of this selected élite of 
messianic “hombres de corazón”, even if only a few years later he would turn against both 
King and Dictator.150 
 
Despite actively participating in the Moroccan war, Queipo was not really a typical Africanista. 
He was old enough to have taken part in the Cuban War of Independence of 1895-98 and was 
therefore inextricably linked to the traumatic loss of the Spanish Empire. For this reason, he 
did not identify with the Africanista generation, too young to have fought in Cuba but old 
enough to be obsessed with restoring the dignity of the Patria. Rather, Queipo was part of a 
more experienced and pragmatic group of army officers that included General Cabanellas. He 
therefore lacked the idealistic verve of the new cohort of officers and, as his career 
progressed, became increasingly cynical. Queipo’s tortuous political career, from Monarchism 
to Republicanism to anti-Republicalism, revealed that the General had become a pragmatist 
focused exclusively on his own self-advancement.151 He was, above all, a ‘Queipist’.  
 
The rebel finds a cause: the Republic 
When in 1923 Queipo de Llano was promoted to the rank of brigadier general, his newfound 
status endowed him with a level of influence that could be potentially used for destructive 
ends. The promotion of a figure such as Queipo - intellectually inept and uncontrollably violent 
- exposed the structural problems affecting the army. These included an inflated officer corps 
supported by an inadequate promotion system and poor training at all levels. To make matters 
worse, General Queipo’s volatile personality started sending shockwaves across the political 
arena, courtesy of the symbiotic relationship between army and politics. This deadly embrace 
was tightened during the interwar period, a process that culminated in the temporary-turned-
permanent dictatorship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera of 1923-30. Queipo de Llano clearly 
considered himself an equal to the dictator and the enmity between both men rapidly 
degenerated into open confrontation. Queipo’s damaged ego triggered a second suicidal feud 
with another senior military figure - General Riquelme - and the unruly general eventually 
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earned himself a month-long arrest for his recurrent acts of indiscipline.152 Still, Primo de 
Rivera showed leniency towards his subordinate, declaring that “Queipo es enemigo de sí 
mismo”.153 However, the insubordinate general perceived the dictator’s tolerance as a sign of 
weakness and began developing a fixation with vengeance. His definite fall from grace 
occurred in July 1924 under bizarre circumstances. Queipo decided to make a vulgar joke, in 
the form of a wordplay, associating Primo de Rivera’s political party Unión Patriótica (UP) with 
Urinario Público (Public Toilet) and was unceremoniously forced into premature retirement. 
However, Primo de Rivera was unaware of the danger posed by an idle Queipo, who became a 
full-time conspirator against the Monarchy of Alfonso XIII. Not even the downfall, exile and 
eventual death of Primo de Rivera in 1930, appeased the general. Later that same year, he 
published the egotistic El General Queipo de Llano perseguido por la dictadura, where he 
delivered a vitriolic attack against several fellow high-ranking army officers and accused Primo 
de Rivera of “suponerse elegido de Dios para salvar a España.”154 In reality, Queipo was simply 
unable to accept authority. In 1954, General Franco told his cousin: “Yo siempre noté la poca 
gracia que le hacía a éste que yo mandara.”155  
  
Obsessed with vengeance, General Queipo became a key figure in the 1930 conspiracy against 
the Monarchy, where his deficient organisational skills were once again exposed. The general 
was trusted with leading the rebellion at the Cuatro Vientos military airfield in Madrid, an 
affair that ended in a monumental fiasco. In 1933, he would publish yet another self-
exonerating book entitled El movimiento reivindicativo de Cuatro Vientos.156 Still, both 
Queipo’s defeat and literary career proved to be only temporary. He fled to a short-lived exile 
only to be lavishly rewarded for his ‘loyalty’ less than a year later, following the proclamation 
of the II Republic. Queipo was promoted to the rank of Major General with retroactive effect 
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(dating back to 31 March 1928).157 The new regime regarded the general as an invaluable asset 
(a liberal within a largely reactionary caste), and for that same reason granted Queipo all he 
had ever craved for: revenge and recognition. 
 
General Queipo was thankful to the Republic and demonstrated his gratitude through 
successive public, and populist, protestations of loyalty to the new regime. The general even 
failed to adopt adequate measures to prevent the anticlerical riots of May 1931 so to endear 
himself to the masses.158 The most flagrant episode took place during an official ceremony to 
pay tribute to several individuals responsible for frustrating the Sanjurjada. In the middle of 
the event, Queipo contravened protocol and led an ovation to the mayor of Seville, González y 
Fernández Labandera, followed by an enthusiastic crowd. Very few high-ranking officers were 
reckless to the point of publicly condemning Spain’s most decorated general (José Sanjurjo).159 
On the fourth anniversary of the Sanjurjada (10-11 August 1936), Labandera was executed on 
the orders of the now anti-Republican General Queipo de Llano.160  
 
In December 1931, Queipo was promoted yet again and appointed Jefe del Cuarto Militar of 
the President, courtesy of his close friendship with Alcalá-Zamora (Alcalá-Zamora’s son 
married Queipo’s daughter in 1935), who came to his protégé’s rescue whenever his 
incompetence was exposed.161 Notwithstanding, the Republic’s patience was rapidly 
exhausted. Prime-minister Manuel Azaña was frequently taken aback by Queipo’s extravagant 
behaviour, which he narrated in his diary with customary irony:  
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“De este general de dos metros comienzan a decir también que se propone hacer esto y otro; 
me lo dicen de la Dirección General de Seguridad. Pero yo no lo creo. Lo que hará sin duda será 
proferir necedades, que las produce naturalmente. En el ejército nadie le hace caso. Y al él se 
debe, por su torpeza, uno de los mayores disgustos que tuvimos al comienzo de la República, 
cuando se decretó el cambio de mandos de la guarnición de Madrid, y él lo realizó 
brutalmente.”162   
 
According to the Prime-Minister, the Republic was willing to turn a blind eye to General 
Queipo’s “necedades” and compulsive lying, which were at the root of his marginalisation 
within army circles. Nonetheless, Queipo’s proverbial lack of tact (“torpeza”) and his tendency 
to carry out orders with unnecessary violence (“brutalmente”) had been undermining the 
Republic ever since its inception. Still, such setbacks did not appear to dispirit the general, who 
went as far as declaring “yo podría ser dictador, soy el más indicado.”163 Manuel Azaña was 
once more lost for words when Queipo approached him for advice on running for elections; 
however, what astonished the Prime-Minister most were not Queipo’s intellectual limitations, 
but his detachment from reality. Predictably, Queipo’s constant meddling in political affairs 
brought about his removal as Jefe del Cuarto Militar on 8 March 1933.164 In September, he was 
appointed Director-General of Border Guards, dismissed from his post the following year and 
later reinstated as Inspector-General.165 The position was still a senior one, with equivalent 
financial remuneration; however, it did not match Queipo’s ambitions. In the end, the 
Republic’s gravest mistake vis-à-vis its capricious protégé was to confuse opportunism with 
loyalism.  
 
Queipo de Llano started looking for better options from the moment Alcalá-Zamora was 
impeached in April 1936.166 Visibly anxious about the prospect of being dismissed from his post 
as Inspector-General of Border Guards, he went to see the acting President Diego Martínez 
Barrio and, quite gratuitously, went to great lengths to reaffirm his Republicanism, asserting 
that he was a “hombre de honor y republicano de la cabeza a los pies.”  In late June, the 
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general saw no moral conflict in asking Martínez Barrio to appoint one of his nephews, 
Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y Buitrón, as a municipal judge (juez municipal) in Málaga on the 
same day he met Mola to discuss the development conspiracy.167 In 1950, the capricious 
general contradicted himself in a letter to General Franco:  
“No fui nunca antimonárquico, aunque llegué a ser enemigo irreconciliable de D. Alfonso. Yo le 
profesaba un cariño, una adhesión tales, que siempre estuve dispuesto a jugarme la vida en su 
defensa, pero correspondió a esa adhesión y a mi lealtad, con la burla más sangrienta. Después 
de esto, ya no tenía por qué serle leal. Entonces juré […] que si antes me hubiera jugado la vida 
por defenderlo, desde entonces me la jugaría para arrojarlo del trono [...] Busqué contactos 
por todas partes, con toda case de elementos y conseguí al fin ver satisfechos mis deseos [...] 
poco después comencé a conspirar contra la República para reinstaurar la monarquía.”168  
 
The rebel finds a cause, part II: the anti-Republican conspiracy in Seville 
Queipo de Llano’s incorporation into the conspiracy was not pacific. The general’s ideological 
pragmatism was at the root of his turbulent relationship with the conspiratorial leadership in 
Andalucía. His realpolitik clashed with the profoundly reactionary convictions of the local 
subversive cells. Thus, when General Mola assigned Queipo to Seville, the Director’s decision 
was greeted with anxiety on all sides. On the one hand, the General Queipo continued to 
pressure Mola to post him to Valladolid; while on the other hand, no conspiratorial cell was 
willing to accept such a volatile personality – until then a high-profile Republican – as its 
leader. So much so, that during his one of his visits to Seville, Queipo had to endure the 
humiliation of presenting a letter of recommendation written by Lieutenant-Colonel 
(Engineers) Alberto Álvarez-Rementería (of the Batallón de Zapadores nº1 Madrid and a UME 
member), and addressed to his brother Eduardo. After examining Queipo’s credentials, Major 
Eduardo Álvarez-Rementería Martínez introduced the general to Major Cuesta Monereo of the 
Estado Mayor, the ‘Director’ of the local conspiracy. Their conference was of little 
consequence.169 The seeds of sedition had already been planted: Mola’s first envoy to 
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Andalucía, Colonel García Escámez, had contacted Major Rementería in late April, a full month 
before Queipo’s trip. García Escámez’s subversive activities were complemented by a series of 
local meetings that took place in bars, restaurants, the Casino Militar, and even the homes of 
Captains Aguilera and Pérez Blázquez. Unsurprisingly, the rebel leadership assembled once 
again after Queipo’s departure, at an up-market restaurant in the Parque María Luisa.170 The 
prospect of having to incorporate such a capricious personality in the local conspiracy 
unnerved the local cell. So much so, that all military leaders, with the exception of Artillery 
Colonel Santos Rodríguez Cerezo, refused to meet Queipo. In any case, a shoring-up of 
Republican loyalty among the higher echelons of the army – what Cuesta Monereo termed the 
“virus marxista”171 –  was to be expected in face of the recent military reforms enacted by the 
Popular Front administration. The Republic attempted to circumvent army encroachment in 
the political sphere by appointing loyal officers to positions of power, hopefully prescribing a 
political analgesic to a structural problem.172 In fact, when the rising erupted, only one out of 
eight Divisional Generals (Miguel Cabanellas of the V Division) sided with the rebels. For that 
reason, the adhesions of high-ranking officers in Cádiz, Málaga and Córdoba could only have 
been regarded as unexpected successes. Queipo de Llano cynically omitted this fact from his 
memoirs.173 
 
The main objective of Queipo’s visit to Seville was to gain the adherence of General José 
Fernández Villa-Abrille y Calivara, leader of the II Division and an old compagnon de route from 
Cuba, Morocco and anti-Monarchist conspiracies. Villa-Abrille rejected Queipo’s proposal but 
refused to denounce his friend to the Republican authorities.174 Queipo de Llano’s trip thus 
revealed two very important features of the rebellion in Andalucía: a) the general’s failure to 
attain his primary objective – to persuade Villa-Abrille to join the insurrection (after this fiasco, 
Queipo would only play a peripheral role in the local conspiracy); and b) the predicament faced 
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by the leader of the II Division, which was paradigmatic of the fortunes of newly-appointed 
Republican authorities, both military and civilian. When the 18 July rising erupted in Seville, 
Villa-Abrille had occupied his post for only five months. Republican administrators felt often 
isolated and intimidated by the anti-governmental fanaticism displayed by their immediate 
subordinates, to the point that many retreated into apathy. This was the case of General Villa-
Abrille, an alien element in a city dominated by an overwhelmingly reactionary garrison. Local 
journalist Enrique Vila could not help but to classify the entire affair as “extraordinario”:  
“en realidad era extraordinario el de militares de graduaciones superiores que conocían los 
manejos de la oficialidad y que la dejaban actuar ni más ni menos que si no se dieran cuenta 
de ello.”175   
 
General Queipo’s miniscule input in the gestation of the rebellion in Seville was an inevitable 
consequence of his late incorporation into the conspiracy. Firstly, the Carabineros commander 
experienced serious difficulties in acquiring Mola’s trust. Nor did Queipo help his cause when 
he openly expressed reservations about assuming command of the II Division. After listening to 
Queipo’s pessimistic report of 23 June, Mola politely brushed aside the general’s anxieties and 
insisted in posting him to Seville. Indeed, Queipo’s conclusions failed to make an impression on 
the Director: the following day (24 June), Mola released an Instrucción Reservada in which he 
revealed a conceptual shift from his original plan, which focused exclusively on the garrisons of 
the north. The Director created mixed military columns and decided to employ the Army of 
Africa (which was expected to disembark in Málaga and Algeciras) to spearhead the rebel 
military advance towards Madrid. According to the new plan of action, Andalucía became 
critical for the success of the coup.176  As a preventative measure, the ever-cautious Director 
sent García Escaméz one last time to Seville and Huelva to corroborate Queipo’s report. Mola’s 
emissary verified the Republican loyalty of most military commanders, but also the subversive 
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eagerness of their subordinates in the coded message: “Las niñas bien, las encargadas 
pésimas.”177  
 
General Queipo de Llano’s atypical pessimism stemmed largely from his aspirations to lead the 
uprising in his native Valladolid and his negative experience in Andalucía, where the local rebel 
leadership had greeted him with deep suspicion. Furthermore, Queipo could expect little 
sympathy from the paramilitary groups. The general’s relationship with the Falange was non-
existent ever since he became involved in a fracas with José Antonio Primo de Rivera at the 
chic café Lyon d’Or in Madrid. A mêlée erupted, described by reporter Jay Allen as a “lovely 
fight”, after Queipo offended an elderly uncle of Primo de Rivera.178 The scandal concluded 
with José Antonio’s expulsion from the army, where he held the rank of second lieutenant 
(alférez de complemento). It was highly unlikely that the Sevillian Falange would greet Queipo’s 
appointment with open arms, especially since it was controlled by Primo de Rivera’s hot-
headed cousin, Sancho Dávila.179 To make matters worse, retired Falangist bullfighter José 
García Carranza - aka Pepe el “Algabeño” -, an essential cog in the local conspiracy and 
Queipo’s future “ayudante civil”, remained sceptical about the general’s newfound anti-
Republicanism.180 Major Cuesta revealed that Queipo’s meetings with the local subversive 
network “aumentaron en calidad más que en número.”181 Indeed, General Queipo de Llano’s 
incorporation in the conspiracy was a tense affair resolved only by the professionalism of 
Cuesta Monereo.182 
 
Major José Cuesta Monereo 
The subversive hierarchy in Seville took the form of a triumvirate formed by Major Cuesta 
Monereo and Captains Gutiérrez Flores and Escribano. This triumvirate, based at the Divisional 
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Headquarters, effectively neutralised General Villa-Abrille. Escribano was later proposed for 
promotion “por méritos de guerra” on the basis of his role as: 
“Promotor del Glorioso Movimiento Nacional, constituye el 18 de Julio de 1,936 uno de los 
más firmes pillares en que se asentó el Mando para sacar adelante tan magna empresa, con el 
más elevado espíritu y firme resolución de vencer actúa con verdadera admiración de todos 
sus Jefes y subordinados resolviendo con sus oportunas intervenciones situaciones críticas y 
decisivas, empleándose en un principio en las calles y plazas de Sevilla con las armas en la 
mano.”183 
 
Major Rementería (UME member and President of the Falange’s Comité Militar) and Colonel 
Francisco Bohórquez Vecina (Coronel jefe de la Auditoría de Guerra) were other key figures in 
the plot, while Captain Francisco Carrillo functioned as a liaison officer linking the rebel high-
command in Navarre with the local seditious cell in Seville. Artillery Major Francisco Carmona 
Perez de Vera revealed, in a written statement, how the entire garrison of Seville was mined by 
sedition:  
“Que respondiendo al llamamiento que por iniciativa del entonces Comandante de Infantería 
Don Eduardo Alvarez Rementería y por conducto del Capitán de Artillería Don Juan Macías 
Esquivel, se le hiciera en Marzo de 1.936, para sumarse a la Oficialidad del Ejército que 
anhelaba el Alzamiento Nacional como único medio de salvar a la Patria de las vergüenzas 
pasadas, se ofreció al primer requerimiento a los de la Guarnición de Sevilla que laboraban por 
él, entre los que se contaban, a más de los dichos, los Capitanes de Aviación Don Modesto 
Aguilera y Don Alfonso Carrillo, los de Infantería Perez Blazquez, (muerto en campaña) y 
Fernández de Córdoba, los de Artillería Villa Baena y Puerta Tamayo, el Teniente de Ingenieros 
Don Carlos Jack Caruncho (muerto en campaña) y otros, que agrupados al Comandante Don 
Eduardo Alvarez Rementería reconocían en éste el enlace de la Guarnición de Sevilla con otros 
Mandos Superiores, el que asignó al que suscribe el número 4586 en la organización militar 
anterior al Glorioso Movimiento Nacional.”184  
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Major Cuesta, the true brains behind the local conspiracy, weaved a network encompassing 
not only Seville, but the entire II Division and stretching even outside the army.185 As early as 
May, Cuesta persuaded Major Garrigós of the Civil Guard (Segundo Jefe de la Comandancia 
Exterior) to join the insurgent cause. Both men met again in June and July. By then, Garrigós 
had already made arrangements for the mutiny of all civil guard posts in the province.186 
Furthermore, Majors Cuesta and Rementería met Carlist Major Redondo on almost a daily 
basis throughout the spring/summer of 1936.187 The anti-Republican fervour of the Comunión 
Tradicionalista was underlined time and again with depressing regularity. On 20 April 1936, its 
sole representative in the Town Hall of Seville, Tomás García, was detained for illegal weapons 
trafficking after four guns and large amounts of ammunition were found concealed inside a 
bed in the office of Traditionalist MP Ginés Martínez Rubio at the Circulo Tradicionalista. The 
building was raided by a joint police and Assault Guard force on the orders of the Civil 
Governor of Seville.188 A storm was gathering in the capital of Andalucía with the paramilitary 
organisations in its epicentre. 
  
The organisational skills of the introvert Cuesta matched, if not surpassed, those of Mola. 
Cuesta Monereo drew important conclusions from the Sanjurjada, including the modus 
operandi and how to incorporate a capricious leader in the entire project.189  Journalist 
Sánchez del Arco described Cuesta as the “alma de la conspiración, cuya actividad hizo 
prodigios, y la energía de Queipo de Llano halló magnífico cauce.”190 Indeed, if Major Cuesta 
had managed to work alongside the disorganised Sanjurjo in 1932, he could certainly deal with 
the mercurial Queipo in 1936. The local Director left no detail to chance, including the myth of 
Queipo de Llano and his soldaditos, of which he would become the second greatest promoter, 
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after the rebel general himself.191 Cuesta wrote over 3,000 pages of notes on the civil war in 
Andalucía and Extremadura, including the exact dates of the occupation of each town in the II 
Division and a personal memoir of the rebellion in Seville.192 He also kept tight control over 
events up until the very last minute: on the eve of the coup (17 July), Cuesta met Garrigós to 
ultimate details regarding the participation of the Civil Guard in the rebellion.193 His leadership 
was beyond dispute:  
“de todas las actuaciones, el capitán Aguilera daba cuenta al comandante Cuesta, porque era 
deseo expreso del Comité que las órdenes del alzamiento partieran en su día del Estado Mayor 
de la División.”194  
  
The reasons for Major Cuesta’s obsessive devotion to the conspiracy (and subsequently to the 
promotion of the myth of Queipo and his soldaditos) can be traced to traumatic events in his 
private life. In 1934, his eldest son José died at the tender age of nine. Later that year, his wife 
died of pneumonia. Cuesta was so traumatised by this double tragedy that he abandoned his 
house with his three remaining children. From that date onwards, “El Comandante Cuesta 
guardó su doble pena muy dentro de sí mismo y dedicó su vida a la familia y al Ejército.”195 
 
General Villa-Abrille 
Throughout the summer of 1936, General Villa-Abrille found himself in a conundrum: he was 
the Divisional General in a city known for the potency of its labour movement; however, it was 
the right that had been rising the political temperature ever since his arrival in Seville. To make 
matters worse, Villa-Abrille could not handle stress. During the failed 1930 Republican putsch, 
the general was entrusted with leading the uprising in the province of Logroño (15 December), 
where “su actitud vacilante pareció demostrar falta de valor personal.”196 Three years later, 
Villa-Abrille reaffirmed his political convictions when he declined to join an anti-Republican 
plot, but also refused to denounce his personal friend and prominent conspirator, Manuel 
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González Jonte.197 In 1936, the Divisional Commander’s political ally – Civil Governor José 
María Varela Rendueles – was also a recent arrival in Seville (April 1936).198  
 
Varela Rendueles would never forgive Villa-Abrille for his complicit silence over Queipo de 
Llano’s presence in Seville, especially in view of the fact that both men had forged a friendship 
ever since their professional careers first converged in 1931, when Varela Rendueles served as 
Civil Governor of Guipúzcoa and Villa-Abrille as the Military Commander of Bilbao. Animosity 
between both men erupted when Major Francisco Núñez Martínez de Velasco was accused by 
a subordinate of illegally stockpiling weapons at the Intendencia (Paymaster/Quartermaster 
Corps) barracks. The Divisional General excused Núñez, but Varela Rendueles decided to 
appeal directly to the Prime-minister and demand the transfer of several officers away from 
Seville. Casares Quiroga replied negatively after being swayed by the assurances given to him 
by Villa-Abrille. The Divisional General would, to the bitter end, deny the existence of sedition 
within his garrison. In denial, he organised several innocuous displays of loyalty to the 
Republic, such as during the occasion of the visit of Minister of Agriculture Mariano Ruiz-Funes 
to Seville. On 7 June, Villa-Abrille paid a visit to both Ruiz-Funes and Varela Rendueles, 
accompanied by all corps leaders who swore - one by one – an oath of allegiance to the 
government. This was an entirely counter-productive exercise, since it produced a false sense 
of security among the Republican authorities.199 Despite the theatrical nature of such displays 
of loyalty, several corps leaders, such as Colonel José María Solis, failed to maintain 
appearances. Solis was swiftly replaced by Colonel Manuel Allanegui Lusarreta as leader of the 
Infantry Regiment Granada nº6. Allanegui was, like Villa-Abrille, a recent arrival in a garrison 
mined by sedition. In reality, links between the army and reactionary politics had reached such 
extremes that, for instance, several Artillery officers were providing military training to 
Falangist militants in the months prior to the rebellion. Prominent Falangists in the garrison of 
Seville implicated in the rebellion included: Major Rementería, Captains Gutiérrez Flores, 
Carlos Fernández de Córdoba, Alfonso Ortí Meléndez-Valdés, Modesto Aguilera Morente, 
Francisco Carrillo, Pérez Blázquez, de la Puerta Tamayo, Lieutenants Sack Carunho, García del 
Moral and Lieutenant-Chaplain Ruiz-Zorrilla.200 The Civil Guard had also been corrupted by the 
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Falange. The battle-hardened police force was arguably even more influential than the 
military. Indeed, it was the blasé attitude of Director-General Sanjurjo that sentenced the 
Monarchy of Alfonso XIII to death in April 1931.201 In short, General Villa-Abrille was the leader 
of the II Division in name only.  
 
The extremism of the political right 
On 18 July 1937, General Queipo de Llano used the first anniversary of the rebellion in Seville 
to deliver a scathing verdict on Villa-Abrilles’ character:  
“El general Villa-Abrille no tenía otra aspiración que ser grato a los obreros, fingiéndoles una 
camaradería que no sentía y permitiéndoles – lo deducía de cosas que me contaba – que se 
mofasen de él y le dirigiesen amenazas y groserías que a él le hacían gracia. En una palabra: 
era el trabajo conducente a tenerlos propicios para, en el caso de que llegase lo que todos 
temíamos, tener probabilidades de salvar la piel […], cubierta en envoltura de indignidad.”202   
 
Much more than a personal attack on his former friend, Queipo’s statement was part of wider 
propaganda manoeuvre aimed at hyperbolising the power of the political left in Seville, while 
at the same time ignoring the extremism of the right.  
 
Throughout the II Republic, the capital of Andalucía was known as “Sevilla la roja” (or “red 
Seville”), mainly because of the numerical strength of the extreme-left: Seville was the only 
major city in Spain where the PCE was an influential political force, rivalling the CNT for control 
over the local labour movement. Despite the combative nature of the trade-unions, Seville’s 
political institutions were dominated by the moderate left: the PSOE, Izquierda Republicana 
(IR) and Unión Republicana (UR). Indeed, the capital of Andalucía was the political fiefdom of 
UR leader Diego Martínez Barrio, who hailed from the city and reviled both poles of the 
political spectrum in equal measure. UR militant Augusto Sánchez Regueiro exposed his party’s 
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fears of the far-left in a prophetic letter to Diego Martínez Barrio written a mere three days 
before the outbreak of the rebellion in Seville (15 July):  
“La gravedad de los momentos por que atraviesa la vida de la política republicana requieren 
una urgente depuración en las comisiones Gestoras y demás cargos gubernativos, pues es 
indispensable limpiarlas de todo elemento anárquico-sindicalista y anárquico-comunista, tenga 
la seguridad y no vacile que son los causantes de que el fascismo en un día menos pensado nos 
sorprenda y nos arrolle.”203  
 
The power of the trade-unions, largely measured by the impressive number of their affiliates 
and the violent actions of its radical wing, was elusive. Even the bête noir of the right, the PCE, 
had moderated its stance after managing to secure membership of the Popular Front electoral 
pact with the Republican left in 1936.204 In reality, the numerically-weak extreme-right 
successfully resisted leftist pressure for socio-economic reform. These local dynamics were 
stimulated by a culture of impunity, which in turn allowed the élites to feel secure in face of 
the growing radicalisation of the masses. In Seville, whenever the left raised the political 
stakes, the right surpassed them: the capital of Andalucía featured prominently in all key anti-
Republican episodes, namely in July 1931 (the bloody suppression a CNT strike) and August 
1932 (Sanjurjada). Indeed, the long tentacles of the oligarchy ensured the immediate, albeit 
short-lived, success of General Sanjurjo’s coup in Seville, only for it to be betrayed by events 
elsewhere in Spain (especially Madrid).205 Among those arrested in the wake of the Sanjurjada 
were retired Lieutenant-Colonel (Cavalry) and future Nationalist Civil Governor of Seville Pedro 
Parias González, his son Gonzalo Parias, retired army officer Manuel Díaz Criado, bullfighters 
Algabeño and Joaquín Miranda, judge Eugenio Eizaguirre Pozzi and his son, Sevilla FC 
goalkeeper Guillermo Euizaguirre – aka the “flying angel” – famed for his reflexes as a 
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goalkeeper and his fierceness in battle as an officer of the Foreign Legion.206 The fate of 
Andalucía rested in the hands of a selected élite.   
 
In Seville, the local political right went as far as to purge the more moderate voices from within 
its ranks.  The most spectacular example was the personal vendetta carried out by the 
landowner from Carmona, Luis Alarcón de la Lastra, against fellow CEDA member Manuel 
Giménez Fernández in 1934.207 It was no mere coincidence that Alarcón de la Lastra was part 
of the group affected by Agrarian Reform.208 Minister of Agriculture Giménez Fernández, who 
advocated a conciliatory solution to the issue of land reform, was at the receiving end of the 
full wrath of the Andalucían landed élites. Not even his status as the rising star of Spain’s 
largest right-wing party could avert his political assassination. By April 1935, Giménez 
Fernández was a spent political force and out of a job.209  
 
The influence of the local oligarchy was so crushing that it even provoked the development of 
inferiority complexes among non-elitist members of the political right. For instance, Joaquín 
Miranda’s working-class background was at the root of a “complejo que era humano, en 
Sevilla”.210 The caste system of Andalucía, immutable since medieval times, prevented the 
Falangist leader from being taken seriously by the local élites. Critically, the oligarchy’s refusal 
to alleviate the unbearable economic condition of the lower-classes perpetuated one of 
Spain’s structural problems: the asymmetric distribution of land.211 In addition, the Republic 
was regarded as an intolerable insult to oligarchy’s feudalistic conception of social relations. In 
this worldview, the lower-classes were regarded as a subhuman species and, as far as the élites 
were concerned, “un republicano era un ser execrable”.212 Fanatical belief in these tenets, 
limitless economical resources and an extensive corruption network (that encompassed the 
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Civil Guard) triggered “the greatest imaginable hatred among classes, a complete rupture 
between those who called themselves right and left-wing”, pushing Andalucía to “the brink of 
class war”.213 Already on 15 May, the dockworkers of Seville wrote an angry letter to the 
Ministro de Trabajo denouncing the “capataces reaccionarios que buscan la forma de 
encender la guerra civil en los trabajos diarios en el Puerto.”214  This was the war that the 
oligarchy had been pressing for ever since the proclamation of the II Republic.215 
 
By 1936, the notion that the political system no longer guaranteed the economic interests of 
the middle/upper-classes had crystallised within all right-wing political families in Spain. The 
landed élites started lending credence to right-wing propaganda of an impending Communist 
coup.216  Consequently, rightist violence was both legitimised and rationalised as a pre-emptive 
reaction against a Soviet-sponsored Trojan horse. According to this rationale, criminals of the 
calibre of Manuel Díaz Criado were but “sevillanos[…] amantes del orden e incondicionales de 
la autoridad.”217 In 1931, Captain Díaz Criado, accompanied by his friend Pepe el Algabeño, 
greeted the recent implantation of the Republic by murdering four workers in cold blood 
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(while supposedly escorting them to prison) on the night of 22-23 July.218 Antonio Bahamonde 
described Algabeño as “un tigre vestido de azul”219 and Barbero as a “personalidad 
destacadísima de Falange y señor de vidas y haciendas”.220 The far-left never forgave Díaz 
Criado and his entourage, all of whom came to embody the radicalism of the right. In the 
aftermath of the Sanjurjada, a crowd of workers set fire to the retired bullfighter’s house and 
in 1934 Algabeño was seriously wounded after being shot four times by left-wing extremists.221  
 
Following the electoral victory of the Popular Front, events in Seville began unravelling at a 
vertiginous speed. The Falange started plotting the downfall of the Republic immediately after 
the February elections.222 In May, the sinister Díaz Criado was (again) arrested for being 
involved in a conspiracy to murder President Azaña.223 Two days later (28 April), the PCE-
affiliated workers of the Tablada Military Airfield filed a written protest against Falangist 
worker Gonzalo Garcia, whom they accused of being a “monarquico-fascista hasta la medulla 
de los huesos”. Garcia was protected by Captain Modesto Aguilera Morente, one of the 
leaders of the conspiracy: “Preso el 10 de Agosto por haber contribuido a la Sanjurjada, 
distinguido perseguidor de los trabajadores a los que cuando ha visto en el poder a la reacción 
y al fascismo que son su norte y guía, no se ha recatado de manifestar su desprecio […] 
diciendo con gran jactancia que odia a los comunista[…] Es preciso que te ocupes de este tipo 
o con sus provocaciones va dar lugar a que lo destrocemos”. The situation became so tense 
that, on 19 May, the Communist parliamentary deputy Vicente Uribe passed the complaint to 
the Ministry of War “en evitación de un conflicto de orden público que pudiera surgir en estas 
Fabricas Militares”.224  
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Right-wing extremism infected all army units within the garrison of Seville. In the Artillery 
Corps, Brigada Fernando Aranda Marcelo kept a political log of all soldiers of 1ª Batería del 
Regimiento de Artillería Ligera.225 Just a few days before the outbreak of the rebellion, a group 
of soldiers had begun singing the International when Sergeant Fernández, with a gun in one 
hand and a grenade in the other, broke into the dormitory and imposed silence. On 15 July, 
following the conclusion of a Mass in honour of the recently-murdered Calvo-Sotelo, a crowd 
of right-wing señoritas asked a group of artillery officers gathered outside the Cathedral of 
Seville: “Qué espera el Ejército?”, to which Major Martín de Oliva calmly replied: “No 
tardaremos en actuar.” Meanwhile, the officership of the Zapadores-Minadores (Engineers) 
batallion was so eager to turn against the Republic that “No poco esfuerzos costó […] 
convencer a los exaltados” to keep their sang-froid.226 At Civil Guard headquarters in Seville, 
rousing thanks to God were shouted out immediately after outbreak of the rebellion.227  
 
Queipo returns 
In early July, General Queipo returned to Seville and installed himself in the centrally-located 
Hotel Simón. Shortly after, he received the visit of Major Rementería, who escorted him to a 
meeting attended by Major Cuesta and Captains (Aviation) Francisco Carrillo and Modesto 
Aguilera, both part of the Falange’s Comité Militar presided by Rementería. After being 
informed of Queipo’s presence in Seville, General Villa-Abrille opted to make a quick escape to 
Huelva under the pretext of a military inspection. The resourceful Cuesta was not willing to 
concede defeat just yet and phoned Villa-Abrille’s aide-de-camp to arrange a meeting between 
both generals. When the Divisional General became conscious of what was being concocted, 
he panicked. Villa-Abrille knew that he too was under governmental surveillance and that, 
should he meet Queipo, he would be left with no other option but to denounce his friend.  
Villa-Abrille’s refusal provoked a heated discussion with Cuesta Monereo and Gutiérrez Flores. 
In fact, Cuesta had actually travelled to Huelva with both Captain Carrillo and Queipo whom 
they had left waiting on the outskirts of the city. Falangist reporter Enrique Villa added an 
important detail, deliberately overlooked by Queipo in his memoirs: rather than dismissing the 
conspirators’ proposal, Villa-Abrille attempted to negotiate: “-¿Pero tiene que ser ahora 
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mismo? ¿El general Queipo no puede verme mañana en mi despacho oficial?”228 The entire 
affair laid bare Villa-Abrille’s total lack of control over his own garrison, to the extent that he 
openly attempted to reach an understanding with the conspirators. Meanwhile, General 
Queipo was tormented by the possibility of a denunciation that failed to materialise.229 
 
The details of General Queipo’s final trip to Seville prior to the outbreak of the rebellion are 
already enshrouded in Nationalist mythology. On 16 July, Queipo had just arrived in Madrid 
following an exhausting journey to Málaga when Lieutenant-Colonel Galarza asked the general 
to return immediately to the capital of Andalucía.230 Queipo left Madrid at 23:00 in the 
company of his aide-de-camp, César López-Guerrero, for what appeared to be – according to 
the Carabineros leader - a suicidal mission. Queipo arrived in Seville at 8:00am and checked 
into the Hotel Simón, but did not stay long there. He travelled to Huelva that same afternoon, 
but not before paying a visit to both General Villa-Abrille and the conspiratorial leadership. 
However, Queipo committed a major gaffe: he overlooked official protocol and failed to 
inform Civil Governor Varela Rendueles of his presence in the capital of Andalucía. According 
to his official biography, Queipo’s trip “no tenía más objeto que entretener la impaciencia de la 
espera.” Yet, as soon as the general arrived in Huelva on 18 July, Lieutenant Cano (Oficinas 
Militares), who functioned as Cuesta’s courier, met Queipo at the local cinema and urged him 
to return to Seville immediately.231 The general ignored Cano and decided to continue with his 
scheduled trip to Isla Cristina and Ayamonte. Before that, he visited local Civil Governor 
Jiménez Castellanos, to whom he loudly proclaimed his loyalty to the Republic. Jiménez 
Castellanos was impressed by Queipo’s pledge and telephoned Varela Rendueles to let him 
know.  At this point, since the military uprising had begun on the previous evening, Casares 
Quiroga had ordered that any officer found travelling outside the area where he was posted 
should be arrested. The Civil Guard Commander of Sanlúcar la Mayor to the west of Seville 
telephoned Varela Rendueles and asked whether he should detain Queipo who was en route 
to Seville.  On the basis of the earlier assurances from Jiménez Castellanos, Varela Rendueles 
ordered that Queipo be allowed to continue his journey.232 The naivety of Jiménez Castellanos 
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was excusable: he had arrived in Huelva only on 8 July. Less than a month later (3 August), 
Queipo de Llano showed no mercy when he signed Jiménez Castellanos’ death sentence, 
carried out the following day.233  
 
An absent leader 
There was another contradiction regarding Queipo’s subsequent legend. After bidding farewell 
to Castellanos, and just as he was about to depart for Isla Cristina, Lieutenant Cano intercepted 
Queipo and begged him to return to Seville. This proved to be a key event in the rebellion in 
Seville.234 Queipo de Llano would retrospectively provide an incoherent excuse to justify his 
absence from Seville between the afternoon of the 17th and the morning of 18 July. He claimed 
that, since he heard no news of the outbreak of the rebellion, he opted to go to Huelva in 
order to evade governmental surveillance. The crux of Queipo’s argument was that he had 
already abandoned Seville when Gutiérrez Flores received news of the mutiny in Morocco at 
16:00 on 17 July. Yet, when the general left Madrid on 16 July, he was informed that the coup 
was expected to erupt at any moment and was therefore expected to stay put in Seville.235 
Even if Queipo arrived in Huelva unaware of events in Morocco, Lieutenant Cano must have 
surely updated him. There are two different accounts on what happened next: according to 
Cuesta Monereo, Queipo was still adamant about pursuing his planned trip to Isla Cristina and 
Ayamonte and returned to Seville only after being confronted a second time by Lieutenant 
Cano.236 Queipo presented a different version of events in his radio speech of 29 July. He 
declared that he first encountered Lieutenant Cano after his meeting the Civil Governor of 
Huelva on the morning of 18 July. He also claimed, implausibly, that the plan to visit Isla 
Cristina had only occurred to him a few minutes before his appointment with Jiménez 
Castellanos.237 Queipo’s far-fetched account was supported by his panegyrists, who also 
transformed the moderate Civil Governor of Huelva into a radical leftist.238 Also, Varela 
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Rendueles stated in his memoirs that Queipo told Castellanos that he planned to return to 
Seville and fly from Tablada to Madrid to put himself under the authority of the Popular Front 
government.239 A fourth source dismantled Queipo’s alibi. Reporter Enrique Villa revealed that 
Queipo first met Castellanos on the evening of the 17th, was informed that same evening of the 
mutiny in Morocco, and met the Civil Governor of Huelva for a second time on the morning of 
18 July.240 On 18 July 1937, Queipo attempted to minimise the negative impact of this 
revelation by writing an editorial in Vila’s newspaper, Falange Española, in which he reaffirmed 
that he first became aware of events in Morocco on the morning of 18 July.241 Queipo 
continued to attempt to justify his absence from Seville until the very end of his life. On 18 
June 1950, he wrote to Franco: “marché hacia Huelva con el pretexto de visitar las fuerzas de 
Carabineros allí existentes, con objeto de que mi presencia en Sevilla no infundiese 
sospecha.”242  
 
In all probability, General Queipo considered the possibility of escaping to Portugal should the 
rebellion end in failure. After all, the general had already fled once to Portugal following the 
Cuatro Vientos mutiny of 1930. In Seville, both Cuesta’s plan and the naivety of the recently-
appointed Republican authorities guaranteed the success of the coup; even if its nominal 
leader was nowhere to be found. 
 
The Republic implodes 
At precisely 16:00 on 17 July, Gutiérrez Flores received a telegram from Algeciras reporting 
that a mutiny had erupted in Spanish Morocco. Flores passed the news to Villa-Abrille, but only 
after notifying first fellow conspirators Major Cuesta and Captain Escribano. The Divisional 
General immediately asked for a second confirmation from Algeciras and phoned all garrisons 
under his command to determine if sedition had spread to mainland Spain. All of them 
reported normality. It was at this point that Villa-Abrille ordered Gutiérrez Flores to assume 
command of the Divisional Headquarters for the night. The general was about to leave the 
Headquarters when he received a distressed call from Varela Rendueles. The Civil Governor 
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had just been informed of events in Morocco by the Ministry of the Interior; and of Queipo’s 
presence in Seville by both the PCE and Assault Guard Captain José Álvarez Moreno (Jefe de la 
Brigada Social). The Divisional General played down the entire affair by claiming that the 
Carabineros leader was in a rush to reach Isla Cristina and Ayamonte, where professional 
commitments awaited him.243 After receiving confirmation of the outbreak of the rebellion, 
Villa-Abrille decided to phone again all garrisons, giving them specific instructions to obey only 
orders given directly by him. Gutiérrez Flores lost his temper:    
“¿Ha pensado usted, mi general, en que puede quedarse solo en la actitud que ha adoptado 
respecto al movimiento iniciado en África?... Piense mi general, en la situación ridícula de un 
general a quien no obedecen sus oficiales… Es que cuando mañana desembarquen en los 
puertos de Andalucía nuestras tropas coloniales, no habrá quien las detenga.” 
“Si se produjera el desembarco”, contestó en tonos nerviosos el general, “la guarnición de 
Granada…”  “¿Y si usted ordenase a la guarnición de Granada y ésta no le obedeciese?”244  
 
Gutiérrez Flores was merely stating the obvious: Villa-Abrille had lost all authority and found 
himself trapped in a “situación ridícula”. Still, he was expected to do more than just turning a 
blind eye to the conspiracy. Yet this was precisely what Villa-Abrille did: he chose to ignore 
Gutiérrez Flores’ open act of insubordination and ordered him to phone all garrisons and 
instruct them to report back immediately should any abnormal activity occur. Gutiérrez Flores 
also suggested informing Cuesta of events in Morocco, but Villa-Abrille refused and ordered 
him to stay put at the Divisional Headquarters and wait for further instructions from the 
Ministry of War. In short, Villa-Abrille had entrusted a leading conspirator to act as the first 
channel of communication between the government and the garrison of Seville.  
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From that moment onwards, events started unfolding at a vertiginous pace. Air Force General 
Núñez del Prado phoned Villa-Abrille and ordered him to load with bombs three planes that 
were already on their way to Tablada. Surprisingly, Villa-Abrille trusted this mission to another 
member of the subversive triumvirate, Captain Escribano. When Gutiérrez Flores was informed 
of governmental plans to bomb the insurgents in Morocco, he snapped again. Once more, 
Villa-Abrille attempted to defuse the situation; but Gutiérrez Flores would have none of it. Still, 
the temperamental conspirator remained lucid enough to ask Villa-Abrille if he would accept 
holding a meeting with all corps leaders.  He replied positively and the meeting was scheduled 
for the following morning.245 
 
While Villa-Abrille procrastinated in Seville and Queipo weighed up his options in Huelva; 
Major Cuesta Monereo worked on the final details of his master plan. He was absent during 
most of the afternoon of the 17th in a meeting with Civil Guard Majors Santiago Garrigós 
(Comandancia Exterior) and Ramón Rodríguez Díaz (Comandancia Interior) held at Garrigós’s 
house. The Comandancia Interior Major assured Cuesta that he possessed the influence to 
seize power from his superiors should they decide to side with the Republic. They were: 
Lieutenant-Colonel Jenaro Conde Bujons, Jefe Comandancia Interior; and overall commander 
Colonel Arturo Blanco, who was on sick leave. The contribution of the Civil Guard was critical 
for the success of the conspiracy. For instance, when General Pozas ordered the arrest of all 
officers found travelling outside their respective garrisons, Garrigós overruled this directive. As 
a result, dissident officers enjoying summer leave began pouring into the capital of 
Andalucía.246 
 
A succession of events sealed the fate of the Republic even before a shot was fired in anger. 
Firstly, Captain Escribano and Lieutenant (Artillery) Pedrosa both agreed to contravene 
governmental instructions to load the three planes destined to bomb the insurrectionary 
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forces in Morocco.247 Equally ignored was Varela Rendueles’ order for the printing of leaflets 
calling for the surrender of the Army of Africa, as instructed by the Popular Front government. 
The directive was obeyed only after PCE leader Manuel Delicado intimidated the director of 
newspaper El Liberal. At the same time, Delicado persuaded Varela to accept his suggestion of 
creating mixed patrols of workers and assault guards to keep military barracks under 
surveillance. This proved to be an ephemeral strategy, for General Villa-Abrille decided once 
more to aid the rebel cause. The Divisional General phoned Casares Quiroga to request the 
immediate withdrawal of all mixed brigades on the grounds that their mere presence might be 
read as a provocation. Last but not least, the PCE also unearthed a Falangist plot to attack the 
open-air cinema (cine de verano) located in Seville’s main square, the Plaza Nueva, followed by 
an assault on the Casa del pueblo in calle Cuna. Manuel Delicado managed to alert Assault 
Guard Captain José Álvarez Moreno, who prevented a massacre by ordering the arrests of 
several armed Falangists. The ones that managed to escape vented their frustration by sniping 
at pigeons in the Parque María Luísa.248 Critically, both Delicado and fellow Communist trade-
union leader Saturnino Barneto could not manage to extract from the Civil Governor weapons 
for leftist militias. In reality, Varela Rendueles feared left and right-wing extremism in equal 
measure, a view shared by the Mayor of Seville, Horacio Hermoso Araújo.249  
 
Tablada 
On the night of 17-18 July, three planes (two Fockers and a Douglas of the LAPE, Líneas Aéreas 
Postales Españolas) landed at Tablada, but the bombs requested by the government were 
nowhere to be found. The combined efforts of Escribano and Pedrosa had ensured that the 
only explosives available were those carried by the planes themselves. While the loyalists 
combed Seville for bombs, Captain Carlos Martínez Vara del Rey became agitated and took a 
taxi to the city-centre to update the subversive high-command and request further 
instructions. He met Captain Escribano, who sent him together with Lieutenant Medina to visit 
a number of army barracks, incite treason, return to Tablada, and disable the planes in the way 
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they best saw fit. Captain Alfonso Orti agreed with Escribano, but advised Vara del Rey “que no 
haga nada sin consultar antes al comandante Cuesta”, which he did.250 Major Cuesta allowed 
the fiery Captain to pursue with what was, to all intents and purposes, a suicide mission.251 
Vara del Rey was not isolated in his extremism. When Lieutenant-Colonel Iturzaeta (second-in-
command at the Pineda Artillery barracks) was informed of events in Tablada, he entertained 
the idea of ordering the shelling of Seville’s military airfield.252 The impatience of the local 
rebels almost provoked the premature outbreak of the rebellion (not to mention the bombing 
of Seville’s only airfield and the subsequent impossibility of airlifting the Army of Africa to the 
capital of Andalucía).253 The sophistication of Cuesta’s scheme subdued the more radical 
impulses of Iturzaeta but not those of Vara del Rey who, as soon as he returned to Tablada and 
armed with a rifle, headed straight to the Douglas and fired at it, damaging the plane. The 
workers reacted immediately. A brief gun-battle ensued in which the rebel captain was shot 
and slightly injured. Lieutenant Medina and number of other officers attempted to protect 
Vara del Rey, but it was the leader of the airbase, loyalist Major Rafael Martínez Estévez who 
prevented a certain lynching. Estévez ordered the immediate arrests of Vara del Rey, Major 
Azaola and Captain Carrillo. Lieutenant Medina was placed under house arrest and Captain 
Aguilera, who arrived at Tablada when the incident had already concluded, was bizarrely 
ordered to place himself under house arrest.254 Major Estévez managed to control the 
situation partly thanks to the intervention of the pilots from Madrid, in particular Major 
(Aviation) Rexach.  One of the three planes, a Focker, eventually left for Morocco at 11:00am; 
however, the bombs it carried originated from Madrid since the local ones, when they finally 
arrived at Tablada, were sabotaged. Eventually, despite the serious nature of Vara del Rey’s 
actions, Estévez excused them to Villa-Abrille by claiming that the captain was drunk at the 
time of the incident. The Divisional General, in turn, played down the entire affair to Varela 
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Rendueles.255 Meanwhile, Queipo arrived in Seville oblivious to the series of events that had 
just occurred at Tablada. Regardless, Air Force General Alfredo Kindelán, would later present 
an alternative version of the Tablada incident so to include the General Queipo de Llano in the 
narrative: “El aérodromo de Sevilla no había sido nuestro desde el principio; pero la decisión 
de Queipo de Llano, valientemente secundado por Azaola, Carrillo, Vara del Rey, Aguilera y 
otros, lo hizo pasar a nuestras mano sin deterioros.”256 
 
Queipo de Llano in Seville 
General Queipo de Llano arrived in Seville on the morning of 18 July. Shortly afterwards, 
Algabeño paid a brief visit to the general before leaving to inform the Falange of the imminent 
outbreak of the rebellion.257 A year later, Queipo de Llano embellished the episode by 
affirming that both he and Algabeño were deeply-concerned about the Republicalism of the 
garrison of Seville. The ever-faithful López-Guerrero corroborated Queipo’s story by stating 
that Seville “se contaba perdida”.258 Meanwhile, Garrigós manipulated a bando (edict) released 
by Varela Rendueles on 16 July in the same way as he had previously distorted General Pozas’ 
orders. Civil and assault guards patrolled the working-class districts of Seville whilst leaving 
army barracks unchecked. Oblivious to all this, the Civil Governor gave a press conference in 
which he declared that: “La normalidad en la provincia de Sevilla es reflejo exacto de la que 
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existe en toda la Península”.259  At the same time, the local Republican authorities reasserted 
its democratic commitment against both poles of the political spectrum, especially after 
Municipal Guard Agustín Carmet was murdered by left-wing radicals on the night of 17-18 July. 
The following morning, UR councillor Ángel Casal presented a motion of protest denouncing 
the assassination, backed by all political parties represented in the Town Hall. Communist 
councillor González Lora was particularly incensed by the killing. The session ended at 13:25, 
while the meeting at the nearby Diputación Provincial concluded earlier, at around noon. 
Afterwards, most provincial councillors, including President José María Puelles, went to the 
nearby Hotel Majestic to celebrate the birthday of right-wing provincial secretary Federico 
Villanova.  The local representatives of the Republic might have been vaguely aware of the 
conspiracy, but remained ignorant of Mola’s repressive project, which called for “castigos 
ejemplares” against the Republican political class.260 For instance, Mayor Horacio Hermoso 
rejected an offer from his PCE-affiliated chauffer to drive him away to safety. Both Puelles and 
Hermoso were later executed by the victorious rebels.261  
 
The myth of General Queipo de Llano 
At around noon of 18 July, all corps leaders and high-ranking army officers in Seville gathered 
at the Divisional Headquarters to swear an oath of allegiance to the Republic.262 General 
López-Viota, Colonels Allanegui and Mateos, and Major Estévez were isolated in their genuine 
support for the government. All other military leaders were happy to swear an empty vow. For 
that same reason, Major Estévez was not reassured by Villa-Abrille’s guarantees that the II 
Division remained loyal to the Republic. Devoid of arguments, the Divisional General abruptly 
decided to conclude the meeting. Villa-Abrille’s delusional optimism was shattered only a few 
minutes later. The general became apprehensive after noticing the unauthorised presence of 
several right-wing extremists at the Divisional Headquarters, including Manuel Díaz Criado.263 
The general lost his composure and entered into a heated argument with Major Cuesta. The 
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events that followed were hijacked by Nationalist historiography, which turned History into 
myth: Queipo claimed that he single-handedly arrested Generals Villa-Abrille and Julián López-
Viota, their respective aide-de-camps, and Major (Estado Mayor) Hidalgo following a brief 
confrontation in which the Divisional General’s cowardice – a symbol of the wider cowardice of 
the Republic - was exposed.264 In 1967, the retired Nationalist Chief of Press stated in his 
memoirs that General Villa-Abrille and Colonel Allanegui “could have overpowered him 
[Queipo], but they lacked the moral courage to do this.”265 The central proposition was that 
the Republic’s moral inferiority, a direct consequence of its ideological degeneracy, permitted 
Queipo to capture Seville. This hypothesis was supported by a wealth of ‘evidence’, including 
‘proof’ of divine intervention in favour of the rebels.266 General Queipo was the greatest 
promoter of his legend, going as far as ridiculing the Archbishop of Seville. The rebel general 
claimed that when he informed Cardinal Ilundáin of his plans to capture the capital of 
Andalucía with a few soldaditos and the help of God, Ilundáin tried to persuade him to 
abandon the suicide mission. Queipo later joked that the Archbishop of Seville was an 
atheist.267 
 
In reality, neither was Cardinal Ilundáin an atheist, nor did Queipo enter into a heated 
confrontation with Villa-Abrille. The rebel general met his old friend just before the meeting 
that took place at around noon of 18 July at the Divisional Headquarters.268 Queipo later 
denied the existence of this encounter only for Cuesta Monereo to refresh his memory in a 
private letter in which he wrote that “Su memoria en este asunto no le es totalmente fiel.”269 
General Queipo’s selective amnesia was understandable: acknowledging that he had met Villa-
Abrille just a few hours before the outbreak of the rebellion would undermine his own legend. 
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Eventually, the general’s desperation reached such proportions that he eventually claimed to 
have punched Villa-Abrille during the Divisional General’s arrest.270 Reality differed 
considerably from propaganda: Colonel Hornillos provided a very different version of events, 
corroborated by Major Allende. He told the Military Tribunal in Seville that Queipo did not 
punch but embraced his friend, followed by a friendly discussion: 
“General Queipo de Llano, quien abrazando al General y manteniendo con él una conversación 
más bien amistosa y seguidos de los demás oficiales entraron en el despacho quedándose el 
dicente fuera sin poder oír la conversación que dentro se mantuvo si comprendió que ambos 
Generales trataban de convencerse mutuamente”.271  
 
General Viota also refused to denounce Queipo de Llano and adopted a neutral stance when 
sedition exploded in Seville. As a result, he only received a light sentence in a time of court-
martials and summary executions. A secret report from the Divisional Headquarters marked 
“MUY RESERVADO” read: 
“Excmo Sr.- Dispuesto por Decreto fecha 23 del mes actual, pase a situación de segunda 
reserva el Excmo. Sr. General de Brigada DON JULIAN LOPEZ VIOTA;  de orden de S.E. el 
Generalisimo de los Ejercitos Nacionales, comunicará V.E. a dicho General que el motivo 
fundamental en virtud del cual ha adoptado la Junta Superior del Ejercito, con respecto a él, la 
determinación indicada, ha sido la de haber observado, en los momentos graves, por que ha 
atravesado la Patria, una notoria falta de celo.- Igualmente notificará V.E. a dicho General que 
oportunamente le será señalado por esta Secretaria de Guerra el haber pasivo que pueda 
corresponderle, así como que, a la mayor brevedad, traslade su residencia a Estella (Navarra).- 
Del cumplimiento de esta orden espero me de V.E. el debido conocimiento.- 
Se traslada a ese Negociado para conocimiento y efectos. 
Sevilla 1º Enero de 1.937.”272  
 
Villa-Abrille’s apathy was equally comprehensible: he was aware of Queipo’s violent 
personality and was intimidated by the extremism of the local garrison. On the one hand, Villa-
Abrille’s Republicanism prevented him from joining the conspiracy; while on the other he 
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hoped that his silence would spare him from execution. A prisoner in a gilded cage, all that was 
left for the Divisional General to do was hope for the defeat of the coup in the rest of Spain. 
 
Victory by magic 
If the account of the arrest of General Villa-Abrille strikes one as questionable, the seizing of 
the Infantry barracks and the capture of Colonel Allanegui can only be regarded as magical. 
According to Nationalist historiography, General Queipo disregarded his own safety and went 
to the nearby Infantry barracks (Granada nº6) accompanied only by his aide-de-camp, and 
Captains Gutiérrez Flores and Lapatza, to try to persuade Republican Colonel Manuel Allanegui 
Lusarreta to throw his lot with the insurgents. Queipo attempted to trick Allanegui by 
pretending to assume that the colonel had already adhered to the rebellion. Having failed to 
surprise Allanegui with his clever subterfuge, Queipo then attempted to negotiate a deal, but 
the Colonel refused to listen to his proposal. It is alleged that it was at this precise moment 
that Queipo de Llano, in a truly legendary demonstration of bravery, instructed López-
Guerrero to return to the Divisional Headquarters and bring Major Cuesta to mediate the 
dispute. The rebel general was then left alone in the Granada nº6 barracks, surrounded by a 
crowd of hostile officers. Miraculously, nobody dared to arrest him. Nationalist historiography 
claimed that most officers implicitly recognised the legitimacy of General Queipo’s actions. 
Meanwhile, the rebel general considered solving the stalemate “a tiros”; in other words, to 
fight the entire Granada nº6 regiment on his own.273 Queipo claimed that he arrested 
Allanegui and all loyalist officers after threatening to resort to violence. Just before that, he 
offered command of the Infantry Corps to both Lieutenant-Colonel Berzosa and Major 
Gutiérrez Pérez, who declined the proposal. Both men cited fears of possible repeat of the 
Sanjurjada to justify their negative reply. Command was then briefly assumed by Falangist 
Captain Fernández de Córdoba before a contrite Gutiérrez Pérez was reinstated and placed in 
charge of the regiment. Fernández de Córdoba did not appear to have taken offense over his 
abrupt demotion and would soon give free reign to his visceral anti-Republicanism in Seville’s 
city-centre.274 
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Yet again, reality differed considerably from Nationalist propaganda. According to the 
statements of both Colonel Hornillos and Lieutenant-Colonel Berzosa to the Military Tribunal 
in Seville, Queipo was not left alone in the Granada nº6 barracks. Furthermore, a number of 
‘loyalist’ officers urged Colonel Allanegui to join the rebellion, most notably Captain Fernández 
de Córdoba. When the colonel reaffirmed his Republicanism, Queipo suggested that they 
should consult General Villa-Abrille to solve the impasse. The objective was to lure the leader 
of the Infantry Corps to the Divisional Headquarters. The colonel fell into the trap: when both 
Allanegui and Berzosa arrived at the Divisional Headquarters, they were instructed to hand 
over their weapons and placed under arrest.275  
 
Queipo and the magical victory  
According to Nationalist mythology, the legendary capture of the Granada nº6 barracks 
legitimised the coup d’état. Bravery sufficed to justify the violent dismantling of the Republic in 
the capital of Andalucía. Furthermore, the incomprehensible passivity demonstrated by loyalist 
officers – especially General Villa-Abrille and Colonel Allanegui – was rationalised as a 
manifestation of the ideological inferiority of the Republic vis-à-vis the Nationalist cause. In 
deep contrast, General Queipo was motivated by the superior nature of his ideal – the rescuing 
of the Patria -, which allowed him to achieve a military feat of legendary proportions. Lastly, 
Nationalist mythology metamorphosed General Queipo from a Republican into a reactionary 
military icon. Queipo grabbed the opportunity to rewrite History with both hands and rapidly 
became the fiercest guardian of his own myth. For instance, he declared in 1940 that General 
Fanjul told him that “Como le indicase que en Andalucía no podía hacer nada, puesto que no 
se contaba con elementos de ninguna clase, me contestó que todos estaban de acuerdo en 
que yo era el único que podía acometer aquella empresa.”276 As a consequence, General 
Queipo’s recent past of ever-shifting political loyalties was bizarrely reinterpreted as a life 
“limpia hasta en sus errores”.277 However, the past would continue to haunt the self-
proclaimed ‘saviour of Seville’. On 20 July 1936, an article in Portuguese daily O Século read: 
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“O general Queipo de Llano que aparece no movimento de revolta do Exercito espanhol como 
comandante das forças de Sevilha, tem o seu nome estreitamente ligado às varias tentativas 
para a implantação da Republica no país vizinho, como o tem à campanha de Marrocos, onde 
ganhou, pelos seus méritos e energia, um alto prestigio. 
A sua carreira militar, esmaltada por serviços brilhantes, tanto em África como na metrópole, 
foi para os republicanos uma garantia de que lhe podia ser confiado um alto posto no 
movimento que havia de derrubar o trono. Foi assim que Queipo de Llano se refugiou um dia 
em Portugal, fracassado o movimento da aviação de Cuatro Vientos, poucos meses antes da 
implantação da Republica. Daquela vez, acompanhava-o o capitão aviador Ramón Franco, que 
mais tarde, o censurou num livro, a propósito daquele movimento.  
Agora, tem a seu lado o general Franco, irmão daquele aviador.”278  
 
General Mola’s plot succeeded in Seville: he placed General Queipo de Llano nominally in 
command of a rebellion that had already been planned by its local Director, Major Cuesta 
Monereo. This effectively prevented a repeat of the Cuatro Vientos fiasco of 1930. As for 
Queipo, he was happy to be placed symbolically in charge of a coup that would allow him to 
rewrite his own personal history. However, Mola had very different plans for his former foe-
turned-ally: Queipo’s mission in Seville was not to gain the capital of Andalucía for the 
rebellion, already secured by Major Cuesta; but to enforce the Director’s repressive project. As 
early as June 1936, Mola had confided to Queipo that “Andalucía necesita un hombre de 
arranque y de empuje”.279  
 
The Director therefore exploited the only constant in General Queipo’s military career – 
violence – and trusted the volatile general with the truly monumental task of exterminating 
the Republic in one of the strongholds of the Popular Front.280 At the same time, the 
insurgents had erected a structure with clay feet. The legitimacy of the rebellion in the south 
was based on the unstable foundation that was the unpredictable personality of General 
Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y Sierra. 
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The episode of the taking of ‘red Seville’, the first and also the most enduring of Nationalist 
myths, persists to the very present. The first version of the legend of Queipo de Llano and his 
soldaditos was presented by the rebel general himself during his triumphant radio speech 
(charla) of 23 July 1936, immediately after the pacification of the working-class districts of 
Seville. Ironically, the tale of the soldaditos, which started out as just another of Queipo’s 
frequent verbal outbursts, was progressively embellished, rapidly growing out of all 
proportion.  It gained a life of its own and developed into a myth for three reasons: a) to 
underpin the legend that a Communist coup had been prevented; b) to legitimise the 18 July 
rising; and c) to metamorphose Queipo from a Republican into an anti-Republican icon (his 
past actions now excused as “actuación equivocada”).281 However, on 23 July 1936, the rebel 
general’s initial objective was simply to magnify his role in the local rebellion. The details of the 
story were truly spectacular, as befitted Queipo’s eccentric personality.  
 
In a nutshell, Queipo de Llano claimed that on 18 July his 180 rebel soldiers defeated the 600 
Republican assault guards defending the Civil Government: “La situación fue resuelta en Sevilla 
por un puñado de soldaditos que marcharon contra las autoridades rojas que en aquellas 
horas disponía de medios de combate muy superiores.”282 The foundation of the myth was the 
casus belli for the July coup: a pre-emptive strike against an imminent Soviet-sponsored 
revolution, spearheaded by native ‘Marxist hordes’. Queipo de Llano’s imagination armed and 
expanded their number, while at the same time handing himself all the credit for the success 
of the rising in Seville. As the legend gained substance, courtesy of Queipo’s solipsistic 
behaviour, the Nationalist leadership came to regard it as the panacea for the rebel crisis of 
legitimacy. A year later (29 September 1937), the tale of the soldaditos was elevated to the 
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pantheon of official Nationalist History when the Medalla Militar Colectiva was bestowed on 
the garrison of Seville (Boletín Oficial de Estado nº351). In order to transform myth into 
History, the rebel high-command decreed that:  
“sólo tendrían derecho a ostentar el distintivo correspondiente por que lucharon en la calle 
con las armas en la mano, y como fuerzas militarmente organizadas, desde las 15 horas, en 
que se declaró el Estado de guerra, hasta las 19,30, hora de rendición del Gobierno Civil, a 
partir de cuyo momento se consideró triunfante el Movimiento en la Capital.”283 
 
The eligibility conditions for recipients of the honour were as restrictive as they were bizarre: 
they excluded anyone who was not part of an official military/paramilitary group on 18 July 
1936; anyone who being part of such a group did not fight, literally, in the streets (for instance, 
a soldier firing from a building would not qualify as having participated in the coup); anyone 
who did fight but only after 19:30. Moreover, the list (and number) of recipients was never 
made public. The episode of the Medalla Militar is therefore as confusing and enshrouded in 
mystery as is the taking of the capital of Andalucía. Ironically, the first crack in the myth was 
provoked by the rebels themselves, more specifically by the same soldiers that participated in 
the ‘miracle’ of Seville.284 Only a few weeks after the announcement of the Medalla Militar, 
the offices of the II Division were flooded by a torrent of written complaints from individuals 
that felt unjustly excluded from the decoration. 
 
Part I: The coup d’état  
 A three-man rebellion 
Nationalist secrecy concerning the Medalla Militar contrasted deeply with Queipo’s shameless 
self-promotion campaign, which reached its climax during the first anniversary of the rebellion.  
At the same time as the stream of formal protests was quietly archived, the rebel general 
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y como fuerzas militarmente organizadas, desde las 15 horas, en que se declaró el Estado de guerra, 
hasta las 19,30, hora de rendición del Gobierno Civil, a partir de cuyo momento se consideró triunfante 
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provided a profoundly narcissistic – and fictional - account of the coup: he stated that at 13:45 
on 18 July only himself, his aide-de-camp (López-Guerrero) and Major Cuesta Monereo had 
mutinied in the capital of Andalucía. Queipo added that a mere fifteen minutes later the three 
insurgents had ‘miraculously’ arrested two generals, two colonels, one lieutenant-colonel and 
two majors.285 He was therefore reinforcing the first part of the myth: the legend of Queipo de 
Llano. 
 
Reality differed considerably from Queipo’s colourful tale. In truth, victory for the insurgents 
had been assured long before the rebel general made his ‘miraculous’ intervention in Seville. 
The Republic had already been defeated locally once in August 1932 and was now starved of 
weapons from the moment Captain (Engineer) Corretger and Lieutenant Sack Caruncho 
(“militar y falangista cien por cien”286) surreptitiously seized the Parque de Artillería.287  Heavy 
machine-guns had already been set up in defensive positions during the night of 17-18 July.288 
Moreover, all key communication lines fell rapidly under rebel control. For instance, retired 
Major (Engineer) Fontán de la Orden and Major Cuesta Monereo made arrangements for the 
swift capture of Unión Radio by a mixed unit of civil guards (Miraflores post), Cavalry and 
Infantry soldiers.289 The leader of the Jefatura de Transportes Militares, Intendencia Major Jose 
Garcia Fuentes, subsequently submitted a written complaint denouncing the fact that his unit 
was not awarded the Medalla Militar despite contributing to the coup by “requisando toda 
clase de vehículos y surtidores de gasolina”.290 22 soldiers stationed at the Pirotecnia on 18 July 
were also overlooked for the decoration, including Lieutenant-Colonel José Sánchez Garcia and 
Majors Manuel Carmona Pérez de Vera and Pedro Fernández Palomino.291 Both reports 
revealed that General Queipo’s ‘miracle’ was but an expertly-planned mutiny that included the 
participation of all military corps in the garrison of Seville.  
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The myth of the soldaditos 
Captain Corrales and Lieutenant Antonio Álvarez-Rementería (brother of Eduardo Álvarez-
Rementería) did not witness the ‘miraculous’ (or magical) arrests of General Villa-Abrille and 
Colonel Allanegui, but arrived at the Infantry barracks just in time to observe the birth of the 
myth of the soldaditos. Both men listened attentively to General Queipo’s harangue to a 
meagre crowd of 130 soldiers (journalist Enrique Villa mentions 160), all of whom were 
induced into believing that they were being sent to save - and not destroy - the Republic. At 
around 15:00, Captain Rodríguez Trasellas and Falangist Lieutenant García del Moral left the 
Cuartel San Hermenegildo with the 130 soldaditos to declare the state of war in both the Plaza 
del Duque and Plaza Nueva. As the unit progressed towards its objective, it placed 
detachments of troops in the narrow streets leading to Seville’s main square (Plaza Nueva), 
where the key institutions of political power were located: Town Hall and Civil Government. 
Both officers received explicit instructions to carry out their mission as quietly as possible so 
not to arouse any suspicion. The confused bystanders could never predict that the military 
edict (bando) informally read out to them would become the backbone of Seville’s judicial 
system for the subsequent three years.292  
 
Mystified by the unusual movement of troops, Civil Governor Varela Rendueles ordered an 
Assault Guard patrol to intercept the rebels. However, the paramilitary unit fell victim to the 
deceitful tactics of Captain Trasellas, who instructed his men to shout Republican slogans 
during the short trip from the Divisional Headquarters to the Plaza Nueva in what would prove 
to be a recurrent tactic adopted by the Nationalists.293 Varela Rendeles was perplexed as he 
saw insurgent Infantry soldiers and loyalist assault guards proclaiming the bando side-by-side 
(the same bando was later used to justify the extra-judicial execution of Assault Guard leader 
Major José Loureiro). In despair, the civil governor was left with no option but to risk the life of 
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his own brother, Joaquín, whom he sent to clarify the situation. Following Joaquín Varela 
Rendueles’ dramatic intervention, heavy gunfire broke out in and around the Plaza Nueva. The 
rebellion had officially erupted in Seville with the Republic already on the defensive, its 
leadership confused by the cunning of Major Cuesta Monereo, the exhausted Assault Guard 
either dispersed or resting (between the hours of 14:00-17:00, as instructed by the Civil 
Governor), and the rebels exactly where they wanted to be: in the Plaza Nueva.294  
 
Official Francoist historiography later claimed that 180 (or 130 or 160, depending on the 
source) soldaditos achieved a ‘miraculous’ military victory that revealed the moral superiority 
of the rebel cause, confirmed by the protective influence of a higher power (God): the myth of 
the soldaditos.295 Ironically, Ignacio Rodríguez Trasellas never lived to witness the complete 
metamorphosis of the coup into a legend. On 20 August 1936, he died of a heart attack while 
attending Mass in Aracena (Huelva) the day after the occupation of the town.296 
 
The Assault Guard 
The Assault Guard reacted immediately to Varela Rendueles’ order and barricaded itself in the 
high-rise telephone company building (Telefónica), the nearby Hotel Inglaterra (located in 
front of the Civil Government, thus functioning as a protective barrier), and the Civil 
Government. The attacking troops were forced into a tactical retreat. An Infantry unit armed 
with mortars and heavy machine-guns headed by Captain Carlos Fernández de Córdoba was 
scrambled to relieve the struggling insurgent soldiers only to be surprised by the tenacity of 
the assault guards, who captured a heavy machine-gun and injured the rebel captain in the 
face. Fernández de Córdoba eventually managed to escape inside the Town Hall, but was 
immediately placed under arrest on the orders of Mayor Horacio Hermoso, who prevented a 
certain lynching. The Mayor of Seville also instructed for first aid to be given to his prisoner. 
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Meanwhile, a group of heavily-armed young Falangists driving a car burst into the Plaza Nueva 
firing at random. Their recklessness proved fatal: the aristocratic José Ignacio Benjumea was 
shot and mortally wounded. He was later ‘canonised’ as the the first Nationalist ‘martyr’ of 
Seville; his death cynically exploited to consecrate the myth of General Queipo de Llano.297  
 
The defensive grit of the Assault Guard delayed, but could never prevent, the inevitable 
collapse of the pro-Republican forces. The transient nature of the government’s military 
superiority was crudely exposed when the Assault Guard realised its inability to mount an 
effective counter-attack after initially forcing the rebels to retreat back to both the Cuartel de 
San Hermenegildo and the Divisional Headquarters.298 The paramilitary group not only failed to 
seize both buildings, but was overpowered by an artillery unit that also captured one of the 
Assault Guard’s three armoured vehicles.299 To make matters worse, around 150 assault 
guards were arrested and later coerced into fighting on the insurgent side.300 By then, it was 
already evident that the Assault Guard was isolated in its loyalty to the Republic.  
 
Queipo de Llano subsequently demonised the Assault Guard; however, a secret document 
from Seville’s Military Tribunal revealed that on the afternoon of 18 July the paramilitary unit 
saved a small party of captured Civil Guards at the La Alameda Headquarters from execution at 
the hands of leftist militants enraged by the earlier massacre of several residents of La 
Macarena:  
“Mi Capitán, dos o tres comunistas que están hablando ahí con un grupo de Asalto les están 
diciendo, que yo acabo de oírlo, que qué esperan para asesinarlos, pues la Guardia Civil son 
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unos canallas y ahora mismo hemos pasado nosotros por el Cuartel de la Macarena y nos han 
tiroteado desde el Cuartel.”301 
 
The victory of deceit, part I 
While Captain Fernández de Córdoba struggled to contain the Assault Guard in the city-centre, 
Captain Escribano ordered Major Núñez of the Intendencia Corps to strike directly at the heart 
of the Republic: the Civil Government.302 Núñez woke up his soldiers in the middle of the siesta 
and headed straight to the administrative center of Seville; but not before organising both the 
defence of the Intendencia Headquarters and the patrolling of nearby streets.303 Núñez’s 
mission was consistent with Cuesta’s plan to capture Seville by way of deception: the 
Intendencia Major had cultivated an artificial friendship with Varela Rendueles during the 
previous months in order to keep a watchful eye over the Republican authorities. Núñez made 
the most of his duplicity: he mimicked Captain Trasellas and also ordered the 76 men under his 
command (General Queipo later reduced the number to 40 to safeguard his myth304) to shout 
Republican slogans during the short trip from the Puerta de la Carne barracks the Civil 
Government.305 At the same time, the 53 soldiers of the Sección de Destinos were instructed to 
protect the Intendencia headquarters, which they did, “cooperando á la defensa del Cuartel de 
Intendencia, así como en las inmediaciones del mismo a restablecer el orden deteniendo y 
cacheando al personal paisano y sosteniendo tiroteo con los sediciosos en las calles de ésta 
Ciudad y conducción de presos.”306  
 
Another group of 78 Intendencia soldiers was also ordered to defend the barracks, 
“respondiendo en todo momento al fuego que se le hacía desde bocacalles y azoteas”. After 
securing the area, the insurgents organised patrols to sweep the entire northern sector of 
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Seville.307 Simultaneously, the Sanidad Corps under the command of Major Altube helped 
establish a protective cordon that sealed-off the working-class district of the Gran Plaza from 
the city-centre. All three military units were excluded from the Medalla Militar, since 
acknowledging the presence of an extra 207 soldiers in Seville would suffice to dismantle the 
fragile myth of the soldaditos. Still, their contribution proved vital for the success of the 
rebellion: they not only prevented left-wing militias from reaching the city-centre, but also 
tightened the noose that would eventually asphyxiate the Republic.   
 
Meanwhile, Major Núñez accomplished in minutes what Captains Trasellas and Fernández de 
Córdoba could not achieve in hours: to penetrate the Civil Government. The local guards 
recognised the Intendencia Major from his frequent gatherings with the Civil Governor and 
granted him access into the building, but not – critically - to the men under his command. 
Núñez believed that perhaps he would be capable of arresting his ‘friend’ on his own; 
however, he was visibly unnerved by the presence of a large group of armed men, including 
Major José Loureiro (accompanied by a number of Assault Guard officers) and trade-union 
leader Saturnino Barneto (also flanked by several PCE militants). Núñez exploited the reigning 
confusion to make a timely escape and head straight to the Divisional Headquarters where he 
passed key information to General Queipo, including news of Varela’s ignorance of Villa-
Abrille’s arrest. Ultimately, the Intendencia Major might have failed in his mission to capture 
the Civil Government, but the Republic remained paralysed by doubt.308  
 
After listening attentively to Núñez’s report, the rebel leadership ordered the Intendencia 
Major to direct the assault against the Telefónica. In order to avoid a certain confrontation 
with the Assault Guard before reaching the Plaza Nueva, Núñez opted to take an alternative 
route back to the city-centre. In doing so, his unit would have forcibly to pass in front the Casa 
del Pueblo, the hub of left-wing trade-unionism in Seville. Yet again, Núñez tricked the local 
workers, who hailed the insurgents as saviours. In the Plaza Nueva, the Intendencia group 
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teamed-up with Infantry and Engineer soldiers already laying siege to the Telefónica.309 
Nationalist historiography remained mute regarding the involvement of the Engineers and the 
Requeté, confirmed by Núñez’s statement.310 Núñez also declared that his group of six men 
captured the Town Hall and arrested 50 or 60 municipal guards (including its leader, Major 
Rafael Lora).311 The Intendencia Major freed Captain Fernández de Córdoba, who arrested both 
Mayor Horacio Hermoso and Councillor Ángel Casal. Meanwhile, rebel sympathisers started 
massing at the gates of the insurrectionary barracks demanding weapons. Captain Eduardo 
Álvarez-Rementería handed to each a rifle, ammunition and identification cards. Carlist 
Captain Benítez Tatay separately armed the Requeté. Unlike Varela Rendueles, who feared the 
growing influence of the radical-left; the insurgents stockpiled weapons reserved for far-right 
extremists. Sensing that the balance of power had tilted decisively in his favour, General 
Queipo sent a letter to Varela Rendueles via a captured assault guard in which he intimidated 
the Civil Governor into accepting an unconditional surrender or else be made responsible for 
all the bloodshed in Seville. Varela called Queipo’s bluff. He made an appeal for a general 
strike via the radio and raised the Republican flag in the Civil Government. The civil governor 
also ordered the printing of leaflets at the El Liberal offices to be dropped by planes on both 
the city-centre and the working-class districts of Seville (to elucidate the population as to the 
true nature of the rebellion). Queipo partly mimicked the Varela Rendueles ploy by also raising 
the Republican flag in the Divisional Headquarters, but his intentions could not have been 
more antipodal: to disorient the militant left.312  
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The Civil Guard 
At around 17:00, a tiny detachment of twelve civil guards arrived at the Civil Government and 
placed themselves under the authority of Varela Rendueles, who was unaware that the group 
functioned as mere decoys. Shortly afterwards, genuine reinforcements in the shape of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Genaro Conde Bujons (Jefe del Interior), Major Rodríguez and Lieutenant 
Juan Masse Esquivel arrived at the Plaza de San Francisco to support Núñez’s assault on the 
Telefónica. Both men had earlier assured Varela Rendueles of their loyalty to the Republic and 
produced a series of excuses for not making an appearance in the Civil Government. They were 
nevertheless impeded from reaching the Divisional Headquarters by an assault guard patrol.  
However, that did not deter the Civil Guard from mobilising en masse against the 
government.313 At around 16:00-16:30, the majority of effectives assembled at their 
headquarters, the Cuartel de San Felipe (calle Gerona). The unusual movement of troops, as 
well as the illegal stockpiling of weapons and ammunition, alerted the trade-unions and the 
headquarters came under attack by a group of around forty militiamen, resulting in a “nutrido 
tiroteo”:  
“fue atacada la casa-Cuartel de San Felipe por elementos marxistas con propósito de asaltarla, 
quizás por conocer se encontraba en ella depositadas centenares de armas largas rayadas y 
cortas, bombas de mano y miles de cartuchos almacenados en el repuesto de ambas 
Comandancias de Sevilla Interior y Exterior”.314  
 
The heavily-armed Civil Guard not only repelled the assault, but also gained control over all key 
streets connecting the working-class districts to the city-centre. Furthermore, Major Garrigós 
ordered a group of four civil guards to function as couriers, driving to the Divisional 
Headquarters, Infantry barracks, Telefónica, Casa de Correos “y otros sectores de la capital 
siendo agredidos durante el trayecto y teniendo que repeler las continuas agresiones 
continuando en servicio durante todo el día y sucesivos”. All were excluded from the Medalla 
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Militar.315 Another group of six left the Parque Movil in a truck to collect 36 civil guards from 
the Burgos Comandancia (headed by Corporal Don Victorino Gonzalez) trapped in the San 
Jerónimo train station. The same unit also transported loyalist detainees to the Provincial 
Prison under intense gunfire.  Later that day, the rebels ordered the Burgos civil guards to 
disperse a loyalist crowd in calle Reyes Católicos. Lastly, the unit also participated in the battle 
of the Plaza Nueva, “luchando con las armas en la mano y repeliendo las agresiones de que 
eran objeto por parte de los marxistas”.316  
 
Queipo de Llano attempted to silence the involvement of the Civil Guard in the insurgency and 
the only source to provide a figure (much to the exasperation of the rebel general) was 
reporter Enrique Vila, who claimed that 90 civil guards participated in the taking of Seville.317 
This was a particularly cruel omission, since the Civil Guard suffered a considerable casualty 
rate, including two dead during a brief gun-battle after a group of leftist militants driving a car 
stormed at full-speed into the Plaza de San Francisco.318 Needless to say, the contribution of 
the battle-hardened paramilitary corps proved decisive for the success of the rebellion. 
 
The Republic versus the garrison of Seville 
The fate of the Republic became clear when Cavalry Colonel Santiago Mateo was arrested by 
both Major Figuerola (his second-in-command) and Captain Rojas. Captain Francisco Parlade y 
Ibarra, a radical rightist who had served a 12 year prison sentence for his involvement in 
several anti-Republican plots; also participated in Mateo’s detention.319 In a crude inversion of 
responsibilities, Colonel Mateo was subsequently court-martialled, sentenced to death for 
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military rebellion for organising a Cavalry party headed by Lieutenant Rincón to protect the 
civil government; and executed on 18 September 1936.320 In other words, Mateo had rebelled 
against the rebellion; an example of ‘reverse justice’.  
 
At the same time, Varela Rendueles ordered Lieutenant Rincón to secure the Puente de Triana 
and instructed working-class militants to abstain from attacking the cavalry unit. It was 
precisely at this point that Rincón decided to head straight to the Divisional Headquarters and 
put himself under the authority of General Queipo de Llano. Meanwhile, Artillery Colonel 
Santos Rodríguez Cerezo, who harboured deep reservations about joining the rebellion, was 
intimidated by extremist Lieutenant-Colonel Iturzaeta (his second-in-command) and the 
remainder of his reactionary officer caste and threw his lot with the insurgents.321 Indeed, the 
Artillery Corps was dominated by a reactionary officer caste poisoned by extremist 
propaganda.322 
 
At around 16:30, two artillery batteries under the command of Captain Pérez de Sevilla 
(totalling 127 soldiers323) left the Pineda barracks to deliver the coup de grace to the Republic. 
However, it took nearly two hours for the military column to reach the city-centre; a delay 
caused by the presence of a group of assault guards barricaded in a nearby hotel. General 
Queipo ordered the shelling of the building, demonstrating a blatant disregard for civilian 
life.324 Fortunately, Pérez de Sevilla’s group was met by a Cavalry unit headed by Captain 
Figuerola who, like Rincón, joined the rebellion after contravening Varela Rendueles’ order to 
intercept and disarm the insurgents. Figuerola’s party overpowered the assault guards 
stationed in La Palmera, seized their heavy machine-guns and freed Lieutenant (Artillery) 
Alfonso Alarcón de la Lastra. After successfully concluding its defensive duties, the Cavalry 
group then headed north to reinforce the security perimeter set up by Major Altube and 
violently dispersed a large crowd of workers from Amate and Cerro del Águila attempting to 
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reach the city-centre.325 Artillery Captain Rafael Esquivias Salcedo, who offered his services to 
Lieutenant-Colonel Iturzaeta at 14:30, functioned as a liaison officer.326  
 
The Nationalist high-command subsequently used Colonel Santiago Mateo’s actions as a 
pretext to exclude the entire Cavalry Corps from both the Medalla Militar and the myth of the 
soldaditos. In doing so, it successfully concealed the key fact that the Republic faced the 
rebellion of the entire garrison of Seville.  
 
The victory of deceit, part II 
There was one final twist to the story. As the Artillery column approached the Plaza Nueva, it 
was intercepted by an Assault Guard patrol at the Avenida de la Libertad. Once more, the 
assault guards were fooled by Pérez de Sevilla’s insincere protestations of loyalty to the 
Republic (the artillery captain told the guards that he was going to “ponerse a disposición del 
gobernador civil”).327 Shortly afterwards, leaflets alerting the local population about the 
outbreak of an anti-Republican rebellion showered from the sky, dropped by planes from 
Tablada. It was already too little too late for the Republic: the Artillery column entered Seville’s 
main square at 18:30.328 At around the same time (18:15-18:30), an Infantry squadron headed 
by Lieutenant Villa and equipped with a cannon and heavy mortars also arrived the Plaza 
Nueva. The presence of Lieutenant Villa’s Infantry group, of Lieutenant Pedro de Rueda’s 
Zapadores-Minadores and the Requeté; all became victims of Queipo de Llano’s selective 
amnesia.329  
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The superiority of the canon and mortar fire rapidly settled a deeply-asymmetrical battle. 
Captain Pérez de Sevilla ordered the shelling of the Telefónica, killing an undetermined 
number of civilians. In 1937, Enrique Vila wrote that only one civilian died during the 
bombardment; however, Major Núñez’s earlier report of 3 August 1936 mentioned ten civilian 
deaths.330 Assault Guard resistance collapsed after Lieutenant Ignacio Alonso Alonso was killed 
during the artillery barrage. Alonso’s death was followed by Major Núñez’s storming of the 
Telefónica. A new Director was immediately installed and all personnel (including the deposed 
Director) received explicit instructions from General Queipo to obey all orders coming from the 
Divisional Headquarters. He also instructed Enrique Pedrosa Barraca to execute anyone who 
refused to comply: “si viera U. alguna vacilación en el cumplimiento de esta orden que le doy, 
saque U. al Director y al persona que no acate y U. mismo lo fusila en la Plaza Nueva.”331  
 
The Republic collapses 
The fall of the Telefónica triggered an irreversible domino effect. The last Assault Guard 
armoured vehicle was bombed out of action and the nearby Hotel Inglaterra - ferociously 
protected by Barneto’s dockworkers union - shelled into submission.332 Only a narrow street 
now separated the rebel-controlled Hotel Inglaterra from the loyalist Civil Government and the 
Republic from total defeat. Varela Rendueles’ last hope was shattered when Major Rafael 
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Martínez Estévez of the Air Force refused to bomb the rebel forces clustered in and around the 
city-centre out of fear of provoking extensive civilian casualties. Immediately after his brief 
telephone conversation with Major Estévez, the Civil Governor found himself completely 
isolated from the outside world when the rebels disabled all communication lines. PCE leader 
Saturnino Barneto offered Varela Rendueles an escape to safety, which the Republican leader 
politely declined. The Civil Governor naively believed that the insurgents would respect 
political moderates. He ordered the raising of the white flag and negotiated the terms of 
surrender with General Queipo de Llano. The deposed civil governor later accused the rebel 
general of breaking his word after initially pledging to respect the lives of anyone found inside 
the building. According to Varela Rendueles, during their first meeting General Queipo de 
Llano granted him a preview of the future Nationalist judicial system: the rebel general 
inverted responsibilities and personally blamed the civil governor for all the bloodshed in 
Seville. Varela Rendueles reminded Queipo that it had been the general who had mutinied 
against the government. The reply infuriated Queipo, who angrily asked the Civil Governor if 
he held any military rank. Varela replied negatively and Queipo cut short a sterile discussion by 
stating that, had the answer been positive, he would have had the civil governor executed on 
the spot.333  
 
Predictably, Queipo de Llano’s version of events differed considerably from Varela Rendueles’ 
account: he affirmed that the Civil Governor accepted an unconditional surrender; however, it 
is highly unlikely that Varela Rendueles would agree to capitulate without conditions, 
especially since both his brother and several close friends were trapped inside the Civil 
Government.334 Also, Queipo’s past record of compulsive lying further discredits his claim. In 
any case, at around 20:00 a group of 60 soldiers headed by Major Núñez detained Varela 
Rendueles, Major Loureiro, around 150 assault guards (including two captains and two 
lieutenants) and 100 civilians.335 Major Núñez’s arrest of Varela Rendueles, a man he had 
artificially befriended for months with the sole purpose of aiding Major Cuesta’s sedition; 
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stands as a fitting epilogue to what was, to all intends and purposes, the victory of deceit. By 
then, General Queipo de Llano’s 130 soldaditos had mutated into an army with explicit orders 
to employ extreme violence.336 
 
The victory of the oligarchy 
The success of the coup also represented the victory of the local oligarchy, which mobilised en 
masse to overthrow the Republic. For instance, the son of Nationalist Civil Governor Pedro 
Parias, Fernando Parias, was present at the Divisional Headquarters in the early hours of the 
rebellion.337 Furthermore, retired bullfighter Pepe El Algabeño informed Falangist Jefe 
Provincial Rafael Carmona of the outbreak of the rebellion immediately after capture of the 
artillery depot.338 Algabeño participated in all major battles, including the taking of the Plaza 
Nueva.339 That same night, at around 1:00am on 19 July, Joaquín Miranda and several 
prominent Falangists were freed from the Seville’s Provincial Prison, where Director Siro López 
Alonso collaborated with the rebels out of fear.340 As for the Requeté, at around 14:00 of 18 
July Major Redondo ordered all Carlist militants to assemble at the house of Second-
Lieutenant Enrique Barrau Salado. Two hours later, an excited group of Traditionalist 
aristocrats fuelled by religious ecstasy joined the insurrectionary forces besieging the Civil 
Government.341  
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The élites not only were instrumental to the success of the coup, but also filled the political 
void triggered by the collapse of the Republic. Varela Rendueles had barely vacated his post 
when landowner Pedro Parias, who fought in the city-centre alongside his four Falangist sons - 
Leopoldo, Pedro, Luis and Gonzalo - was installed as the new Civil Governor of Seville and 
Leopoldo Parias appointed as his father’s secretario particular.342 Simultaneously, the trigger-
happy Ramón de Carranza was appointed Mayor of Seville. In fact, the military leadership 
adopted a policy of promoting prominent members of the oligarchy to positions of authority. 
 
The local oligarchy wasted no time in reclaiming what it perceived to be its inalienable right: 
political power. The élites were equally eager to chastise their traditional class enemies for the 
affront that represented five years of Republican rule in Seville. Already on 18 July, influential 
landowner and retired Artillery Captain Luis Alarcón de la Lastra offered his services to Queipo 
and was instructed to protect the Pasarela Bridge, where he installed a heavy machine-gun 
with the intention of mowing-down any working-class attempt to reach the city-centre.343  
 
For the oligarchy, the rebellion represented but the opening stage of a grand class war. 
Eventually, this proto-alliance headed by the rebel military and formed by the economic élites 
and the political far-right (and later joined by the Catholic Church) would coalesce into the pact 
of blood; a coalition established on the blood its victims.  
 
Constructing the myth: the legend of the ‘red army’ 
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The working-class population refused to accept the victory of the oligarchy without a fight; 
however, it was powerless in face of the onslaught of the entire garrison of Seville. In the 
popular district of La Macarena, local residents massed in front of the Assault Guard 
headquarters in the Alameda de Hércules demanding weapons to defend the Republic. The 
Assault Guard hesitated between obeying Varela Rendueles’ orders not hand any weapons to 
the workers and probably witness the slow agony of the government; or overrule the Civil 
Governor in the hope that the masses would contain the rebellion. Pressured by Communist 
leader Manuel Delicado, Captain José Álvarez handed 80 rifles (with 50 cartridges per weapon) 
to the crowd.344 Against this improvised militia, stood an entire army consisting of civil guards, 
Infantry, Engineers, Intendencia and Sanidad soldiers. The military was strategically stationed 
at La Alameda, La Campana, Avenida de Borolla, Parque María Luisa, Avenida de Portugal, 
Prado San Sebastián, Jardines de Murillo, Puerta de la Carne and Parque María Luísa. The 
objective was to isolate the city-centre from the working class districts of Seville. A second 
security cordon was set-up, stretching from the Pasarela Bridge to Puerta Jerez.345 To make 
matters worse, bitter ideological differences (in particular, between Communists and 
Anarchists) further fragmented the trade-union movement. Nationalist historiography 
interpreted the intestine struggle within the political left as symptomatic of its ideological 
degeneracy; a poor argument to deflect attention away from the fact that the so-called 
‘Miracle of Seville’ was actually an uneven battle between civilians and a professional army 
that resulted in a massacre.346  
 
A ‘battle’ (or massacre) took place before the rebels managed to set up the defensive 
perimeter around the city-centre. According to the personal testimony of Francisco Cabrera, 
the PCE issued orders “for all militants to come to Seville”; however, “the republican 
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authorities were more frightened of the working-class than of the military.”347 A second crowd 
– mostly residents from Triana - assembled in front of the Civil Government calling for 
weapons. Varela Rendueles refused to arm the masses out of fear that the extreme-left would 
gain the ascendancy. A tense impasse ensued until, according to worker Juan Campos, “A cry 
went up calling on people to make for the artillery depot in the Paseo de Colón”. As many as 
two thousand people rushed there, where several desperate workers attempted to climb the 
windows of the building only to be mercilessly mowed-down by machine-gun fire.348 Fourteen 
people were killed and their bodies left to rot for days under the scorching Andalucían sun. A 
secret Nationalist report confirmed that the failed assault commenced at 15:00:  
“A las 15 horas aproximadamente comenzaron a circular por sus alrededores grupos armados 
a pie y en camiones con intención marcada de asaltar el parque y otros individuos, saliendo de 
diferentes casas de la calle Dos de Mayo empezaron a trepar por las ventanas del edificio, en 
cuyo momento, simultáneamente, se abrió el fuego por dichos grupos y desde los balcones y 
azoteas de las referidas casa y la defensa del Establecimiento, en la que distinguió las 
ametralladoras, que con sus ráfagas contribuyeron notablemente a disolver los grupos e 
alejarlos del cuartel, muchos de sus componentes, al no poder seguir por el fuego que se les 
hacía, se cobijaron en los portales de las casa, desde las cuales continuó el fuego de los 
atacantes durante toda la tarde y noche.”349 
 
More attempts to seize the artillery depot followed, all with similar results.350 The following 
day, another twelve bodies were found and over one hundred loyalists arrested. The rebels 
sustained a mere three wounded, and 96 soldiers were later proposed for the Medalla Militar 
(an action that further damaged the credibility of the myth of the soldaditos). Also, the group 
of eighteen Zapadores-Minadores nº2 that had earlier helped capture the Parque now brought 
food supplies to the rebels “efectuándolo bajo el intenso tiroteo enemigo”; but were all were 
excluded from the Medalla Militar.351 The Parque’s Commanding Officer, Artillery Major 
(Artillery) José Mendez de San Julián, led by example. He wore the overalls of a civilian worker 
of the Parque and brought ammunition to the Intendencia soldiers fighting in the Plaza Nueva. 
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So effective was San Julián’s stratagem that he was almost killed by his own soldiers in a 
friendly-fire incident.352  
 
Unable to challenge the rebel military and infuriated by successive massacres, the weapon-
starved loyalists turned against their traditional enemies: the oligarchy, the political right and 
the Catholic Church. Nationalist historiography explained working-class violence as the 
impulses of a “horda” poisoned by the “virus marxista”.353 On 12 August 1936, Carranza wrote 
to the Comisión Gestora, proposing the title of “hijo adoptivo de Sevilla” for General Queipo, 
and in the process cementing the tale of a ‘red army’:  
“Toda Sevilla ha podido apreciar la admirable gestión del Excmo. Sr. General de esta División, 
Don Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, que con un valor ejemplar libró a la Ciudad del poder anárquico 
del marxismo, restableciendo el imperio de la Ley y la tranquilidad pública con los gloriosos 
soldados del Ejército a sus órdenes y demás fuerzas armadas, así como las Milicias Cívicas que 
cooperaron a la restauración de la independencia de la Patria, castigando al mismo tiempo los 
hechos criminales y vandálicos perpetrados por hordas al servicio del marxismo.”354 
 
 Two weeks later (25 August), the Comisión Gestora de la Diputación bestowed on Queipo the 
title of “Hijo adoptivo de la provincia” for having “librado a España del dominio marxista” and 
“la tiranía de los rojos.”355 Moreover, one of the most celebrated Nationalist war 
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correspondents, Manuel Sánchez del Arco, reached the bizarre conclusion that: “El pillaje y los 
incendios de templos y mansiones patricias entretuvieron al populacho.[…] Fueron las víctimas 
propiciatorias, cuyo sacrificio contribuyó acaso decisivamente, al triunfo del general Queipo de 
Llano.”356 Sánchez del Arco not only presented the masses as an irrational, semi-human horde, 
but also – critically – provided substance to the myth of the soldaditos. Enrique Vila even put a 
number on the ‘red army’, claiming that “puede calcularse que sobre las dos de la tarde había 
en Sevilla más de 7.000 personas que se disponían a hacer armas contra los soldados de la 
guarnición”357 At the same time, the Nationalists quietly archived rebel reports revealing that 
both the Civil Guard and the Centro de Movilización y Reserva nº3 prevented the masses from 
reaching the city-centre, attacking leftist militants in the calle Reyes Católicos (Civil Guard 
squadron headed by Lieutenant Juan Masse Esquivel) and La Macarena (Centro de 
Movilización y Reserva nº3).358  
 
In reality, Sánchez del Arco’s report was fabricated, but the central argument remained intact 
and has been repeated (with minor variations) ad nauseam by pro-Francoist historians up until 
the end of the XX-Century. According to Nicolas Salas, the working-class indulged in an orgy of 
violence while leaving the city-centre unprotected. Salas also confirmed the myth of the 
soldaditos, overlooked the massacres of 18 July and dismissed Nationalist reports confirming 
that rebel patrols successfully prevented that “las patrullas marxistas se acercaran al Centro de 
la Capital”. Incidentally, the contribution of the Centro de Movilización y Reserva nº3 was 
erased from Nationalist historiography so as to harmonise it with legend of the ‘red army’. 
Salas concluded his argument by stating, without irony: “Fue el comienzo de una leyenda.”359 
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Enraged by the massacre of the Parque, an infuriated crowd from Triana decided to vent its 
anger at the properties of the rich. The loyalists ransacked a number of houses in the upscale 
calle Reyes Católicos, including the properties of Falangist leaders Sancho Dávila and Joaquín 
Miranda. Miranda’s house was protected by a tiny group of party militants that was not 
attacked by the mob.360 However, the greatest target of popular fury was the Catholic Church. 
For the masses, the Church was the enemy within, and the first religious building consumed by 
the flames of anticlericalism (18:00) - Omnium Sanctorum - was located deep inside the 
working-class district of La Macarena.361 Anticlericalism ran deep among the urban poor of 
Seville, who viewed the attacks with a mixture of joy and derision. As the fire devoured several 
religious buildings, a resident in San Luis joked: “¿Y ahora las monjitas, donde oirán misa?”362 
One of the most symbolically-charged attacks was the sacking of the Salesian’s Escuela Social 
Obrera; a testament to the failure of the Church’s social policy.363 A total of fifteen religious 
buildings were either damaged or destroyed in the capital of Andalucía, one of the oldest 
dioceses in Christendom: 
1. Santa Ana (Triana) 
2. San Bernardo (Gran Plaza) 
3. San Gil Abad (La Macarena)  
4. Inmaculada Concepción (Nervión) 
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5. San Juan de la Palma (La Macarena) 
6. San Marcos (La Macarena) 
7. Santa Marina (La Macarena) 
8. Nuestra Señora de la O (Triana) 
9. Omnium Sanctorum (La Macarena) 
10. San Román (La Macarena) 
11. San Roque ( close to La Macarena) 
12. Capilla de Nuestra Señora de los Dolores (Cerro del Águila) 
13. Capilla de Monte-Sión (La Macarena) 
14. Convento de San José (close to La Macarena) 
15. Monasterio de la Visitación de Santa María (close to La Macarena)364 
 
The reality of violence against individuals also differed considerably from the official version 
expounded by Nationalist propaganda. The most publicised case was the assassination of the 
parish priest of San Jerónimo, José Vigil Cabrerizo. The rebels presented the murder as 
evidence of the existence of a plan to annihilate the clergy in Seville when in reality there was 
an element of tragic casualty in Cabrerizo’s death. After witnessing the sacking of his church in 
May 1936, the priest moved with his family (parents and two younger sisters) to the upscale 
calle Conde De Ybarra where, on the afternoon of 18 July one of his neighbours, a hot-
tempered right-wing adolescent aged only 17 (the son of a military officer), opened fire at a 
leftist crowd. One worker was killed and the enraged mob headed straight to the aggressor’s 
house. The teenager panicked and fired again, killing a second person. The crowd then forced 
its way into the adjacent house where they found Cabrerizo. The priest was immediately 
identified by a militant who denounced Cabrerizo as a fascist and repeatedly insulted and shot 
him in his left shoulder in front of his desperate family. The mob eventually decided to 
abandon the house only for the unlucky priest to be recognised by a second group of militants 
and shot again in his injured shoulder. As the party was about to leave, an exalted militant 
shouted “No lo dejéis que este es el Cura de San Jerónimo” and shot Cabrerizo in the 
abdomen. In desperation, his sister threw herself in front of the fatally wounded priest. The 
scene moved a militant who declared: “A las mujeres no hay que tirarles”, but then proceeded 
to torture Cabrerizo by shooting again in his wounded shoulder. An argument ensued and the 
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militants eventually decided against delivering the coup de grâce. Cabrerizo was eventually 
rushed to the Cinco Llagas Hospital while his house was torched. He died the following day, but 
not before repeatedly declaring that he forgave his aggressors and forcing his father to 
promise that he would not seek revenge for his murder. He also prayed fervently for the Virgin 
Mary to deliver Spain from Communism.365  
 
Father Vigil Cabrerizo was not the only religious victim of leftist extremism. On the afternoon 
of 18 July, a mob broke into the house of the elderly priest of San Bernardo, José Álvarez Díaz. 
The priest fainted never to regain consciousness and died the following day. Also, Salesian 
monk Antonio Fernández Camacho and Falangist Patricante Francisco Fuentes Manfredi were 
both spotted and lynched in the San Marcos neighbourhood of La Macarena and their bodies 
dumped inside the local church, which was then set ablaze.  Lastly, a number of clergymen 
escaped the anticlerical fury in extreme circumstances, such as the Coadjutor of Santa Marina, 
who saved himself by hiding under the deathbed of an elderly parishioner.366  
 
On a political level, the most high-profile victim of radical-left was Falangist industrialist Luis 
Mensaque Arana, murdered on 18 July.367 Mensaque initially managed to flee to safety, but 
decided to return to his house to reassure his anxious wife. The property was rapidly 
surrounded by a hostile crowd that arrested Mensaque as he attempted to escape through the 
roof. The Falangist militant was then dragged to the local PCE headquarters in calle Fabíe, 
sentenced to death by an illegal revolutionary tribunal and executed by firing squad against 
the walls of calle Pagés del Corro. His distressed wife tried to embrace him and was shot in the 
legs. Mensaque died shortly after in the local casa de Socorro.368 Another political victim of 
extremism was anarchist-turned-Falangist Joaquín Julio Fernández, also known as El Libertario. 
Fernández, who collaborated regularly with Carlist newspaper La Unión, was marked for death 
by his former friends who regarded his political apostasy as an unforgivable insult. He was 
lynched in the calle San Luis (La Macarena) on 19 July and his body dumped inside the burning 
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church of San Marcos alongside those of Fernández Campos and Francisco Fuentes 
Manfredi.369  
 
Another four unexplained deaths might be attributed to leftist extremists. They were: 
Capuchin monk Fray José (of the Convent of San José), shot on 19 July while inspecting a 
rooftop between calles Tetuán and Sierpes; Manuel Díaz Ramos, shot at from a bar in calle San 
Jacinto; Manuel Anguado Guerra, victim of “disparos a la entrada de una casa”; and Raimundo 
Álvarez Vigil, brother-in-law of Luis Mensaque, also murdered in Triana.370 Ultimately, leftist 
violence did not translate into the homicidal rage publicised by Nationalist propaganda, which 
also accused the Republic of complicity in the murders. In reality, the moderate left was simply 
impotent to curb extremism for the simple reason that it ceased to exist on the afternoon of 
18 July 1936, a victim of its ignorance over the true objectives of the rebellion, which extended 
even to the Assault Guard. Indeed, without encountering resistance, Major Loureiro complied 
with General Queipo’s order to call for the immediate surrender of the Assault Guard 
headquarters in La Alameda. Loureiro’s cooperation did not spare him from execution, which 
took place on the night of 22-23 July.371 Only one man among Varela Rendueles’ prisoner 
group appeared to grasp the wanton nature of Nationalist violence: Lieutenant-Colonel 
Caballero of the Regulares. As an Africanista, Caballero could foresee the full implications of 
rebel victory and, in visible despair, attempted to offer his services to General Queipo on 18 
July, who shunned his proposal. Caballero’s fears proved correct: Tablada surrendered that 
same night, the V Bandera of the Foreign Legion was airlifted to Seville the following day and 
Juan Caballero López was executed on 31 July.372 
 
PART II: The myth of the soldaditos 
Constructing the myth: Queipo and the rebellion  
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The myth of the soldaditos was, like most Nationalist propaganda tales, straightforward: it 
consisted of a synthesis of an edited version of Queipo’s 23 July charla (the soldiers that seized 
the Civil Government had now captured the entire city-centre) with the tale of the impending 
Communist coup. Accordingly, the few soldaditos at the disposal of General Queipo de Llano 
‘miraculously’ defeated thousands of Marxist militiamen about to usher a Communist 
revolution in the capital of Andalucía, which would then function as a bridgehead for the 
implantation of a Soviet-style regime in Spain. At the same time, the ‘miracle’ of Seville 
revealed the moral superiority of the Nationalist cause over the ‘degenerate’ Republic, thus 
legitimising the rebellion.  Also, the myth elevated the rebel general to the status of a semi-
deity in Nationalist Seville, which effectively ‘sanctified’ his rule. A similar process (the myth of 
the Alcázar of Toledo) institutionalised the cult of personality of General Franco.373 In 
retrospect, the longevity of the myth of Queipo de Llano and his soldaditos is remarkable, 
especially when compared with the relative ephemerality other of major Nationalist legends: 
Guernica, Alcázar de Toledo and of the Soviet conspiracy to take over Spain; all of which have 
long been discredited.374  
 
The first and most formidable challenge to the consolidation of the ‘Miracle of Seville’ was, 
ironically, General Queipo de Llano, more specifically his egotism. The volatile general 
committed his first major gaffe on 18 July 1937 when he opened his memoirs of the rebellion 
with a shocking revelation: “quizás haya omitido algunos detalles involuntariamente y otros 
con propósito deliberado.”375 The Nationalist propaganda juggernaut, expertly directed by 
Major Cuesta Monereo, attempted to minimise the negative impact of Queipo’s recurrent 
verbal outbursts by devising a campaign aimed exclusively at transforming the capricious 
general into a secular Nationalist saint. A few months later, even Queipo de Llano’s Delegado 
de Prensa y Propaganda, Antonio Bahamonde, was astonished by the number of photos, 
posters, mirrors and even ashtrays bearing the portrait of the general that circulated in Seville. 
Many were autographed by Queipo, who turned into an overnight celebrity. Acción Española 
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leader Eugenio Vegas Latapié corroborated Bahamonde’s account.376 In contrast, the image of 
the true leader of the Nationalist faction, General Franco, was notoriously absent from the 
capital of Andalucía, a scandal that would eventually degenerate into a destructive clash of 
egos.  
 
The legend of Queipo de Llano was not the exclusive product of the general’s delirious 
egotism; it became a political priority for the Nationalist leadership from the moment all 
‘evidence’ pertaining to a Soviet-sponsored putsch in Spain was greeted with scepticism by the 
international press. On a national level, there was an urgent need to maintain morale following 
the failure of the coup in most of Spain. Ultimately, by venerating Queipo as a secular saint, 
the rebels were indirectly sanctifying the rebellion. 
 
The legend of General Queipo 
General Franco constantly reaffirmed Nationalist orthodoxy, defending it against all threats of 
‘heresy’. For instance, the Generalisímo declared to La Revue Belge on 15 August 1937:  
“Así, en Sevilla, el General Queipo de Llano logró dominar la situación con un simple puñado 
de hombres – 180 exactamente -, a pesar de que de 40 a 50.000 rojos, animados por el furor y 
la desesperación se le opusieron en esta ciudad.”377 
 
General Franco’s apparent endorsement of a rival consisted but of a skilful propaganda 
manoeuvre. The Generalisímo realised that, by lending support to the myth of Queipo, he was 
also legitimising the rebellion and cementing his own authority. In fact, Franco’s ascension to 
the leadership of the Nationalist faction on 1 October 1936 was equally based on a legend: 
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that the liberation of the Alcázar of Toledo.378 As far as the insurgents were concerned, the 
proliferation of ‘miracles’ served as ‘evidence’ of the moral superiority of the rebel cause over 
the Spanish Republic.  
 
Franco’s insincere declarations were complemented by a number of works that simply echoed 
Queipo’s memoirs.379 For instance, Nationalist military historian Luis María de Lojendio wrote 
in 1940:  
“En su visita a la División y al Cuartel del Regimiento de Granada, el general Queipo de Llano 
fue únicamente acompañado de los comandantes Cuesta y López Guerrero. Y allí, ante un 
cuadro de generales y jefes hostiles al Movimiento, ganó en realidad la batalla de Sevilla.”380  
 
Furthermore, the recognised Francoist authority on military history, former Basque Nationalist 
playboy Manuel Aznar Zubigaray, focused on the “milagro” in his monumental four-volume 
Historia Militar de la Guerra de España:  
“Sevilla, escenario de una inimaginable proeza llevada a cabo por el General Queipo de Llano, 
el cual, prácticamente solo, frente a unos mandos hostiles y en medio de una población 
integrada en arte por bravas masas comunistas y anarquistas, hizo el milagro de alcanzar una 
victoria decisiva para la marcha futura de la guerra nacional.”381  
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A few selected works embellished Queipo’s role in the already legendary capture of Seville at 
the expense of the tale of the soldaditos, relegated to background narrative. For instance, the 
general’s first biographer – Luis de Armiñán Odriozola382 -  wrote:  
“él [Queipo] solo se presenta ante el general de la Plaza”, adding: “Quizá en esa exposición 
clara, sencilla, esté mejor dada la nota de peligro, de amargura y de decisivo valor, que el 
general puso en sus actos para lograr el efecto deseado: la salvación de Andalucía.”383  
 
Armiñán Odriozola interviewed the rebel general on the same day as Franco was officially 
anointed as dictator of Nationalist Spain. Queipo opted to ignore the historic event, preferring 
instead to indulge on a lengthy monologue on the ‘Miracle of Seville’; a silence that spoke 
volumes. Seduced by Queipo’s oratory, Armiñán Odriozola concluded his argument by 
comparing the general’s role in the coup with the exploits of the XV-Century Catholic 
Monarchs that completed the Reconquista, sponsored Christopher Columbus’ voyage to the 
American continent and founded the Spanish Empire.384 Reporter Enrique Vila went even 
further, claiming that the ongoing civil war was “cien veces más importante” than the military 
achievements of Kings Isabella of Castille and Ferdinand of Aragón:  
“La guarnición de Sevilla escribió en los días 18, 19 y 20 de Julio, una de las páginas más 
gloriosas de la historia militar de España: los hombres de esta generación que hemos vivido en 
toda su trágica intensidad estas fechas memorables, estamos en cierto modo incapacitados 
para comprender en su verdadero valor, la maravillosa importancia de esta empresa, inicio 
feliz de una guerra de reconquista, cien veces más importante que la llevada a cabo en la Edad 
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Media, y que será juzgada por las generaciones venideras, o como algo sobrenatural, o como 




The mystical claims present in the ‘Miracle of Seville’ triggered a heated theological debate in 
Nationalist Spain. For instance, Enrique Vila described the insurgency as “sobrenatural”, 
marked by “fatalismo religioso” and “providencialismo”.386 The proponents of this rationale 
called themselves “providentialists”:  
“Los providencialistas tenemos la firme convicción de que está marcado el dedo de Dios. 
¿Cómo si no explicarnos el suceso? 
Un hombre, por grande que sea su voluntad, por enorme que sea su deseo de vencer, no 
puede arrollar los obstáculos infranqueables, cuando éstos son de tal naturaleza que no se 
presten a ser doblegados por sólo la voluntad.”387  
 
“Providentialism” was rooted in the belief that the July 1936 coup d’état was destined to 
replace the Reconquista as the central epic of Spanish history. Nationalist intellectual José 
María Pemán expounded this theory in a speech delivered on 15 August 1936 where he asked 
Queipo:  
“¿Verdad que en aquellas primeras veinticuatro horas, había algo superior a lo humano, detrás 
de ti? ¿Verdad que tu sentiste en el hombre, aconsejándote y animándote, el rostro de niña de 
la Virgen de los Reyes?”388  
 
Pemán eventually reached the conclusion that “aquellos primeros episodios milagrosos de la 
Sevilla de Queipo” confirmed that the civil war was but “la España […] venciendo a la anti-
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España”.389 Moreover, on the first anniversary of the coup Catholic periodical El Correo de 
Andalucía described General Queipo as “un hombre providencial que Dios envió a Sevilla para 
la salvación de España”, adding (without irony) that the rebel general  functioned as an 
“instrumento de Dios para vencer a la mentira, arma favorita de los marxistas”.390  
 
In short, General Queipo de Llano was the enforcer of God’s will on Earth.391 This conviction 
eventually evolved into the dogmatic belief that the capture of Seville was but the opening 
battle of a modern-day crusade. Already on 31 July 1936, flyers containing a poem entitled 
“¡Detente, enemigo! El Corazón de Jesús está conmigo”, circulated in Seville.392 A year later, 
Nationalist writer Ramiro de Alconchel dedicated a poem entirely to the ‘miraculous’ taking of 
the capital of Andalucía entitled “La Novena Cruzada. Poema de la guerra contra los 
monstruos”393; while the Town Hall of Seville proposed the creation of a “Museo Nacional del 
Movimiento Salvador de España” to perpetuate the ‘Miracle of Seville’ and hosted an exclusive 
party in the salón de fiestas de la Casa Consistorial “en homenaje al ilustre e invicto General D. 
Gonzalo Queipo de Llano” to celebrate the first anniversary of the “Movimiento Salvador de 
España”.394 At the same time, the campaign of ‘deification’ of Nationalist war heroes climaxed 
with the elevation of Generals Franco and Moscardó to legendary status: if Queipo was a 
modern-day prophet who captured Seville to clarify the working-class; General Moscardó was 
compared to God for having sacrificed his son during the siege of the Alcázar.395 Seduced by 
constant blandishment, General Queipo de Llano rapidly converted to this new ‘faith’, going as 
far as telling, tearfully, reporter Jean Alloucherie that the Holy Ghost had inspired him to seize 
Seville and save “civilización occidental.”396 
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The myth becomes international 
General Queipo de Llano eagerly embraced his role as a Nationalist saint and courted the 
international press (Bolín confirmed that “Queipo liked talking to journalists”397) to promote 
the ‘Miracle of Seville’. For instance, after initially cancelling his scheduled interview with Jean 
Alloucherie, General Queipo suddenly found time to meet the reporter after being informed of 
his imminent departure for the Marbella front. To Alloucherie’s astonishment, what was 
supposed to be a short, informal chat turned into an hour-long monologue focused on the life 
of Queipo, starting as early as his “infancia estudiosa”. Alloucherie noted sarcastically that: 
“Apenas tuve tiempo de abrir la boca y de pedir a Gonzalo que me hablara de España, cuando 
ya él me hablaba de sí mismo […] Hay que admitir que se encontraba interesante, Gonzalo, 
que se amaba con pasión, se admiraba y creía que cada minuto que pasaba le daba ocasión de 
admirarse aún más.” However, Alloucherie also conceded  that “no era desagradable 
escucharle, cuando uno se había resignado a seguir su verborrea sin poderla digerir. Tenía la 
palabra sonora, el gesto variado, un juego de ojos especial.”398  
 
Indeed, the general also made a strong first impression on Antonio Bahamonde.399 During the 
autumn of 1936, Queipo de Llano reached the peak of his popularity, even attaining 
international celebrity status. The reasons for this were twofold. Firstly, correspondents from 
all over the world poured into the capital of Andalucía to cover the Nationalist advance on 
Madrid. Secondly, the ‘Miracle of Seville’ was simply too good of a story to be ignored, as was 
the General’s eccentric character. Indeed, Queipo often became emotional and overwhelmed 
by patriotic fervor during interviews, clutching the Nationalist flag as he tearfully reminisced 
over the legendary taking of Seville. The relationship between the impulsive general and the 
pro-Nationalist foreign press was one of intense mutual admiration. Queipo was seduced by 
the constant appeals to his personal vanity and retold his story time and again to an ever-
growing body of foreign reporters, who listened in awe. The general’s magnetic personality 
mesmerised even the most experienced of reporters, such as Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist 
Hubert Knickerbocker, who had previously covered the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. 
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Knickerbocker was particularly fascinated by Queipo’s informal presentation (the general was 
dressed in a “palm beach suit crinkled pretty badly” when both men first met), markedly 
distinct from the ceremonial rigidity of most of his fellow generals. According to the 
correspondent, “The saviour of Seville was most hospitable. He had an air of dignity and 
gravity which completely belied the previous descriptions I had heard of him.”400 After listening 
attentively to Queipo’s story, Knickerbocker concluded that:  
“this redoubtable figure is one of the most colourful talkers on the White side[...] But he is just 
as colourful a fighter. If Madrid had possessed a White general with the guts and quickfire 
decision of de Llano, the capital would have fallen on the day after Franco raised the banner of 
revolt in Morocco.”401 
 
Eventually, General Queipo’s “colourful” talking threw into question the entire credibility of 
the myth. Unable to keep his emotions under control during his regular chats with foreign 
reporters, the general frequently contradicted his official account of the ‘Miracle of Seville’. As 
a result, several conflicting versions appeared in the international press, including fluctuations 
in the number of soldaditos. For instance, Arthur Loveday stated: “General Queipo de Llano 
had captured Seville with his 183 men. How he did this by pure bluff is now a matter of 
history”402; whereas Francis Rogers described the taking of Seville as in the following terms: 
“This is the most fantastic story of the Civil War in Spain. It is the unbelievable tale of the 
capture of Seville, one of the largest cities of Spain, by a lone general, the radio, 8 Moors and 
123 soldiers. Their capture of a city of nearly half a million people, is an epic – and something 
of a comedy, too.”403 However, Queipo provided a different figure to Alloucherie, stating that 
the number of soldiers that participated in the coup was 150404; while his retired Chief of 
Press, Luis Bolín, raised the figure to 200 soldaditos.405 Finally, Knickerbocker wrote: “He 
[Queipo] took it [Seville] by sheer audacity. It was a Red city with tens of thousands of Frente 
Popular supporters ready to go out in the streets and shoot the military. But General de Llano 
beat them to it. With only one hundred and eighty soldiers, he knew he could do nothing but 
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die if he took the defensive.” The correspondent added that “the de Llano army by nightfall 
numbered thousands”, a detail that went unexplained.406  
 
Dismantling the myth: early historiography 
Certain sections of the international press were far from impressed with Queipo de Llano’s 
oratory, in particular the ‘providentialist’ argument. Henry Buckley defined him as an 
“excitable and irascible officer”, while Captain Francis McCullagh doubted the sincerity of his 
‘epiphany’: “In his past life, General Queipo de Llano did not distinguish himself, as he does at 
present by public attendance and religious functions in Seville Cathedral as a member of a 
religious confraternity.”407 However, it was not until 1948 that the authenticity of the legend of 
Queipo and his soldaditos was first questioned by the foreign press, more specifically by 
Associated Press correspondent Charles Foltz in Masquerade in Spain:  
“The man who held Sevilla for the Army was General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano. He was in 
command of two thousand troops, but felt he could count on only a few hundred among them. 
Most of these were kept busy trying to crush the resistance of Socialists in the workers’ 
quarter of the city.”408 
 
Foltz based his claim on Enrique Vila’s polemical book ¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del 
alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla, first published in 1937 under the pseudonym of Guzmán de 
Alfarache. In a nutshell, Vila dismantled the legend of the soldaditos by providing a list of 
participants in the rebellion, while at the same time reaffirming the tale that Queipo 
‘miraculously’ captured both the Divisional Headquarters and the Infantry barracks on the 
early afternoon of 18 July 1936. Enrique Vila’s motivations for writing ¡18 de julio en Sevilla! 
remains a mystery. The author might have wished to pay homage to the insurgents by means 
of eternalising their names in a book. However, Vila was also aware of the irreparable damage 
that such an explosive revelation would do to the credibility of the ‘Miracle of Seville’. In any 
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case, ¡18 de julio en Sevilla! was certain to provoke a violent reaction from Queipo. The 
‘saviour of Seville’ reached the bizarre conclusion that the best approach to combating Vila’s 
heresy was to write an acerbic preface to ¡18 de Julio en Sevilla!. 
  
For General Queipo de Llano, who admitted only to flicking through the book (therefore 
confirming his well-known aversion to reading), the “verdad real, la verdad absoluta sobre los 
hechos ocurridos con anterioridad al 18 de Julio, en dicho día y en los sucesivos” could be 
reduced to a few bullet points: first, Enrique Vila’s lists did not correspond to the actual 
number of soldiers involved in the taking of the city-centre. Visibly unnerved by Vila’s work, 
Queipo once more contradicted his official account of the coup by reducing the number of 
soldaditos from 180 to 100. The general also denied meeting Villa-Abrille before the outbreak 
of the rebellion, reduced both Núñez and Corretger’s squadrons to a mere 40 soldiers each, 
stated that only 30 troops were scrambled to support Trasella’s assault on the city-centre, and 
overlooked the contribution of both the Civil Guard and the Artillery Corps. Lastly, the ‘saviour 
of Seville’ failed to explain how the defenceless insurgent barracks managed to repel a loyalist 
counter-attack and capture a large number of assault guards.409 Eventually, both Vila and 
Charles Foltz’s works slipped into oblivion, crushed by a sea of historiographical conformity. 
 
Hubris 
General Queipo exploited both his elevation to legendary status and the internationalisation of 
the myth as a platform to achieve political power. During an interview with Portuguese 
correspondent Artur Portela, Queipo coolly declared that Spain required “por 25 años lo 
menos” of military dictatorship before returning to civilian rule, of which ten would be entirely 
devoted to the extirpation of “semientes marxistas”:  
“Cuando se organizó el movimiento, ninguno pensó en República o Monarquía; apenas en 
salvar a España. Transcurridos esos 25 años, cuando hayamos formado una generación, 
cuando haya – de hecho – libertad en la aceptación más genuina de la palabra, entonces, sí, 
España decidirá si quiere ser República o Monarquía.”410  
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During that same interview, Queipo denied rumours that he harboured any political ambitions 
(“¡No tengo ambiciones!”411); a statement that conflicted with the memoirs of General 
Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo (Pacón), the Generalísimo’s cousin. Salgado-Araujo was 
informed by a foreign diplomat, prior to the military conclave that would appoint the future 
dictator of Nationalist Spain, that General Queipo expressed his confidence that he would be 
selected for the post: “Queipo cree que será él porque es más antiguo que su primo.”412 Upon 
the predictable promotion of Franco to the leadership of the rebel faction, Pacón predicted 
future difficulties in dealing with the hot-tempered general: “al general Queipo no le agradaría 
ser mandado por un general de menor antigüedad.”413 Enraged by General Franco’s 
promotion, Queipo de Llano continued to exploit his newfound status to denigrate the 
reputation of his many rivals, including the already-deceased Generals Mola and Fanjul. For 
instance, he claimed that the Director had decided to flee Spain on the night of 19 July, but 
then decided stay put once he heard of Queipo’s ‘miraculous’ capture of Seville. The general 
also attacked Franco’s brother-in-law and right-hand man, the physically feeble but political 
powerful Ramón Serrano Súñer; and even the Generalísimo himself. Ultimately, Queipo’s 
suicidal feud with Franco proved to be his undoing.414  
 
The elevation of the ‘Miracle of Seville’ to the pantheon of Nationalist mythology pleased all 
elements within the pact of blood, with the notable exception of General Queipo; it did not 
satisfy his ambitions. Indeed, the myth legitimised the class war waged by the élites against the 
masses; the annihilation of the political left masterminded by both the Falange and the 
Requeté; and sanctioned the Church’s monopoly over the cultural sphere. Also, Seville became 
the de facto capital of rebel-controlled Spain. On 15 August 1936, the city was selected to host 
the ceremony of the changing of the flag in Nationalist territory (the Monarchist bicolour 
replaced the Republican tricolour). Generals Franco, Queipo and Millan-Astray were invited as 
guests of honour; with Queipo delivering a bizarre lecture on Ancient Egypt and Millan-Astray 
concluding his speech with hysterical cries of “¡Viva la muerte!”415  
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Queipo was not disheartened by his successive gaffes and continued shamelessly to exploit the 
myth to wage a proxy war against Franco, who had arrived in the capital of Andalucía on 7 
August and installed himself in the luxurious palace of the Marquésa de Yanduri. In Seville, the 
future Generalísmo had the opportunity to experience first-hand the irascible nature of 
Queipo. The mercurial general declined to greet Franco upon his arrival and gave him an icy 
salute when both men met for the ceremony of the changing of the flag. Queipo de Llano was 
visibly unnerved by news that mixed crowds of Falangists, Requetés, soldiers and civilians were 
gathering daily at Franco’s residence, singing patriotic songs and hailing him as the saviour of 
Spain.416 It soon became evident that cooperation between both men would be impossible. 
Exhausted by Queipo’s war of attrition, Franco abandoned the capital of Andalucía on 26 
August. It was a pyrrhic victory for Queipo de Llano. Following his elevation to the leadership 
of rebel faction on 1 October 1936, the Generalísimo settled in Salamanca, which replaced 
Seville as the new centre of Nationalist Spain. Consequently, Seville’s political decline was 
inextricably linked with Queipo’s hubris.417  
 
Dismantling the myth: the Medalla Militar Colectiva 
The Nationalist military high-command closed ranks around Queipo and continued excusing his 
eccentric behaviour in the hope of legitimising the rebellion, going as far as supporting the 
general’s most outrageous claims. For instance, the eligibility conditions for the  Medalla 
Militar Colectiva were based on Queipo’s assertion that only the hours of 12:00-15:00 of 18 
July were relevant for the success of a coup d’état that did not conclude until 23 July. Critically, 
those same hours coincided with Queipo de Llano’s cameo appearance in the rebellion. In 
other words, the erratic general was handed carte blanche to protect the myth by all means 
necessary. And this was exactly what Queipo de Llano did, going as far as ridiculing his closest 
allies, including El Algabeño. The Falangist bullfighter had initially pledged 1,500 Falangists to 
the rebellion when in reality only 15 made an appearance in the city-centre.  The ‘saviour of 
Seville’ decided to cynically exploit Algabeño’s excessive optimism to cement the myth of the 
soldaditos. At the same time, Queipo conveniently ‘forgot’ the one hundred Falangists that 
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swelled the ranks of the insurgent army after being released from the provincial prison during 
the night of 18-19 July.418  
 
Ultimately, the number of officers awarded the Medalla Militar revealed that rebellion was not 
a suicidal mutiny headed by Queipo de Llano who, with the help of God, miraculously seized 
the Divisional Headquarters, the Infantry barracks and galvanized a handful of soldaditos to 
overthrow the Republic; but an expertly-planned coup d'état, devised and matured inside the 
Divisional Headquarters, which encompassed the leadership of all military corps in capital of 
Andalucía.419 As a result, all reports and lists of participants in the rebellion were quietly 
archived in both the Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur in Seville and the Archivo General Militar in 
Madrid.420 
 
List of officers/soldiers based at the Divisional Headquarters on 18 July 1936 awarded with the 
Medalla Militar: 
 General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y Sierra 
 Major (Infantry) Pedro López Guerrero Portocarrero 
 Major (Estado Mayor) José Cuesta Monereo 
 Major (Infantry) Eduardo Álvarez-Rementería 
 Major (Infantry Diplomado) Simón Lapatza Valenzuela 
 Captain (Estado Mayor) Manuel Escribano Aguirre 
 Captain (Estado Mayor) Manuel Gutiérrez Flores 
 Captain (Infantry Diplomado) Julián García Pumarino y Mendez 
 Captain (Artillery) Ricardo Arjona Brieva 
 Captain (Infantry) Miguel Pérez Blázquez 
 Captain (Engineer) José Fijo Castrillo 
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 Captain (Aviación) Modesto Aguilera Morente 
 Captain (Infantry) Manuel Díaz Criado 
 Lieutenant (Cavalry) Francisco Parladé Ybarra 
 Lieutenant (Invalidos) Enrique Parladé Vazquez 
 Lieutenant (Intendencia)  Antonio Díaz Criado 
 Oficial 1º Equitación Gabriel Fuentes Ferrer 
 Oficial 3º O.M. Vicente Celis y Sánchez de la Campa 
 Oficial 3º O.M. Higinio Acero Gonzalez 
 Auxiliar Administrativo C.A.S.E Juan Pons Ribot 
 Brigadier (Artillery) Joaquín Flores Gaviño 
 Sergeant (Artillery) José Almonte Cruzado 
 Sergeant (Cavalry) Luis Cueto Ortega 
 Sergeant (Infantry) Paulino M. González Gil 
 Sergeant (Infantry) José Chavez González 
 Sergeant (Infantry) Candido Barrena Valle 
 Sergeant (Infantry) Manuel Gonzalez Castellano 
 Sergeant (Infantry) Manuel Moreno Jurado 
 Sergeant (Infantry) Enrique Villanueva Guerrero 
 Corporal (Infantry) Serafin Sama Ricardo 
 Corporal (Infantry) José Fuentes Cabrera 
 Corporal (Infantry) Angel Sanchez Garcia 
 Corporal (Infantry) Ramón Diaz Román 
 Corporal (Infantry) Francisco Ortega Bellido 
 Second-Lieutenant (Cavalry) José Maria Escribano Aguirre 
 Soldier (Engineer) Pablo Nizo Chaparro 
 Alumno (Cavalry) Marcelino del Rio Bandera 
 
The list revealed that Queipo de Llano, his aide-de-camp and Major Cuesta were not the only 
rebels at the Divisional Headquarters in the early afternoon of 18 July 1936. 
 
List of officers (rank general to lieutenant) proposed for the Medalla Militar Colectiva: 
Infantry (Granada nº6): 
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 Major Antonio Álvarez-Rementería 
 Major Rafael Corrales Romero 
 Major José Gutierrez Perez 
 Captain (Medic) Victor Hornillos Escribano 
 Captain Angel Medina Serrano 
 Captain Fernando Ponce de León 
 Captain Pedro de Castro de Lasarte 
 Captain Carlos Gomez Cobian 
 Captain José Delgado y García de la Torre 
 Captain Ignacio Rodriguez Trasellas 
 Captain Obdulio Cancio Gomez 
 Captain Carlos Fernández de Cordoba 
 Lieutenant Nicolas Fernandez de Cordoba 
 Lieutenant Aurelio Gonzalez Lepe 
 Lieutenant Victor Garcia del Mora 
 Lieutenant Manuel Hidalgo Romero 
 Lieutenant Juan Gonzalez Fernandez 
 Lieutenant Francisco Villa Salgado 
 Lieutenant Jose Castelló Alvarez 
 Lieutenant José Tormos Lobera 
 Lieutenant Francisco Rivero Moliné 
 
According to a report of 2 December 1936, a total of 115 Infantry officers/soldiers declared the 
state of war and participated in the capture of the Telefónica (Corporal Francisco Díaz López 
died during the assault), Town Hall and Civil Government.  
 
Artillery (Regimiento de Artilleria Ligera nº3): 
 Colonel Santos Rodríguez Cerezo 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Francisco Iturzaeta Gonzalez 
 Major Miguel Martin de Oliva y Enjuto 
 Captain Fernando Barón y Mora Figueroa 
 Captain Vicente Pérez de Sevilla 
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 Captain Antonio Villa Baena 
 Captain Eduardo de la Torre de Dios 
 Captain Juan Cortes Mateo 
 Captain Manuel de la Fuente Castelló 
 Captain Antonio de la Puerta Tamayo 
 Captain Rafael Esquivias Salcedo 
 Lieutenant Manuel Arjona Brieva 
 Lieutenant Luis Valle Colmenares 
 Lieutenant José García Castro 
 Lieutenant Juan de Dios Porras Ruiz Pedrosa 
 Lieutenant Antonio Navarro Carmona 
 Lieutenant Andrés García Rodríguez 
 Lieutenant Luis González de la Vega 
 
A series of reports (dated 23 August 1937) listed 127 Artillery officers/soldiers (under the 
command of Captains Vicente Pérez and Mora Figueroa and Lieutenant González de la Vega) 
that operated at the Avenida de la Libertad, Casa Correos, Telefónica, Hotel Inglaterra and the 
Civil Government. The reports specified that all soldiers that joined the rebellion outside the 
‘mythical’ hours of 15:00-19:30 were not included in the list. 
 
Cavalry (Regimiento Cazadores de Taxdir 7º): 
 Major Gerardo Figuerola y Garcia de Echave 
 Captain Antonio Fernandez Heredia 
 Captain Jose Ramos Salas 
 Lieutenant Emilio Lopez Rincon 
 Lieutenant Ramon Serrano Martin 
 Lieutenant Miguel Soto Garcia 
 Lieutenant Ricardo Rojas Solis 
 Lieutenant Francisco Mora Figueroa 
 
A total of 208 men (divided in two squadrons of 104 soldiers each) operated in Miraflores 
(capture of the local radio station “efectuando algunos servicios desalojando casas que se 
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estaban saqueando é incendiando por los elementos revoltosos”), La Palmera, Civil 
Government, Divisional Headquarters and the Intendencia Headquarters (protecting it from a 
joint attack by assault and seguridad guards). 
 
Batallón Zapadores-Minadores nº2: 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Eduardo Marquerié y Ruiz Delgado 
 Major Antonio Escofet Alonso 
 Captain Adolfo Corretjer Duimovich 
 Captain Evaristo Ramirez Moreno 
 Captain José Sicre Marassi 
 Captain Alfonso Orti Melendez-Valdez 
 Captain Francisco Bravo Simon 
 Captain (Medic) Antonio Alvarez Gonzalez 
 Lieutenant Carlos Jack Caruncho 
 Lieutenant José Oliver Sagrera 
 Lieutenant Pedro de Rueda y Ureta 
 Lieutenant Cayetano Ramirez Lozano 
 Lieutenant Alfonso Chamorro Cascos  
 Lieutenant Luis Iglesias Carrasco 
 Lieutenant (Veterinarian) Bernardino Moreno Cañadas 
 
Two reports (23 September 1936 and 2 April 1937) listed 119 officers/soldiers that contributed 
to the “aplastamiento del elemento marxista hasta la hora en que se rindió el Gobierno Civil”. 
The Zapadores-Minadores nº2 also participated in the “defensa del Cuartel, sosteniendo 
tiroteo con los marxistas apostados en las ventanas del Edificio de la Plaza de España”, 
occupied the Telephone Company at the Parque Maria Luisa, protected a number strategic 
buildings and clashed with leftist militiamen in the calle Reyes Católicos. 
 
Segundo Grupo Divisionario de Intendencia: 
 Major Francisco Núñez Fernandez de Velasco 




A total of 82 officers/soldiers were involved in the capture of the Telefónica, Hotel Inglaterra, 
Town Hall and Civil Government. 
 
Sección Destinos: 
 Captain (Infantry): José de la Herran Viniegra 
 
A report of 1 April 1937 listed 53 officers/soldiers that participated in the rebellion. 
 
2º Grupo de Sanidad Militar: 
 Lieutenant José Selma Martínez   
 
A total of 91 officers/soldiers patrolled the Jardines de Murillo, Puerta de la Carne and Parque 
María Luísa. The report specified that the list only included individuals that “prestó servicios en 
la calle”. 
 
Border-Guards (12º Comandancia de Carabineros):  
 Teniente Manuel Martinez Espinosa 
 
In a report dated 10 August 1936, Espinosa claimed to have joined the rebellion at 16:00. He 
was unable to reach the Carabineros headquarters, so decided instead to head to the Granada 
nº6 Infantry barracks with retired Infantry Capitan César Collado García, “atravesando por 
entre varias camionetas de comunistas que marchaban a armarse hacia la Alameda de 
Hércules con los Guardias de Asalto”. He met Major Rementería, who organised the defence of 
the barracks with a handful of soldiers against two separate Assault Guard attacks. Espinosa 
also participated in the capture of the Plaza Nueva and combated “los numerosos pistoleros 
que desde azoteas y balcones de la Campana, calle Tetuán y afluentes nos hostilizaron durante 
toda la noche del sábado al domingo y cuya eliminación hubimos de dedicarnos durante toda 
aquella noche y parte del domingo 19”. Lastly, Espinosa was also part of the group that 
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escorted Varela Rendueles, his secretary and five councilors from the Town Hall to the 
Divisional Headquarters. 
 
Civil Guard (17º Tercio, Comandancia Sevilla Interior): 
 Captain Antonio Galan Hidalgo 
 Lieutenant Angel Cuña Camacho 
 Lieutenant Juan Domínguez Serrano 
 Lieutenant Francisco González Narbona 
 Lieutenant David Castelló Bruna 
 Lieutenant  Jose Fernandez Muñoz  
 
Civil Guard (17º Tercio, Comandancia Sevilla Exterior): 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Genaro Conde Bujons 
 Major Santiago Garrigós Bernabeu 
 Major Ramon Rodriguez Diaz 
 Lieutenant Juan Marquez Perez 
 Lieutenant Juan Masse Esquivel 
 
Civil Guard (Triana):  
 Captain Antonio Galan Hidalgo 
 
Falange:  
 Antonio Garcia Lacalle 
 Leopoldo Parias y Calvo de Leon 
 Pedro Parias Corrales 
 Luis Parias y Calvo de Leon 
 Gonzalo Parias y Calvo de León 
 Alfonso Medina Benjumea 
 Manuel Vazquez Alcaide 
 Antonio Garcia Carranza (Pepe El Algabeño) 
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 Ignacio Cañal y Gomez Imaz 
 Marcelino Pardo Maestre 
 Ignacio Romero y Gomez Rull 
 Alberto Perez y Ruiz Brincau 
 Rafael Carmona Roldan 
 Carlos Llorente Gordillo 
 Francisco Arboleya Martinez 
 
A final report (June 1937) proposed a total of 886 officers/soldiers for the Medalla Militar 
Colectiva. The list was controversial, mainly because of its stated objective: to reduce the 
number of participants in the rebellion to an absolute minimum so to harmonise the award 
with the myth of Queipo de Llano and his soldaditos.421 Indeed, the Nationalist leadership 
mercilessly excluded any individual that did not meet the restrictive eligibility conditions 
detailed in the Boletín Oficial de Estado nº351. The case of the Centro de Movilización y 
Reserva nº3 (based at the Cuartel de los Terceros) is exemplary. On 18 July 1936, Engineer 
Captain Carlos Lemus Martinez presented himself at Divisional Headquarters and was ordered 
to proceed with the “requisa de Automoviles sufriendo varios tiroteos en distintos sectores de 
esta Capital cuando efectuaba dicho servicio.” Simultaneously, Second-Lieutenant Lorenzo 
Rodriguez Rosado organised the defence of the Cuartel de los Terceros “siendo hostilizado dia 
y noche por los marxistas con fuego de arma larga por la Plaza de Ponce de Leon y con fuego 
de arma larga y ametralladora por la fachada de la calle Sol”; frustrating all working-class 
attempts to reach the city-centre from that area. A total of 15 officers/soldiers submitted a 
written protest demanding their inclusion in the Medalla Miltar. The request was ignored and 
the unit erased from official Nationalist History.422 
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One of the many individual victims of the bureaucratic trap set-up by General Queipo de Llano 
was Lieutenant Arturo Fabregas Martinez, who came under fire while protecting the Sanidad 
Militar Headquarters. Unfortunately for him, the bullets fired in the suburbs were not of the 
same value as those shot in the city-centre. His petition was rejected.423 Others were excluded 
from the Medalla Militar for no reason other than the need to reduce the number of 
recipients, such as Lieutenant Andres Portavell Serda, who was at the Divisional Headquarters 
during the early hours of the insurgency. The Nationalist leadership was forced to reverse its 
original verdict after Serda presented a reference signed by the all-powerful Major Cuesta.424  
 
Ironically, the group most affected by the painful metamorphosis of the myth into History was 
the Infantry Corps (the soldaditos). The rebels were obsessed about ensuring that the number 
of soldiers awarded with the Medalla Militar did not deviate significantly from the figure 
presented by Queipo in his memoirs of the rebellion. The Infantry soldiers refused to concede 
defeat and submitted a torrent of written protests, most notably those that served under the 
orders of Major Antonio Álvarez-Rementería, Captain Trasellas and Lieutenant Villa.425 
Regrettably, the Nationalist leadership was more preoccupied with the preservation of the 
myth of the soldaditos than awarding those same soldaditos, dismissing dozens of petitions in 
the process. For instance, Provisional Second-Lieutenant José Alvarez Sotomayor’s appeal was 
rejected on the grounds that he was not included in the group that went to declare the state 
of war, despite actively participating in the coup from 17:00 of 18 July.426 Another soldier, 
Miguel José Romero Serrano, left the Infantry barracks at 14:30 as part of the unit ordered to 
protect the pabellones militares in calle Monsalves. Serrano was involved in a gun-battle 
against an Assault Guard armoured vehicle in the Plaza del Duque and, according to his own 
personal testimony: “Más tarde, por habérseme estropeado el fusil, me defendí a culatazos de 
varios guardias de Asalto”. Lastly, Serrano was also ordered by Major Álvarez-Rementería to 
defend a rooftop in calle Jesús del Gran Poder.  
 
Miguel Serrano was not the only soldier to go beyond the call of duty passed for the 
decoration. Pedro Martínez García was recovering from his wounds when he decided to 
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abandon his hospital bed to swell the rebel ranks.427 Lastly, and to Queipo’s chagrin, Francisco 
López Valle presented his inclusion “en el libro 18 de Julio” as evidence of his participation in 
the coup, where he fought alongside Captain Trasellas (and Lieutenants Francisco Rivera and 
Victor García del Moral), helped capture an Assault Guard armoured vehicle in calle Sierpes 
and was involved in several gun-battles until the surrender of Telefónica.428  
 
General Queipo de Llano’s plan to use the Medalla Militar to rewrite History resulted in a 
monumental failure. Not only did the June 1937 report disprove the tale of the soldaditos, but 
also enraged hundreds of officers and soldiers, all of whom felt unjustly excluded from the 
decoration. In despair, the Nationalist leadership attempted to intimidate its former heroes-
turned-villains; however, not even the threat of court-martials could prevent a flood of written 
complaints from reaching the offices of the Divisional Headquarters in Seville. The rebel high-
command panicked and resorted to imposing a veil of silence over an affair that had been 
originally orchestrated to sanctify the ‘Miracle of Seville’.  
 
The exact number of rebel troops on 18 July 1936 remains unknown, courtesy of Queipo’s 
efforts to preserve his myth. Moreover, the general attempted to discredit Enrique Vila’s work, 
which listed a total of 2,550 participants in the insurgency, by declaring that a majority of 
soldiers were enjoying summer leave on the day of the coup. However, Nationalist reports 
disproved the general’s claim. Not only were the military rebels informed of the development 
of the conspiracy, but were joined on 18 July by the Falange, Requeté and 187 civilian 
volunteers.429 Ultimately, the 2,550 soldiers and civil guards numbered in ¡18 de julio en 
Sevilla! are closer to the real number of participants in the rebellion than the 886 that met the 
Kafkian eligibility conditions of the Medalla Militar Colectiva. As for General Queipo de Llano’s 
180 soldaditos, they were exactly what pro-Francoist historiography labelled them: a 
“leyenda”.430 
 
The battle for the Laureada 
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For General Queipo de Llano, the Medalla Militar Colectiva represented but a stepping stone 
to total power. His obsession was Spain’s highest military honour - the Cruz Laureada de San 
Fernando – which would grant him a status similar to that enjoyed by General Franco. In order 
to attain his objective, Queipo used Seville’s political institutions to pressure Franco into 
awarding him the decoration. On 25 August 1937, the president of the Diputación, Joaquin 
Benjumea Burín, joined a petition initiated by the Town Halls of Pamplona and Málaga 
requesting the Laureada for Queipo de Llano for his actions during both the 18 July 1936 coup 
in Seville and the conquest of Málaga in February 1937.431 Two years later (June 1939), the 
Town Hall of Seville increased the pressure by writing an open letter to the Generalísmo:  
“Fiel intérprete del sentir popular, el Excmo. Ayuntamiento ha tomado el acuerdo de organizar 
el próximo día 18 de Julio un acto de homenaje en su honor donde todo el pueblo de Sevilla 
haga patente su deseo de que nuestro General luzca sobre su pecho tan merecida y preciada 
recompensa.”432 
 
Biographer Armiñán Odriozola developed an original argument to support Queipo’s 
propaganda campaign. He compared the ‘saviour of Seville’ to King Fernando III, who had 
actually reconquered Seville from the Moors in 1248 and was subsequently canonised as a 
saint by the Catholic Church.433 However, Queipo’s ultimate ambition – total power - was 
unattainable primarily because of his ever-shifting political loyalties, military incompetence 
and conflictive personality. At the same time, General Franco was trapped in a conundrum: on 
the one hand, the Laureada would grant immense prestige and political leverage to the elder 
statesman of military conspiracies in Spain; while on the other, the Generalísmo was aware 
that he could not employ his usual bullish methods against his insubordinate general or risk 
creating a martyr and provoking a crisis of faith in the Nationalist zone. Franco deal brilliantly 
with Queipo. Perhaps drawing conclusions from Primo de Rivera’s flawed decision to force 
Queipo into premature retirement in 1924, the Generalísimo decided that an idle Queipo 
would be potentially more dangerous that a ‘saviour of Seville’ immersed in administrative 
work, where he would find himself out of his intellectual depth. Thus, instead of going down 
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the traditional route of disciplinary action, Franco opted to limit Queipo’s military 
responsibilities. As a result, eyewitness accounts of civil war Seville gradually shifted from the 
myth of Queipo and his soldaditos to the administration of the capital of Andalucía.434 
Ironically, Franco greatly appreciated the work of Queipo’s bureaucrats, so much so that he 
appointed the mayor of Seville, Joaquín Benjumea Burín, to several ministerial posts between 
1939 and 1942.435  
 
After successfully mutating the conquering hero of Seville into a civil servant; Franco’s next 
step was to politically isolate Queipo while leaving the myth untouched for his own personal 
benefit. Consequently, the legendary general was unceremoniously silenced on 1 February 
1938 after delivering his final radio speech. A prisoner in the gilded cage that was the capital of 
Andalucía, Queipo de Llano could do little more but vent his frustration by throwing insults at 
Franco (his personal favourite was to call Franco “Paca la culona”).436 Queipo developed such 
an extreme hatred of the Generalísimo that it eventually eroded his mental health.437 Queipo’s 
cronies attempted to excuse, with little success, his volatile personality:  
“El general Queipo de Llano siempre lo arriesgó todo al luchar en la avanzada, su lugar de 
costumbre, contra cosas y hombres. Siempre inspiraron sus actos imperiosos requerimiento 
del honor.”438 
 
In fact, Queipo “arriesgó todo” on 18 July 1939 and lost. The impulsive general lost his final 
gamble against Franco after using the third anniversary of the outbreak of the rebellion to 
publicly protest at the fact that the Cruz Laureada de San Fernando was awarded to Valladolid, 
but not Seville. In the capital of Andalucía, celebrations were marked by a series of religious 
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services (at the Virgen de la Victoria, the Cruz de los Caídos and the Virgen de la Macarena) 
and a bullfight, with all proceedings going for the reconstruction of the shrine of Santa María 
de la Cabeza, destroyed by Republican forces. The festival climaxed at the Plaza de San 
Fernando, where a hysterical Queipo made his polemic demand. His outburst was sure to elicit 
a response from the Generalisímo. A few weeks later, Franco effectively banished Queipo to 
Italy under the pretext of inaugurating a military legation, but not before Serrano Súñer 
warned Mussolini’s son-in-law, Foreign Minister Galleazo Ciano, that the fiery general was 
“loco”.439 
 
During his Italian sojourn, Queipo de Llano confirmed that he could truly bear a grudge. In 
Rome, the general rejected an offer of rapprochement with King Alfonso XIII, delivered by a 
representative of the deposed monarch. He later narrated the episode to General Franco: “Me 
negué diciendo que no me engañaría más. Y cuando hizo decirme que quería darme unas 
explicaciones, contesté que no tenía gusto en escucharlas.”440 When Queipo de Llano returned 
from his Italian exile in 1942, the ‘saviour of Seville’ was, ironically, more of a mythical relic of 
the past than an influential general. He was quietly passed to the reserve on 19 February 1943. 
However, Queipo continued to battle incessantly for the Laureada. A month before his 
retirement, the general petitioned again for Spain’s greatest military honour. His request was 
backed by dozens of Andalucían Town Halls and a small but influential clique of cronies 
(including the ever-faithful Cuesta Monereo).441 Seville led by example by bestowing the city’s 
Gold Medal on the ageing general in front of a large, ecstatic crowd that assembled at the 
Town Hall on 12 October to catch a glimpse of its fading hero. Aware that Queipo no longer 
possessed any threat to his leadership, Franco gladly yielded to pressure and presented the 
Laureada to his former rival in February 1944. The Generalisímo made it a point of honour to 
be present at the award ceremony. On 6 May, Franco personally decorated the chastened 
‘saviour of Seville’.442 
 
A legend dies 
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The Cruz Laureada de San Fernando failed to mellow General Queipo, a man described as a 
“sadist” by Gerald Brenan443 and “brutal y sentimental” by Ian Gibson.444 Aged 73, he wrote a 
vitriolic letter to Serrano Súñer, complaining at the revelations contained in the latter’s 
recently-published memoirs. Franco’s brother-in-law wrote a mordant reply on 6 October 
1948. Súñer mentioned the “carácter excitable, violento y agresivo que, desde siempre, había 
prestado singularidad a la figura de usted”, and concluded his letter sarcastically by declaring 
his open admiration for Queipo’s ‘miraculous’ intervention in Seville on 18 July 1936. The 
general lost his composure and wrote a second letter on 24 October 1948. Queipo did not 
mince his words. He referred to Súñer as a “víbora” that triggered feelings of “indiferencia y 
repugnancia”, going as far as threatening to “aplastarlo.”445 Lastly, the irascible general turned 
his attention to his nemesis, who he continued to defy (with little success) until the bitter end. 
Less than a year before his death (18 June 1950), Queipo wrote a letter to the Generalísimo, in 
which the ‘saviour of Seville’ showed worrying sings of a growing detachment from reality. By 
then, Queipo de Llano had actually convinced himself that he had organised the conspiracy 
against the Republic and persuaded General Mola to become its Director. Like General Franco, 
it appears that the ‘saviour of Seville’ was brainwashed by decades of unilateral propaganda.446 
Moreover, Queipo de Llano also informed the Generalísimo of his discontentment at not being 
adequately rewarded for his contribution to the success of the rebellion in Seville. Queipo 
concluded his letter with a final show of defiance: he declared himself a “ferviente 
monárquico”, anathematising Francoism.447  
 
Franco never graced Queipo with a reply. The forgotten ‘saviour of Seville’ died a bitter man 
on 9 March 1951. According to newspaper ABC, minor seismic activity was felt in the capital of 
Andalucía on the exact moment of his death; nothing compared to the three-year socio-
political earthquake that shook Seville to its very foundations during Queipo’s rule, claiming 
thousands of lives and whose reverberations are still felt, and debated, today.448 
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Institutionalising Terror in Rebel Spain: the pacification of the working-
class districts of Seville (19-23 July 1936) 
 
Introduction  
Violent opposition to the 18 July coup d’état in Seville was deliberately exaggerated by the 
Rebels either to conceal or excuse the massacres of 19-23 July, rationalised as mere 
“punishments” (or castigos). The same justification was applied to Badajoz and all other towns 
that resisted the rebels during the bloody march of the Army of Africa from Seville to Madrid in 
the summer/autumn of 1936.449 The insurgents rewrote History for two main reasons, because 
acknowledging reality would imply both: a) the admission that the Rebels employed the most 
brutal colonial war tactics to crush civilian opposition to the coup and; b) the dismantling the 
myth of the soldaditos. At the same time as it institutionalised terror the rebel leadership was 
terrified by the possibility of provoking any questioning of their methods within Rebel Spain.  
 
The fact that the majority of the local population rejected the so-called Alzamiento Nacional 
was dismissed as detail of minor importance. The rebels openly despised universal suffrage 
since they believed that the capital of Andalucía had been infected by the “virus marxista”.450 
In his memoirs, Major Cuesta Cuesta Monereo described Republican Seville as living in an 
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“ambiente totalmente hostil y con una masa obrera de miles y miles de hombres, 
envenenados y armados”; whereas General Queipo de Llano’s first biographer claimed in 1937 
that one in every three residents was affiliated to extreme-left paramilitary organisations 
(around 100,000 out of a total population of 267,192).451 That same year General Queipo 
inexplicably reduced the figure to between 50-60,000 and by 1990 pro-Francoist 
historiography revised the number down to 30,000.452 Numerical discrepancies apart, all 
accounts converge on the crucial point that Seville was under siege by an internal enemy and 
that that the rebellion consisted of a pre-emptive strike against an impending Communist 
coup. Furthermore, the Rebels bizarrely equated trade-unionism with affiliation to a militia; a 
rationale that went in line with the Bando de guerra of 18 July, which called for the execution 
of all strikers.453 Arminán Odriozola and Queipo de Llano went even further: they simply 
militarised the entire population - including women and children - of the working-class districts 
of Seville (or barrios); all treated as legitimate military targets between the days of 18-23 July 
1936.  
 
The constant references to the ‘Marxist hordes’ created the perception of a city dominated by 
left-wing extremism and where the recourse to violence was inevitable; a view exported to the 
rest of Spain. Conversely, the Republican authorities were dismissed as cowardly and incapable 
of defeating a spontaneous rebellion headed by a small group of patriotic army officers. In fact, 
the legend of Queipo made it almost impossible to challenge the puritanical motivations of the 
insurgents, while simultaneously creating a parallel tale: the ‘myth of the red army’. All this 
was demolished by a secret rebel report dated 12 August 1936, passed to the Rebel columns 
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advancing towards Madrid, which described in very crude terms the military weakness of the 
loyalists. The Rebel high-command revealed: “La calidad del enemigo que tenemos delante, sin 
disciplina ni preparación militar, carente de mandos ilustrados y escasos de armamento y 
municiones en general por falta de Estados Mayores y organización de servicios, hace que los 
combates que nos veamos obligados a sostener las resistencias sean generalmente débiles y 
que confíen solo a la fortaleza de las posiciones y a la acción de la Aviación y concentración de 
artillería el batir a las Columnas.”  Other important sections read: “Nuestra superioridad en 
armamento y hábil utilización del mismo nos permite el alcanzar con contadas bajas los 
objetivos; la influencia moral del cañón mortero o tiro ajustado de ametralladoras es enorme 
sobre el que no lo posee o sabe sacarle rendimiento.  [… ] muchas veces basta la intimidación y 
un cañonazo en puertas o ventanas para que cesen las resistencias. […] si el enemigo se 
defiende aislarlo y la labor metódica de bombardeo, quema, agujeros en las paredes, etc., 
darán resuelto el problema sin apenas bajas.  Al enemigo no conviene acorralarlo sino dejarle 
abierta una salida para batirle en ella con armas automáticas emboscadas.  Puede asegurarse 
también que la falta de disciplina del enemigo y carencia de servicios hará que ninguna 
concentración pueda sostener dos días de combate por falta de municiones.” 454  
 
The myth of the ‘red army’ 
General Queipo’s argument that the Rebels defeated an immense ‘red army’ proved to be as 
hollow as the myth of the soldaditos. His former Chief of Press, Luís Bolín, claimed that 
“Russian ships had landed arms and ammunition along the Guadalquivir River; a Communist 
putsch had been set for the end of July or beginning of August”.455 In reality, there was no 
organised large-scale militia, no Russian ships, and no Communist putsch in Seville; but merely 
a spontaneous mobilisation of the working-class districts against the rebellion. However, 
mobilisation did not imply unity of action and existing tensions within the local labour 
movement (especially between Communists and Anarchists) were further strained by Cuesta 
Monereo’s deceitful tactics.456 So effective was Cuesta’s stratagem that it even tricked the 
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Archbishop of Seville. General Franco later told his cousin Pacón: “Seguramente el retraso en 
presentarse no sería por falta de cortesía del cardenal, y sí por el concepto que de Queipo se 
tenía como republicano[…] El general era considerado de izquierdas y tal vez por ello el 
cardinal demoró todo lo posible visitarle.”457   
 
In the midst of the reigning confusion, PCE leader Manuel Delicado lost his voice while 
unsuccessfully attempting to harangue a confused loyalist crowd at the Alameda de Hércules 
on the afternoon of 18 July, urging it to form a united front against the insurgency. Predictably, 
the few armed workers ignored Delicado and rapidly dispersed into the labyrinth of streets of 
La Macarena. To make matters worse, the improvised militia possessed a mere eighty rifles 
(plus fifty shells per weapon) handed out by the Assault Guard. Delicado was left with 
hundreds of desperate, unarmed workers, distressed by the brutality of the rebellion. He 
embarrassingly urged them to defend the Republic by all means possible.458 The scarcity of 
weapons was such that Anarchist leader Julián Arcas patrolled San Luis with an antique 
sabre.459 A few weeks later (8 September), Communist militant Helios Gómez explained the 
chaotic situation in an interview to Republican newspaper Informaciones: “los obreros fueron 
víctimas de un movimiento envolvente, pues la militarada fascista les cogió desarmados.”460 
 
Major Cuesta Monereo shrewdly exploited Queipo de Llano’s Republican past to present the 
coup as a movement in the defence of the government. Hence, during the first days of the 
insurgency, Queipo’s radio broadcasts were followed by the Republican anthem at the same 
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time as the working-class neighbourhoods of Seville were pacified one-by-one.461 On the same 
day of the capture of La Macarena, the rebel general declared in an interview to newspaper 
ABC that the coup was “netamente republicano” and that “El Ejército, como Institución, huye 
de la política”.462 Still, the few loyalists that were aware of the true nature of the rebellion 
could never predict the full implications of rebel victory. Most believed that the 1936 coup was 
a replica of the Sanjurjada of 10 August 1932. All doubts were violently dispelled on 19 July 
following the arrival of the first shock troops of the Army of Africa, formed by the Foreign 
Legion and the Moroccan mercenaries of the Regulares Indígenas.  
 
A new political landscape 
Despite Queipo’s constant reassurances that the coup was apolitical and that the rebels were 
under attack by an elusive Communist army, the rebels felt secure enough to start imposing 
their political programme as early as the morning of 19 July, when a Comisión Gestora (Town 
Hall Management Committee) was sworn in. The Committee was presided by the aristocratic 
Ramón de Carranza y Gómez-Aramburu (Marquis de Sotohermoso). Its other members were: 
Alberto Gallego y Burín, Secretario General; Antonio González y González Nicolás, Interventor 
de los Fondos Municipales and Fernando Camacho Baños, Asesor Jurídico Municipal.  
 
The first measure adopted by the new mayor (alcalde) of Seville on 19 July was to dismiss all 
the municipal councillors: “atendiendo a las circunstancias presentes he tenido a bien destituir 
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de los cargos todos los Concejales”.463 Later that same day, Ramón de Carranza released a 
public note marked “URGENTE”:  
"El Sr. Alcalde ordena a todos los individuos de la Guardia Municipal que mañana Lunes día 
Veinte se presenten a las diez de la mañana en el Ayuntamiento vistiendo de uniforme. Los 
que no lo hagan quedan cesantes en su empleo y serán juzgados severísimamente."464 
 
All decisions of the Comisión Gestora were passed unanimously, a direct consequence of its 
partisan nature, since it was exclusively composed by members of the local oligarchy. Indeed, 
the first non-military action of the rebels was to restore the élites to a position of pre-
Republican political power. The father of the new mayor of Seville, Ramón de Carranza y 
Fernández de la Reguera (Marquis de Villapesadilla) was, notwithstanding his advanced age 
and precarious health (he died the following year), appointed both civil governor of the 
adjacent province of Cádiz and mayor of the provincial capital.465 The elitist El Correo de 
Andalucía showered praise on the new Comisión Gestora of Seville, stating that the former 
Popular Front administration “muy lejos de una reunión de personas, parecía una junta de 
beduínos” and that the “Gobierno civil llegó a convertirse en una verdadera cueva de 
bandidos”; while Enrique Vila wrote in FE (8 September) that the new organisation contributed 
to the “salvación de la Patria.”466 Political pluralism was eradicated overnight and all state 
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institutions purged of “Bedouins” (Republicans) that were subsequently placed at the 
"disposición de la Autoridad Militar", the equivalent of a death sentence. Predictably, on 31 
July the Town Hall produced its first list of "obreros represaliados" (134 workers), followed by 
another, more comprehensive list, on 10 September (156 workers).467 On 3 August, the 
president of the new Comisión Gestora de la Bolsa Municipal de Trabajo explicitly admitted 
that all its deposed Republican members would be executed if arrested.468 
 
The meteoric ascension of Ramón de Carranza and Pedro Parias to the highest positions of 
political power in Seville not only represented the victory of the élites over the democratic 
challenge posed by the Republic, but also revealed that the rebels adopted a policy of 
promoting extremists in order to maximise repression. By then, it was already becoming 
evident that the Bando was used as a pretext to justify political violence. Promoted and 
protected by the rebel military leadership, the new mayor of Seville surpassed all expectations. 
Ramón de Carranza organised and assumed the leadership of a military column formed mainly 
by fanatical monarchists and named after himself - Columna Carranza - that proceeded to 
subdue large swathes of the provinces of Seville and Huelva. The mayor of Seville saw no 
moral contradiction in massacring the same population he was supposed to administer. So 
much so, that he enthusiastically joined the Army of Africa during its murderous drive to 
Madrid until 2 October 1936, when the Rebel high-command ordered his return to Seville to 
assume his administrative post on a full-time basis.469  
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The fall of the Gran Plaza (19 July 1936) 
The baptism of fire of the Columna Carranza took place in a cluster of working-class 
neighbourhoods - Amate, Cerro del Águila, Ciudad Jardín and Nervión – that formed the Gran 
Plaza district. The barrio was one of the most economically depressed areas of Seville: its 
residents suffered from chronic unemployment, lacked basic housing conditions (including 
sanitation) and only around 8% of the local population aged between 15-24 in Cerro del Águila 
enjoyed primary education.470 On 18 July, a general strike was declared, paralysing all public 
transportation and leaving Brigada Antonio Flores Patrocinio (Granada nº6 regiment) in a 
difficult situation: “siendo lo más probable caer en poder de las turbas por haber salido a la 
calle vestido de militar y armado de dos pistolas.” Patrocinio took the sensible option of 
retiring to the security of his home and wait patiently for the arrival of the rebel army.471 
 
The Gran Plaza was the first barrio to fall to the insurgents and its pacification was achieved 
with relative ease: its wide avenues favoured the attacking forces and the unfinished 
barricades were mercilessly bombarded by mortar fire that sowed panic among the residents.  
The weapon-starved defenders were incapable of seizing the small Civil Guard post of Ciudad 
Jardín on 18 July. Two local civil guards – Manuel Sanchez Garcia and Andrés Durán Marquez – 
later reported:  
“Que el día 18 de julio de 1936 fecha en que se inició el Glorioso Movimiento Salvador de 
España, sobre las 18 30 horas […] un elevado grupo de marxistas, sobre la ya citada hora, 
pretendió asaltar el cuartel establecido en la Ciudad Jardín, contribuyó, en unión de la fuerza 
del mismo, y a las órdenes de su Comandante de puesto, a dispersar al enemigo después de un 
nutrido tiroteo.”472   
 
Despite the low level of resistance, "Ramón Carranza, mandó las fuerzas que cayeron sobre los 
revoltosos de Amate, Ciudad Jardín, infligiéndoles un durísimo castigo que disolvió sus 
concentraciones."473 The disproportionate use of force, euphemistically described as a 
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“durísimo castigo”, was immediately followed by the imposition of the Bando, which ordered 
the execution of all strikers, anyone bearing weapons and "cuantos por cualquier medio 
perturben la vida del territorio de esta División."474 The wording was deliberately vague so to 
encourage an indiscriminate massacre. The radio, used as a weapon of psychological terror by 
Queipo de Llano, explained the military edict in more explicit terms:  
"Toda persona que posea armas ha de entregarlas inmediatamente en la Jefatura de la 
División, en las Comandancias de la Guardia Civil, Puestos de dicho Instituto o Cuartel de la 
Alameda. Se hace la advertencia formal de que el que sea portador de una arma sin permiso 
de la Autoridad militar podrá ser fusilado si infundiera sospecha de utilizarla en agresiones."475 
 
The Columna Carranza carried out meticulous house-to-house searches. The aristocratic Rafael 
de Medina (future Duke de Medinaceli), an influential member of the military unit, narrated in 
his memoirs how an excited mayor of Seville, after breaking the loyalist siege on the Civil 
Guard post in Nervión, instructed the corporal and his five subordinates to enforce the Bando. 
When the corporal refused to execute a man found with a rifle, Carranza immediately ordered 
that both men be shot on the spot only for Medina to save the corporal’s life.476 The episode 
revealed that extreme violence was always employed irrespective of the level of resistance put 
up by the loyalists; a rationale that was yet to be grasped by the civil guard corporal. Medina 
also exposed a key feature of the Rebel military modus operandi: political repression began 
immediately after a battle and the elimination of Republicans was a military objective of equal 
(if not greater) importance as the capture of a barrio.  
 
The myth of the soldaditos, part II  
Shortly after the capture of the Gran Plaza, the 475 Moroccan soldiers of the 1st Tabor de 
Regulares de Ceuta nº3 headed by Major Oliver arrived in Seville after completing the 
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"limpieza" of Cádiz.477 Another group of 140 Regulares reached Seville before the end of the 
month following an epic crossing of the straits of Gibraltar organised by Major Arsenio 
Martínez Campos and Falangist Jefe de Milicias for Cádiz Manuel Mora-Figueroa. Yet again, the 
rebels claimed that they were ‘providentially’ protected by the Virgin Mary.478 The presence of 
the Regulares in peninsular Spain was controversial, not least because of the evident moral 
contradiction about employing foreign Muslim mercenaries in a war that was – according to 
the rebels – partly waged in the defence of Catholic values.479 Rebel intellectual José María 
Pemán provided the most colourful justification for the use of the Regulares. He argued that 
the Moors arrived to “defender la civilización occidental” as an altruistic gesture in gratitude 
for Spain’s ‘civilising mission’ in Morocco.480 On 21 July, General Queipo released a statement 
to the radio:  
"A la una treinta horas de hoy han llegado en varios camiones el grupo de Regulares de Ceuta 
que viene poseído del mayor espíritu y de enorme entusiasmo. Durante su itinerario han 
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desarmado y sometido totalmente varios pueblos y especialmente Los Palacios del que las 
fuerzas marxistas estaban totalmente enseñoreada."481  
 
According to La Unión, Los Palacios had already experienced the consequences of this ‘debt of 
gratitude’, suffering a “dura represión”.482 The insurgents also waited impatiently for the 
arrival of the Foreign Legion. On the first anniversary of the rebellion, Queipo de Llano’s aide-
de-camp revealed that, throughout the night of 18-19 July 1936, insurgent soldiers were given 
instructions to fire continuously into the air in the hope of discouraging loyalists from attacking 
the city-centre before the airlifting of the Legion from Spanish Morocco to Tablada military 
airfield.483 Soon, the number of legionaries and Regulares was such that the fourth-largest city 
in Spain was unable to accommodate them. On 13 August, the Town Hall ordered the 
slaughter of a 203kg cow to feed the Melilla Tabor of Regulares that had arrived in Seville to 
fight the “hordas marxistas" and "librar España de la ominosa dictadura roja".484 Another 
group of Regulares decided to install themselves in the luxurious gardens of the Parque María 
Luísa, where they tore down the local vegetation to make fires for cooking and converted the 
ornamental ponds into showers where they bathed naked in broad daylight. The Moroccan 
mercenaries caused a scandal for turning the park into the centre of prostitution and 
homosexuality in Seville.485 The local authorities remained unperturbed by the apparent 
paradox between their self-proclaimed moral crusade and the events taking place at the 
Parque María Luísa.  
 
When the tale of the soldaditos was absorbed into official history, Queipo de Llano was forced 
to conceal the presence of the Army of Africa in Seville or risk the dismantling of his myth. 
Thus, in 1937 General Queipo rewrote History and claimed that only a dozen Regulares arrived 
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in Seville on 19 July and that the Rebels deliberately created an optical illusion (by repeatedly 
parading the soldiers around the city in open trucks) so to trick the locals into believing that an 
entire army had actually made an entrance in the capital of Andalucía.486 Hence, the radio note 
was nothing more than a bluff aimed at demoralising Republicans. As for the Foreign Legion, 
Joaquín Arrarás, the official historian of the Franco regime (and a personal friend of the 
Generalíssimo), claimed that a total of 21 legionaries headed by Lieutenant Francisco Gassols 
arrived in Seville and were immediately thrown into the battle of Triana. Arrarás also affirmed 
that the locals (inexplicably) failed to notice that the paraded soldiers were merely being 
driven in circles around the city. The story is implausible, not least because the route included 
some of the largest streets in the capital of Andalucía (including calle O’Donnel).487 Major 
Castejón partially contradicted Arrarás’ official version: he declared to reporter Ortiz de Villajos 
that a group of 30 legionaries (including himself) arrived in the morning and not the evening of 
20 July.488 An alternative version of the legend asserts that another group of twenty legionaries 
enjoying summer leave in Seville also joined the parade; while Antonio Olmedo wrote that the 
Regulares were in fact Spanish soldiers disguised as Moroccan mercenaries.489 Despite its 
many variations, the story of the parading of the Army of Africa around Seville served as the 
basis for the second part of the myth of the soldaditos: after claiming that he had captured the 
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city-centre with 130 men, General Queipo de Llano now affirmed that he pacified the barrios 
(and its tens of thousands of armed militiamen) with 250 soldiers, thus achieving a military 
victory of truly epic proportions.490  
 
The numbers game 
The second stage of the myth of the soldaditos possessed a clear political (and even spiritual) 
purpose: to deify General Queipo de Llano and legitimise a posteriori both the coup d’état and 
his dictatorship. For that same reason, the rebel general laboured tirelessly to conceal the 
participation of the entire garrison of Seville (including the Air Force), elements of the Army of 
Africa, Civil and Assault Guard, Requeté, Falange and 187 unaffiliated civilian volunteers. In 
reality, Queipo de Llano possessed an entire army at his disposal:  
 2,250 soldiers (Garrison of Seville) 
 300 civil guards 
 600 assault guards 
 140 civil and assault guards from Huelva, headed by Major Haro Lumbreras 
 100 militiamen (50 Falangists and 50 Requetés)  
 187 civilian volunteers  
 475 Regulares (3rd Ceuta Tabor)  
 2,073 legionaries were airlifted in Seville between 19-31 July491 
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The exact number of legionaries present in Seville at the time of the pacification of the 
working-class districts remains a mystery. What is clear is that the overall number of both 
soldiers and militiamen must have been considerably higher than on 18 July, since Queipo 
ordered the militarisation of the entire city in a note released to Unión Radio the following 
day:  
“¡Sevillanos!: El Ejército Español, fiel depositario de las virtudes de la raza ha triunfado 
rotundamente. Mas la victoria no ha de detener la labor depuradora que el país necesita, y por 
ello el General Queipo de Llano dicta el siguiente  BANDO ADICIONAL 
1º.- Toda persona que posea armas ha de entregarlas inmediatamente a la Jefatura de la 
División, en las Comandancias de la Guardia civil, Puestos de dicho Instituto o Cuartel de la 
Alameda. Se hace la advertencia formal de que el que sea portador de un arma sin permiso de 
la Autoridad militar podrá ser fusilado si infundiera sospecha de utilizarla en agresiones. 
2º.- Para poder distinguir a las personas de orden y amantes de la verdadera justicia, todos los 
que tal se tengan deben presentarse al Gobierno civil o Jefatura de la División a ofrecer el 
concurso que su conciencia le dicte. 
3º.- Para facilitar la labor del Ejercito se previene a todo el vecindario levante las persianas de 
los balcones a fin de no dar sospecha a que de tal forma puedan encubrirse los agresores, 
advirtiéndosele que de no observarse esta indicación pueden sufrirse consecuencias 
desagradables.”492  
 
The Bando adicional eliminated the concept of neutrality and forced the civilian population to 
take sides in the conflict. Those who failed to present themselves at either the Civil 
Government or the Division Headquarters would be treated as legitimate military targets in 
the “labor depuradora que el país necesita”. Queipo de Llano also cancelled all military 
summer leaves and ordered the mobilisation of all males that had served in the army between 
the years of 1931-35.493 In parallel, on 23 July he created the:   
“Fuerzas Civicas al Servicio de España - Todas las personas a las cuales se les ha facilitado 
armamento en la Division, que no pertenezcan a FALANGE Y REQUETES y todas lar particulares 
voluntarias a las que no se le facilitó armamento quedan desde este momento agrupadas a las 
FUERZAS CIVICAS DE ESPAÑA debiendo hacer su presentación a las oficias de las antedichas 
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agrupación tiene establecidas en la calle Jesús del Gran Poder nº48 al 52 (Escuela Normal) en 
donde recibirán instrucciones (horas de 9 a 1 y de 3 a 6).  (Sevilla 23 de Julio de 1936)”494 
 
Soon, Seville was covered in ‘patriotic’ posters coercing civilians to enlist in either a military or 
paramilitary organisation. One such poster read: “«Alístate en cualquier milicia antes que sea 
demasiado tarde».”495 The results of this intimidation campaign were truly spectacular. On 18 
October 1936, the Falange’s Jefe Provincial de Milicias – Ignacio Giménez Gómez Rull - 
informed Queipo that his paramilitary organisation already possessed 4,000 men.496 In only 
few weeks, General Queipo boasted, he had enough soldiers to form his Army of the South. 
 
The fall of Triana (20-21 July 1936) 
Firmly in command of Seville’s city-centre and backed by an ever-expanding army, the 
insurgents now set their sights on the district of Triana and the Seville-Huelva road. The 
ultimate objective was to capture Huelva and link rebel Spain with Portugal, governed by a 
right-wing dictatorship sympathetic to the Rebel cause.497 The occupation of Triana required a 
carefully-planned military operation: restricted access (three bridges from the rebel-controlled 
city-centre) and a maze of narrow, densely-populated streets were certain to prove a sterner 
challenge than the wide avenues of the Gran Plaza. On the other hand, the local residents 
hoped to resist long enough until the arrival of Republican reinforcements. Their situation was 
truly desperate: there was a ratio of one rifle per 20 militants and a severe shortage of 
ammunition.  During the fighting, a militia man would have to wait for a comrade-in-arms to 
be shot before obtaining a weapon. The military weakness of the loyalists was such that – like 
the defenders of the Gran Plaza – they even failed to capture the local Civil Guard post 
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(located in calle Pagés del Corro), defended by seven soldiers that barricaded themselves in 
the building at 19:00 on 18 July.498 The radicalised local Civil Guard illegally collaborated with 
the Falange even before the February 1936 elections.499 Also, women performed a number of 
support duties: some risked their lives by venturing into the rebel-controlled city-centre to 
look for food for the starving militia; while others brought water to loyalist fighters under 
intense gunfire. Republican wounded were denied medical treatment and several were even 
executed inside the municipal hospital.500 The locals were already accustomed to enduring 
severe hardships, including recurrent famines (the upper-classes were derogatorily labelled as 
“steak-eaters”).501 General Queipo de Llano subsequently mocked the entire barrio by labelling 
Triana as “el reducto rojo inexpugnable”.502 
 
The first failed offensive (20 July 1936)  
On 20 July, the insurgents failed twice to capture Triana. The press did not release any news of 
the embarrassing double defeat. Equally silenced was the indiscriminate shelling of the barrio, 
(“bombardeo de castigo sobre Triana”) that commenced at around 19:30 of 19 July and 
resulted, in the words of Colonel Cerezo, in a “duro castigo a las turbas marxistas”.503 The 
report of the first failed assault, which took place on the morning of 20 July, was later quietly 
archived in the Archivo General Militar in Madrid.504 Newspaper El Liberal (Madrid) later 
                                                          
498
 Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur (Seville), Legajo 5376, carpeta 12. Ortiz de Villajos, Cándido, De 
Sevilla a Madrid, page 46; Medina Villalonga, Rafael, Tiempo Pasado, page 42-43. 
499
 “El teniente, que mandaba el Cuartel de la Guardia Civil de Triana, transmitía a Martín todos los 
informes que de las células comunistas de aquel barrio le suministraban los traidores confidentes; y las 
reuniones convocadas en aquéllas, próximas a cualquier agresión o provocación roja, Martín y los suyos 
irrumpían en la taberna trianera de turno y apaleaban a los líderes empavorecidos que en alguna 
ocasión salieron de cabeza por las ventanas.” Dávila, Sancho; Pemartín, Julián, Hacia la historia de la 
Falange: primera contribución de Sevilla, page 92. 
500
 Delicado, "Cómo se luchó en Sevilla", Discurso pronunciado en el Pleno ampliado del C. C. del 
Partido Comunista de España, celebrado en Valencia los días 5, 6, 7 y 8 de Marzo de 1937, page 7. See 
also Delicado’s declarations in El Liberal (Madrid), 4 August 1936. 
501
 Burgos, Antonio, Guia secreta de Sevilla, pages 258-69. 
502
 La Unión (Seville), 18 July 1937. 
503
 Written declaration submitted by Artillery Captain Rafael Esquivias Salcedo on 11 April 1938 (part of 
his petition for the Medalla Militar). See also the reference wrriten by Colonel Santos Rodriguez Cerezo: 
“pasando aproximadamente a las 19 horas con sus piezas al barrio de Triana imponiendo con el fuego 
de las mismas duro castigo a las turbas marxistas”. Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur (Seville), Legajo 5375, 
Carpeta 14. See also Carpeta 20. 
504
 Archivo General Militar (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 18, Carpeta 18, Documento 1. 
The Harca Berenguer also participated in a mopping-up operation in Cerro de Águila and a "razzia" 
targeting refugees from Amate, Cerro del  Águila and several nearby pueblos (29 July). Berenguer wrote: 
“Toma de Cantillana y Tocina en este ultimo pueblo Harca castigó bien previa identificación de un 
guarda civil del puesto”. The “castigo” resulted in 125 executions. Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid), 
Expedientes Policiales, H-754. 
145 
 
revealed that the rebel soldiers deceived the locals by posing as Republicans (by shouting 
leftist slogans) until crossing the San Telmo Bridge and subsequently initiating the assault.505 
The insurgents were nevertheless surprised by the tenacity of the loyalist snipers. In the 
middle of the chaotic offensive, the leader of the Harca Berenguer, Juan Berenguer, was 
ordered by Lieutenant Castelló of the Foreign Legion to return to the Divisional Headquarters 
and request a tank. Queipo complied and the tank ultimately saved Castelló and his men, 
trapped in the Plaza de Altozano. Captain Lindo was fatally injured, while the slightly injured 
Sergeant Maestre was dragged out of the battlefield by Berenguer himself.506  
 
The second failed offensive (20 July 1936) 
The second assault took place on the afternoon of the same day. It was spearheaded by Major 
Castejón and a company of his V Bandera of the Foreign Legion. Castejón was accompanied by 
an Infantry unit, a Falangist Centuria and the notorious Harca Bereguer and Columna Carranza 
(including Algabeño, Rafael de Medina and footballer Guillermo Eizaguirre, who was eager to 
avenge a failed assassination attempt on his father’s life by Anarchist extremists).507 The 
Rebels destroyed several barricades and penetrated deep inside Triana before being forced 
into a tactical retreat due to the rapid approach of nightfall and, according to Gutiérrez Flores, 
because the “enemigo era fuerte”.508  
 
Ideological imperatives forced the insurgents to impose a veil of silence over both episodes, 
which were expunged from Rebel historiography. The Rebels were unable to acknowledge 
military defeats for the simple reason that doing so implied the dismantling of a series of 
myths erected around the persona of General Queipo de Llano. According to the Rebels, the 
success of the rebellion was a natural consequence of the moral (and not military) superiority 
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of the rebels – guided by Queipo de Llano - over the "hordas marxistas".509 Therefore, the 
“hordes” were doomed to suffer successive military defeats until their ultimate annihilation. In 
a few hours, the residents of Triana dismantled the ideological foundation of the Queipo 
regime. 
 
The capture of Triana (21 July 1936) 
The third and final offensive on Triana occurred in the early morning of 21 July. The insurgents 
left nothing to chance. An artillery salvo signalled the start of the operation followed by 
another blanket shelling of the district. The rebel advance was protected by sniper and artillery 
fire from the Paseo de Colón. Rebel historiography attempted to minimise the role played by 
the Army of Africa; however, Gutiérrez Flores, in a report to Cuesta Monereo dated 11 October 
1940, revealed that both the Assault Guard and the already complete (“por completo”) V 
Bandera were involved in the offensive.510 Shortly before the attack, the rebels released the 
following instructions to the local residents:  
“Dentro de un cuarto de hora, a partir de esta orden, deberán todos los vecinos de Triana abrir 
sus puertas, a fin de que pueda hacerse el rápido servicio de captura de los pocos que aún 
disparan de las azoteas para producir la alarma.  Los hombres deberán estar en la calle, 
levantando los brazos en cuanto se presenten las fuerzas de vigilancia para dar la sensación de 
tranquilidad y coadyuvar al mejor servicio.”511 
 
The Rebel army was divided in three columns. The first, headed by Major Castejón, entered 
Triana from the Puente de San Telmo. He was accompanied by his V Bandera, the Columna 
Carranza, an artillery battery and an armoured vehicle.512 The second column, commanded by 
Lieutenant Gassols of the Foreign Legion, assaulted the Puente de Triana. The column was 
formed by legionaries, assault guards, Falangists and volunteers not (yet) affiliated to any 
paramilitary organisation. Joaquín Arrarás erroneously claimed that the already-deceased 
Captain Lindo was placed in command of the second column (probably in an attempt to mask 
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the failed attack of 20 July). The third column, headed by Civil Guard Major Haro Lumbreras, 
attacked the Puente del Cachorro and was formed by an Infantry company, the civil and 
assault guards of Huelva, a group of Requetés and two Falangist Centurias.513 The 3rd Ceuta 
Tabor of Regulares also probably joined the assault since the insurgents silenced the 
participation of several military/paramilitary units, including Sanidad Militar and a group of 
civil guards from Burgos.514   
 
The Rebels were eager to avenge the humiliating defeat of the previous day and were 
particularly obsessed about capturing the Plaza de Altozano (the location where Captain Lindo 
was fatally wounded). The three rebel columns entered Triana protected by a barrage of 
artillery fire before splitting into smaller groups that encircled the entire district. The modus 
operandi was typically Africanist. Major Castejón explained it to Ortiz de Villajos while 
narrating the capture of Morón de la Frontera (25 July 1936):  
"Sin embargo, yo accioné a base de un estrecho movimiento envolvente que me permitiese 
castigar con dureza a los rojos. Todo resultó de acuerdo con mis prevenciones, pues cuando 
los tuve entretenidos con las fuerzas que tenían por misión principal la de amagar caí sobre 
ellos por el lado izquierdo con el núcleo más importante de mis efectivos, cuyo mando 
personal me reservé. Su derrota fue desastrosa. Y el castigo, durísimo.”515 
 
The tactic consisted in enveloping the enemy and then “castigar con dureza”. The method 
proved to be both effective and bloody: in Morón, 26 people had died as a result of leftist 
violence, whereas 238 were killed by the Rebels. Queipo rejoiced at the operation, declaring 
that “la justicia se ha cumplido de manera dura y terrible, como es consiguiente, para acabar 
con la canalla marxista.”516 In Triana, Castejón exploited the military inexperience of the 
                                                          
513
 For the composition of the three columns see: Archivo General Militar (Madrid), Zona Nacional, 
Armario 18, Legajo 35, Carpeta 23; Arrarás Iribarren, Joaquín, Historia de la Cruzada Española, vol. 3, 
Tomo XI, page 214; Medina Villalonga, Rafael, Tiempo Pasado, pages 42-43; El Tebib Arrumi, Así se 
conquistó Sevilla, page 59. 
514
 Written declaration of Joaquín de Castro Gonzalez (“tomando parte en la liberación de Triana”) 
Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 17. 36 civil guards from the Burgos 
Comandancia participated in the capture of the city-centre, Triana and La Macarena. Archivo 
Intermedio Militar Sur (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 20. 
515
 Ortiz de Villajos, Cándido, De Sevilla a Madrid, page 55. 
516
 Queipo affirmed on 25 July: “Morón ha sido dominado por las fuerzas, y la justicia se ha cumplido de 
manera dura y terrible, como es consiguiente, para acabar con la canalla marxista.” El Correo de 
Andalucía (Seville), 25 July 1936. García Márquez, José María, "La represión franquista en la provincial 
de Sevilla. Estado de la cuestión" in Ebre 38. Revista Internacional de la Guerra Civil (1936-1939), nº2, 
Barcelona, Publicacions I Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona, 2004, page 94. 
148 
 
“canalla marxista” to encircle them, close any escape route and finally proceed with a 
“castigo” where the Army of Africa used knifes to carry out a massacre.517 The death of Captain 
Lindo, like that of Simón Lapatza (a key figure in the conspiracy in Seville) during the first 
assault on Morón (24 July 1936); merely served as a pretext for the rebels to indulge in 
indiscriminate slaughter.518 Consequently, the “esfuerzo de los bravos legionarios, leales a la 
causa de España” turned the barrio into a war zone covered in white flags, which was read as a 
symbol of “la actitud pacifista de sus obreros, libertados de la tiranía marxista."519   
 
The ultimate objective of the operation was to initiate the process of repression by means of 
an exemplary crushing of an entire social group (the working-class). The shelling of a 
residential area and the use of the Army of Africa revealed the purpose of the mission: it was a 
punitive action. In the aftermath of the battle of Triana, mixed patrols of soldiers and 
Falangists performed house searches and murdered anyone affiliated to a trade-union, even if 
no weapons were found during the search.520 At the same time, Ramón de Carranza stamped 
his authority as mayor of Seville and gave a 10-minute ultimatum for all residents to remove all 
pro-leftist graffiti from the walls of the barrio. Rafael de Medina noted with unequivocal joy 
that the residents slavishly completed the task before the deadline. Republicanism was – 
literally - wiped out from Triana.521  
 
The fall of La Macarena (21-22 July 1936) 
The last major military objective of the rebels was the district of La Macarena (which 
encompassed all working-class neighbourhoods in the north-western sector of the city). The 
barrio had been isolated from the rest of Seville since 18 July, when the Rebels captured both 
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the city-centre and the adjacent ring road.522 The central problems faced by the weapon-
starved defenders were the fragility of the barricades and the wide perimeter of defence, as 
explained by Arrarás: "La línea de fortificación, muy rudimentaria por cierto, formada por 
adoquines y colchones, va por las calles de Sol, San Julián, Arco de la Macarena, calle de 
Castellar, Ronda de Capuchinos, calle de la Feria y plaza de San Marcos y Santa Marina ."523 The 
ancient walls of La Macarena also functioned as a protective barrier. The epicentre of loyalist 
resistance, which was headed by Andrés Palatín, was the calle San Luis and its orphanage, 
converted into an improvised military headquarters, hospital and refugee camp. According to 
newspaper ABC, Palatín protected the nuns trapped inside the orphanage.524  
 
On the morning of 21 July, an initial rebel attack spearheaded by the Cavalry Corps resulted in 
an unexpected rout. The cavalry assault pierced the first line of barricades but the advance 
stalled in the labyrinth of narrow streets of La Macarena. The leader of the unit trusted with 
reaching the Plaza de San Marcos via calle Castellar was killed with a pickaxe.525 The streets 
were littered with dead horses (one horse was later found dying inside a church) and the 
abandoned weapons of the rebels. At least seven horses, seven rifles and large stocks of 
ammunition were captured. A heavy-machine gun was also seized (but without 
ammunition).526 General Queipo forced a veil of silence over the episode and diverted 
attention from the embarrassing defeat by focusing his nightly charla of 21 July on a 
"saneamiento" among the pro-Republican telegraphists of Seville.527 
 
The capture of La Macarena (22 July 1936) 
The insurgents did not carry out any other offensive on La Macarena on 21 July. General 
Queipo decided to wait patiently for the return of the Army of Africa (busy subduing a number 
of nearby pueblos) to impose an ‘exemplary punishment’ on the district. The scale of the 
assault was such that it threatened the very existence of the myth of the soldaditos. On 23 July 
El Correo de Andalucía, despite accepting the existence of only two columns (Arco de la 
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Macarena and Puerta de Córdoba), reported three separate military manoeuvres: the first in 
calle San Luis; a second in San Julián; and a third that crossed several unnamed streets until 
reaching calle Bustos Travera and the Plaza de San Marcos.528 Both Arrarás and Ortiz de Villajos 
exploited the confusing post-battle report of El Correo de Andalucía to support Queipo’s 
extravagant charla of 1 February 1938 claim that only 250 soldiers divided in two columns 
participated in the attack. Gutiérrez Flores finally conceded in 1940 that the number of 
columns was in fact three, while at the same time declaring that "no recuerdo ni la 
composición de las tres columnas ni los mandos de ellas; desde luego, eran muy pequeñas".529 
Furthermore, Francoist historiography omitted the presence of the Regulares in a frustrated 
attempt at masking the fact that an entire army was employed to pacify the working-class-
districts of Seville. Ironically, it was General Queipo who acknowledged the participation of the 
Moroccan mercenaries in one of his recurrent verbal outburst in his charla of 22 July; a few 
hours after the capture of La Macarena and a few minutes before losing his voice and cutting 
short his speech.530  
 
The three columns were formed by the Foreign Legion, Regulares, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, 
Engineering and Paymaster/Quartermaster Corps, Civil and Assault Guard, Requeté, Falange, 
Harca Berenguer and Columna Carranza.531 The main column, trusted with the critical mission 
of penetrating the barrio from the Arco de La Macarena and securing the calle San Luis, was 
spearheaded by Major Castejón and his V Bandera. Both this and a second column included 
civil guards, Requetés and the Artillery and Engineering Corps. The second column attacked La 
Macarena from the Puerta de Córdoba and its primary objective was to secure calle Hiniesta 
and calle San Julián. The third column entered the district from calle Sol, at the junction 
between the Ronda de Capuchinos and calle Maria Auxiliadora, and was formed by civil 
guards, Falangists, apolitical volunteers (with the Harca Berenguer “a la cabeza”), three 
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Requeté squadrons and the Engineering, Paymaster/Quartermaster and Artillery Corps. All 
three columns were instructed to converge at the Plaza de San Marcos.532 An entire army, 
numbering not 250 soldiers as subsequently claimed by Queipo and his panegyrists, but 
thousands; left the city-centre at 14:00 and headed towards La Macarena while the radio 
released, according to the testimony of Gutiérrez Flores, "instruciones muy severas a los 
vecinos."533 The battle concluded at 20:00.534 
 
The tactic employed by the Rebels was a replica of the one used during the capture of Triana, 
with equally destructive results. Several artillery batteries stationed along a number of 
strategic locations (and which had been ‘softening’ the area for at least two days) were now 
ordered by Castejón to intensify the shelling of the barrio, badly damaging the Arco de La 
Macarena (a symbol of Seville) in the process and provoking several friendly-fire incidents.535 
The majority of houses located in the frontline were obliterated.536 In San Julián, the barricades 
set up in front of the Capuchin Convent were also destroyed and Edmundo Barbero, who also 
paid a visit to the damaged Arco de la Macarena, stated in his memoirs that all houses in the 
area bore the scars of bullet impact.537 The artillery barrage was followed by a brutal offensive. 
According to the personal testimony of Manuel Delicado: “Los obreros que caían en poder de 
los facciosos eran fusilados inmediatamente” and “El bombardeo cada día era más intenso. Las 
fuerza facciosas comenzaron a desalojar las viviendas obreras más próximas. Al salir las 
mujeres y los niños aterrorizados por el bombardeo, la Guardia civil y los fascistas hacían 
descargas cerradas contra ellas. Los hombres que estaban refugiados en estas viviendas eran 
apartados de las mujeres y conducidos a la muralla del barrio de la Macarena, donde eran 
fusilados.”538  
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The Rebels also instructed the air force to bomb La Macarena with complete disregard for 
human life.539 On 18 July, Major Rafael Martínez Estévez had already contravened orders from 
Varela Rendueles to shell the rebel forces clustered in and around the city-centre on the 
grounds that it would cause large numbers of non-military casualties.540 The participation of 
the air force was omitted from Francoist historiography; however, on 22 July El Correo de 
Andalucía printed an edict released by Queipo directed at the residents of the densely-
populated district:  
"Por esta orden general se comunica a los pequeños focos que aún existen que depongan su 
actitud arrojando las armas por la calle, colocando distintivos blancos en las puertas y ventanas 
en evitación los daños que pudiesen ocasionar la Aviación y las fuerzas del Ejército."541 
 
The column that penetrated La Macarena from calle Sol temporarily seized both the Plaza de 
los Terceros and calle Bustos Travera only to be forced to retreat twice. As in Triana, the rebels 
relied on the support of an armoured vehicle that pushed the advance to the Plaza San 
Marcos, bombarded the square and destroyed the barricades. Foot soldiers also used hand 
grenades. Already in the Plaza de San Marcos, a Carlist priest provided spiritual support to the 
advancing rebel troops.542  
 
The Army of Africa suffered its highest number of casualties in the triangle calle San Luis-Plaza 
de Pumarejo-calle Santa Maria.543 The Foreign Legion put its nihilistic ethos into practice: a 
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number of eye-witnesses confirmed that the legionaries forced their way through the wrecked 
barricades with hand grenades and used women and children as human shields.544 The files of 
the Diputación Provincial revealed that at least three children were killed during the 
offensive.545Already deep inside the barrio, the legionaries randomly tossed hand grenades 
inside houses and stabbed residents to death in an operation termed by Ortiz de Villajos as "la 
limpieza de la Macarena".546 The final assault on the orphanage was described by the La Unión 
reporter as an “apocalipsis”.547 Converted into a makeshift refugee camp, the orphanage 
sheltered entire families (including pregnant women, children and elderly people), in addition 
to the resident orphans. It was mercilessly assaulted with hand grenades and heavy machine-
gun fire. Andrés Palatín, who according to the Rebel press fought with exceptional bravery, 
evaded the siege and hid in a nearby house until being spotted and executed.  Resistance was 
particularly stubborn in San Julián. So much so, that the insurgents were forced to dispatch a 
column to mop-up the entire area the following morning. Queipo provided an alternative 
version of events in a flagrant attempt at denigrating Palatín’s reputation: “Tenían el puesto de 
mando en el Hospicio, que fué tomado por las fuerzas del comandante Castejón, poniendo en 
fuga a las muchas docenas de criminales que pudieron escapar, en su mayoría, por la puerta 
trasera del edificio. Sin embargo, dejaron en el interior del edificio bastantes muertos, entre 
los que estaba el del señor Palatín”.548  
 
After attaining their primary military objective, the rebels divided the columns into smaller 
units that combed the streets in search for Republicans, killing anyone found with a weapon. A 
bystander witnessed the desperate efforts of a man attempting to dispose of his gun, noting 
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"si le cogen con la pistola está perdido."549 The Africanist modus operandi was evident: the 
subdivision of the columns in smaller units that encircled the area and blocked all escape 
routes so to maximise casualties.550 300 captured loyalists were later paraded around the city-
centre as war trophies, but not before the Rebels forced the local residents to tear down the 
barricades with their bare hands.551 That same night, a triumphant General Queipo declared 
that “el castigo ha sido ejemplar”552; while an eye-witness confirmed to La Unión that "la lucha 
ha sido cruenta; las paredes llenas de impactos; regueros de sangre."553 The following day (23 
July), the ABC reporter was sickened by the stench of putrefying bodies in Santa Marina554; 
whereas Queipo’s Delegado de Presa y Propaganda wrote: "En San Julián la matanza fue 
tremenda. Obligaron a todos los hombres que encontraban en las casas a salir a la calle, sin 
averiguar si habían tomado parte en la lucha, y allí mismo los mataban."555 Antonio 
Bahamonde was so emotionally overwhelmed by the massacre that it triggered a crisis of 
conscience that led to his eventual defection.  
 
Rationalising repression 
The central problem faced by the rebels was moral and not martial. The capture of the capital 
of Andalucía became a matter of time following the occupation of the city-centre on 18 July; 
however, the insurgents needed urgently to justify the military methods employed, including 
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the use of the Army of Africa against residential districts. The rebel leadership, the majority of 
which served in Spanish Morocco, was clearly aware of the inevitable bloody consequences of 
unleashing the African units in mainland Spain, which only aggravated their crisis of 
legitimacy.556 To counter this, two different approaches were adopted: either a) the cover-up 
of specific episodes (Gran Plaza) or b) exaggeration of leftist violence and the dehumanisation 
of the enemy (Triana and La Macarena). For instance, on 22 July General Queipo cynically 
stated that twenty rebel sympathisers were murdered in the San Marcos neighbourhood alone 
in what consisted of a typically Africanista propaganda coup aimed at deflecting attention 
away from Rebel violence.557 In July 1937 General Franco employed the same tactic when he 
calmly declared to a Belgian reporter that only 4,500 people had been executed by the rebels 
during the first year of the rebellion.558 In contrast, only 14 anti-Republicans were murdered in 
Seville between 18-23 July.559 Moreover, rebel casualties were slim. The military unit trusted 
with spearheading the offensives against the barrios – the Foreign Legion – sustained a 
remarkably low number of losses: 4 dead and 7 injured. In addition, the column that 
penetrated La Macarena from Puerta de Córdoba suffered a mere two casualties (a seriously 
wounded soldier and a slightly injured Falangist) and only one Requeté was injured during the 
pacification of San Julián, a clear indication of the military inexperience of its civilian 
defenders.560 Ultimately, the insurgents refused to release full casualty figures for fear of 
exposing the military asymmetry between the opposing forces and demolishing the argument 
that the taking of the barrios was part of a wider struggle pitting the “Ejército de la Patria” 
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against the “imperio del marxismo.”561 Lastly, the pacification of La Macarena was followed by 
an intense propaganda campaign aimed at presenting the massacre as mere retributive justice 
or a “castigo” for the barrio’s past Republican-era crimes. Pro-Francoist historiography 
officially labelled the district as "el terrible barrio rojo sevillano, sede del comunismo”.562  
 
The dehumanisation of Republicans was a natural extension of the fabrication that a Soviet-
sponsored Communist coup was being concocted in Spain. The rebels justified massacres with 
the argument that they were compelled to adopt extreme force so to ensure the success of 
the rebellion, under threat by thousands of militiamen both inside Seville and in the 
surrounding countryside. According to such rationale, repression was merely a reflexive tactic 
to guarantee the triumph of a defensive, apolitical coup aimed at preserving national 
sovereignty. It was therefore justifiable in the context of a city under both internal and 
external siege.563 Already on 22 July 1936 ABC excused the bloody taking of Triana and the 
imminent capture of La Macarena with the following title: "POR LA SALVACION DE LA PATRIA. 
GUERRA A MUERTE ENTRE LA RUSIA ROJA Y LA ESPAÑA SAGRADA".564 
 
The Rebels claimed to be fighting a “war to the death” against a foreign enemy (Spaniards who 
had de facto abjured their nationality and swore allegiance to the Soviet Union); or, as 
historian Herbert Southworth sarcastically put it: “Los trabajadores de Sevilla hacían de pieles 
rojas para estos modernos conquistadores.”565 The insurgent leadership closed ranks and 
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repeated the argument ad nauseam. That very same day, General Franco stated that "Todos 
tenemos el deber de cooperar en esta lucha contra Rusia."566 A year later, Queipo reiterated 
the casus belli for the rebellion with renewed vitriol: “El bolchevismo tenía elegida Sevilla para 
hacerla blanco de sus horrores, que son vergüenza de la sociedad. Todos, los ateos, los judíos, 
los masones, los rojos en general, se habían conciliado contra nuestra Patria”.567 The Falange 
also contributed to the demonisation of the Republic by handing out flyers to the very same 
workers it repressed. The tone was apocalyptic:  
“Habéis sido testigos horrorizados de la catástrofe preparada por los sicarios de Moscú. España 
vivía entregada al espíritu asiático de Rusia, Judaísmo, Masonería, Marxismo: he ahí los tres 
enemigos de nuestra redención.  Respirábamos un aire pestilente de cloaca, de charca infecta, 
donde se revolvían detritus negativos de vileza y destrucción, que alegres vientos de justicia 
han logrado purificar.”568 
 
After ‘cleansing’ the working-class districts of Seville, the Falange now proposed to wipe out 
the “detritus negativos” that continued endangering the Patria. At the same time, the rebels 
laboured intensely to conceal the events of 18-23 July in Seville. Their efforts were initially 
undermined by the naivety of the press. Immediately after the occupation of La Macarena (24 
July), ABC reported:  
"La resistencia de San Marcos, el Pumarejo y San Julián, fué más aparatosa que eficaz. No tenía 
el foco la menor importancia militar. Un sentimiento humanitario hizo al general Queipo 
demorar en lo posible la ocupación de este sector, que pudo ser barrido a cañonazos; pero el 
deseo de evitar corriera de sangre de los obreros engañados dilató la ocupación."569 
 
By revealing that loyalist resistance in La Macarena was “más aparatosa que eficaz”, ABC 
dismantled the Rebel’s key argument that the rebellion was a pre-emptive strike against a 
Communist putsch. Reporter Sánchez del Arco also confirmed the military asymmetry between 
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insurgent and loyalist forces, a constant throughout both the pacification of western Andalucía 
and the march of the Army of Africa from Seville to Madrid.570 The rebels replied by tightening 
their grip on the press.571 The need to exaggerate leftist violence compelled the rebels to 
rewrite History in just a matter of days. Precisely one week after ABC (24 July) reported that 
Andrés Palatín had protected the nuns residing in the orphanage of San Luis; La Unión (1 
August) provided an entirely different perspective on the Anarchist leader: "Quien convierte 
un centro benéfico en cuartel general de unas hordas peores que salvajes[…] no puede menos 
que merecer los más duros calificativos. Pero[…] murió fusilado como un caballero; Dios acoja 
su alma con más benevolencia que la que él tuvo con sus semejantes."572  
 
In order to attain this objective and avoid a repeat of the public relations disaster that was the 
massacre of Badajoz of 14 August 1936, Major Cuesta Monereo released - on 7 September 
1936 - strict instructions for press censorship. Its 14 points included specific orders ( 1º and 2º) 
for newspapers to present edited versions of the macabre radio speeches of General Queipo 
de Llano573; and the imposition of a code of silence over both the number of Rebel casualties, 
“defeatist” (derrotista) reports (4º) and the foreign origin of rebel aircraft (8º). Other 
instructions included a general prohibition on the publishing of any news that might threaten 
the unity of the rebel alliance (10º). The single most important order was number 9: “9°- En las 
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medidas represivas se procurará no revestirlas de frases o términos aterradores,  expresando 
solamente "se cumplió la justicia", "le llevaron al castigo merecido", "se cumplió la ley", etc., 
etc."574 
 
Major Cuesta’s instructions were critical for the moral survival of the insurgency. The press 
was instructed to describe violence euphemistically. And so, “repression” became “justicia”, 
“ley” or “castigo”; and the “castigo ejemplar” of La Macarena a synonym for “massacre”.  
 
Bellum iustum 
The Rebels militarised (“fuerzas marxistas”), politicised (“tiranía marxista”) and dehumanised 
(“hordas marxistas”) the Republican ‘other’. This rationalisation permitted the rebels to 
convert residential districts into legitimate military targets, metamorphose loyalists into Soviet 
agents and perceive themselves as modern-day “conquistadores”; while at the same time 
excusing the use of the most brutal Africanist war tactics to achieve specific non-military goals. 
The ultimate objective was to enforce a new political order. As a result, the castigo of Seville 
did not conclude with the occupation of the city, but with the eradication of Republicanism. 
Only a few days later (27 July), Queipo de Llano personally oversaw the organisation of “unas 
guardias cívicas, que tendrán por objeto vigilar toda la población de Sevilla[…] Ayer abrí las 
listas y hoy ya hay más de mil; la organización  será por barrios, distritos y calles, y con tal 
rapidez, que antes de 24 horas no podrán circular por las calles más que aquellos que pueden 
hacerlo con la frente muy alta.”575  
 
The primary objective of the coup was not to conquer and administer; but rather to conquer 
and ‘punish’ the local population for its loyalty towards the Republic. Hence, the new sectarian 
Comisión Gestora presided by part-time mayor, part-time militia leader Ramón de Carranza 
was simply implementing its very first decision – "auxiliar oficialmente al Excmo. Sr. General de 
la División" – when it released a series of murderous decrees under the ‘legal’ protection of 
the Bando.576 This modus operandi was replicated all over rebel-controlled Andalucía. For 
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instance, the self-appointed Comandante Militar of Sanlúcar de Barrameda, Antonio de León y 
Manjón, gave a 24 hour deadline on 5 August for: “Todos los Sanluqueños ó que vivan 
habitualmente en esta ciudad vendrán a esta Comandancia Militar donde después de serle 
leída la fórmula de la promesa que consiste en síntesis en sacrificar la última gota de nuestra 
sangre y nuestra última peseta hasta conseguir el triunfo de nuestros ideales, se adherirán en 
su firma hasta a ella.”León y Manjón also warned that anyone who contravened the Bando 
that “lo consideraré como enemigo de España y Sanlúcar”; dividing loyalists into two distinct 
categories: “los elementos leales a sus ideas” and “la de los cobardes y egoístas […] sobre los 
cuales caerá el desprecio de España y Sanlúcar, y a los que aniquilaré sin piedad.”577 
  
The tactics adopted by the rebels revealed that the Bando was not just a military edict 
designed to impose public order, but the first step towards the institutionalisation of terror in 
Spain. In Seville, the Bando ‘legalised’ a carefully planned repressive process based on the 
power usurped by Queipo de Llano on 18 July, which in turn was legitimised by the myth of the 
soldaditos. In reality, repression was not a defensive tactic aimed at pre-emptively aborting a 
Soviet-sponsored coup, but a political tool to purge Seville of Republicans, ‘Bedouins’ or 
‘Marxist hordes’ (depending on the version). Consequently, the capture of the suburbs did not 
represent the conclusion, but merely the opening stage of the Rebel repressive project. So 
much so, that the modus operandi employed in the taking of the barrios served as a model, 
repeated over and again during the pacification of western Andalucía and the march to 
Madrid.578 For instance, leftist militiamen were savagely murdered in both the hospitals of 
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Seville and Toledo.579 The massacre of Badajoz represented but the bloody climax of a strategy 
that can be traced back to the capture of the working-class districts of Seville.  
 
Rebel-controlled Andalucía served as a testing ground for the Africanistas’ ambitious project of 
inverting the results of the February 1936 elections by means of violence. General Queipo 
enforced this policy with gusto. On 25 July 1936, he declared: “La canalla marxista hay que 
extirparla de España, hasta sus raíces”.580 This was precisely what the insurgents did, 
‘extirpating’ the Republic  from all but one town in the province of Seville; whereas loyalist 
violence affected only 33 out of a total of 101 pueblos.581 In effect, the interior colonisation of 
Spain envisaged by the Africanista military caste began with the ‘colonisation’ of the working-
class districts of Seville on 19-23 July. The capital of Andalucía never experienced a civil war; 
however, the mass killings that claimed at least 3,028 lives between July 1936-January 1937 
continued at a frantic pace in a city living officially in peace.582 
                                                                                                                                                                          
6. Se extremará la energía en la represión, sobre todo en aquellos individuos que se consideren 
peligrosos de acción, los que hayan empuñado las armas contra la fuerza pública, o los que hayan 
cometido desmanes. 
7. Se procurará que en cada pueblo de tránsito queden restablecidas las comunicaciones 
telegráficas y telefónicas con el Cuartel General, dando cuenta al mismo del resultado de la operación 
en cada pueblo, a ser posible desde éste. 
8. Todo Jefe de columna, a su regreso, dará cuenta por escrito del resultado de la misión 
encomendada, indicando las incidencias y consideraciones que juzgue convenientes. 
Sevilla 31 de Julio de 1936EL GENERAL DE DIVISIÓN, GONZALO QUEIPO DE LLANO” Archivo General 
Militar (Madrid), Armario 7, Rolo 54, Legajo 363, Carpeta 41. 
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During the initial weeks of the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39, Nationalist propaganda claimed 
that Seville was one of the provinces least affected by the conflict. The argument was both 
simple and logical: the capital of Andalucía fell under rebel control during the first days of the 
rebellion and (despite its violent pacification) was therefore otherwise spared from the 
ravages of war. This brainwashing campaign was carefully orchestrated to coincide with the 
most virulent phase of Nationalist repression, which occurred after and not during the 
pacification of the city of Seville. Indeed, the bloodiest month in the capital of Andalucía during 
the conflict – September 1936, with a daily average of over 26 executions (totalling 785) – 
occurred in a city removed from the frontline but where peace was but a hopeful mirage.583  
 
A second concept remains largely unchallenged to the very present: that the process of 
political transition from democracy to autocracy was both quick and relatively painless. 
According to Nationalist propaganda, life in rebel Spain rapidly returned to a pre-Republican 
normality no longer threatened by the social chaos promoted by the Popular Front 
government. In reality, the overthrow of the Republic was quick (courtesy of a conspiracy that 
had been planned for months), but certainly not painless. Moreover, the intense level of 
violence did not imply that the rebels possessed a defined political program (which they clearly 
lacked).584 Above all, the rebellion failed in most of Spain and there was a sudden demand for 
money to finance an unanticipated war of attrition. Already on 24 July 1936, Nationalist 
intellectual José María Pemán acknowledged the failure of the July coup and welcomed its 
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mutation into a bloody civil war which he regarded as both “necessario” and “conveniente”. 
According to Pemán, the Spanish Civil War was actually a gift from God:  
“Dios nos ha mandado la suprema lección de una guerra, que por eso digo que era 
conveniente; conveniente para que en su transcurso nos purifiquemos; para que en sus 
caminos nos dejemos atrás nuestros errores y pecados, y lleguemos al final puros y limpios, 
dignos de recibir en nuestras manos, lavadas de sudor, la España que se nos prepara.”585 
 
When the advance of General Mola’s Navarrese columns stalled in the mountain passes of 
Madrid, the onus of the Nationalist war effort fell overwhelmingly on Seville; as did the 
economic strain. The capital of Andalucía was the only fully-operational industrial centre in 
rebel Spain (Zaragoza was besieged by the Republican army) and also functioned as the 
peninsular hub of the Army of Africa.586 Hence, the early capture of Seville not only did not 
result in any major saving of life (a consequence of physical repression), but also caused the 
financial exhaustion of the province. This process was supported by the absence of legislation 
to keep in check ‘patriotic subscriptions’ and other instruments of extortion devised by the 
Pact of blood.587 Furthermore, physical violence represented merely the opening phase of 
General Mola’s repressive project, coexisting with other parallel (and complementary) forms of 
repression: economic and cultural. Indeed, the plundering of defeated Republicans was 
promoted and directed from above: Colonel Yagüe led by example when he stole the car of 
Luis Pla in the aftermath of the massacre of Badajoz. Shortly afterwards, the Nationalist high-
command legalized the looting of towns and villages.588 This married perfectly with the notion 
of the material punishment of political opponents as a complement to physical violence. As a 
result, the Army of Africa not only spearheaded the rebel advance towards Madrid, but also, 
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according to General Queipo’s former Delegado de Prensa y Propaganda: “El pillaje y el saqueo 
fue consubstancial con la columna. Pueblo en que entraban, pueblo que devastaban. En todos 
ellos se ven las huellas de su paso. Los moros y el Tercio, cuando iban a Sevilla, llegaban 
cargados de objetos de todas clases. Vendían, sin el menor recato, aparatos de radio, relojes, 
joyas, etc.”589 
 
Repressive actors: Army, Falange, Requeté, Catholic Church and oligarchy 
In Nationalist Spain, repressive pluralism replaced Republican political pluralism. The 
immediate consequence of this process was that the torment of Seville was multiplied; not 
only different forms of repression emerged, but they were also enforced by a multitude of 
groups – Falange, Requeté, Catholic Church and the oligarchy - all under the aegis of the rebel 
army. Indeed, economic repression was central to the establishment of the Pact of blood, the 
process by which all segments of society were coerced into collaborating in the forging of the 
new state. All aspects of daily life were regimented by the new regime.  In doing so, the rebels 
ensured the loyalty of the local population, for now all had played a role in the extermination 
of the Republic. At the same time as it concentrated power on itself, the Nationalist state 
shared responsibility for its crimes collectively. The forging of a Kleptocratic State was not a 
collateral consequence of the civil war.  Daily life in rebel territory was conditioned by the dual 
fear of violence and starvation.  
 
State-sponsored extortion achieved its most refined level of sophistication in Seville under the 
tutelage of General Queipo de Llano and the symbiotic relationship Army-Falange. Both the 
Carlists and the Falange were initially regarded as valuable allies in the militarization of civil 
society; however, the indisputable victor in the battle for popular support was the Falange. Its 
totalitarian project was far more appealing and inclusive than the theocratic utopia proposed 
by the Comunión Tradicionalista. On the eve of the rebellion, the Seville branch of the Falange 
possessed around 1,200 members (9,000 in Andalucía). By November 1940, membership had 
exploded to 88,632 in the province of Seville and 190,123 in Andalucía. By 1942, the Falange 
possessed 13,262 affiliates in the city of Seville alone.590 Thus, while the rebel army 
desperately attempted to gather resources to finance its military campaign; the Falange (and 
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to a lesser extent the Requeté) had also materially to support its ever-expanding organisation. 
The Falange employed all means at its disposal to attain its objectives, including extortion. 
According to Bahamonde, a simple yet effective tactic consisted of confiscating properties by 
placing a sign that read “Incautado por Falange”. This was the case with newspaper El 
Liberal.591 On the very first day of the rebellion in Seville, the offices of El Liberal were 
ransacked by Falangist militants, who then proceeded to use the premises to print their newly-
established newspaper, FE (from 1 September 1936). General Queipo narrated the event in his 
charla of 21 July:  
“He tenido que tomar una determinación severa con “El Liberal”. A mis noticias había llegado, 
y se extendió por todo el Ejército civil y militar de Sevilla la especie de que ciertas hojas 
clandestinas que han circulado en Sevilla, llenas de infundios propalados por los marxistas, 
habían sido confeccionados en la imprenta “El Liberal”. Esto produjo la natural indignación en 
estos valientes soldados sevillanos, y esta tarde han asaltado la imprenta del citado periódico, 
destruyendo los muebles.”592  
 
The alliance between the rebel army and the Falange was mutually profitable; both repressive 
agents sustained each other economically. For instance, the military regularly donated state 
property (such as the Pabellón de Brasil in Seville)593 to the Falange and sanctioned the 
paramilitary group’s fundraising campaigns. In exchange, the Falange would lend a helping 
hand or contribute directly to military ‘patriotic subscriptions’. On 11 September, a Falangist 
Children’s Commission (Comisión de muchachos) from Jerez de la Frontera (Cádiz) handed 
Queipo an impressive 61kg of gold, of which 37.251kg were collected directly by the 
Falange.594 Four days later, the Falange of Cantillana (Seville) donated 1.480kg of gold and an 
undisclosed number of gold watches to the Treasury Department (Tesoro) and 4,177 pesetas 
to the Army Fund. However, the granting of a wide degree of autonomy did not imply that the 
military would not suffer from any form of competition; the rebel army occupied the highest 
rank in the repressive hierarchy. On the other hand, the local population now had to prove its 
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patriotic zeal not to one, but to several repressive agents. For example: on the same day that 
the Falange of Cantillana visited Queipo, Seville’s tram company (compañía de tranvías) 
pledged 3,748.05 pesetas to the Army Fund and another 1,000 pesetas (equivalent of one day 
of work) to the Falange.595 The multitude of subscriptions eroded the fragile economic health 
of Seville in a process that represented the apex of repressive pluralism in the II Division.596 
 
Economic repression was divided into two main categories: a) that directed against the 
perceived enemies of the regime and b) against the wider population. The notion that 
repression was exclusively directed at the enemies of the new state was a Nationalist 
fabrication. Indeed, the main distinction between economic violence directed against 
Republicans and fundraising campaigns targeting the wider population was simply a question 
of method and degree. Common citizens were coerced into contributing financially to the 
point of exhaustion; whereas political opponents, after being stripped of all rights and 
therefore reduced to the status of social non-entities, would simply see all their possessions 
confiscated. According to Bahamonde, the victims were: “condenadas a la más absoluta 
miseria. Miseria que nadie se atreve a remediar, por temor a ser tildado de marxista.”597  
 
This was the politics of exclusion. Plunder was 'legalised’ in rebel Andalucía by three military 
edicts released by General Queipo de Llano: bando nº 13 of 18 August 1936 (Confiscación de 
bienes de inductors a la violencia, propagandistas y rebeldes), bando nº 23 of 2 September 
(Inductores de la rebelión. Inmovilización de cuentas y valores) and nº 29 of 11 September 
(Confiscación de bienes. Y adiciones y aclaraciones al bando nº 13).598 Economic repression was 
formally institutionalised at a national level only after the publication of the Ley de 
Responsabilidades Políticas of 9 February 1939. Reduced to the status of non-persons, the 
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ostracised loyalist middle-classes were the ghosts of a Republican past in the new Nationalist 
Spain. 
 
The genesis of the Kleptocratic State: fundraising campaigns 
Both the rebel military and the Falange resorted to the rudimentary tactic of equating 
collaboration with patriotism in order to promote fundraising campaigns. In the deeply 
intoxicating political atmosphere of Nationalist Spain, this seemly puerile approach proved 
irresistible. Refusal to cooperate amounted to treason. Punishments varied according to 
circumstances: political allies could expect a severe financial penalty. Exemplary fines served a 
purely educational purpose and the local population rapidly internalised the message (the 
press failed to identify a single re-offender. Conversely, traditional inimical groups, most 
notably the working-class, could not afford the luxury of transgression. Punishment would 
almost certainly follow with, at the very least, incarceration and, in 1936 Seville with its 
constant purging of prisons, the possibility of extra-judicial execution. Other punishments 
included slander campaigns (via the press), job loss, social ostracism or even public corporal 
punishment (shaving of head, forced ingestion of castor oil, etc).599  
 
A second parallel tactic, devised by the Falange and rapidly copied by Queipo de Llano, 
emerged in Seville. It was specifically aimed at the conservative middle-classes and toyed with 
the conceptualisation of the rebellion as a pre-emptive strike against an imminent Communist 
coup:  
“CAPITALISTA: El día 18 de Julio lo tenías TODO perdido: vida y hacienda. Hacienda y vida que 
has salvado gracias al esfuerzo de todos; sobre todo aquellos que precisamente NADA tienen. 
No lo olvides nunca. La memoria es flaca; vendrán días de sosiego y de paz; y es preciso que no 
se te olvide AQUELLO!”600 
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The text concluded in typical intimidating fashion: “¡Que nunca te lo tengamos de recordar!” 
The Falange exposed the reality of daily life in Seville less than two months (13 September) 
after the outbreak of the rebellion: a city increasingly remote from the frontline, where the 
new regime felt already compelled to refresh the collective memory of its inhabitants in order 
to maintain patriotic fervour. Propaganda was insufficient and the only way to preserve the 
polarised political atmosphere (and fund the military rebellion) was to resort to intimidation 
and exploit the myth of the imminent Communist coup. Physical and economic repression, the 
pillars of the new state, mutually sustained each other. 
 
The inevitable reference to the working-class (“Aquellos que precisamente NADA tienen”) 
went in harmony with the Falange’s perception of itself as a movement cutting across the 
social divide. However, the editorial also exposed the party’s schizophrenic relationship with 
the popular classes. The Falange strived to develop into a truly fascist organisation by 
incorporating the masses into its ranks, while at the same time participating in the military’s 
repressive project.601 At the same time, General Queipo de Llano’s relationship with the 
working-class was equally full of contradictions, even if devoid of ideological constraints. 
Queipo cynically appropriated the Falange´s discourse of reintegrating a working-class 
‘deceived’ by the Republican élites, while simultaneously supporting the oligarchy’s class war. 
In truth, Queipo deeply resented popular resistance to his rule and regularly demonstrated 
contempt for workers in his charlas. On 4 September, he declared:  
“Y, por último, he recibido un telegrama de la Sociedad de metalúrgicos de Zafra en el que 
decía haber acordado la disolución de su Sindicato y que ponía a mi disposición la suma de 
5,946 pesetas, que constituían en fondos del mismo. Es curioso observar cómo en tan poco 
tiempo hemos logrado hacer cambiar de manera de pensar a una cantidad enorme de 
obreros.”602 
 
General Queipo de Llano’s speech was supported by Falangist rhetoric. The next day (5 
September), FE reported that in the province of Seville “la tranquilidad es absoluta” and “la 
clase trabajadora, convencida del engaño y la traición de sus jefes marxistas, reanudó sus 
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trabajos a su debido tiempo.”603 Queipo de Llano’s sarcastic remark, at the same time as 
physical repression climaxed in the capital of Andalucía (26 daily executions), corresponded 
perfectly with the Falange’s idyllic portrayal of life in the province. For the metallurgical 
workers of Zafra (Badajoz), the dissolution of their trade-union and the transfer of its funds to 
the Army Fund represented the only realistic hope of avoiding execution. A similar situation 
affected the working-class Sociedad Minera y Metalúrgica de Peñarroya, which on 14 
September 1937 submitted its 18th donation (totalling 17,491.70 pesetas)604 Lastly, Nationalist 
obsession with working-class donations, publicised ad nauseam in the press, also served 
another vital purpose: to create an impression of national unity.  
 
The apparently spectacular ideological shift of the masses simply reflected survival tactics. 
Indeed, the extraordinarily high level of ‘contributions’ merely exposed the scope and intensity 
of economic repression. Examples are plentiful, even if fragmented. For instance, between 9-
10 September 1936 members of the Comandancia Militar of Algeciras (Cádiz) visited Queipo to 
hand him in person an impressive 8kg of gold, while representatives of the recently-defunct 
Unión Fosforero trade-union donated 2,154 pesetas. Furthermore, the Comisión Gestora of La 
Carlota (Córdoba) contributed 7,656 pesetas to the subscription for the rebel army, the 
Comisión Gestora of Guadalcanal (Seville) donated 11,650 pesetas and 1.7kg of gold and the 
recently-disbanded Sociedad Nicot handed 300 pesetas (second donation).605 In his charla of 
10 September, Queipo announced that the Cruz del Campo beer factory had pledged 1,525 
pesetas, the employees of the Pirotecnía Militar 5,960 pesetas, Paradas (Seville) residents 
7,800 pesetas, Rute (Córdoba) residents 42,201.25 pesetas, 218 gold coins and 7.185kg of gold, 
and a Ladies Commission (Comisión de Señoritas) from Jerez 50.895kg of gold.606 In addition, 
on 15 September Queipo read a letter from the Coronel-Jefe de la Pirotecnia declaring that the 
local workers, who had only recently “contribuido generosamente”, would now further 
increase their efforts and donate the equivalent of one extra hour of daily work to the Aviation 
Fund. Queipo noted that “Ese reconocimiento es demostrativo de que se liberaron ya de la 
infamia de los marxistas.”607 This was the ‘recognition’ that the working-class strived for, since 
it implied some relaxation of the repression. In Nationalist Spain, expiation came via extortion 
(donations, forced labour, starvation wages). Ultimately, the resounding success of ‘patriotic 
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fundraising campaigns’ and ‘spontaneous’ private contributions in Andalucía was replicated all 
over Nationalist Spain. Hence, Seville functioned as the testing ground for the future Francoist 
Kleptocratic State.608 
 
As the repressive process intensified, so did the desperation of the masses. In an attempt to 
escape retributive violence, workers parroted military/Falangist discourse and justified recent 
opposition to the coup by claiming that they were either deceived or intimidated by the trade-
union and Republican leadership. In his charla of 11 September, Queipo read a letter from the 
dockworkers of Seville, in which they declared their willingness to work for free because: “por 
dicho Ejército nos hemos emancipado para siempre de la pistola, que, manejada por los 
marxistas, se había impuesto en estos muelles.” The dockworkers not only were expected to 
humiliate themselves, but also justify an apparent delay in producing the letter. They excused 
themselves by citing the temporary absence of many fellow co-workers (many had gone 
underground to escape repression). The letter concluded with a crude exposé of the economic 
condition of the working-class: “ya que no podemos cooperar con dinero o especies a las 
necesidades que requieren las circunstancias actuales, ofrecemos gustosos y gratis nuestro 
trabajo cuantas veces lo necesite la Superioridad.”609 Stripped of all material possessions, the 
dockworkers offered their last remaining possession to General Queipo de Llano: their labour.  
 
The episode of the dockworkers of Seville was by no means exceptional. Instances of workers 
offering free labour as a replacement for monetary contributions multiplied all over Andalucía. 
According to the Military Commander of Casariche (Seville), Rafael Martínez, such sacrifices 
were necessary if the masses were to be regarded as “buenos españoles” and “sienten las 
necesidades de su pueblo y su corazón vibra al unísono de la regeneración del país que lleva a 
cabo el glorioso Ejército.”610 Ironically, and according to a 1938 Civil Guard report, leftist 
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violence caused no victims in Casariche; whereas the Nationalists executed eleven residents.611 
In private, some poked fun at Queipo through jokes: “Ya sabe usted que hay quien saluda 
cerrando el puño; otros con la mano extendida… Pues nuestro general saluda con la mano 
extendida, pero con la palma mirando arriba… siempre esperando que le echen algo.”612  
 
The omnipresent threat of physical violence revolutionised class relations in Andalucía. Inter-
class tensions were replaced by internal class conflicts. Worker groups became engulfed in a 
bitter competition between each other to prove their loyalty to the new regime. On the other 
hand, the victors presented the imposition of starvation wages and extra working hours as 
patriotic sacrifices. The ultimate objective of the rebels was to attain complete social unity, 
largely through the cult of personality of Queipo de Llano. The volatile general was eventually 
brainwashed by their own propaganda. In November, Queipo was overwhelmed with emotion 
during a visit to Ubrique (Cádiz), where he was welcomed with adulation and showered with 
gifts. The general later declared that he was particularly impressed by the local workers and 
“su encendido amor a la Patria”.613 This sudden wave of ‘patriotic fervour’ was in fact triggered 
by the mass execution of local residents by the Nationalists. More than one hundred people 
had been killed following the capture of the pueblo by a column of Regulares on 27 July 
1936.614 
 
Recently-pacified pueblos, in particular those that had resisted the coup, had everything to 
prove to the rebel alliance. Financial demands regularly reached truly extravagant levels. On 17 
November, the town of Constantina (Seville), where left-wing violence had been intense and 
Nationalist retribution particularly savage (92 killed by the loyalists, 990 by the rebels), raised 
41,000 pesetas for the Nationalist army.615 One of the most extraordinary cases was that of 
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recently-pacified Mérida (Badajoz). Just before he marched northwards to the Toledo front, 
the local military commander telegraphed Queipo that the rebel army had so far collected 
795,225.000 pesetas plus an undisclosed amount in gold. He added that the local rail-workers 
donated 6,881.77 pesetas (the equivalent of one day’s pay.616 The industrious Falange had 
separately raised 700,000 pesetas. General Queipo claimed that working-class contributions:  
“demuestra que España ha de llegar pronto al esplendor que todos deseamos, porque cuando 
los obreros se expresan en esa forma […] es prueba de que ese patriotismo que parecía 
adormecido merced a las canallescas pistolas de los comunistas, despierta, y con ello los hijos 
amantes de España.” 617  
 
In Mérida, like all recently-pacified towns where a list of donors was not made public, it is 
impossible to distinguish organised extortion from outright plunder. Regardless of the method, 
the process whereby financial assets were transferred to the rebel army constituted an 
important social ritual in Nationalist Spain. Huge military processions headed by high-ranking 
officers and flanked by civilian authorities descended upon the Divisional Headquarters in 
Seville to hand in the product of ‘patriotic contributions’. The ceremony was carefully 
choreographed so to impress the local population. For instance, the Military Governor of 
Cádiz, General López-Pinto, travelled to Seville on 21 October to hand over 2,642 gold coins, 
51.307kg of gold and an undisclosed amount in foreign banknotes to General Queipo de 
Llano.618 Competition between pueblos was intense, since loyalty to the rebellion was 
measured by the level of generosity to fundraising campaigns. Hence, on the same day López-
Pinto visited Queipo, the town of Zufre (Badajoz) donated 2kg of gold and an undisclosed 
number of gold coins to the Army Fund.619 The case of Fregenal de la Sierra (Badajoz) is 
symptomatic. A new Comisión Gestora (presided by the local Jefe of the Falange) was 
appointed and the pueblo adhered immediately to existing fundraising campaigns. At the same 
time, FE reported the inauguration of a soup kitchen that would provide 300 daily meals to 
alleviate famine in Fregenal; where one person was killed by the left and 66 executed by the 
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Nationalists.620 In Alcalá de Guadaira, a comedor of Auxilo Social of the Falange was opened to 
feed around 100 children orphaned as a consequence of Nationalist repression (loyalists did 
not commit any murder in the pueblo).621 A humanitarian catastrophe – a direct consequence 
of the rebellion – was starting take shape in the II Division.  
 
The number of contributions remained high throughout the civil war, regardless of the amount 
of the donated sum (at times pitiful, a consequence of the extreme poverty of the working-
class).622 The principle was that nobody was exempt. The masses rapidly recognised the 
difference between a reactionary and a totalitarian state: not only were they expected to 
accept the new regime, but also actively participate in its projects. In the end, the success of 
the Kleptocratic State was only possible under a totalitarian society.  
 
The Kleptocratic State and the middle-classes 
On 13 September (the same day of the Capitalista article), FE published a letter from the 
President of Unión Industrial y Comercial S.A. - Antonio de la Fuente García -, in reply to an 
earlier denunciation from the Falange:  
“La forma anómala y violenta que revista la carta abierta que han publicado en el diario «F.E.», 
me obliga, como presidente de la Unión Industrial y Comercial, S.A., a contestarle, para que la 
opinión pública no se desvíe en tan delicado asunto y quede bien claro y patente la actitud de 
cada uno. […] Con anterioridad a la fecha de esa reunión ya habíamos aportado nuestro primer 
donativo a tal fin, sin prejuicio de los efectuados en especie, que con el unánime acuerdo del 
consejo se han hecho y se vienen haciendo.  Son ustedes los que no tienen derecho a hacer 
caer en esta hora crítica, sobre la entidad que represento, la sombra de una resistencia a la 
contribución, cuya santidad todos reconocemos; pero que pierde mucho de aquélla cuando 
con fines que no he de calificar se hace público en la forma de tan desconsiderada que ustedes 
lo hacen.”623 
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In other words, the myriad of fundraising campaigns had induced the Falange into an error. 
The rage of Antonio García was understandable, especially in view of the current political 
climate (“en esta hora crítica”, a veiled allusion to repression). An unfounded accusation could 
have easily brought about his personal economic ruin, as well as that of the institution over 
which he presided.  Ultimately, Antonio García’s written protest confirmed the resounding 
success of Nationalist economic repression, to the point that state action was no longer 
required. Indeed, García stated that Unión Comercial had already contributed generously to 
existing fundraising campaigns without being overtly pressed to do so. During the first weeks 
of the rebellion, the new regime intervened frantically to impose its authority. By September 
1936, the local population had already internalised the message: governmental intervention 
implied punitive action. Therefore, the mere opening of a subscription would suffice to 
provoke a torrent of ‘voluntary’ donations.  
 
Despite its momentary setback, the accusatory tone of Falangist reports continued unabated. 
On 28 November, the Falange proclaimed triumphantly that “bastó un artículo en «F.E.» para 
que vibrara el espíritu en la ofrenda guerrera” in Estepa (Seville), where in a matter of days 
15,000 pesetas had already been collected. The motivations for the “generosidad de nuestro 
pueblo” were evident, as were the reasons for social unity (“el empuje del alma española está 
llevando a la Patria a una de sus más grandes realizaciones: su unidad”). The economic rape of 
Estepa was supervised by local Military Commander Bonifacio Fernández and enforced by both 
the Falange and the Civil Guard. Of particular notoriety was the “fecunda actividad” of Civil 
Guard Sergeant José López Fernández, who embarked on “incasables gestiones para que cada 
ciudadano aparte del acuerdo con sus posibilidades económicas.” The text concluded with a 
threat: “con mucho gusto publicará nuestro diario la lista de donantes.”624 This statement 
sufficed to trigger a flood of donations in a town still traumatised by Nationalist repression, 
which claimed 58 lives.625  
 
The 28 November article was a follow-up to an earlier article/denunciation published on 7 
November that confirmed the coercive nature of subscriptions: “la cuantía de las aportaciones 
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estepeñas a las suscripciones patrióticas es tan irrisoria, mísera y desproporcionada, que nos 
moverá a poner los puntos sobre las «íes».”626 In other words, donations were voluntary 
insofar as they met Falangist monetary demands. Indeed, Queipo’s former Delegado de Prensa 
y Propaganda revealed that the amount of money collected from each pueblo was previously 
fixed and the locals were left with no choice but to fulfil their respective quota.627 And Estepa 
had been clearly found wanting. The 7 November editorial opened with an aggressive 
statement:  
“El rico que todo había perdido y todo lo ha ganado; el propietario que ve triplicada la fortuna 
de sus tierras con la «plus valía» de un Gobierno estable, permanente y de orden, no ha 
despertado aún de su apático egoísmo. Estamos esperando aún, apellidos de las grandes 
fortunas estepeñas en el grueso de las suscripciones patrióticas en una ofrenda generosa a la 
Patria.  Recordamos con pena, aquella pobre mujer que desprendió gozosa los zarcillos de su 
único adorno en contraste con la señorona que regateó y lagrimeó unos aretes no más allá de 
ocho duros.”  
 
The reference to “el rico que todo había perdido y todo lo ha ganado” was merely a 
continuation of the campaign initiated by the ‘Capitalista’ article. The novel element (and a 
particularly disturbing one), was the detailed nature of the accusation, which revealed the full 
scope of the Falangist surveillance apparatus (“Estepa es pueblo de grandes contingentes de 
fortuna: tres propietarios superan los cuatro millones; más de diez se acercan a los dos y 
mucho más, muchísimos más, oscilan en el círculo de los grandes ricos”). The editorial reached 
the simplistic conclusion that there was no excuse for failing to contribute to ‘patriotic 
subscriptions’ (“no queremos esfuerzos ruinosos; pero sí el sacrificio patriótico de todos”). 
Anyone who refused to collaborate could expect to have their name shamed in the local press, 
followed by an exemplary fine imposed by the local authorities (when not directly by the 
Falange). Predictably, the landowners of Estepa closed ranks to protect their corporate 
interests. Local Falangist José Marquéz clarified the incident in an open letter: he revealed that 
the subscription had only opened a few days earlier and already over 50,000 pesetas had been 
raised.  He concluded the letter by revealing that the landowners of Estepa had been 
financially supporting the local Falange for several months.628  
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What a fringe group within the élites failed to grasp, however, was that a totalitarian state 
would no longer tolerate the carving of separate spheres of influence. The military leadership 
suppressed dissent aggressively. General Queipo de Llano imposed exemplary fines. For 
instance, on 14 November, Queipo announced that he had sentenced Antonio Gaviño, a 
landowner from Bormujos (Seville), to pay 1,000 pesetas plus the illegal profit Gaviño had 
amassed from imposing lower wages than stipulated in the Nationalist bases de trabajo.629 The 
example made of Antonio Gaviño served as a warning to other landowners. Already on 10 
August 1936, the Falangist-dominated Town Hall of Lebrija (Seville) ordered a local wealthy 
landowner to “ingresar en las Arcas Municipales, de cuatro a seis de la tarde del día de hoy la 
cantidad de CIEN PESETAS, apercibiéndose que de no verificarlo será puesto a disposición del 
Excmo. Sr. General Jefe de la División.”630 In Seville, General Queipo punished the local taxi 
drivers for not contributing sufficiently to patriotic subscriptions by ordering that all taxi fares 
be cut in half. According to Bahamonde, “El General, por radio, dijo que la medida que había 
tomado con los taxistas, les serviría a todos de lección.”631 Such actions consisted of a public 
display of force on the part of a regime that delivered sentences with absolute disregard for 
formal judicial procedure. General Queipo exposed the full scope of Nationalist repression on 
3 November, during a public rebuke of affluent Spaniards living in exile:  
“A éstos les digo que para vivir en el extranjero es necesario que sepan que todas esas pesetas 
que gastan en el extranjero son necesarias en España. Que vengan a España, sobre todo 
aquellas que supieron burlar la vigilancia llevándose cantidades importantes de pesetas. Que 
se den cuenta de que eso lo deben gastar aquí. Es preciso que acudan a cumplir su deber, en la 
inteligencia de que si no lo hacen con la mayor prontitud, siguiendo órdenes de la Junta de 
Burgos, estoy dispuesto a incautarme de lo que tengan en España. Ya saben que el que avisa 
no engaña, y que el que avisa desde Sevilla cumple lo que promete.”632 
 
Queipo de Llano’s latest verbal outburst concluded with a warning. It was revealing of the 
lengths the regime was willing to go in order to retrieve what it perceived as its rightful 
property. Indeed, the omnipresent threat of physical violence provoked a permanent state of 
anxiety within the population of Seville. A simple command from General Queipo sufficed to 
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subtract the only means of livelihood of a sizeable segment of the population.633 A note, 
released on 21 November, exposed the regime of economic terror inaugurated by Queipo:  
“El conflicto del cambio de moneda se va solucionando la noticia que anoche ofreció en su 
charla por Radio Sevilla, el ilustre general señor Queipo de Llano, dando cuenta de la 
intervención de plata y sanciones a sus tenedores, de dos industriales sevillanos, ha servido de 
saludable medida, hasta tal punto, que en el de hoy se ha notado su eficacia, porque se ha 
visto mucha mayor facilidad en el cambio de papel de moneda por plata y calderilla.    
¡Y hasta en la puerta del Banco de España, se ha visto el efecto, pues la cola de quienes aceden 
a cambiar papel por moneda, ha sido menos nutrida que en anteriores días!  Antes de la una 
de la tarde, ya no había nadie en la puerta del Banco de España, la cual prueba de una manera 
evidente, que el cambio se ha hecho más fácil, como así se hará en lo sucesivo cuando se vaya 
conociendo la aplicación de sanciones contra los acaparadores de la plata, verdaderos 
antipatriotas.”634 
 
The exemplary punishment of two middle-class individuals was sufficient to intimidate a 
population already attempting to make ends meet amid the extortionate frenzy of the 
Kleptocratic State. For the Pact of blood, it was imperative occasionally to adopt what the 
latter termed a “saludable medida” to shore-up loyalty. The media played a vital role in this 
process: they functioned as the regime’s mouthpiece. For instance, FE published on 24 
November a report on the summary court-martial of Ignacio Cuesta Fernández. Accused and 
sentenced the same day, the offender was handed a 12 year prison sentence plus a 5,000 
pesetas fine. In other words, he was condemned to socio-economic ruin.635 The collective fear 
that paralysed local society was not the product of empty rhetoric. Extra-judicial killings were 
complemented by draconian verdicts for minor economic offenses. In 1936, Nationalist court-
martials possessed a unique function: to provide maximum publicity to exemplary 
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punishments.636 By December 1936, the bourgeoisie had already internalised the message. So 
much so, that the rebels felt confident enough to release a bando (9 December) instructing all 
“clases endineradas” to organise “comisiones de hombres honrados y solventes” from “la 
parte más sana y honrada de los pueblos” to aid those living in abject poverty. These demands 
were justified by the ‘Miracle of Seville’: the middle-class was forever indebted to the rebels 
for saving it from certain extermination at the hands of the extreme-left. The Nationalists 
transformed this political ‘debt’ into a financial one. In the event of lack of “patriotismo”, the 
regime threatened to adopt “procedimientos coercitivos, imposición de multas o otras 
medidas más rigurosas.”637 A day earlier (8 December), and in order to ensure the success of 
the bando, the Nationalists distributed flyers in Seville reminding the local population of its 
eternal ‘debt of gratitude’ to the rebels for saving the capital of Andalucía from the spectre of 
Communism.638 
 
The impact of the new state over the conservative middle-classes was devastating. The 
bourgeoisie was transformed into a mere tool at the service of a totalitarian regime looking to 
fund a total war.  The bourgeoisie’s collective response to the demands of the Pact of blood 
became increasingly reflexive. The middle-classes realised that action, rather than reaction, 
was what was expected from them. For example, during preparations for the celebration of 
the presumed imminent capture of Madrid, Unión Comercial ‘spontaneously’ decided to 
organise a convoy to deliver goods to the capital and announced the opening of a subscription 
to that end in newspaper FE (3 November). Despite the impromptu nature of the petition (“se 
                                                          
636
 For the impact of Francoist court-martials on a regional level see: Anderson, Peter Philip. The 
Francoist Military Trials. Terror and complicity (1939-1945). 
637
 FE (Seville), 9 December 1936. In Nationalist Spain, fundraising capacity was correlated to political 
prestige. The failure of a particular subscription would inexorably damage the credibility of its 
promoter(s). The case of the patriotic subscription for hospitals in Seville is exemplary. On 11 December, 
the Committee administering Seville’s hospitals released a statement in which it revealed - in very 
explicit terms - its exasperation in face of the steady decline in the number donations. This was but to be 
expected, since the bulk of contributions went to military subscriptions (Infantry, Aviation, Falange, 
etc.). Nonetheless, the Committee ignored all signs of economic fatigue in the province and perceived 
the absence of donations as a symptom of anti-patriotism. The letter concluded with a threatening 
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hace público el presente aviso, ya que dada la rapidez con que hay que organizar esta 
expedición, no hay tiempo material de que la comisión organizadora pueda hacer visitas 
individuales”), the volume of donations was extraordinarily high.639 So much so, that the 
campaign headquarters had to be moved to a larger warehouse in calle Rioja, nº 6. The 
motives for the subscription, opened shortly after Unión Comercial had attracted the 
unwanted attention of the Falange, were evident. Furthermore, the ad hoc fundraising 
campaign organised by Unión Comercial was part of a chain reaction provoked by the 
unchecked enthusiasm of General Queipo de Llano, who time and again announced the 
imminent conquest of Madrid. A few days later, the flour traders (harineros) and bakers 
(panaderos) of both Seville and Alcalá de Guadaira (Seville) offered to supply bread to Madrid 
free of charge once the capital was liberated.640 Belief that the conflict was nearing its end 
triggered a new wave of state-sponsored kleptocratic hysteria. Every pueblo in the II Division 
dressed up to commemorate Nationalist victory. Special religious ceremonies and military 
parades were held and new fundraising campaigns created to fund the fêtes. Embarrassingly 
for Queipo, the ‘imminent’ capture of Madrid did not materialise until 28 March 1939.  
 
Falange and famine 
Whereas the rebel leaders envisaged economic repression in terms of military imperatives 
(punitive action against enemies, funding of the military rising), the situation was rather more 
complex for the paramilitary groups: they not only aspired to play a central role in the 
disintegration of the Republic, but also needed to subsidise their respective social projects. The 
Falange took aid work very seriously. Party leaders made it a point of honour to be present at 
inaugurations and special celebrations. For instance, the opening of the Asistencia Social soup 
kitchens in Seville (calle Joaquín Guichot; capacity for 200 people) was attended by the 
Falangist, military and civilian authorities of the capital of Andalucía.641 Therefore, the 
phenomenon of the cocinas económicas also served to solidify the alliance between different 
repressive agents, including the Catholic Church.642  
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The poor and ostracised rapidly became reliant on the Falange for survival. Examples are 
plentiful: in Fregenal de la Sierra (Badajoz), a town with a population of just over 10,000, the 
local Falangist cocina económica was feeding 340 people on a daily basis by November 1936.643 
In Ubrique (Cádiz), 600 out of a total population of around 7,000 people were dependant on 
meals provided by Falangist soup kitchens.644 In Carmona (Seville), the comedor infantil 
(children’s soup kitchen) was inaugurated by the local Comisión Gestora but run by the Falange 
and named after Pilar Primo de Rivera, the sister of José Antonio Primo de Rivera and head of 
the Falange’s Women’s Section (Sección Femenina). Located in the Plazuela del Saltillo, the 
kitchen catered for the daily needs of 100 children, most of whom were the orphans of the 381 
leftists executed by the Nationalists.645 In Villamartín (Cádiz), a town of around 8,000 people, 
150 children depended on Falangist charity meals for survival. In this pueblo, Nationalist 
repression claimed 111 lives; whereas the left had killed only one person. The crisis was so 
acute in Villamartín that in December 1936 the Falange expanded its kitchen in order to feed a 
total of 600 starving children.646 Famine was endemic in the Nationalist-controlled pueblos. A 
Falangist report on the opening of a comedor infantil for 100 children in Coria del Río (Seville) 
provided a very graphic description of parental despair in the small towns and villages of 
Andalucía:  
“Al asistir al acto inaugural se sentía la emoción profunda de contemplar cómo desde las 
puertas de los comedores varias madres pobres veían comer con fruición y alegría a sus 
pequeños, y observar cómo las lágrimas brillaban en los ojos amorosos de esas madres 
pensando quizás en las necesidades pasadas. Por ello es necesario que no haya un coriano que 
deje de contribuir al sostenimiento de los comedores.647 
 
The scale of the humanitarian crisis that affected the II Division required a degree of financial 
and organisational flexibility that married perfectly with the Falange’s proselytising fervour, as 
well as its adroitness in devising new forms of extortion. The Falange followed the cardinal 
rules of the Kleptocratic State: a skilful balance of propaganda and intimidation. The 
paramilitary organisation was sincere concerning its source of funding: “es necesario que no 
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haya un coriano que deje de contribuir al sostenimiento de los comedores”. Also, the article on 
Coria del Río concluded with a veiled threat: “Otro día daremos cuentos de los donativos para 
tal fin.” Ultimately, extortion represented the cruel culmination of a repressive project that in 
the case of Coria del Río could be described as gratuitous violence: loyalist repression claimed 
no lives, whereas the Nationalists murdered 152 people in the pueblo.648 
 
The modus operandi of the Falange was simple. The organisation would establish a 
humanitarian agency in a pueblo, which would then be funded by local residents regardless of 
their economic condition. It was accepted as a fait accompli that the target population would 
contribute, voluntarily or otherwise. The end result was impressive: in Almonte (Huelva), the 
Falange published an editorial eulogising the industriousness of the local Sección Femenina 
(which provided 500 daily meals to the local poor), followed the next day by an article adding 
that all meals were funded by a monthly tax imposed on the local population.649 Furthermore, 
when it was revealed that the Flechas (youth section of the Falange) soup kitchen in Seville 
(calle Rioja, nº 16) did not possess enough financial liquidity to support itself; the organisation 
decided to expand its social project and ensure that no “flecha[…] queda sin comer” by 
demanding that: “todo buen falangista está obligado a engrosar, en la medida de sus fuerzas, 
la cantidad que precisamos.”650  
 
The “Pro-Sevilla” Stam  
One of the greatest absurdities of Nationalist Spain was the fact that the kleptocratic policies 
enforced by Queipo de Llano – the economic equivalent of the military scorched earth policy 
adopted by the Army of Africa – were destroying social cohesion right before the very eyes of 
the all-powerful military leadership. In a time when the rebel war machine was in full offensive 
mode, the socio-economic crisis represented a greater threat to the survival of the new regime 
than the prospect of a Republican military victory.  Indeed, when Joaquín Benjumea y Burín 
was sworn in as the new President of the Diputación Provincial (14 December), he declared 
during his inaugural speech that all chronic problems affecting Sevillian society prior to the 
outbreak of the July 1936 rebellion remained unsolved. Worse, Benjumea acknowledged the 
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emergence of a new problem: orphans.651 The situation was so grave that on 7 August General 
Queipo released orden nº13 establishing a special stamp (“Pro-Sevilla”) to provide 
humanitarian assistance to the many orphans of Seville:  
“Honda preocupación produce al Mando del Ejército Salvador de España, la situación precaria 
de las clases menesterosas agravada en los momentos actuales, aunque originada por el 
desvío de los dirigentes políticos y sociales de estos últimos años. Urgen remediar las miserias 
de nuestros hermanos y principalmente de los niños, huérfanos, abandonados y a veces 
explotados por profesionales de la mendicidad.”652  
 
The rebels officially blamed the Republic (“dirigentes políticos y sociales de estos últimos 
años”); but the truth was that the orphans were a direct consequence of the brutal pacification 
of the province of Seville.653 The rebels secretly recognised this fact in letter from Mayor 
Ramón de Carranza to the Comisión Gestora (20 August): “Con motivo de los pasados sucesos 
el barrio de San Julián último baluarte de las hordas marxistas ha sufrido las consecuencias de 
la obcecación de sus morados quedando gran número de niños, seres inocentes ajenos a la 
contienda en el mayor desamparo”.654  As a result, the local orphanage (Asilo de San 
Cayetano): “Por las causas aludidas hay actualmente gran número de criaturas desvalidas que 
supera la capacidad económica de aquel benéfico establecimiento, pero como la Caridad 
cristiana nos obliga a acudir en socorro del necesitado”.  
 
In order to palliate the consequences of its own repressive project, partly enforced by the new 
mayor of Seville, the Town Hall decided give a subvention of 40 pesetas daily to the Asilo de 
San Cayetano (20 August). On 31 August, the grant was increased to 60 pesetas daily to be 
funded by the local population of Seville via the special “pro-Sevilla” tax. At the same, Mayor 
Carranza proposed the fusion of the Asilo with the Institución Municipal de Puericultura in 
order to cut costs.655 
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The “Pro-Sevilla” stamp went on to become one of the most profitable enterprises in 
Nationalist Spain. A report of 16 December 1936 revealed that the Town Hall of Seville was 
collecting a daily average of 676.20 pesetas from stamp sales, with a total of 69,153.02 pesetas 
raised since 21 August. The problem of the orphans, however, remained unsolved. On 14 
Febuary 1938, another report recommended the Town Hall of Seville to continue providing 
economic support to the Asilo because “aun existe una verdadera necesidad de dar de comer a 
estos niños”.656 Already on 14 October 1937, the Director of the Casa Cuna recognised, in 
letter to the Comisión Gestora, “el problema grave que plantea tanto niño huérfano y 
desvalido.”657 By January 1939, infants were still being abandoned in orphanages, such as the 
Casa Cuna, by starving mothers.658 The Nationalists had successfully ‘purified’ Spain from 
Marxism, but struggled to construct a viable society from the ashes of the Republic. 
 
Case study I. The victory of the Totalitarian State: the Plato Único 
In October 1936, General Queipo announced the creation of the Plato Único fundraising 
campaign. One day a month, all food establishments in Seville were to serve single course 
meals to its customers while still charging for a full meal. The monetary difference was 
collected by the Nationalist authorities.659 The Plato Único campaign (literal translation: “single 
course meal”), was one of the defining social events in rebel Spain during the civil war. The 
Plato Único represented the victory of totalitarianism over civil society, the establishment of 
the Kleptocratic State.  First and foremost, a fundraising campaign of such magnitude required 
an established repressive network capable of monitoring every single citizen without the need 
to resort to large-scale punitive action. According to Nationalist logic, blanket violence against 
the masses was no longer required: they had internalised the educative message conveyed 
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during the savage pacification of the popular districts of Seville (on-going repression 
functioned as a continuous aide memoire). On the other hand, the acquiescence of the local 
population revealed that the rebels had successfully paralysed society by means of terror. 
Lastly, the Plato Único was originally a Nazi German fundraising campaign; nevertheless, its 
wholehearted adoption by the Nationalist regime revealed: a) the growing ideological 
symbiosis between rebel Spain and Nazi Germany, and b) the totalitarian ambitions of the 
rebels who, a mere three months after seizing power, already attempted to emulate the most 
totalitarian regime in Europe.  
 
Once more, Seville functioned as the testing ground for a kleptocratic project that rapidly 
expanded to a national level and contributed decisively to the economic collapse of Nationalist 
Spain.660 The Plato Único was scheduled to take place every first Friday of the month and 
specialist committees were appointed to monitor its correct functioning. On 24 October, FE 
published an open letter from María Luisa de Carlos of the Organizing Committee, exhorting 
the local population to adhere to the campaign:  
“¡Por España!  El día del plato único.   
La estupenda idea de nuestro general, lanzada por la radio, proponiendo el «plato único», ha 
sido acogida con entusiasmo por todos, siendo las señoras sevillanas de Acción Católica las que 
se han ofrecido a organizarlo y llevarlo a la práctica cuando antes. 
En más de una ocasión hemos comentado acerca de la iniciativa del Führer alemán, que tan 
excelentes resultado dio en su país y que debiera de haber sido católica y española, 
doliéndonos de que no hubiera nacido en nuestro suelo; así que ahora, con verdadero júbilo, 
acogemos, repito, la idea, que por ser del general ya es católica, española y sevillana. 
No podía ser más oportuna; en estos momentos en que una ola de angustia y amargura 
envuelve a España, oprimiéndonos el corazón con el dolor no sólo proprio sino de todos 
nuestros hermanos. Es la hora del sacrificio, del renunciamiento, de la generosidad; hemos 
dado el oro al Ejército, la plata para los Sagrarios, damascos y encajas para ornamentos de las 
Iglesias saqueadas, ropas de abrigo para los soldados que combaten en el frente, y ahora 
compartiremos nuestro alimento con los que no lo tienen, y si faltase de momento 
alojamiento a tantísimo huérfano como quedó abandonado, vacilaríamos en abrirles las 
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puertas de nuestros hogares, que la caridad de los sevillanos es capaz de remediar cuantos 
estragos causan los malvados. 
La caridad fundida con el sentimiento patriótico que culmina ahora en España es doblemente 
hermosa y sublime. Por Dios y por España en estos momentos estamos dispuestos a todo, sin 
que nos pese ni duele el sacrificio. 
No vacilamos en asegurar que esta nueva manifestación de generosidad, impulsada por el 
excelentísimo señor general Queipo de Llano, constituirá un éxito completo, llegando a ser 
obra nacional que resolverá graves problemas sociales, cabiéndole a Sevilla la honra de haber 
sido una vez más propulsora de grandes empresas. 
Por la Comisión organizadora, María Luisa de Carlos.”661 
 
The acknowledgement of the foreign origin of the campaign (“del Führer alemán”) - a rare 
admission in Nationalist Spain – revealed the rebels’ profound admiration for Nazi Germany. 
Nevertheless, the Organising Committee compensated for this apparent lack of ‘Spanishness’ 
by praising the “estupenda idea de nuestro general” and making an allusion to the cultural 
discrepancies between Spain and Germany. María Luisa de Carlos also declared that the Plato 
Único campaign was “acogida con entusiasmo por todos” and even afforded the luxury of 
forecasting its “éxito completo”. The capital of Andalucía was, literally, paying the price for 
falling under rebel control on 18 July: Seville was coerced into financing a long war of attrition 
and at the same time supporting the economic consequences of Nationalist repression that 
claimed over 3,000 lives in six months. There was a direct correlation between the number of 
orphans (tantísimo) and physical repression. Furthermore, the aristocratic composition of the 
Organising Committee belied General Queipo’s rhetoric of a popular uprising directed against 
an extremist government. The board, presided by the General’s wife, was dominated by the 
local oligarchy (“las señoras sevillanas de Acción Católica”): the Marquesa de Arancena, 
Concepción Murube, Regla Dávila, Marquesa de Valencina, Baronesa de la Vega de la Hoz, 
Juana Turmo de Cámara, Marquesa de Gómez de Baneda, María Luísa de Carlos, and the 
Marquesa de los Ríos.  
 
The Plato Único introduced a new rationalisation for the extortionate activities of the 
Nationalist state. The original argument that Spain was saved in extremis from a Soviet-
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sponsored coup d’état was now complemented by the conceptualisation of the rebellion as a 
modern-day religious crusade. According to official discourse, the Nationalists rose up in arms 
“Por Dios y por España” and, similarly, the Plato Único campaign was “católica, española y 
sevillana”. The Catholic hierarchy immediately embraced the project and devised an ambitious 
plan for the re-Catholicisation of Andalucía, which included the religious indoctrination of the 
orphaned children of Seville (“todos, todos, han de tener cabida, todos alimento, abrigo, 
cariño, alegría… y catecismo donde aprendan a conocer a Cristo”). Thus, the local population 
was not only forced to support the extortionate activities of a kleptocratic state, but also those 
of its allies. As far as the Church was concerned, the sacrificial collaboration of the masses 
would be repaid in blessings: “el Señor os los devolverá con creces.”662 On the other hand, the 
Nationalist regime enthusiastically endorsed the cultural projects of the Catholic Church, since 
its vision for a totalitarian society envisaged the active participation of all segments of society, 
including the children of its executed enemies. For the new regime, the dual objective of 
palliating the humanitarian catastrophe and indoctrinating the orphans of Seville was 
indivisible. In short, the Nationalists put into practice the words of María Luísa de Carlos: “por 
Dios y por España en estos momentos estamos dispuestos a todo, sin que nos pese ni duele el 
sacrificio.”663  
 
The aggressive announcement of the Plato Único campaign was followed by a more appeasing 
editorial published the following day (25 October), reminding the local population that 
collaboration “está al alcance de todos, pues no se trata de un donativo más ni de una nueva 
subscrición que venga a atacar el ya sacudido bolsillo, que en este caso no se toca, puesto que 
ya el gasto está previsto y hecho; aquí el sacrificado es el estómago, ó más bien, el paladar, 
pues para el primero, según opinión médica, es muy sana esta medida.”  
 
For the first time, the Nationalist regime conceded (even if only implicitly) that Seville was on 
the brink of economic exhaustion. At the same time, the Organising Committee announced the 
establishment of a complex network of committees, divided by parishes, to monitor the 
development of the campaign.664 Lastly, police patrols ensured that the local population 
observed Day of the Plato Único.665 
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On a cultural level, the Plato Único defined the role of women in Nationalist Spain. On the one 
hand, it was inconceivable to allow females to hold executive posts in 1936 Seville; while on 
the other, a totalitarian regime demanded the participation of all segments of society in its 
projects, including women. Hence, females were expected to enlist in one of the paramilitary 
organisations (in a non-combatant role) and contribute to the forging of a Kleptocratic State. 
This became evident following the formation of a female-only Organising Committee for the 
Plato Único. Middle-class women were particularly active, regularly taking to the streets to 
pressure the local male population into contributing to fundraising campaigns. Female 
militants also included both flechas and pelayos (the youth sections of the Falange and the 
Requeté respectively) in their projects; a tactic extended to militia recruiting campaigns.666 
 
On a political level, the Plato Único confirmed the deification of General Queipo de Llano in 
Seville and consolidated the Pact of blood. Queipo invested his reputation in the fundraising 
campaign, to the point that he presented the Plato Único as his brainchild, despite the evident 
plagiarism. Fearful of the political implications of General Franco’s recent elevation to the 
leadership of the Nationalist faction (1 October 1936), Queipo de Llano was determined to 
remain an influential figure in rebel Spain, even if the price to pay was the economic ruin of 
Seville. On 28 October, FE published a vitriolic editorial:  
“Más sobre el “Plato único”.  Ya se está cociendo el «Plato único» con entusiasmo e interés por 
parte de todos, ya que se trata de algo nacional y patriótico. Pero […] no olvidemos de echarle 
la sal […] Quien quiera cumplir aportando un tanto a guisa de contribución o de impuesto y no 
privándose ni suprimiendo ese día nada en la comida, se equivoca. O no lo ha entendido bien 
[…], o es un perfecto egoísta […] ¡Muchos de los nuestros están en España padeciendo 
verdadera hambre: los prisioneros, los sitiados, huérfanos, viudas; muchos, son muchos! 
Sevilla tuvo la suerte de ser preservada de estos y otros horrores gracias a la Providencia y al 
general que fue su instrumento; luego nuestra nobleza nos obliga, en agradecimiento, a 
participar de ese ayuno […] 
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En otros países en que está impuesto el «Plato único» se lleva con un rigor extremo y hay 
inspectores que van a las casas a sorprender a quienes no lo cumple, detenerle e imponerle 
sanciones muy duras. Esto no pega aquí, donde todo lo hacemos «por las buenas». No hay 
necesidad de estos rigores, que serán contraproducentes. En España sabremos imprimir a esta 
obra el sello de espiritualidad y elegancia moral que lleva todo lo nuestro.”667 
 
The message was clear: anyone unable to collaborate would be immediately labelled as 
unpatriotic, regarded as an enemy of the state and punished accordingly. FE also ‘reminded’ 
the local population of its moral obligation to support all fundraising campaigns. Seville was 
forever-indebted to both “Providencia” and General Queipo for ‘miraculously’ saving the city 
from the abyss of Marxism. The FE article concluded with a threatening note: “en otros países 
en que está impuesto el «Plato único» se lleva con un rigor extremo”. In other words, the 
regime warned the local population that it was willing to resort to large-scale violence should 
Seville fail to adhere en masse to the Plato Único.668  
 
Ultimately, the mere threat of violence proved sufficient to galvanise a society already 
exhausted by an endless succession of fundraising campaigns. On the day of the inauguration 
of the Plato Único, the Regimiento de Granada (headed by Colonel Solís) donated 1,140.45 
pesetas to the campaign.669 The contribution of the Granada barracks was carefully 
orchestrated to turn on the pressure on the local population, already living under an 
atmosphere of constant intimidation. Inevitably, the Plato Único was a tremendous success. 
On 21 November, FE triumphantly announced that the Plato Único campaign had raised a total 
65,029.40 pesetas (“con inclusión de las entregas hechas por hoteles, restaurantes, fondas, 
bares, cervecerías, cafés, pescaderías, regimientos, hospitales, escuelas y tripulaciones de 
buques”).670  The success of the Plato Único was so resounding that, on 11 November 1936 it 
was expanded to all of Nationalist Spain. Furthermore, on the eve of the first anniversary of 
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the rebellion (16 July 1937), the Día del Plato Único was made into a weekly event.671 Lastly, a 
report from the Diputación Provincial de Sevilla revealed that the fundraising campaign had 
raised the astronomical sum of 229,548.87 pesetas in 1937 and 212,341.51 pesetas between 
January-August 1938 in the province of Seville.672 All money collected during the campaign was 
later reinvested in the Auxilio de Invierno, a Nationalist relief organisation modelled on the 
Nazi Winterhilfe.673  
 
Case study II. Clinching the Pact of Blood: The Aguinaldo del Soldado 
On 15 November 1936, at the same time as the Nationalist offensive on Madrid grounded to a 
halt, FE announced the creation of the Aguinaldo del Soldado (literal translation: “Soldiers’ 
Christmas gift”) fundraising campaign, presented as a spontaneous manifestation of social 
unity in rebel Spain. The timing was no mere coincidence. The Aguinaldo was created during 
one of the greatest existential crises of the Nationalist regime: all over rebel territory, 
scheduled celebrations for the much-anticipated final rout of the Republic were quietly 
postponed sine die (street decorations, public banquets, music festivals, etc.). The organisation 
of a massive fundraising event at a time of both military and ideological uncertainty confirmed 
the perception that these campaigns possessed far greater significance than that of a mere 
instrument of extortion at the service of a Kleptocratic State. Thus, a sense of political urgency 
pervaded the organisation of the fundraising day of the Fiesta del Aguinaldo in Seville, where 
pins sponsoring the colours of the Nationalist flag were given in exchange for a donation. 
Female members of the local oligarchy were particularly active, setting up parallel Aguinaldo 
committees all over Nationalist territory.674 An aggressive propaganda campaign was organised 
in the press and leaflets promoting the Aguinaldo distributed all over Seville. They read:  
“!ESPAÑOLES! Los soldaditos están a la intemperie, nieve, frio, ¡mucho frio!... ¡No lo olvidarlos 
Españoles! Los que gozamos el calor del hogar hemos de desprendernos por ellos de todo lo 
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superfluo, de todo lo innecesario.  En todos los Bancos y en todas las Sucursales, hay una 
ventanilla para recoger el cariñoso donativo con el titulo de “AGUINALDO DEL SOLDADO” ¡No 
olvidarlo españoles!-”675 
 
In short, the rebel leadership (in close alliance with the local élites) strove to form a Nationalist 
identity precisely as the rebel assault on Madrid entered an uncertain phase. The centrality of 
Seville and the pivotal role played by the élites in the forging of a Kleptocratic State was again 
reconfirmed during the Aguinaldo del Soldado campaign. The Aguinaldo committee – presided 
by General Queipo’s wife - was exclusively dominated by the local oligarchy (a recurrent 
pattern in Nationalist relief agencies).  Its leadership included the viuda de Parladé, Condesa 
viuda de Aguiar, Condesa de las Torres de Guadiamar, viuda de Arjona, Emilia Ybarra Gamero 
Cívico, Marquesa de Villafranca del Pítamo, and the Marquesa de Gómez de Barreda. General 
Queipo de Llano attempted to excuse the elitist composition of the committee by claiming that 
the “iniciativa” had originated from a group of local workers.676 On 29 November, the 
appropriately-named “donation committee” declared that “ni uno que se precie de ser español 
debe quedarse sin adquirir el distintivo.”677 In other words, to refuse collaboration amounted 
to treason. Predictably, the Fiesta was a tremendous success. FE published a comprehensive 
coverage of the event that inadvertently revealed the modus operandi of the “donation 
committee”:  
“ EL AGUINALDO DEL SOLDADO  
[…] se ha celebrado hoy la fiesta del Aguinaldo del Soldado, a cuya hermosura ha contribuido 
la hermosura del día, Margaritas y falangistas, con patriotismo y entusiasmo, se han dedicado 
durante el día a la no fácil conquista de pechos y bolsillos masculinos. Para llenar aquéllos de 
banderitas de nuestros gloriosos colores tradicionales, mientras éstos se iban vaciando. Buena 
recaudación. Y satisfacción íntima de todos. Que satisfacción grande es poder volver a ver 
nuestros pechos llenos de nuestra Santa insignia y nuestros bolsillos vacíos para tan santo fin.  
Españoles de retaguardia: que este espectáculo de hoy se repita muchas, muchas veces. 
Cuanto somos, cuanto tenemos, los debemos exclusivamente a esos soldaditos, caballeros de 
esta gran cruzada, que luchan por Dios y por España.  […] Esta es nuestra misión. Un día y otro, 
y siempre, vacían nuestros bolsillos para nuestros soldados. Alegremente. Con sana alegría de 
quiero no realiza un sacrificio, sino que cumple con su deber. Cristiana y patrióticamente. Con 
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la vista puesta en Dios y en la Patria, que está ya nos ha premiado al otorgarnos el título de 
hijos suyos y Áquel bien sabéis que nos premiará mañana.-”678 
 
The political atmosphere in Seville was claustrophobic. Donation tables were set in key areas 
of the city and female militants affiliated to either the Carlist Party or the Falange joined forces 
and took to the streets to pressure the local population to contribute. Donations could also be 
handed directly to a number of institutions, including local banks. Ironically, the military 
branch expected to benefit most from the Fiesta del Aguinaldo was the Army of Africa, whose 
destructive actions in Seville still remained fresh in the collective memory of local residents. 
The corollary was a “buena recaudación”, since to display patriotism was only possible through 
“bolsillos vacíos para tan santo fin”. Lastly, the “satisfacción íntima de todos” represented a 
collective reaffirmation of unity in a time of military and ideological uncertainty. Still, FE 
warned that the Fiesta del Aguinaldo was not an isolated occurrence and that more similar 
events would follow: “que este espectáculo de hoy se repita muchas, muchas veces.” As 
expected, another Fiesta was held on 6 December. General Queipo’s wife personally headed 
the donation table set up in front of the Town Hall. Her group of “simpáticas «asaltantes»” 
collected a respectable 450 pesetas.679 One of the victims of this ‘robbery’ was pro-Francoist 
correspondent Theo Rogers who noted: “as we stepped down, two pretty girls rushed up to 
pin a strip of paper on our coat lapels, the old flag of monarchist Spain. They were a pair of 
thousands who were collecting funds for the “Aguinaldo” for the soldiers (their Christmas gift) 
for Christmas was not far away. I was to find later men with their coats literally covered with 
these flags, so many times they had contributed to the fund.”680  
 
The Aguinaldo ‘fever’ rapidly infected the rest of the II Division. Neighbouring provinces 
attempted to contest the hegemonic position of Seville in fundraising campaigns. By 15 
December, Cádiz had raised over 20,000 pesetas.681 A year later (22 January 1938), the local 
Civil Governor reported to the Divisional Headquarters that the province had amassed a total 
of 261,014.81 pesetas (137,503 collected by the Jefe del Estado Mayor del Gobierno Militar; 
105,000 by the Jefe Provincial de Falange).682 Overall, the profit yielded by the Aguinaldo del 
Soldado campaign was impressive, especially in view of the fact that the ostensible primary 
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objective of the Aguinaldo was to collect commodities for the frontline. In Valverde del Camino 
(Huelva), the volume of donated material was such that the Fe correspondent failed to 
quantify it.683 In fact, the press could only keep track of the most generous contributions.684 
Nearby Manzanilla (Huelva) collected 1,202.80 pesetas on 9 December 1936.685 On 8 
December, General Queipo proudly announced that Guadalcanal (Seville) had raised 5,000 
pesetas (3 December).686 In addition, La Campana (Seville) donated 1,815 pesetas (and a large 
amount of commodities), Cazalla de la Sierra (Seville) collected 7,000 pesetas worth in 
goods687, and the tiny village of Benacazón (Seville) raised 852 pesetas.688 On 6 December, 
Osuna (Seville) held its own Fiesta del Aguinaldo: “desde bien temprano el domingo, día 6, 
presentó la bella fisionomía de las muchachas osuneses postulando y «asaltando» a los 
transeúntes […] Todos contribuyeron a la medida de sus fuerzas y la recaudación fue 
crecidísima, calculándose en más de cinco mil pesetas.”689  
 
In Alcalá de Guadaira, the local ‘assault’ also bore a healthy profit: on 14 December, three 
trucks decorated with the Nationalist flag and overflowing with donated goods left for Seville. 
They were escorted by the local Falangist band and 80 female militants, who personally 
delivered 2,655 pesetas to General Queipo. Special media attention fell on the 800 pesetas 
raised among the local working-class (“todos han contribuido en la medida de sus fuerzas, y de 
una manera especial las familias pobres”).690 For the Falange, the contribution of the workers 
of Alcalá de Guadaira was but evidence of the success of the party’s proselytising efforts. The 
success of the Aguinaldo campaign was cynically manipulated in order to provide legitimacy 
for the rebellion; however, donations were anything but voluntary. Failure to contribute 
adequately to a fundraising campaign was regarded as crime against the state. For instance, on 
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17 December FE violently denounced the “cantidades ridículas” donated by Los Palacios 
(Seville).691 
 
Intoxicated by its own propaganda, the Falange claimed that all the possessions of the wealthy 
were in fact the joint property of the “juventud falangista” and the “glorioso Ejército español”, 
for the reason that both had embarked on a ‘crusade’ to save Spain from Marxism. The capital 
of Andalucía had to set an example in fundraising campaigns because of this ‘debt’. For that 
reason, FE urged General Queipo to punish anyone who failed to grasp “esta cristiana y justa 
comprensión de las cosas”. This tactic proved fruitful: in Seville, the Aguinaldo moneyboxes 
(huchas) still collected an average of 25 pesetas per day (some raised 100 pesetas) on 17 
December 1936. Furthermore, the main Aguinaldo warehouse (located in calle Alemanes, nº9 
and leased free of cost by the Conde de Bustillo) had reached full capacity (“los citados locales 
están ya abarrotados de mercancías para su reparto a la tropa”).692 The following day (18 
December), donated goods (including livestock) were already being stockpiled in the adjacent 
streets.693 Indeed, the Aguinaldo Committee was overwhelmed by the sheer volume of 
contributions, which included 400 trucks of ‘donated’ goods from neighbouring Portugal.694 
 
On an ideological level, the Aguinaldo del Soldado contributed decisively to the forging of a 
Nationalist identity. The campaign promoted political bipolarisation and congealed the Pact of 
blood at the same time as the Nationalist siege of Madrid concluded in an unexpected, 
embarrassing defeat. Nearly a year after the creation of the Aguinaldo del Soldado (8 
November 1937), the closing sentence of a letter addressed to General Queipo from the elitist 
Circulo Mercantil de Sevilla summarised Nationalist dogma:   
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“EN ESTE LADO, UN ESTADO  EN EL OTRO, UNA HORDA  ¡ARRIBA ESPAÑA!”695 
 
The ‘miracle’ of Seville, the myth of a Soviet-sponsored coup, the dehumanisation of the 
Republican ‘other’ and the perception of the rebellion as a religious crusade coalesced into a 
single conceptualisation of the civil war. All these notions were omnipresent in the many 
letters sent to General Queipo. The concept of crusade was evident in a letter (19 December 
1936) written by a group of orphans of the Escuela Noviciales del Parque in Palma del Río 
(Córdoba). The children adhered to the Aguinaldo “pensando que a los soldados, valientes 
hermanos nuestros les debemos la salvación de España” and “Que el Niño Jesus a quien hemos 
de pedir mucho en Su Nacimiento de a nuestros soldados fuerzas para conseguir el triunfo 
definitivo.”696 On 14 December, 17 year-old Juan Nicolás Márquez Domínguez from Paymogo 
(Huelva) reaffirmed the myth of Queipo when he declared that he was present in Seville when 
Queipo “con desprecio de su preciada vida, supo librar a esa bellísima Ciudad de los terrores, 
crímenes y sinsabores marxistas.” A week later (20 December), José Brenes thanked Queipo de 
Llano for “saving” (“salvar”) Spain “de las garas de Moscú” and donated his meagre savings to 
the Aguinaldo campaign.697 The vast majority of letters revealed the shattering social 
consequences of the daily charlas of Queipo, which encouraged violence against Republicans 
and culminated in the brainwashing of an entire generation of impressionable youths. On 22 
December, Fernando Pizarro Niebla, a child enrolled in the Flechas of Puebla de Cazalla 
(Seville), wrote a letter apologising for his modest contribution (25 pesetas), which he 
nevertheless hoped would be channelled to those defending “mi Dios y mi Patria”. He also 
revealed his impatience to reach military age, participate in the war and sacrifice his life in the 
fight against the “canalla marxista” (he quoted Queipo verbatim). Another letter from the 
Spanish protectorate of Morocco (Cape Juby), dated 15 November 1936, exposed the 
ideological impact of the violent Aguinaldo campaign. 12 year-old Pablo Morlán Fernández 
insulted both “la canalla de las hordas rojas” and the Republican leadership and philosophised 
if leftists “tienen corazón”, proudly quoting Queipo in the process: “la madre y el padre de 
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todos ellos”. All this was rooted in his eagerness to witness the rebirth of Spain, defended by 
“verdaderos españoles”. Fernández also revealed his frustration at being too young to enlist in 
the Nationalist army. He nevertheless prayed fervently for “el justo castigo de la Canalla 
Marxista”. Lastly, Fernández openly acknowledged the influence of General Queipo’s speeches 
in his own thinking and cited one as being particularly inspirational: the general’s charla of 23 
November, followed by a speech delivered by “Manuel Sinún”. According to Fernández, a 
euphoric “Sinún” claimed that Jesus Christ had anointed Franco as the saviour of Spain.698 
“Sinún” was in fact Manuel Siurot Rodríguez, a lawyer acclaimed by the reactionary right for 
his pedagogical work with underprivileged youths in Andalucía. His speech of 23 November 
1936 must have been so inflammable that ABC opted against printing it.699 
 
The politics of hate promoted by General Queipo forged an entire generation of extremists. 
These youths were clearly influenced by three factors: a) the incendiary charlas of Queipo de 
Llano, which encouraged and justified Nationalist repression; b) the myth of Seville (and other 
Nationalist legends), which provided legitimacy to rebellion; and c) the successive fundraising 
campaigns, which not only funded the civil war, but also served as an invaluable propaganda 
tool for the Francoist regime. 
 
Palliating the humanitarian catastrophe: introduction 
The setting up of charitable events to palliate the economic crisis triggered by the civil war was 
customary practice in Nationalist Seville. All expenses were covered by the local population, in 
particular the middle-classes. Non-attendance was equated with treason and punished 
accordingly. As a consequence, charity events would inevitably turn out to be resounding 
financial successes. Organisational costs were asphyxiating and the profit, when not directly 
channelled to the war effort, was handed to Nationalist relief agencies (also maintained by the 
local population). The II Division pioneered such initiatives: on 24 October, Queipo de Llano 
announced that a “patriotic bullfight” (corrida patriótica) held in Seville had raised 102,556.10 
pesetas; however, the organising committee, presided by Pepe El Algabeño, handed civil 
governor Pedro Parias a clean profit of 111,726.25 pesetas.700 Events continued to be 
organised at a frantic pace. On 8 December, a dog-racing track (canódromo) was inaugurated 
in Seville. The winners of the first race donated all their earnings to the Aguinaldo del Soldado. 
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Present as guests of honour in a stand decorated with the flags of Portugal, Italy, Germany and 
the Majdén, were Queipo de Llano and his wife.701 Furthermore, these initiatives were 
replicated in the pueblos. For example, in Aguilar de la Frontera (Córdoba) a local theatre play 
raised the respectable sum of 2,702.50 pesetas for the Army Fund.702 Indeed, the mere use of 
the term ‘patriotic’ was sufficient to ensure the success of a fundraising campaign, for 
between the words ‘patriotic’ and ‘unpatriotic’ stood the thin line that separated economic 
and physical repression. For the state, the situation could not have been more clear-cut: all 
offenders were “verdaderos antipatriotas” undermining the new regime. While Seville plunged 
into the depths that Cabanellas termed an “orgía económica”, on 31 October 1936 the Army 
Fund (Infantry branch alone) had amassed the astronomical sum of 3,489,558.93 pesetas.703 
 
Palliating the humanitarian catastrophe: the Junta de Auxilios alimenticios a los necesitados 
The kleptocratic policies adopted by the rebels were economically unsustainable. They were 
first and foremost a reflexive response to the failure of the coup in most of Spain. The plunder 
of the popular districts of Seville was part of the initial Nationalist repressive project; however, 
the insurgents failed to draw up any contingency plans for the possible defeat of the rebellion. 
Thus, what was primarily an extension of physical repression gained a status of its own: as the 
coup degenerated into a long war of attrition, so did plunder evolve into organised extortion. 
Economic and physical violence complemented each other, forming an all-encompassing 
repressive network. The kleptocratic policies of the regime funded the civil war, punished 
ideological enemies, consolidated the Pact of blood and paved the way for the establishment 
of a totalitarian state. The target population was subjected to all forms of extortion, including 
the pro-Nationalist middle-classes, who felt unjustly treated by the new regime. Nevertheless, 
if bourgeois cooperation implied a drastic reduction in living standards, the situation of the 
masses was far more delicate: donation equalled starvation.  
 
The Nationalists gave two options to the population living in rebel-controlled Spain: either 
accept the economic demands of the rebels or be included in the policy of extermination 
reserved for the Republican political class. Ultimately, the state might have successfully 
                                                          
701
 FE (Seville), 9 December 1936. A few days later, a “patriotic concert” to raise money for the Aviation 
Fund was scheduled for 13 December at Coliseo España. The organisers were exempt from paying rent, 
electricity, or even printing costs for the programs. FE (Seville), 11 December 1936. 
702
 FE (Seville), 16 December 1936. 
703
Cabanellas, Guillermo,  a guerra de los mil d as  nacimiento, vida y muerte de la II  ep  lica 
 spa ola, page 879; FE (Seville), 3 November 1936. 
197 
 
terrorised its citizens into submission to the point of accepting starvation; however, it was now 
faced with the consequences of that same policy. By the end of the summer of 1936, rebel-
controlled territory was on the verge of social and economic collapse. Ironically, the regime 
was then left with no alternative but to attempt to contain a humanitarian catastrophe of its 
own making. 
 
The Nationalist leadership became aware of the potentially devastating consequences of its 
repressive project as early as 2 August, when the Junta de Auxilios alimenticios a los 
necesitados was created following an emergency meeting of the Comisión Gestora presided by 
Mayor Ramón de Carranza.704 Ironically, Carranza had contributed decisively to the economic 
ruin of Seville by leading a military column that brutally subdued large parts of the province.705 
Also present at the meeting was the president of the Asociación Sevillana de Caridad, Antonio 
Gamero Martín (and a number of other members from this organisation). However, it was not 
until 17 August that the Junta was formally established via bando nº12; thus revealing that 
humanitarian relief was not a priority for the new regime.706 Furthermore, the Junta followed 
the traditional Nationalist formula of concentrating power on a reduced number of individuals: 
the Mayor of Seville was duly appointed as its president, notwithstanding his evident 
unsuitability for the job. The board reached the unanimous decision that the Junta’s main goal 
was to provide charity meals for the unemployed, which would be produced by existing 
cocinas económicas, already unable to cope with the needs of a society on the brink of mass 
starvation.  The board’s single greatest concern, however, was “la tributación y forma de 
llevarla a cabo, para obtener efectivo metálico con que atender a los gastos que han de 
originarse.” To this end, it was agreed that the Junta would be financed by a universal tax 
imposed on the local population via the issuing of a special stamp (sello especial). Constrained 
by a kleptocratic economic policy, the Junta could never succeed as a traditional humanitarian 
organisation. Nor was this its raison d’être. For example, eligibility conditions for charity meals 
were extremely restrictive. Only individuals in possession of a special permit (issued by the 
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government) and whose loyalty to the new regime had been previously confirmed (via a 
positive reference from the parish priest) could apply.707 Accordingly, on 2 September the 
Junta released the following decree:  
“Se previne a todos los que actualmente están recibiendo raciones de comida de esta Junta, 
que a partir de primeros de Noviembre próximo, será requisito indispensable que todos los 
varones de 18 a 60 años de edad que figuren en los carnets, exhiban también el de estar 
inscripto en la oficina de colocación obrera.”708 
 
The number of applicants was intentionally kept to an absolute minimum. Only adult males 
aged 18-60, unemployed and registered as active jobseekers were eligible to apply. It was 
taken for granted that all females, as well as males outside the established age bracket, would 
be supported in full by their respective families. Former Republican sympathisers were 
automatically disqualified; nor would it be advisable to make such a public admission of ‘guilt’ 
in a time when physical repression climaxed in Seville. Indeed, anyone found wanting a 
positive reference from the local priest automatically became a social non-entity; as far as the 
government was concerned, the individual did not exist.  Whether his death came as a result 
of extra-judicial execution or starvation was irrelevant.709 
 
The guiding principles of the Junta were clearly outlined in its statutes.710 Section one 
confirmed the growing symbiosis Church-State, via the creation of an “organización, 
netamente cristiana”, where the government delegated to priests indirect power of life and 
death over the local population:  
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“Con la denominación de “Junta de Auxilios alimenticios a los necesitados”, se crea una 
organización, netamente cristiana, auxiliar de la Asociación Sevillana de Caridad, dedicada a 
facilitar alimentos a todas aquellas personas que se encuentren imposibilitadas de atender a 
su sustento y al de su familia, por carecer de recursos para ello a causa de paro forzoso, 
enfermedad, etc.”  
 
Concerning funding, section two read:  
“Para atender al cumplimiento de sus fines, esta Junta dispondrá de los siguientes recursos: 
Las aportaciones voluntarias de los vecinos de Sevilla que contribuyan a la suscripción abierta 
con carácter permanente para el expresado objeto en las oficinas de la 2ª División.  A) El 
producto de la recaudación que se obtenga con la imposición que se declara obligatoria, de 
unos sellos que pondrá en circulación la expresada Junta.” 
 
Section three revealed the form of taxation. The Junta established an ambitious VAT-type tax 
only possible under a totalitarian regime, since it required a surveillance network capable of 
monitoring every single economic transaction in Seville. Last but not least (section eight), the 
Junta adverted that transgression would be “castigada severamente” and “enérgicamente” 
and encouraged denunciations:  
“Será castigada severamente la tenencia de vales por las personas distintas de las que los 
hayan solicitado, así como también se sancionará enérgicamente a las que soliciten y obtengan 
estos vales mediantes falsedades y a cuyos individuos se demuestre cuentan con medios para 
su sostenimiento. Toda persona que tenga conocimiento de algún abuso de esta índole, 
vendrá obligada a denunciarlo para favorecer así a los verdaderamente necesitados.” 
 
In spite of the restrictive eligibility conditions (section six)711, the number of applicants 
continued to grow at an alarming rate. On 18 September, the Junta decided to increase the 
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number of meals: “Se cambiaron impresiones sobre el constante aumento de solicitudes 
interesando socorros y se acordó hacer lo posible para forzar la producción actual de las 
cocinas en mil raciones más”. However, the board also agreed to schedule a meeting with 
General Queipo to discuss possible measures both to increase revenue and discourage further 
applications.712  
 
In short, the board concluded that it would only continue to function as long as it remained a 
lucrative enterprise. As a typical business (and not a relief organisation), the Junta explored 
new avenues to maximise profits and reward (political) loyalty. Large companies were given 
the option between paying a tax calculated in advance (and save money in the process) or 
following standard procedure. The majority settled for the first option, a compromise that 
pleased both sides. In deep contrast, the situation of the working-class remained truly 
desperate. Long queues of people gathered daily at the gates of the Infantry barracks (calle 
Jesús del Gran Poder) and also calle Baños to collect food leftovers. The spectacle was so 
shocking that the head of the Municipal Guard wrote a letter to the Junta requesting it to issue 
a decree ordering crowds to disperse immediately once all food had been distributed.713 
 
Punishing ideological enemies: Amate 
The Nationalist leadership remained indifferent to the plight of the masses. It still perceived 
events primarily in political terms and the post-18 July famine was regarded as an adequate 
punishment for working-class Republicanism. The case of the popular district of Amate was 
exemplary. Amate was arguably the most notorious shantytown suburb of the Andalusian 
capital, where poverty, crime, unemployment, and extreme-left politics all converged to form 
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the social powder keg of Seville.714 Three months after its violent pacification, the Junta 
released on 22 October 1936 a crude study that would sentence the neighbourhood to 
starvation. It was clear that the Nationalists were still chastising the neighbourhood for siding 
with the Republic during the coup; this despite the “durísimo castigo” inflicted by Mayor 
Carranza on 19 July 1936."715 According to the Junta’s own estimates, 5,504 people resided in 
shacks (by multiplying the 1,366 shacks per 4; the number 4 standing for the average nuclear 
family). Rather than conduct a census, the board opted for guesswork and ignored the 
prevalence of higher birth rates among the urban poor. The Junta also noted that of all 5,504 
residents living in extreme poverty, only 260 people were registered in the padrón de obreros 
parados de Sevilla (unemployed census), of which all but 8 had found employment. In 
conclusion, the ‘study’ reached the figure of 1,400 (260 x 4) residents “que no tienen medios 
de manutención”. Another report from the Municipal Guard declared that by 20 October 1936, 
2,500 daily meals were being handed out in Amate. Since the unemployment census revealed 
that only 1,024 people “no tienen medios de vida, según confesión propia”, the Junta reached 
the bizarre conclusion that it should immediately cancel the distribution of 1,476 daily meals in 
the neighbourhood: “suponemos que de los mil cuatrocientos setenta y seis individuos 
restantes hay muchos que o tienen otros medios de vida o no quieren trabajar, por no haberlo 
hecho nunca[...] Proponemos, en su visita, que no se socorra a ninguna familia perteneciente 
al barrio de Amate, cuyo cabeza no esté inscrito en el censo de obreros parados.”716   
 
The Nationalists were so pleased by the financial outcome of this measure that they 
considered applying it to all working-class districts of Seville: “si esta medida la aplicáramos a 
los distintos barrios, podríamos introducir una enorme economía en el reparto de comidas que 
hoy se hace en Sevilla.” By 18 September, one hundred vouchers had already been confiscated 
from individuals found guilty of misuse.717 Thus, the Junta’s goal was to provide aid to a 
minimum number of people (and contain a humanitarian crisis that would compromise the 
Nationalist war effort), while at the same time punishing ideological enemies by means of 
starvation. Hence, rather than a humanitarian agency, the Junta functioned as a repressive 
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tool to keep the local poor in check by using food rationing as an instrument for social control. 
The collective punishment of the residents of Amate would only conclude a year later, when 
General Queipo ordered the razing of the entire shantytown of under the pretext that it was a 
“barriada peligrosa”, leaving 6,000 people homeless.718 
 
Palliating the humanitarian catastrophe 
The transition from coup d’état to civil war aggravated the already fragile economic condition 
of the working-class of Seville. Nationalist repression, the failure of the rebellion in most of 
Spain and the establishment of a Kleptocratic State; all were at the root of a humanitarian 
crisis that threatened the very survival of the Nationalist regime.719 Unsurprisingly, a fifth soup 
kitchen was inaugurated in Seville on 19 September, increasing the number of charity meals 
being handed out daily in the capital of Andalucía to an impressive 14,000. Less than a week 
later, the figure had risen to 14,726. In order to cut costs, the Junta called on its allies for 
assistance, most notably the Catholic Church. As a result, the nuns of the Hermanas de la 
Caridad were reduced to de facto slave labour and worked for free in the soup kitchens. 
Regardless, on the day of the inauguration of the new kitchen, the Junta released a note aimed 
at discouraging further applications:  
“Queremos hacer público para que llegue a conocimiento de cuantos están recibiendo este 
auxilio, que a pesar de las severas advertencias de la Autoridad Militar y las medidas 
adoptadas por esta Junta, han logrado obtener comidas algunos desaprensivos que no son 
tales necesitados, a los que, una vez descubiertos, se les ha retirado la ficha de auxilio. 
Pero, en delante, no será esto solo lo que se haga, pues aquello no es solo un abuso, sino un 
verdadero robo que tales indeseables hacen a necesitados auténticos; sino que, una vez esté 
terminada de organizar la inspección (cuestión de brevísimos días) será denunciado 
inexorablemente a la Autoridad Militar cualquiera otro caso que se descubra, y ni que decir 
tiene que la sanción será adecuada al grave delito de robar el alimento al necesitado, ya que 
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no pudiendo producir más las cocinas, se encuentran pendientes de despachos numerosas 
nuevas solicitudes. 
Los auténticos necesitados que conozcan algún caso de abuso, harán bien y cumplirán un 
deber de ciudadanía denunciándolo a la Junta o en la Tenencia de Alcaldía donde recojan sus  
bonos. Esto será su beneficio y en el de otros necesitados que aguardan el momento de ver 
satisfecha su necesidad. Que se den por avisados del peligro que corren los que traten de 
llevarse lo que no es suyo: nos consta que el castigo será ejemplar…  Y, como dice nuestro 
insigne General “quien avisa, no engaña.”720 
 
Ironically, the Kleptocratic State was now accusing its own population of “robbery” (“robo”). 
The concluding paragraphs encouraged denunciations, reaffirmed that all transgression would 
be met with “castigo […] ejemplar” and quoted General Queipo de Llano verbatim. By 4 
October, a surveillance network formed by 19 inspection centres, under the overall leadership 
of Daniel Puch Aguilar, was already working with clockwork precision. It monitored the five 
kitchens in Calle Bazán, Capuchinos, Triana, Postigo and Puerta de la Carne; all located in the 
most economically depressed areas of Seville.721 Nevertheless, both restriction and repression 
failed to eradicate transgression in Seville, much to the dismay of General Queipo. The 
desperate economic condition of the working-class explained the recourse to risk tactics, such 
as falsely claiming eligibility for charity meals. On 3 November, a visibly exasperated Queipo de 
Llano declared:  
“tengo noticias de que hay bastantes desalmados que, a pesar de haber obtenido colocación 
recientemente, han seguido yendo a recoger la comida que roban a esos pobres seres a 
quienes todavía no les ha correspondido el carnet. Claro que he ordenado que se tomen las 
medidas convenientes para descubrir a los autores de esa villanía y tengan la seguridad los que 
tal hacen – ya deben saber que soy hombre que cumple lo que anuncia – que al que se coja en 
un renuncio de esos, en primer lugar perderá el destino que tenga, que será abierto por otro 
obrero sin trabajo, y ese obrero que cometiese esa infamia se pasará seis meses en la cárcel y 
después de salir de la cárcel y aun cuando no obtenga trabajo, perderá el derecho a obtener el 
carnet. Me han dicho también que hay algunos tan canallas que van a recoger el plato de 
comida con el sólo objeto de hacer gasto, y que después hacen alarde de tirar esa comida al 
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río. Tengan mucho cuidado los que cometen esa infamia, pues he dado órdenes severísimas 
para que al que se coja cometiendo esa canallada siga el mismo camino que la comida.”722  
 
General Queipo unintentionally exposed the full extent of the humanitarian crisis in Seville. He 
revealed that a remarkable 16,600 charity meals were being handed daily in the Andalusian 
capital and “que hay dos ó tres mil instancias pidiendo alimentación, solicitudes a las que no se 
ha podido atender porque no hay locales ni elementos para hacer más comidas ni medios 
económicos para ello.” The 3,000 individuals deprived of charity meals were, in Queipo’s own 
words, “pobres seres” without any apparent means of survival. The general acquitted his 
administration from any responsibility by citing Seville’s overstretched resources and claiming 
that the Junta lacked the economic capacity to accept more applications. Subsequent events 
disproved Queipo’s discourse: a mere twelve days after the General’s 3 November charla, the 
rebels mobilised sufficient resources to organise the Aguinaldo del Soldado fundraising 
campaign. Still, Queipo used his self-exonerating speech to turn the pressure on the local 
population. On 6 November, the rebel general made an unequivocal statement concerning the 
source of funding for the 17,000 meals being handed out daily in Seville: “se sufraga con el 
importe que voluntariamente aceptaron sobre sus sueldos y jornales, por mi iniciativa, todos 
los sevillanos.”723 Ironically, the omnipotent General Queipo, who claimed to have performed a 
‘miracle’ on 18 July 1936 after being inspired by the Holy Ghost, now conceded that he was 
powerless to solve the feeding of 3,000 people.724 
 
By 30 September 1936, the Asociación Sevillana de Caridad was providing assistance to 47,784 
people in Seville, out of a total population of 267,192.725 During that same month, the Junta de 
Auxilios a los necesitados handed out a total of 411,752 meals that cost the organisation 
205,876 pesetas. By October, the number of meals had risen to an astonishing 502,033 (with 
costs ascending to 251,016.50 pesetas). The November report revealed the success of the 
board’s cost-cutting policy: only 220,482 pesetas were spent in charity meals. No official 
figures for meals were released for November; however, General Queipo stated in his charla of 
6 November that 17,000 meals were being distributed daily, which would amount to a total of 
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510,000 pesetas. By December, the Junta had also succeeded in reducing the number of 
meals: 452,649 (total cost: 226,324.50 pesetas). Lastly, the board’s much-publicised fears of 
financial insolvency proved to be nothing more than a clever subterfuge to pressure the local 
population into financially supporting the organisation. A report compiled by Junta’s treasurer 
revealed that by 30 November 539,090.70 pesetas had been collected from the special tax 
imposed by General Queipo and a further 512,756.80 pesetas from ‘voluntary’ donations; 
adding up to an impressive total of 1,051,847.50 pesetas. The revenue from private 
contributions almost equalled that of a tax imposed on all commercial transactions in Seville; 
an indication of the coercive power of the state. On the other hand, expenditure stood at 
786,207.50 pesetas (including expenses associated with the instalment of a new soup kitchen 
and the upgrading the existing four).726 The end result was a straight profit of 265,640 pesetas, 
a figure that refuted Queipo de Llano’s speech of 3 November, in which the general sentenced 
3,000 people to starvation after proclaiming the Junta’s financial impotence to expand the 
number of daily meals given to the local poor. 
 
A profitable business 
The Junta de Auxilios a los necesitados was designed to appear to be a relief agency, but never 
to function as one. In fact, the Junta was a profit-oriented business with five clear objectives: 
1) to return a profit, 2) avert the imminent humanitarian catastrophe, 3) punish ideological 
enemies (by means of starvation), 4) cement the pact of Blood (by promoting cooperation 
between its different members) and 5) lay the foundations for the establishment of a 
totalitarian regime (via the creation of a surveillance network). Ultimately, the Junta failed to 
attain all but one of its goals: to preclude the humanitarian crisis. Strict eligibility rules, the 
imposition of a universal tax and, above all, the exclusion of former Republicans, all failed to 
prevent mass famine. As a result, the board decided to reformulate its objectives: the Junta 
now concentrated its efforts on palliating the humanitarian crisis, while still anathematising 
Republicans. Indeed, the creation of the Pact of blood led to the parallel formation of a ‘Pact of 
Hunger’, based on the punishment of ideological enemies by means of starvation.727 After 
fulfilling its primary function, the Junta de Auxilios alimenticios a los necesitados officially 
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disbanded on 15 January 1937, transferring all its funds to the Asociación Sevillana de Caridad. 
However, the ‘Pact of Hunger’ prevailed, leading to the so-called ‘Years of Hunger’ of the 
1940s. Moreover, economic repression did not end with Queipo de Llano’s unceremonious 
banishment from the capital of Andalucía. On 4 March 1944, the Diputación ‘invited’ all 
pueblos in the province of Seville to adhere to a public subscription to buy the insignia of the 
Gran Cruz Laureada de San Fernando for General Queipo. On 20 March, the ‘saviour of Seville’ 
expressed his “emocionada gratitud” at the gesture.728  
 
As for the capital of Andalucía, it was living officially in peace and removed from the frontline, 
but functioning as a laboratory to test the economic policies of the nascent Nationalist regime. 
General Queipo de Llano’s Kafkian social experiments transformed his administration into one 
giant extortion racket that amassed, for the Army Fund alone, 16,625,825.25 pesetas during 
the civil war.729 In the process, it triggered a humanitarian catastrophe of unimaginable 
proportions: in late 1936, almost one in every five residents in the unofficial capital of 
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The “a ostasy of the masses”: cultural re ression and the Catholic 
Church during the II Republic and the Spanish Civil War (1931-39) 
 
Introduction 
The days of 17-18 July hold great symbolic significance for the Spanish Catholic Church, far 
beyond the traumatic events of 1936 that signalled the start of the bloodiest anticlerical 
persecution in its History. The Spanish Civil War resulted in the deaths of 6,832 members of 
the clergy, including 283 nuns and 4,184 parish priests (out of a total of 29,902).731 Exactly 102 
years before the outbreak of the rebellion (17-18 July 1834), the first major anticlerical riot in 
Spain erupted in Madrid, triggered by the rumour that the local clergy had caused a cholera 
epidemic by poisoning the public water supply. Almost a hundred priests were lynched in the 
streets of the capital. Ultimately, the 1834 riots confirmed not only that the Church had 
become a divisive force in Spain, but also that the working-class was violently opposed to it. 
Hence, when the first Anarchist and Socialist missionaries arrived in the Iberian Peninsula in 
the late XIX Century, they found themselves preaching to the converted, but nevertheless 
provided an ideological structure to anticlericalism. In panic, the Catholic hierarchy developed 
a siege mentality, becoming increasingly (and decisively) politicised; thus crystallising its status 
as a polarising cultural force in XX-Century Spain.732 
 
The “a ostasy of the masses” 
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The identification of the Catholic Church with sectarian politics belied its claim that it was the 
highest representative of Spanish identity. For instance, the Vírgen del Pilar was the patron 
saint of the Civil Guard, which was in the frontline of a bitter class war pitting the landed 
aristocracy against the landless peasantry. Precisely thirty-six years prior to the outbreak of the 
1936 rebellion (17 July 1900), the Basilica of the Vírgen del Pilar was stoned during political 
clashes in Zaragoza.733 By the turn of the century, the Vírgen del Pilar had become a symbol of 
social and political division in the country. However, the Church hierarchy kept insisting in 
equating Spanishness with adherence to Catholicism.734 The paradox between the Church’s 
universal claims and its alignment with the political right was skilfully exploited by its 
detractors. The masses were particularly incensed by the apparent lack of morality of its 
representatives; a fact observed by Marxist sociologist/journalist Franz Borkenau in civil war 
Barcelona: “they are making fun at the expense of the church and of the clergy. The 
conversation is in Catalan, yet I am able to grasp its general trend. There are two main themes 
which call forth that special kind of laughter that expresses both hatred and contempt. The 
one is the greediness of the clergy: the church of the poor, the church whose realm is not of 
this world, has proved very clever in securing the best of the pleasures of this world. The 
second, proffered, of course, with still more laughter, is the alleged objectionable conduct of 
the priests, who if you are to believe them, are professionals of chastity.”735 
 
The same “hatred and contempt” had been present during the Tragic Week (Semana Trágica), 
which erupted 27 years prior to the outbreak of the civil war in mainland Spain (18 July 1909). 
Mass demonstrations flared up in Barcelona after a group of aristocratic Catholic women tried 
to present religious objects to working-class conscripts about to set sail for Spanish Morocco. 
In Morocco, Spain was entangled in a deeply unpopular colonial war in which the lower-classes 
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were used as cannon-fodder by a brutal military caste, the Africanistas, obsessed with 
rebuilding the country’s recently-lost empire. When news of the massacre of the unit that left 
Barcelona on 18 July reached Catalonia, rage turned into violence. The Anarchist union, the 
Confederación Nacional del Trabajo, was in the vanguard of the protests, during which over a 
hundred religious buildings were sacked and burned. For nearly a week, columns of dark 
smoke clouded the skyline of Barcelona before military units from other regions of Spain were 
rushed to Catalonia to put a bloody end to the Tragic Week (and thus turning an anti-war riot 
into a regionalist cause célèbre).736  
 
Events such as the Tragic Week alerted the Church to the escalation of anticlericalism in Spain. 
In order to counter this trend, the Catholic hierarchy devised a proselytization campaign aimed 
at re-Catholicising the country inspired by the Papal Encyclical Rerum Novarum (16 May 1891). 
Public spaces were consecrated to the Sacred Heart of Jesus and a network of confessional 
trade-unions and Catholic missions established all over Spain (301 missions in the Dioceses of 
Seville alone between 1908-21; as opposed to 213 between 1922-37).737 In 1915, the Church 
published a manual in which it introduced missionaries as modern-day apostles. Missionary 
fervour was followed by a series of controversial miraculous visions that invariably took place 
in times of great political turmoil. For instance, the visions of Gandía (8 June 1918) and Limpias 
(19 March 1919), occurred during the Trienio Bolchevique (Bolshevik triennium) of 1918-20. As 
expected, Gandía was consecrated to the Sacred Heart of Jesus on 20 May 1920. However, the 
Church’s plan to re-hegemonise Spanish culture ended in failure, largely because of its 
unconditional support of property rights. Another major source of friction was the neo-
medieval moral code promoted by the Catholic hierarchy. That same year, Jesuit priest and 
Catholic trade-unionist Sisino Nevares reported to the Vatican that the masses were “like 
pagans who know neither God nor the Church.”738  
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The phenomenon of the “apostasy of the masses” became a matter of serious concern for the 
Catholic hierarchy only after the establishment of the II Republic in April 1931.739 Until then, 
the Church’s claim that it was the highest representative of Spanish identity was legally 
enshrined in the Constitution.740 The symbiotic relationship Church-Monarchy provoked an 
anticlerical backlash immediately after the departure of the King. The Vatican instructed the 
Spanish Catholic hierarchy to respect the Republic, which it did; but it was a question of too 
little too late.741 On 10 May 1931, an altercation in front of a Monarchist club in Madrid 
resulted in two deaths and degenerated into a major anticlerical riot that rapidly spread to the 
apostate south of Spain. The following day, six religious buildings were set ablaze in Seville. 
The protesters went as far as to try to burn the Archbishop’s palace, but were stopped by both 
the police and passers-by. On 12 May, martial law was proclaimed in the capital of Andalucía, 
but failed to prevent further incidents in the province. The moderate political left repudiated 
the attacks, but more extremist organisations openly supported the demonstrators, going as 
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durante estos últimos días. Tenga pues V.E. la seguridad de que secundaré gustoso los deseos de la 
S.Sede.” Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126. See also: 
Rosado, Antonio, Tierra y libertad. memorias de un campesino anarcosindicalista andaluz, page 59: 
according to Antonio Rosado, the new Republican authorities in an unnamed pueblo telegraphed 
Madrid on 15 April 1931 asking: “¿qué hacemos ahora con el cura?” 
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far as claiming that priests were firing at protesters from inside the churches of Madrid.742 As 
in 1834, a mere rumour served as the spark that ignited the flames of anticlericalism. A few 
days later (15 May), the Apostolic Nunciature in Spain wrote to the Archbishop of Seville 
requesting an official report on the incidents. Cardinal Ilundáin replied on 22 May - “Lleno de 
dolor y de amargura” -, stating that the anticlerical riots had erupted even before the downfall 
of the Monarchy (during the municipal elections of April 1931): 
“Nada digo a V.E. de los desacatos cometidos contra mi persona después del día 12 de Abril 
último ya con clamores de la plebe, ya con pasquines difundidos en la ciudad, sumamente 
injuriosos y aun provocando las iras del pueblo contra mí, ya con rótulos puestos en mi Palacio 
Arzobispal con frases soeces y asquerosas. Tengo que advertir que la Autoridad Militar puso 
guardia en mi Palacio el día 12 de Mayo corriente y en Seminario para protegerlos y continúa 
todavía, por lo que estoy agradecido al Sr. Capitán General de Sevilla.”743  
 
The Archbishop concluded his report by providing a list of assaulted religious buildings in the 
Dioceses of Seville:  
 Jesuit college, San José church, residence of PP. Paules, church and convent of PP. 
Carmelitas Calzadas in Seville  
 Franciscan church, Reparadoras church,  church of PP. Carmelitas Calzadas, church and 
residence of Jesuits, church and convent of Mínimas in Jerez de la Frontera (Cádiz) 
 Parish church and two chapels in Coria del Río (Seville) 
 Parish church and church of Monjas Mercedarias  in Lora del Río (Seville) 
 Salesian church and college in Arcos de la Frontera (Cádiz) 
 Two churches in Ardales (Málaga) 
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 The radical left viewed the anticlerical riots with an element of romanticism. Ramón Franco, General 
Franco’s brother and the enfant terrible of the Bahamonde family, declared: “I contemplated with joy 
those magnificent flames as the expression of a people which wanted to free itself from clerical 
obscurantism.” Preston, Paul, Franco: a biography, page 79. See also: Jiménez Guerrero, José, Quema 
de conventos en Málaga, mayo de 1931 (Málaga, Editorial Arguval, 2006).  
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 Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126. See also: 
Macarro Vera, José Manuel,  a utop a revolucionaria  Sevilla en la Segunda  ep  lica, pages 111-47; 
Pascual Cevallos, Fernando, Luchas agrarias en Sevilla durante la Segunda República. The conservative 
but politically moderate Cardinal Eustaquio Ilundáin Esteban was born in Pamplona (Navarre) in 1862. 
He had previously served as bishop of Orense (1905-21) before being appointed Archbishop of Seville in 
1921. In Orense, Ilundáin was an enthusiastic promoter of Catholic missions. In 1921, the local 
authorities requested that the government award the Cruz de Beneficiencia to the bishop for his role in 
combating a flu pandemic in the province. Vilaplana Montes, Manuel, “Nota biográfica sobre 
monsenhor Ilundain. Actividad y magistério hasta su nombramiento como arzobispo de Sevilla” in 
Archivo Hispalense, Tomo 72, nº 219, Sevilla, 1989, pages 70, 72-74 and 78-79. 
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 Residence of PP. Capuchinos in Sanlúcar de Barrameda (Cádiz) 
 Parish church of San Nicolás del Puerto (Seville) 
 Sacristy of the parish church of San Juan de Aznalfarache (Seville) 
 
In addition, the priests of Gerena (Seville), San Nicolás del Puerto, Prado del Rey (Cádiz), 
Sagrado Corazón (Huelva), the Superior of the Jesuits of Jérez de la Frontera, the PP. Paules of 
Ayamonte (Huelva); were all forced temporarily to abandon their appointments. To make 
matters worse, many representatives of the new regime were aggressively opposed to the 
Catholic Church. The PP. Salesianos of Morón, PP. Redentoristas of Carmona and PP. 
Mercedarios of Marchena “fueron expulsados urgentemente” by the local authorities and “en 
algunas poblaciones se prohíbe por los Socialistas todo entierro religioso y se coacciona a los 
fieles para que no asista el Clero y para que no sean bautizados los niños.” At the same time, 
the right exploited the riots for its own political benefit; therefore polarising the already 
strained political atmosphere. On 28 July, a parliamentary deputy from Toledo wrote to 
Cardinal Ilundáin requesting a report to be presented in the Cortes aimed at exposing the 
passivity of the local Republican administration, including a full list of destroyed works of 
religious art, closed educational/cultural Catholic centres and the number of students affected 
by the tumults.744  
 
The divorce between the Catholic Church and the new regime became evident when on 3 June 
the Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo – Pedro Segura – ignored Vatican calls for moderation and 
addressed a pastoral letter to all the bishops and the faithful of Spain, calling for the mass 
mobilization of all in a crusade of prayers to unite “de manera seria y eficaz para conseguir que 
sean elegidos para las Cortes Constituyentes candidatos que ofrezcan garantías de que 
defenderán los derechos de la Iglesia y del orden social”. In irresponsibly provocative language, 
in a context of popular enthusiasm for the Republic, he went on to praise the monarchy and its 
links to the Church.  This led to his expulsion by the deeply Catholic Minister of the Interior, 
Miguel Maura.745  
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Anticlericalism and the “apostasy of the masses” were both problems that plagued the Spanish 
Catholic Church for at least a century prior to the advent of the II Republic. However, instead 
of embracing reform, the Catholic hierarchy retreated into a movement of defensive 
dogmatism and political reaction that only exacerbated existing tensions, barely contained by 
the Monarchy. Devoid of governmental support following the establishment of the Republic, 
the Church now entered a period of uncertainty and anxiety. 
 
The Church census on the Dioceses of Seville (1928-1932)746 
The chaotic condition of Catholic Church in southern Spain pre-dated the establishment of the 
II Republic. Indeed, between 1928 and 1932, average Sunday Mass attendance rate in the 
capital of Andalucía stood at a shocking 2.69%. The situation was even more scandalous in the 
province, where the number of regular churchgoers failed to reach the 1% milestone (0.98%). 
The total average for Seville (city and province) was 1.44%.747 In short, organised religion had 
all but disappeared from Seville; the most striking example of the phenomenon of the 
“apostasy of the masses”.748  
 
By the 1930s, the Catholic Church was on the verge of losing its last remaining link with Seville: 
popular religion. In Andalucía, the tradition of heterodox forms of worship, often syncretised 
with pre-Christian pagan rituals and folklore, was deeply embedded in local culture. Seville was 
famed for its elaborate Easter processions which served, under the cloak of a religious festival, 
as a collective reaffirmation of local identity. Indeed, the American Ambassador to Republican 
Spain (1933-39), Claude Bowers, described Holy Week in 1935 Seville as “the strange mingling 
of the sacred and profane” where: “in other times, far back, there was a more reverential 
attitude of the crowd, I am told, and men and women dropped more easily to their knees 
when the images went by. The religious phase was then predominant, but now one gets the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
defensa del tesoro de la fe. See also: Núñez Beltrán, Miguel Angel, “El Cardenal Segura y su acción 
sinódico-conciliar en Sevilla” in Anuario de la Historia de la Iglesia Andaluza, vol. 2, año 2009. 
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 The official title of the census was: Relación quinquenal (1928-32).Encuesta sobre el estado religioso y 
moral del Arzobispado. Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 
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 The 1928-1932 Church census on the Dioceses of Seville led to the publishing of a book on the 
“apostasy of the masses” in the adjacent province of Huelva. Ordóñez Márquez, Juan, La apostasía de 
las masas y la persecución religiosa en la provincia de Huelva, 1931-1936.  
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feeling of being a spectator at a magnificent pageant, a splendid artistic drama, with thousands 
of actors on a huge stage.”749 
 
Catholic feast days had long been transformed into secular celebrations of local identity, 
superseding their original religious significance. Bowers was fascinated by a series of 
paradoxical events, such as locals singing flamenco songs to religious icons or the fact that “the 
burden bearers are recruited mostly from amongst the workers of the wharfs, and many of 
these are syndicalists, enemies of the church. Religion, borne on backs of unbelievers!”750 In 
reality, the Church played a peripheral role during Easter celebrations, where the object of 
collective worship was the statue of the patron saint. Manchester Guardian correspondent 
Frank Jellinek was equally captivated by the fanatical devotion displayed by the residents of 
Seville towards their local saints: “During the Holy Week festival at Seville in 1936, Communists 
in full uniform of blue shirt and red scarf paraded a famous Virgin, shouting: “We are 
Communists. Our knives for anyone who touches her!”751 
 
However, the growing politicisation of the Catholic Church in Spain threatened the very 
survival of popular religion in Andalucía, a trend clearly exposed in the 1928-1932 Church 
census on the Dioceses of Seville. For instance, eleven out of a total of nineteen parishes (one 
did not reply to the question752) in the capital of Andalucía failed to attract half of their flock to 
Easter Mass. The situation was particularly worrying in predominantly working-class districts: 
20% attendance rate in San Gil, 20% in Nuestra Señora de la O, 15% in El Sagrario, 10% in Santa 
Ana, 10% in Omnium Sanctorum (the first church attacked on 18 July 1936) and 5% in San 
Julián. The percentage of those receiving Holy Communion on Easter Sunday was even lower, 
with an additional parish failing to reach the 50% mark. The least religious were: San Roque 
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Legajo 559.  
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(5%), La Concepción Inmaculada (5%), and San Roman (0.6%). In deep contrast, the hold of 
popular religion remained strong in Santa María Magdalena (80%) and San Nicolás (96.5%). 
However, adherence to popular religion did not imply acceptance of Catholic orthodoxy. Any 
optimism felt by the Church hierarchy was tempered by Sunday Mass attendance rates of 
7.84% in Santa María Magdalena and 2.22% in San Nicolás. Still, Santa María Magdalena was 
one of the most devout parishes in the capital of Andalucía, only surpassed in piety by San 
Vicente Mártir (9.52%) and San Andrés (10%); an achievement if taking into account that nine 
parishes failed to attract as little as 2% of their parishioners to regular Sunday Mass.753 
Moreover, in a region where Easter celebrations were regarded as an integral part of local 
folklore, an average Easter Sunday Mass attendance rate of 26% could only have been 
interpreted as disastrous by the Catholic hierarchy. The figure confirmed that the vast majority 
of residents in the capital of Andalucía preferred to abstain from participating in an important 
cultural ritual than being affiliated (even if only nominally) to an institution they viewed as 
sectarian. Hence, Easter Sunday represented a time of renewal of communal identities only for 
a segment of the local population. The Catholic Church was perceived primarily as a political 
(and not a religious) institution. The social consequences of the Church’s alliance with both the 
Monarchy and the political right were, in the long-term, devastating. 
 
The discrepancy in attendance figures for Easter (26%) and regular Sunday Mass (2.69%) 
confirmed that religious feast days were primarily regarded as cultural events and that Catholic 
orthodoxy had all but lost its influence over the local population. In the parish of San Gil, only 
60 out of 10,500 parishioners were regular churchgoers; in San Bartolomé, between 25-30 out 
of 6,811; in Santa Ana, 90 out of 20,000; in Omnium Sanctorum, 34 out of 10,900; and in San 
Roman, between 10-12 out of a total of 9,700 parishioners. Also, the 1928-1932 census 
revealed that the Church had long been anathematised by the lower-classes of Andalucía. For 
example, the five most irreligious parishes of Seville – with a shocking 0.39% average church 
attendance rate were all located in working-class districts.754 Moreover, the five least devout 
parishes at Easter (the combined average Mass attendance rate stood at 7%) were also located 
in predominantly popular neighbourhoods.755 The priest of San Vicente Mártir was explicit 
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 See Table I and II. In ascendant order (by level of absence): San Gil, San Bartolomé y San Esteban, 
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regarding the existence class divisions in his parish. On the topic of adherence to Catholic 
morality he wrote: “en las clases altas y media bueno; en las bajas malo”. The parish priest of 
San Bernardo reached similar conclusions: “la clase media regular, la clase alta deja que 
desear, y la obrera deplorable.” In similar deplorable state was the working-class parish of 
Nuestra Señora de la O, whereas the priest of La Concepción Inmaculada noted that “la masa 
popular está demoralizada.” Even in the predominantly bourgeois parish of Santa Cruz, where 
morality was found to be in a general healthy state, it invariably remained “defectiva en las 
clases obreras”. Working-class districts produced devastating reports. In San Gil “abunda el 
alcoolismo y disolución de constumbres”, whereas the last vestiges of popular religion were 
being openly discarded in San Julián: “en muchas casas hay desaparecido las imágenes de los 
santos”. In Santa Ana, only a tiny fraction of parishioners followed Catholic morality, while the 
priest of San Roque wrote: “Son muy contadas, contadísimas, las familias que por su conducta 
pública y privada merezcan ser tenidas verdaderamente por familias cristianas.”756 
 
The lower-classes perceived the Church’s fixation with morality as insulting; especially if 
compared with the Catholic hierarchy’s indifference towards key social and economic issues, 
such as chronic unemployment and endemic poverty.757 Already in 1878, a Catholic missionary 
in Seville wrote that the local population regularly skipped Mass in order to “no perder los 
jornales de los Domingos y fiestas” and “desde pequeñuelos se habituaban a esta vida 
indiferente, llegando a los veinte años de edad sin saber siquiera hacer un acto de contrición.” 
As a result, “ni ven sacerdote alguno ni se da culto” and “la impiedad en sus doctrinas 
ominosas, valiéndose de la novela y del periódico irreligioso, había hecho entender a los 
pueblos que los Frailes eran monstruos de vicios y maldad”.758 Half a century later, the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Isidoro/San Vicente Mártir, El Salvador/Santa María Magdalena y San Miguel and Santa María la Blanca. 
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mingled with the chant of the priests inside the church.” Bowers, Claude Gernade, My mission to Spain: 
watching the rehearsal for World War II, page 23. 
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imposition of a “moral” dress code “con el máximo rigor” in San Roque y San Benito continued 
to discourage potential churchgoers from attending Mass (1.75% attendance rate). In the more 
affluent parish of El Salvador, people who did not observe the dress code were barred from 
entering the local church. The Catholic hierarchy was equally obsessed with what it termed 
“inmoral” theatres/cinemas and the tiny Protestant community (labelled as ‘heretic’).759 
Regarding observance of Easter fasting and sexual abstinence, only the parishes of El Salvador 
and San Isidoro followed Catholic doctrine. Class divisions surfaced again in the more affluent 
parish of San Vicente Mártir: “una gran parte de la feligresía muy bien, el pueblo bajo majo”. 
Again, working-class districts produced negative reports. In San Román, the parish priest 
stated that only 300 out of a total of 9,700 parishioners observed Church dogma and in San 
Roque: “son contadísimos los fieles que se preocupan del cumplimiento de estos preceptos”. 
As for baptism, the priest of Nuestra Señora de la O was clear: “rarísimo el que se bautece 
dentro de los ocho días”. Only in the predominantly bourgeois parish of Santa Cruz did a 
majority of families baptise children, but even so with the notable exception of the lower-
classes. Furthermore, the population of Seville found ways to circumvent laws that bonded 
them (even if nominally) to the Church, such as canonical marriage.  Up until the legalisation of 
civil marriage in 1931, a substantial number of residents opted for unmarried unions, which 
the Catholic hierarchy derogatorily labelled as “concubinatos públicos”. Unmarried 
partnerships were prevalent among the urban poor of Santa Ana (the vast majority of the 
population), and comprised up to 30% of unions in Nuestra Señora de la O.760 This represented 
a bitter defeat for an institution that was deeply committed to regulating sexuality. 
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By 1932, the self-proclaimed guardian of Spanishness was an institution alien to Andalucían 
society. Fifteen of Seville’s twenty parish priests reported that they were treated by the 
population either with “respecto” or “indiferencia”.761 In both La Concepcion Inmaculada and 
El Sagrario, reverence towards the clergy could only be found among the small Christian 
minority and the priest of San Gil reported a growing trend of contempt (“menosprecio”). 
However, only in San Bernardo did contempt degenerate into open hatred (“actualmente 
poca, y menos la clase obrera, a veces con odio”). San Pedro reported a single case of hostility 
towards the clergy (from non-residents) and a growing minority mocked and even insulted the 
priest of San Nicolas y Santa Maria la Blanca. Still, violence against the Catholic Church was 
primarily directed against its property, a physical symbol of political sectarianism in Republican 
Seville. In short, the census provided a depressing portrait of the condition of the diocesan 
clergy in the capital of Andalucía: that of an isolated group living in an overwhelmingly 
apostate society. Most priests felt lonely, ostracised and were profoundly ignorant of their 
immediate socio-political surroundings (to the extreme that only a few were able to accurately 
inform their superiors about the existence of left-wing trade-unions in their parishes).762 Most 
importantly, there were no reports of physical attacks against the clergy between 1928 and 
1932.  
 
According to the 1928-1932 Church census, the average churchgoer in 1930s Seville was 
predominantly female and middle/upper-class. The gender-biased nature of religiosity was 
most pronounced in working-class parishes, where virtually no males could be found attending 
Sunday Mass. In a time when the political sphere was almost exclusively dominated by men 
(women remained disenfranchised until 1933), this trend exposed the growing ideological 
divorce between the Church and the working-class, both of which came to espouse mutually-
exclusive political views. The census also revealed the Church’s failure to adapt to urbanisation 
and industrialisation. For instance, the priest of the least religious parish in Seville, San Román, 
regarded modernity as sinful. In Santa Ana and Nuestra Señora de la O, two priests were 
trusted with the impossible task of providing spiritual support to a combined total of 40,000 
parishioners. Unsurprisingly, weekly church attendance rates stood at a shocking 0.45% (Santa 
                                                          
761
 No reply from Santa Cruz, San Bernardo y San Sebastián, San Isidoro, El Salvador, San Nicolás y Santa 
María la Blanca, Nuestra Señora de la O, Omnium Sanctorum and San Pedro y San Juan de la Palma.  
762
 Santa Ana: “al exterior, parece guardar reverencia.” San Nicolás y Santa María la Blanca: “algunos los 
respetan, la generalidad le son indiferentes, y hoy muchos los hacen objeto de burla o insulto.” San Gil: 
“hasta hace poco ha guardado respeto, ahora va encontrándose la indiferencia e iniciándose el 
menosprecio.” San Pedro: “guarda el debido respeto; excepto en un caso lamentable, no realizado por 
feligreses de esta Parroquia.”  
219 
 
Ana) and 1.5% (Nuestra Señora de la O) respectively. This, in turn, provoked serious economic 
problems for the Church. The priest of San Roque was explicit: “el ingreso de misas es[…] 
insignificante, por lo casi nulo.” The financial condition of all Catholic schools in Seville (except 
San Vincente Mártir) and the Brotherhoods of San Andrés, San Bartolomé, San Vicente Mártir 
and Nuestra Señora de la O; was equally precarious. As a result, the Church relied on state 
subsidies, the economic activities of religious orders and the benevolence of private 
benefactors for survival. This unhealthy financial dependency positioned the Catholic Church 
dangerously close to the economic élites, an alliance that often spilled over into the political 
sphere. On an ideological level, the Church’s strident anti-modernism was enthusiastically 
embraced by the oligarchy, which regarded industrialisation as a threat to the economic status 
quo. This, in turn, only further antagonised the masses, who swelled the ranks of left-wing 
trade-unions.763 In Seville, the only parish to report the existence of a confessional trade-union 
was Omnium Sanctorum (however, the union functioned as a de facto charity). The failure of 
confessional syndicalism in Andalucía meant that the Church had lost all realistic hope of 
(re)converting the masses.764 In despair, the Catholic hierarchy turned attention towards the 
youth of Andalucía. 
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Santa Ana the local trade-unions had the effect of “el de ir agrupando a poco a poco todos los pobres”. 
Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 559.   
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 The confessional trade-union network promoted by the Church resulted in a monumental fiasco 
(except in the pious north of Spain), largely because of its Integrist ideology. Catholic unions were anti-
liberal, unconditional in their defence of private property and rejected the principle of class struggle. For 
the Integrists, pluralism implied heterodoxy and the denial of Catholic supremacy.  Vincent, Mary, 
Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic: religion and politics in Salamanca, 1930-1936, pages 99-
110. For the failure of confessional trade-unions in Seville (and consequent socio-political tensions) see: 
Álvarez Rey, Leandro, ““Obreros honrados”: las derechas y el sindicalismo católico en la segunda 
república” in Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Lemus López, Encarnación (ed.), Sindicatos y trabajadores en 
Sevilla: una aproximación a la memoria del siglo XX. 
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Re-Catholicising Republican Seville765 
Condemned to certain extinction by an irreligious society, the Catholic hierarchy reached the 
highly optimistic conclusion that the key to the re-Catholicisation of Seville rested on the 
indoctrination of the local youth. The Church seized the opportunity presented by the absence 
an adequate state school system to establish a monopoly. It was not until the advent of the 
Republic that a secular education system was created. In 1932, only 15% of parishes reported a 
majority of children attending state institutions (Santa Ana, La Concepción Inmaculada and San 
Roque y San Benito). In addition, there was a wide disparity between the number of children 
attending Catholic and state schools (for instance, in San Andrés 700 children attended 
Catholic institutions, while only 50 frequented state schools).766 Moreover, religious education 
was still taught (albeit unofficially) in several secular institutions: in San Andrés y San Martin, 
the children attending the local state school were educated by a devout Catholic teacher (“la 
enseñanza laica oficialmente, la maestra muy piadosa”). However, Church monopoly over the 
education system did not translate into increased piety. Only a fraction of children receiving 
religious education were also enrolled in Catholic associations (despite being actively 
encouraged to do so).767 Ultimately, parental opposition undermined Church plans to re-
Catholicise Seville: only in three predominantly bourgeois parishes did a majority of parents 
regard the Catholic upbringing of their children as a priority (El Salvador, San Vicente Mártir 
and San Pedro). In San Andrés, the local priest reported that “las familias acomodadas se 
preocupan de esto, los pobres muy peor”, whereas in Santa Cruz “hay bastantes defectos en 
las clases populares”. In San Julián, the priest noted that “sólo se preocupan[…] de llevarlos a 
colegios católicos. Muchos ni aún esto.” Lastly, the parish priest San Nicolás y Santa María la 
Blanca summarised the failure of the Church’s quixotic plan to re-Catholicise the poor via the 
indoctrination of the local children: “Muy mal; sobre todo la clase pobre que ni quiere, ni 
quiere tener conciencia de tan grave obligación.”  
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 See Table III. 
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 Only San Roque y San Benito showed a wide disparity in favour of state schools: 1,610 children 
attended state institutions (with a further 200 enrolled in a protestant school), whereas only 455 
children frequented the local Catholic school. Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos 
Despachados, Legajo 559. 
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 Percentage of children attending Church schools also enrolled in Catholic institutions: 43% in La 
Concepción Inmaculada; 43% in San Pedro; 38% in Santa Cruz; 15% in San Roque; 14% in Nuestra Señora 
de la O; 11% in San Isidoro; 1% in Omnium Sanctorum. The priests of El Salvador (“algunas”) and San 
Vicente Mártir ("mediana”) provided vague replies. The priest of Nuestra Señora de la O wrote: “en 
cuanto a la enseñanza grande; en los demás aspectos; exíguo.” In San Gil, only a small minority among 
the 900 students attending the local Catholic school were also enrolled in Juventud Católica. At its peak, 
Juventud Católica possessed only 50 members in the parish; by 1932, it had all but disappeared.  
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Waiting for a miracle: General Queipo de Llano 
The 1928-1932 Church census recognised the existence of an irreversible trend towards total 
apostasy in the Dioceses of Seville. The tiny Catholic minority was a marginalised social group 
that followed the most strident precepts of Church doctrine, with the notable exceptions of 
the working-class parishes of San Gil, San Julián, Nuestra Señora de la O, Omnium Sanctorum 
and San Nicolás. In fact, the only lower-class Catholic community to remain steadfast in its 
adherence to Catholic dogma was that of Santa Ana.768 Increased piety, however, failed to 
reverse the fortunes of the minuscule Catholic minority. In San Ildefonso, the proselytization 
campaign devised by the minuscule Catholic community was nullified by the activities of the 
local trade-unions and in San Pedro “los que pertenencen a partidos politicos extremistas, 
propagan sus ideas.” At the same time, the clergy was impotent to curb the growing influence 
of the left-wing press. The priests of San Andrés and La Concepción Inmaculada attempted to 
distribute religious periodicals, but were unable to gather the necessary financial resources to 
publish their own newspaper. Also, the parish priest of San Vicente Mártir laboured tirelessly 
to “propagar la buena prensa, que no la quieren por mucho que se les insiste”. The majority of 
parish priests resorted to traditional methods such as catechism, preaching from the pulpit, 
personal example and the occasional private chat; without any tangible results. Only the priest 
of San Andrés offered a more pragmatic solution by proposing the construction of a night-
school for working-class adults. In the end, the diocesan clergy of Seville resigned itself to the 
fact that it was impossible to regain Seville for Catholicism. The priest of San Román wrote that 
the 10-12 people that attended church regularly (out of a total of 9,700 parishioners): 
“procuran atender en medida de sus fuerzas”. The priest of San Nicolás had also abandoned all 
hope “porque no hay forma de atraerlos al templo”, and even the more resourceful priest of 
San Andrés conceded defeat: “ahora dificilmente se puede hacer algo”. Lastly, the priest of El 
Sagrario openly recognised that the only option left was to pray for a miracle (“pedir a Dios 
que ponga remedio a tanto mal”)769 According to Nationalist mythology, a miracle did occur on 
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 13 positive replies, 6 negative and 1 unclear (San Pedro y San Juan de la Palma: “hoy en general […] 
pero también abundan los de verdadera piedad”). The priest of La Concepción Inmaculada wrote: “las 
personas religiosas, lo son de verdaderú espíritu.” Only the priest of San Ildefonso reported that a 
majority of churchgoers attended “inmoral” cinemas/theatres. In San Nicolás y Santa María la Blanca, 
the faithful few even attempted to ameliorate the precarious economic condition of the parish. The 
census also enquired whether Catholics indirectly favoured the spread of irreligion. 14 priests (out of a 
total of 18 replies) reconfirmed the piety of the local Catholic minority. 
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 San Julián: “con todos los medios que le sugiere un buen deseo, entre ellos los cultos modestos que 
puede celebrar […] hasta ahora poco eficaces.” Santa Ana: “el que puede hacer un pobre cura con su 
trabajo.” San Nicolás y Santa María la Blanca: “poco dadas las circunstancias”. San Ildefonso y Santiago: 
“lo posible in mi situación actual.” The priest of San Gil also attempted – without much success - to 
persuade unmarried couples to baptise their children and sanctify their unions in the local church. 
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18 July 1936, when that most unlikely protector of Catholicism, General Queipo de Llano (who 
in 1931 had allowed the anticlerical masses to assault the churches of Madrid), initiated a 
crusade to save Spain from atheism.770  
 
Church and Republic (1931-1936)  
The census of 1928-1932 in the Dioceses of Seville revealed that the Catholic Church’s efforts 
to evangelise beyond its historical boundaries resulted in a monumental failure. Matters took a 
turn for the worse following the de-confessionalisation of Spain during the II Republic, which 
established a secular society, ended state subventions to the clergy, dissolved the Society of 
Jesus and prohibited all other religious orders from engaging in industry, commerce and 
education.771 The end of all economic privileges threatened the very existence of the Catholic 
Church. This was particularly true in regions of low religiosity, such as Seville.772 
 
The passing of article 26 of the 1931 Constitution represented an immense blow for the 
Catholic Church, in particular to the religious orders. In 1930, Spain possessed around 20,000 
monks and 60,000 nuns that dominated both the education and health sectors and used this 
privilege as a platform to combat secularism.773 Radical anti-clericals, such as Luis Jiménez de 
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 Arrarás, Joaquín, Historia de la Segunda Republica Española, vol. 1, pages 109-110. 
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 The Catholic hierarchy was particularly incensed by the Law on Religious Congregations; however, 
the clause that barred all religious orders from teaching (to be applied between June-October 1933) was 
never enforced by the new right-wing government that won the 1933 elections: “Declaración del 
Episcopado con motivo de la ley de Confesiones y Congregaciones Religiosas[…]el hondo sentir de la 
Iglesia ante los excesos del Estado violadores de la conciencia católica y de los derechos confesionales, 
elevó a los gobernantes serenos ruegos y pacificadores advertencias, que debieran haber enfrenado 
toda tendencia de sectaria persecución, y dictó normas prácticas a los católicos, a fin de responder a una 
legislación injusta con acción eficaz de pura religiosidad y actitudes rectas de acendrado patriotismo.” 
Also, “hemos de lamentar, en cambio, que aquel laicismo agresivo inspirador de la Constitución, en frase 
de comentadores ajenos a un criterio confesional, no sólo no ha remitido, sino que se ha agravado y ha 
seguido proyectándose con animadversión mayor en la aplicación de los preceptos constitucionales, en 
las leyes y reglamentaciones posteriores y en los actos mismos del poder ejecutivo, que con la 
conculcación sucesiva de los derechos eclesiásticos vienen a confirmar el espíritu y ánimo decidido de 
hostilidad en que las Cortes se inspiran con evidente injusticia y sin provecho el bien general de la 
Nación.” Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico del Arzobispado de Sevilla, 3 June 1933. 
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 “Exigencias inexcusables de previsión Pastoral Nos impelen a hacer hoy un llamamiento a la reflexión 
y una excitación al celo de nuestro muy amado Clero parroquial en relación con la situación económica y 
los modos de hacer frente a las necesidades materiales de la vida del Clero y de las necesidades y gastos 
que origina el culto y la conservación de los templos.” This “AVISO PASTORAL” was in reply to the 
cancellation of all state subventions to the Dioceses of Seville on 1 January 1933. Boletín Oficial 
Eclesiástico del Arzobispado de Sevilla, 7 February 1933.   
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 For instance, a Catholic school textbook in 1934 described the “law of majority rule, a savage law of 
the strongest, the germ of ruin and death in its hankering after liberty.” RR del Sagrado Corazón, Manual 
de la clase 4 (Barcelona, 1934) in Lannon, Frances, Privilege, Persecution and Prophecy: The Catholic 
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Asúa, wanted to abolish all religious orders, but were publicly rebuked by Manuel Azaña in a 
speech delivered in Parliament on 13 October 1931.774 Prime-Minister Alcalá-Zamora had 
already addressed the Cortes three days earlier (10 October) declaring that, as a political 
moderate and a Catholic, he felt ideologically trapped between the antidemocratic Catholic 
right and the anticlerical left. Predictably, the passing of article 26 triggered the immediate 
resignations of Alcalá-Zamora and Interior Minister Miguel Maura.775 As for Integrist Catholics, 
the removal of crucifixes from public buildings, the banning of processions, the legalisation of 
civil marriage and divorce, and the secularisation of cemeteries was all but evidence of the 
anti-religious nature of the II Republic.776 Priest Antonio Pildain openly declared in the Cortes 
that, according to Catholic doctrine, resistance to unjust law could be expressed by armed 
rebellion. Also, in 1934 the canon of Salamanca Cathedral, Aniceto Castro Albarrán, had 
provided a theological justification for a coup d’etat. In doing so, Albarrán revealed that the 
Church’s hostility towards the Republic was not merely a reaction to the latter’s anticlericalism 
but essentially ideological: the Church was anti-modernist, anti-democratic and anti-liberal. 777  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Church in Spain, 1875-1975, page 82. For statistical data see:  Anuario Estadístico de España 1930, pages 
672-73 in Lannon, Frances, Privilege, Persecution and Prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875-
1975, page 61. 
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 Ibid, pages 183-87. See also page 184: Manuel Azaña, based on his own personal experience of being 
educated by Augustinian monks, viewed religious schools as an ideological threat to the Republic. He 
earned a place in Catholic demonology when he declared “that Spain had ceased to be Catholic” in 
October 1931. 
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 “El Gobierno, que sabe los inconvenientes de estar flanqueado por dos fuerzas enemigas, conoce 
también la táctica para seguir adelante y para desbaratar los planes de una y de otra.” Alcalá-Zamora, 
Niceto, Discursos, pages 535. See also pages 347-71 and 534-37. Alfredo Mendizábal, a professor of 
Philosophy of Law at the University of Oviedo, also felt ideologically trapped between Integrists and 
anticlericals. He stated that the Church had been hijacked by the oligarchy, which equated Catholicism 
with anti-Marxism, defence of property, autocracy “and, in short, all the values which characterize a 
conservative regime with Fascist methods, too many Catholics rendered a great disservice to the 
Church, the results of which were quickly evident.” Mendizábal Villalba, Alfredo, The martyrdom of 
Spain: origins of a Civil War, page 271.  
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 Republican anticlericalism alienated the moderate faction within the Catholic Church, including 
Cardinal Vidal i Barraquer who in December 1931 made public his opposition to the new Constitution. 
Still, the Integrist faction was more influential. For instance, Cardinal Gomá, who replaced Segura as 
Primate of Spain, was an Integrist. On 10 January 1937, he wrote Respuesta obligada, an open letter to 
the President of the pro-Republican Basque autonomous government, in which he rejected all Basque 
claims for autonomy, denied that economic asymmetries were at the root of social conflict in Spain or 
even that General Franco was supported by the financial élites. Gomá y Tomás, Isidro, Pastorales de la 
Guerra de España, pages 73-93; Gomá y Tomás, Isidro, Por Dios y por España. Pastorales, instrucciones 
pastorales y artículos, discursos, mensajes, apéndice, 1936-1939; Gomá y Tomás, Isidro, Respuesta 
obligada: carta abierta al Sr. D. José Antonio Aguirre.  
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 Castro Albarrán, Aniceto, El derecho a la rebeldía. In 1940, Albarrán also provided a theological 
justification for the July 1936 rebellion. Castro Albarrán, Aniceto, El derecho al Alzamiento.  
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Republican anticlericalism created an enmity that would eventually prove fatal. The political 
left gravely underestimated the mobilising power of a victimised Church. Indeed, 
anticlericalism helped to mobilise Catholics across categories of socio-economic class and in 
1933 the Church functioned as the element that agglutinated a myriad of right-wing groups 
into the CEDA, the largest party of the political right. The pre-eminence of the CEDA – which 
based its ideology exclusively on the protection of religion, family, property and patriotism – 
polarised Spain. The CEDA appropriated Catholic rhetoric and manipulated it to create a mass 
party and become the political vehicle of Catholic values and agenda. Furthermore, the CEDA 
promoted a binary conception of society that also dismissed moderate Catholics (including 
Catholic Republicans) as heterodox. Most importantly, the party regularly classified its policies 
as ‘Catholic’ and used the Catholic label to oppose all attempts at political reform. In a 
nutshell, the Church represented Spain; its opponents (including the Republic) were anti-
Spain.778 
 
The umbilical nature of the conservative alliance implied that whenever one of the members 
of the pact came under attack the tide could easily turn against its weakest link: the Church.779 
This became clear when both an anti-war demonstration (Tragic Week) and a political protest 
(May 1931) both degenerated into anticlerical riots.780 The Catholic Church was the most 
vulnerable element of the coalition because it was physically in the frontline of the political 
war being waged in the streets of Spain: churches and other religious building were often 
located in the central square of a pueblo or deep-inside urban working-class districts. In 
addition, Catholic schools and trade-unions brought the Church dangerously close to the 
masses, not as an ally, but as an unwelcome guest. Tensions reached boiling-point in May 
1936, when the unfounded rumour that nuns were handing poisoned sweets to children 
                                                          
778
 Montero, José Ramón, La CEDA, 2 vols.; Gil Robles, José María, No fué posible la paz. 
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 “The best that can be said about the riots that took place during the months following the General 
Election is that they seem nearly all to have been spontaneous, unorganized acts of hooliganism, due to 
the return of exiled extremists and to the ebullition of feeling at the return of power of the Left after a 
period of eclipse. 
It was fortunate that the first targets of popular violence should have been churches, for the inactivity of 
the forces of law and order in suppressing the outbreaks was interpreted, at least by implication, as 
pointing to a new period of official anti-clerical policy. As a matter of fact, it seems to have been due 
rather to a desire not to excite mob feeling and to the hope that, if left alone, it would in the course of a 
few weeks die a normal death.” Peers, Allison, The Spanish Tragedy 1930-1936. Dictatorship, Republic, 
Chaos, page 194. “The bloodiest blows and the greatest refinements of cruelty were, however, nearly 
always reserved for Catholics.” Blaye, Edouard de, Franco and the politics of Spain, page 94. See also: 
Robinson, Richard, The origins of Franco’s Spain, page 258. 
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 Ullman, Joan Connelly, The tragic week: a study of anticlericalism in Spain, 1875-1912; Ealham, Chris, 
Class, culture, and conflict in Barcelona, 1898-1937. 
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sufficed to provoke a major anticlerical riot in Madrid. Prime-Minister Casares Quiroga was 
visited by several women (some of whom were pregnant) desperately pleading for help; a 
desperation that rapidly turned into “reacciones fieras” and “enloquecimiento de la multitud”. 
Casares Quiroga condemned the disturbances in a speech delivered to the Cortes:  
“Se produjo un estado de excitación, de histerismo, perfectamente enfermizo, que dio lugar en 
los primeros momentos a actos que yo repruebo, que el Gobierno reprueba, y que estoy 
seguro que no hay nadie en la Cámara que no repruebe.”781  
 
The Prime-Minister accused the right of spreading false rumours in an attempt to truly poison 
the political atmosphere. Once again, the Catholic Church was in the frontline of a political 
confrontation. In reality, the Church had long ceased to be regarded primarily as a religious 
institution. For the political right, it was an invaluable ideological ally; for the left, it was a key 
member of a coalition that threatened the very existence of the Republic. This alliance would 
gradually mature into the Francoist Pact of blood. 
 
Church and Popular Front in Seville (February-July 1936) 
The triumph of the Popular Front in the February 1936 elections triggered a new wave of 
anticlericalism in Andalucía. On 14 April, a crowd in Marinaleda (Seville) decided to celebrate 
the fifth anniversary of the Republic by assaulting the parish church and was about to burn 
religious icons in the main square when the Civil Guard intervened and dispersed the group. 
Later that same night, the local chapel was sacked. The parish priest suffered a nervous 
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 Quiroga spoke of “hechos dolorosos, incalificables, execrables, que el Gobierno es el primero en 
condenar y en execrar (Muy bien)” and declared: “tengo vehementísimas sospechas de que aquellos que 
han lanzado la miserable idea, para enloquecer la multitud, de que se estaban repartiendo en Madrid 
caramelos envenenados no han podido ser, ciertamente, los hombres que a las tres de la tarde se 
lanzaron a la calle a parar y detener aquellas locuras, mientras vosotros (Dirigiéndose a las derechas) 
estabais en vuestras casas. (Aplausos.- El Sr. Bermúdez Cañete: ¡Si oyen esto en el extranjero, Sr. 
Ministro de la Gobernación! – Ruidosas protestas). 
El Sr. Presidente: ¡Orden, orden! Dejen hablar al Sr. Ministro de la Gobernación. 
El Sr. Ministro de la Gobernación: Una noticia, no sólo falsa, sino ruinmente inventada, ha levantado un 
momento a determinados barrios en Madrid, los barrios donde vive gente popular, que tiene reacciones 
fieras porque tiene corazón (Rumores), gente a la que se ha dicho sus hijos estaban siendo envenenados 
por tales o cuales personas. A mi despacho venían mujeres, algunas de las cuales estaban en vías de ser 
madres, a pedir socorro para sus hijos, creyendo ver en cada mano que alargaba un caramelo un 
asesino, provocando así en enloquecimiento de la multitud.” Quiroga believed that the right fabricated 
the story because it was frustrated by the peaceful nature of May Day demonstrations in Madrid. He 
also revealed that a retired army officer had been arrested on 2 May for firing against a leftist crowd. 
Grandío Seoane, Emilio (ed), Casares Quiroga: Discursos Parlamentarios (1931-1936), pages 251-52. 
See also pages 253-54. 
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breakdown, abandoned the pueblo and wrote two days later to the Archbishop of Seville 
begging: “todo menos volver á Marinaleda”.782  On 18 April, another crowd attacked seven 
convents and monasteries in Jérez de la Frontera (Cádiz), while the resident monks fled the 
buildings in panic.783 The following day, the priests of El Cuervo (Seville) and Algar (Cádiz) were 
forced to abandon their parishes after receiving death threats; whereas in Lebrija (Seville), 
successive attempts to burn down several religious buildings forced the local nuns to 
temporarily renounce their closure vows. According to the religious authorities, this was 
because “ser los frailes objecto de malquerencia”.784 The anticlerical wave that followed the 
February 1936 elections resulted in a total of 66 damaged/destroyed religious buildings in 
Andalucía.785  
 
Violence against the Church did not explode abruptly in 1936, but rather remained a constant 
throughout the II Republic in Seville, peaking in May 1931, the summer-autumn of 1932 and 
the summer of 1933.786 Two years of right-wing government (1934-35) did not help defuse the 
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 On 18 April, Ilundáin ordered the priest of Marinaleda to return to his parish. Other attacks were 
aborted in extremis thanks to prompt intervention of the Civil Guard, such as in Castillo de las Guardas 
(Seville) on 16 April 1936. Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, 
Legajo 591. 
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 Convento de las Mínimas, Reparadoras, Espíritu Santo, Madre de Dios, Compañía de María, Frailes 
Franciscanos, Carmelitas (most nuns had already abandoned clausura on 14 April). Archivo Arzobispal 
de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126. 
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 In Algar: “El Parroco ha tenido que huir en vista de que el elemento obrero amenaza con ensañarse 
con el.” Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126. 
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 12 damaged/destroyed churches in Seville, 17 in Cádiz, 16 in Málaga, 7 in Córdoba, 7 in Granada, 5 in 
Huelva, 1 in Almería and 1 in Jaén. Caro Cancela, Diego, “La primavera de 1936 en Andalucía: 
conflictividad social y violencia política” in Alvarez Rey, Leandro (ed.), Andalucía y la guerra civil: 
estudios y perspectivas, page 21. 
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 1931: Seville: San José, Villasis, Carmelitas, San Julián.  
1932: Seville: Santa Catalina, San Ildefonso, San Martín, San Leandro. Jerez de la Frontera: Carmelitas, 
Jesuits, Minimas. Lora del Rio: parish church, Mercedarias. Sanlúcar la Barrameda: parish church, 
Capuchinos. Arcos de la Frontera: Salesianos. Marchena: San Sebástian. Écija: Carmelitas, San Gil, Iglesia 
de las Marroquies. Dos Hermanas: San Sebastián (chapel). Also, parish churches assaulted in San Juan de 
Aznalfarache, Coria del Rio, Ardales, El Rubio, Mairena del Alcor, Real de la Jara, Aznalcollar, Sanlúcar la 
Mayor, Marchena, Nerva, Aznalzacar, Gerena, Badolatosa, Real de la Jara.  
1933: Santa Olalla: parish church; Nerva: parish church; temporary closure of the Colegio de las 
Hermanas de la Caridad. Castaño del Robledo: confiscation of Catholic cemetery. Pilas: confiscation of 
Catholic cemetery. Cabezas Rubias: parish priest arrested. Pruna: parish priest arrested. Camas: parish 
priest fined and restrictions imposed on bell-ringing. Villamartin: town hall imposed fee for bell-ringing. 
Valencina: destruction of religious icons in the streets of the pueblo. Villarasa: destruction of a wall in 
the atrium of the parish church. Coripe: removal of two religious plaques, one of Sacred Heart of Jesus 
and another attached to the rectory. Galaroza: confiscation of Catholic cemetery. Cantillana: the local 
mayor prohibited the priest from delivering a sermon during a religious feast day. Cortegana: a Padre 
Redentorista was forced to cancel a novena and ordered to leave the pueblo “para evitar males 
mayores” (the mayor also forbade him from preaching again in the village). El Madroño: priest detained 
for distributing leaflets condemning civil marriage. Aroche: confiscation and conversion of the chapel of 
San Sebastian into a public market. Algodonales: confiscation and conversion of a chapel into a “escuela 
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situation; instead, it merely repressed it. The religious problem surfaced again in 1936 with 
such violence that the Vatican Embassy in Spain wrote to the Dioceses of Seville requesting an 
official report on the anticlerical riots. Cardinal Ilundáin – “con gran dolor y pesadumbre” - 
delivered two separate documents on 24 March and 6 June respectively.787  
 
The number of attacks revealed that anticlericalism was a collective manifestation of hatred 
towards the Catholic Church that could be traced back to before the establishment of the 
Republic. Church reports attempted to obscure this fact by derogatorily labelling the crowds as 
“turbas”, implying that the emergence of the ‘mob’ was somehow related to the creation of 
the Second Republic. Therefore, in El Almendro (Huelva), the chapel of Nuestra Señora de 
Piedras Albas was burned (including the statue of the patron saint) by a “turba numerosa en 
actitud violenta” that also sacked the rectory “en actitud amenazadora contra el Párroco que 
tuvo que huir para salvar su vida.” On 23 April, the parish church of El Gastor (Cádiz) was 
attacked “por las turbas”, while “El cura ha huido amedrantado”. That same day, the priest of 
La Roda de Andalucía (Seville) informed Ilundáin that he had been given a five-day deadline to 
abandon the pueblo. On 26 April, the Archbishop of Seville ordered him to remain in the 
pueblo, not leave his house alone at night, and counselled him: “Ponga en Dios la confianza”.788 
A similar situation occurred on 7 May in Guillena (Seville), where the “turbas amotinadas” 
destroyed religious objects belonging to the parish church and the priest was forced to flee the 
pueblo. His sister suffered a seizure and was left traumatised by the incident. On 26 May, the 
priest was granted a four-month leave of absence after receiving death threats.789 There were 
further anticlerical incidents in Tocina (Seville), Herrera (Seville), El Saucejo (Seville), Corcoya 
(Seville) and Galaroza (Huelva). Indeed, the atmosphere in the nearby province of Huelva was 
equally volatile. In Niebla, the parish church reported an “Incendio monumental del templo 
parroquial”; whereas in Palos de la Frontera, the local cleric escaped to nearby Moguer.790 In 
                                                                                                                                                                          
laica”. Attacks against clergy in: Teba, Gerena, Coria del Río, Peñaflor, Aguadulce, Prado del Rey, 
Peñarrubia, Arcos de la Frontera, Marchena, Carmona, Morón de la Frontera and Ayamonte. Archivo 
Arzobispal de Sevilla, Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126. 
787
 The original request from the Nuncio Apostólico was dated 19 March 1936. For the anticlerical 
incidents of 1936 and the 24 March and 6 June reports see: Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), 
Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126 and 05097 (592). 
788
 On 15 July, the priest requested a month-long leave of absence to “descansar atendiendo a su salud”. 
The request was accepted the following day.  
789
 In Guillena: “Las turbas amotinadas han destrozado cuanto han querido de los objetos sagrados del 
templo parroquial – El Parroco viéndose amenazado de muerte me ha rogado le autorice ausentarse con 
gran sentimiento suyo y mio”.   
790
  A similar situation occured in Villanueva de las Minas (Seville): “El parroco temeroso de un atentado 
contra su vida se ausenta a Constantina”. In Espera (Cádiz), the local Catholic community advised the 
priest to abandon the pueblo. 
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Las Delgadas, it was the Jefe del cuerpo de Seguridad for Rio Tinto himself who urged the priest 
to flee, “en vista del peligro que corria su seguridad personal”.791  
 
By February 1936, the general trend of “indiferencia” towards parish priests reported in the 
1928-1932 Church census had turned into open hatred. The situation took its emotional toll on 
the clergy. The priest of Santa Maria Magdalena y San Miguel (Seville) was repeatedly insulted 
by construction workers over a pay dispute that provoked “un ataque congestivo y de hecho 
notable agravación de mi enfermedad que se fomenta con las impresiones de disgustos”.792 
Moreover, the priests of Brenes (2 May), Guillena (26 May), Almadén de la Plata (10 June), San 
Sebastián (Alcalá de Guadaira, 30 June), San Gil Abad (Seville, 1 July), San Blás (Carmona, 6 
July) and La Roda de Andalucía (15 July); all requested leaves of absence.793 The most extreme 
case occurred a week before the outbreak of the rebellion (11 July) in Cañete la Real (Málaga), 
where the local priest became suicidal after his initial petition for special dispensation for 
health reasons (2 July) was turned down by the Archbishop of Seville:  
“tengo el sentimiento  de poner en conocimiento de Vstra. E. Rvma. que dicho Sr. Cura desde 
el día cinco de los corrientes padece una depresión de aspecto endógeno con impulsión al 
suicidio, aconsejando los facultativos que le han reconocido su reclusión en una casa de salud, 
por lo que desde dicha fecha ha tenido que dejar su residencia parroquial y está con su citado 
hermano mientras este gestiona su ingreso en el Sanatorio de San José de la ciudad de 
Málaga.”794 
 
The number and spontaneous nature of anticlerical riots disproved Catholic claims that the 
attacks were caused by irrational “turbas”. The timing of the disturbances (during and after the 
February 1936 elections) revealed that the anticlericalism was politically motivated. For 
instance, on 26 April a crowd interrupted Mass in Gelves (Seville) and forced the priest to 
perform the Communist salute.795 Moreover, left-wing groups regularly attempted to convert 
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 All reports in: Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126 
and 05097 (592). 
792
 On 7 May, the priest requested to abandon his parish, which was accepted the following day by 
Cardinal Ilundáin. 
793
 Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 591 and 05097 (592). 
794
 Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05097 (592). 
795
 Another report re Gelves read: “Durante la celebración de la Misa forzaron al Párroco para que 
marchase a votar el día 26 de Abril – Suspendió el Párroco la Misa; y forzándole para que les 
acompañase fue al Colegio electoral”. A few days earlier (21 February) in Corcoya (Seville), the priest 
denounced a failed attempt to burn the parish church and declared that “con todo será muy difícil 
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religious buildings into Casas del Pueblo and/or other worker associations, such as in Cantillana 
(Seville), San Juan de Aznalfarache (Seville), Puebla del Río (Seville), Mairena del Alcor (Seville) 
and Almensilla (Seville). Tensions flared-up again in the politically-charged holiday of 1 May, 
most notably in the working-class districts of Seville. Also, in the Barriada de la Azucarera in La 
Rinconada (Seville), the Sindicato de Azucareros went as far as to prohibit its members from 
engaging in any sort of religious rituals. The local priest was stoned and warned not to 
celebrate Mass in the local chapel, which was eventually closed in order to prevent arson.796 
Lastly, on 2 May in Brenes (Seville), a crowd burned several religious objects and attempted to 
convert the parish church into a Casa del Pueblo. The priest was forced to flee and all religious 
services temporarily suspended. The situation was so tense that the Civil Governor dispatched 
an Assault Guard unit from Seville to impose the rule of law. The assault guards collected all 
religious objects, placed them inside the church (which was then locked from the inside) and 
patrolled the streets to protect the building from further attacks. That same night, a crowd 
desecrated a local chapel and burned religious icons in the streets of the pueblo, while a group 
of youths “En medio de tanta algarabía y por divertirse mas, tocaban las campanas.” The Civil 
Guard did not find the situation amusing and decided to open fire, seriously injuring one rioter. 
The following day, the mood in Brenes had altered considerably. The fearful local priest 
reported to Cardinal Ilundáin that “se han exaltado sobremanera los ánimos llegando a decir 
                                                                                                                                                                          
esclarecer nada, porque el alcalde de Badolatosa es el jefe de la sociedad obrerista de Corcoya que es la 
que se cree ha realizado el atropello, y procurará que todo quede en la impunidad.” The anticlerical 
attitude of the mayor found echo in the “izquierdismo irreligioso de casi toda la masa.” Archivo 
Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 591 and 05097 (592).  
796
 In the parish of San Jerónimo (Seville), priest José Vigil Cabrerizo reported that the local church was 
first occupied on 1 May after the chaplain refused to hand in the keys to “una turba de jóvenes”. After 
breaking into the temple, the youths handed all religious objects to the chaplain, destroyed the 
altarpiece and proceeded to convert the church into a Casa del Pueblo. The adjacent rectory was not 
attacked. On 6 May, a patrol of assault guards dislodged the occupiers, however: “La actitud de los 
vecinos es sea como fuera volver al asalto porque pretenden instalar la casa del pueblo”. As a result, the 
Civil Governor decided to keep a permanent civil guard patrol. In Cantillana (24 April): “Los Socialistas se 
apoderaron de la Capilla del Rosario después de sacar los objetos religiosos por personas piadosas”. 
Puebla del Rio: “El Párroco medroso, quizá excesivamente, por haberle pedido unos jóvenes la llave de 
una Capilla de S. Sebastián, accediendo a requerimientos posteriores de personas piadosas entregó a 
estas la llave para que sacasen los objetos sagrados de la Capilla y entregasen despues la llave a aquella 
Comisión del pueblo que la pedía para casa del pueblo – Posteriormente y por orden superior 
gubernativa ha sido devuelta.” Mairena del Alcor: a “muchedumbre” demanded that the priest hand 
over the key of the chapel of San Sebastián so to convert it into a Centro Obrero de Mujeres. The fearful 
priest complied only for the key to be returned four days later. Almensilla: “La juventud Marxista se 
apodera de los almacenes dependencia de la parroquia en los cuales establecen su centro.” Another 
group of adolescents forced the priest to hand over the keys of the local chapel and converted it into a 




que ya no queda nada de la Iglesia más que las campanas y el cura y que es necesario hacerles 
desaparecer.”797  
 
Several representatives of the newly-elected Popular Front were so eager to curb the influence 
of the Catholic Church that they also often resorted to illegal tactics. In La Palma del Condado 
(Huelva), the Comisión Gestora ordered the razing of the local monument to the Sacred Heart 
of Jesus, forbade both bell-ringing and public religious services, and imposed an illegal tax of 
200 pesetas on all religious funerals. In Los Corrales (Seville), the priest was fined for praying in 
the spot where a demolished iron cross used to stand, threatened with the confiscation of his 
rectory and prohibited from celebrating religious funerals. In Moguer (Huelva) and Bollullos del 
Condado (Huelva), the local Catholic cemeteries were taken over by the municipal authorities; 
whereas in Valdelarco (Huelva)798, El Madroño (Seville) and El Cerro Del Andevalo (Huelva)799, 
the local authorities decreed a ban on all religious funerals and church bell-ringing. In addition, 
a number of mayors gratuitously humiliated the clergy. For instance, the mayors of El 
Madroño800 and Sanlúcar de Barrameda (Cádiz) ordered the local priests to inform their 
respective town halls of all planned religious services in advance for approval.  In Calañas 
(Huelva), the local administration ordered a search on the parish church that found an 
obsolete hunting rifle, which was then used as a pretext to detain the priest for four days. The 
church Los Milagros in El Puerto de Santa María (Cádiz) was also searched on the basis of the 
false denunciation that the parish priest was hiding “personas enemigas del regimen”. The 
situation became so tense that several members of the religious orders temporarily renounced 
their vows without even seeking prior approval from the Archbishop of Seville. Other abuses of 
authority took place in Rota (Cádiz), Río Tinto (Huelva), Fuentes de Andalucía (Seville), Lora del 
Río (Seville), Marchena (Seville), Arahal (Seville), and Coria del Río (Seville).801 At the same 
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  That same day, the priest abandoned the pueblo after being given a leave of absence by Cardinal 
Ilundáin. On 1 July, the priest requested another 20-day leave citing health reasons. His petition was 
rejected by the Archbishop of Seville. All reports in: Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, 
Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 591 and 05097 (592). 
798
 Also in Valdelarco: “Por acuerdo del Alcalde se ha prohibido a las señoritas catequistas enseñar el 
catecismo en la parroquia.” Catholic schools were also closed in Moguer, Coria del Río and Galaroza. 
799
 A small chapel was also confiscated in the pueblo. 
800
 The local mayor also prohibited the celebration of religious rituals after 20:00.  
801
 Lora del Río: the abandoned La Merced Convent was demolished under the pretext that both its 
rooftop and a lateral wall were at risk of collapse. “Es de notar que el peligro de ruina provino 
especialmente porque las turbas – o alguna persona intencionada – abrió brecha en el muro.” 
Marchena: representatives of the local Casa del Pueblo tried to confiscate the Church of Santo Domingo. 
Río Tinto: failed attempt to convert the Chapel of La Dehesa into a public library. Arahal: the local mayor 
attempted to confiscate the Ermita of San Antonio. Rota: on 17 April, the Chapel of La Caridad and 
Chapel of San Roque were both attacked and several religious images burned in the main square of the 
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time, the moderate political left attempted to curb the excesses of the extremists. A month 
later, normality had already been restored thanks to the timely intervention of the Civil 
Governor of Seville. At the same time, Cardinal Ilundáin adopted a moderate stance, using 
official channels (for instance, filing complaints with the Civil Government) to combat 
anticlericalism.802 The joint strategy adopted by both the Civil Governor and the Archbishop of 
Seville displeased political extremists. For instance, on 28 April 1936 the Comité de Radio de 
Arahal wrote a letter to the PCE parliamentary representation denouncing the fact that “los 
patronos no cumplen nada de lo que se comprometieron”, at the same time as the Civil 
Governor “desautoriza a los alcaldes a que hagan nada sin que se lo comuniquese”, while the 
masses languish “muertos de hambre”.803 
 
The shocking findings of the 29 March and 6 June reports compelled the Apostolic Nunciature 
to request (29 June) a list of priestless parishes in the Dioceses of Seville.804 Cardinal Ilundáin 
attempted to mask the situation in his reply of on 6 July by stating that there were no 
abandoned parishes, arguing instead that several priests were temporarily forced – for security 
                                                                                                                                                                          
pueblo. The assistant priest (coadjutor) was arrested for five days without even being informed of the 
reasons for his detention. Fuentes de Andalucía: the parish priest was detained for a day. Coria del Rio: 
on 25 April, a town hall councillor and a commission from the Casa del Pueblo requested the keys of the 
Chapel of la Soledad from the local priest. The priest complied and several religious objects were 
destroyed. Cardinal Ilundáin later phoned the priest, informing that he held him personally responsible 
for all damages since he did not hand the keys under the threat of violence. Archivo Arzobispal de 
Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126, 591 and 05097 (592). See also: Macarro 
Vera, José Manuel, Socialismo, república y revolución en Andalucía (1931-1936), page 411. 
802
 Normality returned to Seville mostly thanks to the intervention of the Civil Governor. In Valencina del 
Alcor (Seville), when both the priest and the entire Junta of a religious Brotherhood (Confradía) were 
arrested for holding a meeting in the local church (subsequently searched); the Civil Governor ordered 
their immediate release. He also overruled an order from the mayor of Alanís (Seville) instructing the 
local priest to suspend all public religious services in the pueblo. A demonstration against the priest was 
held following the revocation of the mayor’s original order. Varela Rendueles also ensured that Holy 
Week in Seville passed without incidents. Legal channels were also employed to separate Church and 
State. In Seville, Huelva and Ayamonte, the local authorities rescinded their contracts with the 
Hermanas de la Caridad working in state institutions (Seville: Asilo de San Fernando; Huelva: Hospital 
Provincial; Ayamonte: Asilo y Casa Cuna). In Huelva, the Diputación also decided to confiscate the 
church contiguous to its building. Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos 
Despachados, Legajo 05126 and 05097 (592). For the actions of Civil Governor Varela Rendueles see: 
Varela Rendueles, José María, Rebelión en Sevilla: memorias de su Gobernador rebelde, pages 29-71. 
See also: Macarro Vera, José Manuel, Socialismo, república y revolución en Andalucía (1931-1936), 
page 397. 
803
 Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica (Salamanca), PS Madrid, 385(2)/37.  
804
 For all documents see: Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, 
Legajo 05099, 05100 and 05102. 
232 
 
reasons - to abandon their posts.805 By July, only six parishes remained ‘officially’ vacant. These 
were: 
In Cádiz:  
 Prado del Rey (4,900 residents)  
 Algar (2,890 residents)  
In Huelva:  
 Almendro (1,372 residents)  
 Las Delgadas (1,314 residents)  
In Seville:  
 Gelves (1325 residents)  
 Guillena (4,335 residents) 
 
An additional twelve parishes remained de facto priestless “Desde muchos años”. Also, the 
Archbishop of Seville ordered priests residing in adjacent pueblos with the administration of 
sacraments to Catholics in ‘temporarily’ vacant parishes.806  
 
Economic troubles 
The withdrawal of the Church’s economic privileges decreed by new Republican government 
threatened the very survival of the Catholicism in Seville. On 30 December 1931, the priest of 
Montellano (Seville) wrote to Cardinal Ilundáin, stating:  
“Que en las difíciles circunstancias porque atraviesa esta parroquia como consecuencia de la 
desenfrenada campaña laizante, tenazmente sostenida por los directivo de la actual situación 
a la que se debe haya desaparecido en absoluto la parte funeral, que constituía el principal 
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 “Existen desgraciadamente algunas parroquias cuyos párrocos se han visto en el lamentable caso de 
ausentarse a consecuencia de la situación peligrosa que se les creó desde el mes de Febrero, o desde 
Mayo ultimo, por elementos desafectos a la Iglesia y al Clero católico.” Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla 
(Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05102. 
806
 Reasons put forward by Cardinal Ilundáin to explain the existence of priestless parishes: “La 
hostilidad de una parte del vecindario” and “Además: los párrocos han sido objeto de amenazas que 
hacen temer graves agresiones a su persona, o, la expulsión violenta.” He concluded: “Hay finalmente 
dos parroquias, a saber, S. Nicolás del Puerto y Corcoya que desde hace algún tiempo están servidas por 
el párroco inmediato, por no haber tenido sacerdote disponible para ser nombrado Vicario Ecónomo. 
Actualmente sería muy aventurado exponerse al riesgo de que no fuese recibido si se nombrase ex 
proffesso; pues la efervescencia sectaria en estas regiones es muy acentuada desgraciadamente.” 
Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05102. See also: Legajo 
05126 and 05097 (592).  
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ingreso de Curato y Fábrica y los casamientos se están celebrando civilmente (diez y seis se 
han celebrado civilmente en los tres días de Pascua)”. 
 
Furthermore, and as a direct consequence of the anticlerical legislation promulgated by the 
government, the parish had lost two-thirds of its income since May 1931. To make matters 
worse, the wealthiest Catholic families in Montellano decided to abandon the pueblo for 
security reasons.807  
 
In January 1932, Cardinal Ilundáin attempted to preclude the economic impact of Article 26 of 
the Republican Constitution.  He sent a Circular letter to all 260 parish priests in his dioceses, 
instructing them to set-up committees to raise money for the maintenance of the clergy. The 
conditions were few and clear: all members had to be male adults, practicing Catholics, of 
acceptable morality and influential in their local community. Twenty-three parishes reported 
that they were unable to meet the requisites, whereas others simply opted to ignore them 
altogether and set-up committees that included non-practising Catholics. To the great 
exasperation of the conservative Ilundáin, the priest of El Berrocal (Huelva) suggested that the 
local committee should include women. Four years later, the Dioceses of Seville was on the 
verge of financial bankruptcy. On 5 March 1936, the priest of Puerto Serrano (Cádiz) confided 
to the Archbishop of Seville that “es evidente que no se puede vivir, no se me oculta que esta 
mi situación es la de muchos compañeros.”808 Indeed, several parishes relied on direct funding 
from the Dioceses for survival, including San Sebastián (heavily indebted and unable to 
maintain its Catholic school)809 and Santa María la Blanca (unable to fund repair works in its 
rectory).810 Financial troubles in the capital of Andalucía extended even to the Archbishop’s 
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 Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05104. 
808
 On 8 May, the priest spoke of “casi nulos ingresos” that did not even allow the parish to financially 
support the sexton who had since tendered his resignation. Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), 
Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05097 (592). 
809
 On 4 May 1935, the priest of San Sebastián (Seville) revealed that his parish still owned 1,315.38 
pesetas in debts dating back to 1934 (which Ilundáin accepted to cover on 5 May). On the eve of the 
rebellion in Seville (17 July 1936), the priest also requested a subsidy of 500 pesetas. Cardinal Ilundáin 
acceded to all requests on 27 November. Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos 
Despachados, Legajo 05097 (592). 
810
 On 10 July, the priest coadjutor of Santa Maria la Blanca - Lorenzo Pérez Fernández - informed the 
Archbishop of Seville that the rectory was in need of urgent repairs (part of it had already collapsed). 
Ilundáin replied that the same day, authorising repair works but instructing the parish to fund it. Three 
days later, the priest wrote back declaring that the parish possessed “recursos […] nulos” and that “La 
Iglesia filia de Santa Maria la Blanca no cuenta con recursos ni ordinarios procedentes de fábrica que son 
nulos y menos extraordinarios que puedan destinarse a la urgente y necesaria reparación de la casa 
habitación del Coadjutor.” He added: “son poco en número los que habitualmente contribuyen y los 
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Library, the Biblioteca Colombina, reliant on donations to expand its book collection.811 On 19 
June, Cardinal Ilundáin refused to provide financial aid to the parish of Sanlúcar la Mayor on 
the grounds that “la situación económica actual solicita Nuestra preocupación para que no 
falte al personal de párrocos y coadjutores el subsidio mensual.”812 A majority of priests 
blamed low levels of religiosity for the precarious economic condition of their parishes. For 
instance, the priest of Santa María (Estepa) denounced the “enorme negligencia de la inmensa 
mayoría de los fieles en aportar medios con suscripciones y limosnas o colectas.”813  
 
Church and civil war in Seville (1936-1939) 
The 18 July 1936 rebellion signalled a radical rupture with the recent past in rebel-controlled 
Spain: anticlericalism evaporated overnight and the Catholic Church was restored to an 
idealised past of medieval glory. A year later (July 1937), General Franco declared to a German 
reporter that:  
“En España no hay problema religioso, pues la totalidad del país es católico, y nuestro 
Episcopado, en general, es ejemplo de virtudes y de apartamiento de las cosas temporales.”814 
 
Nationalist historiography explained the ‘miracle’ of the re-Catholicisation of southern Spain 
with another one: it was the result of a collective catharsis triggered by the legendary capture 
of Seville by General Queipo de Llano and his soldaditos. As a result, local priests saw their 
churches packed with new ‘converts’ for Sunday (and even daily) Mass. However, the reason 
for the sudden revival of Catholicism in rebel-controlled Andalucía appears to be more 
mundane. Religious harmony was achieved by the same method that brought about political 
unity: repression. The fact that the rebels accomplished their objective in such a short space of 
time only confirmed the exceptionally violent nature of the new regime.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
mismos sobre quienes pesa no solo la suscripción de CULTO Y CLERO, sino también todas las demás 
colectas extraordinarios y cultos que son de rigor hacer en la Iglesias de la Archidiocesis.” Archivo 
Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05097 (592).  
811
 “Continuando  agravada y déficit, cada dia mas, la situación económica de nuestra Biblioteca, 
tampoco en estos dos semestres se han podido efectuar trabajos de catalogación, y en los de 
encuadernación.” Archivo Catedral de Sevilla, Archivo Histórico Capitular, Libro de Autos Capitulares, 
nº234, 1931-1938, 3 July 1936. 
812
 Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05097 (592). 
813
 On 17 June, the priest of Sanlúcar la Mayor requested 1,000 pesetas to repair the local church and 
revealed that the parish possessed a mere 150 pesetas and “los feligreses poco dan para el Culto y 
Clero”. On 24 July, the priest of Santa María (Estepa) requested a subsidy to perform urgent repair 
works in the rectory, which was in danger of collapse. Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, 
Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 591.  
814




However, the re-Catholicisation of Seville was only achieved after one last brief, but extremely 
violent, anticlerical explosion. Exactly one month after the outbreak of the rebellion in 
Andalucía, Cardinal Ilundáin dispatched to the Vatican a pessimistic report on anticlerical 
violence in his Dioceses:  
“Emmo. Sr. Cardenal: Con profundo dolor he de manifestar a V.Emna. la condición aflictiva a 
que ha sido reducida esta diócesis de Sevilla por la persecución que los Marxistas han 
declarado en España contra la religión y la Iglesia católica y sus sagrados ministros e 
instituciones. 
Desde el día 18 de Julio en que se inició la guerra civil en España la diócesis de Sevilla ha 
sufrido mucho. Actualmente la máxima parte del territorio amplísimo de la diócesis Hispalense 
está tranquilo; pero los desastres causados y los desmanes perpetrados durante este mes han 
sido innumerables y gravísimos.” 
  
The Archbishop of Seville revealed that thirty religious buildings (nine in the city of Seville) 
were burned and over a hundred sacked and/or damaged (the vast majority of which were 
parish churches). There was also a “sin número” of desecrations, including destroyed religious 
objects and parish archives of incalculable artistic/historic value. Cardinal Ilundáin also 
confirmed the murder of ten priests and two Salesian monks, and speculated that the number 
of assassinations might ascend to twenty.815 In reality, a total of 27 priests and seminarians 
were murdered in his Dioceses; eleven of which (nine priests and two seminarians) in the 
province of Seville, all in pueblos of extremely low religious observance. They were:  
1. Jose Vigil Cabrerizo (chaplain of San Jerónimo in Seville, murdered in Seville on 19 
July).816 
2. Francisco Arias Rivas (priest of Lora del Río, murdered in Lora del Río on 1 August).  
3. Juan Coca y González Saavedra (coadjutor of Lora del Río, murdered in Lora del Río on 
1 August). Both Rivas and Saavedra were insulted and forced to perform menial jobs (such as 
cleaning toilets) during their brief incarceration. Average church attendance rate in Lora del 
Río in 1932: 0.44% (50 regular worshippers out of a total population of 11,373). 
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 Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla, Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126.  
816
 For Cabrerizo’s murder see Chapter IV. 
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4. Pedro Carballo Corrales (priest of Guadalcanal, murdered in Guadalcanal on 6 August). 
Average church attendance rate in Guadalcanal in 1932: 1,33% (100 regular worshippers out of 
a total population of 7,523) 
5. Antonio Jesús Díaz Ramos (ecónomo of Cazalla de la Sierra, murdered in Cazalla de la 
Sierra on 5 August). At 15:00 on 18 July, Ramos was informed of the outbreak of the rebellion 
in Seville by local rightists who also urged the priest to flee the pueblo and take with him the 
statue of the patron saint. However, Ramos believed that political moderation would prevail in 
Cazalla and refused to abandon his parish. His optimism proved unfounded. The priest was 
detained, interrogated and tortured by the local revolutionary committee, who accused Ramos 
of concealing a machine-gun in his church. On 5 August, just as a Nationalist column 
approached the outskirts of Cazalla, the committee decided to release a number of prisoners. 
A second group of detainees, including Ramos and seminarian Enrique Palacios Monraba, was 
selected for execution. Members of the committee returned later to the prison to finish-off 
survivors with hand grenades. The building was set ablaze and anyone who attempted to 
escape shot dead.  
6. Enrique Palacios Monraba (seminarian from Cazalla de la Sierra, murdered in Cazalla 
de la Sierra on 5 August). Average church attendance rate in Cazalla de la Sierra in 1932: 0.55% 
(60 regular worshippers out of a total population of 11,000). 
7. Salvador Lobato Pérez (ecónomo of El Saucejo, murdered in El Saucejo on 21 August). 
Pérez was arrested on 23 July and spared from execution thanks to the timely intervention of 
the Civil Guard. Pérez’s family (mother and brother) was forced to move residence and placed 
under house arrest. On 21 August, the local militia was about to flee El Saucejo (the Nationalist 
army was already in the suburbs of the pueblo) when two enraged women challenged the 
militiamen to murder the priest. The Pérez brothers bid farewell to their mother before being 
taken to their execution. Both men were still breathing when their killers stole their shoes, 
sitting on the victims’ stomachs. The average rate of church attendance in El Saucejo in 1932: 
0.10% (6 regular worshippers out of a total population of 5,990). 
8.  Miguel Borrero Picón (coadjutor of Santa María de Utrera, murdered in Utrera on 26 
July). Picón said Mass on 18 July but was prohibited from holding further religious services in 
Utrera. That same night, the priest went to the town hall to demand the release of several 
prisoners, but was instead detained. Picón continued performing his priestly duties during his 
brief incarceration. On 26 August, just as the Nationalist column approached the outskirts of 
Utrera, a group of militiamen opened the local jail. Picón was the first detainee to step out and 
was immediately shot dead; followed by a massacre of prisoners. Average church attendance 
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rate in the parish of Santa María de Utrera in 1932: 0.83% (100 regular worshippers out of a 
total population of 12,000). 
9. Manuel González-Serna y Rodríguez (priest of Constantina and Archpriest of Cazalla de 
la Sierra, murdered in Constantina on 23 July). Rodríguez was arrested in Constantina on 19 
July. While in prison, the guards demanded that the Archpriest hand over his crucifix, but 
Rodríguez not only refused to comply, but also continued performing his priestly duties. On 23 
July, the Archpriest was dragged to the main square of the pueblo, forced to witness the 
sacking of his church, taken to the sacristy and shot in the mouth and head. The following 
morning, Rodríguez’s body was dumped in the local cemetery.  
10. Manuel Heredia Torres (priest in Jaén, murdered in Constantina on 3 August). 
11.  Juan Heredia Torres (priest in Jaén, murdered in Constantina on 3 August). Average 
church attendance rate in Constantina in 1932: 1.36% (200 regular worshippers out of a total 
population of 14,740).817 
 
As for the female religious orders, many nuns were forced temporarily to renounce their vows, 
“pero ningún daño personal se les causó, y fueron respetadas por los Marxistas”. Moreover, 
thirteen religious buildings were assaulted before the rebels seized full control of the capital of 
Andalucía.818 The brutal state of affairs during the early days of the civil war was summarised 
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by Andrés Nin, leader of the POUM (Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista), in a speech 
delivered at a rally in Barcelona on 6 September 1936: “El problema de la Iglesia ya sabéis 
cómo se ha resuelto: no queda ni una iglesia en toda España.”819 
 
The number of anticlerical incidents confirmed that hatred of the Catholic Church ran deep 
among significant segments of the local population, a fact openly recognised by Cardinal 
Ilundáin.820 His position was subsequently revised by the new Archbishop of Seville, Cardinal 
Pedro Segura who was appointed following the death of Ilundáin and took up the post on 12 
October 1937.821 In 1938, Segura made the remarkable declaration that, despite the 
domination of the Republican political arena by anticlericals, “la mayor y más sana parte del 
pueblo se conservaba firmemente adherida a la santa fe católica, apostólica y romana”.822  
Clearly, Segura’s declaration was meaningful only as a piece of delusional propaganda or as a 
reflection of the success of the terror in stimulating religious practice, real or simulated. 
 
The brutal murder of eleven priests in the province of Seville listed in Ilundaín’s report to the 
Vatican, had been successfully exploited by Nationalist propaganda to promote tales of “nuns 
exposed naked in the shop windows, and afterwards forced to run naked through streets lined 
on both sides by the Red militia, who spat insults at them and stoned them. Other refugees 
told of priests who, still living, had had their stomachs cut open and filled with quick-lime.”823  
Most of the stories were promoted by General Queipo de Llano. Arthur Koestler listened to 
one of the general’s charlas where, “For some ten minutes he described in a steady flood of 
words, which now and then became extremely racy, how the Marxists slit open the stomachs 
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of pregnant women and speared the foetuses; how they had tied two eight-year-old girls on 
their father’s knees, violated them, poured petrol on them and set them on fire. This went on 
and on, unceasingly, one story following another – a perfect clinical demonstration in sexual 
psychopathology.”824 However, Ilundáin’s report confirmed that violence against the Catholic 
Church was primarily directed against its property. Still, a number of priests were saved in 
extremis and their stories would later form the backbone of (yet) another Nationalist myth 
aimed at justifying repression: that the rapid conquest of the province of Seville frustrated 
Republican plans to exterminate the personnel as well as the property of the Catholic 
Church.825 
 
The Catholic Church, a full member of the Pact of blood  
The military rebels exploited anticlerical violence to consolidate the nascent Nationalist 
alliance, the Pact of blood, in the same way as the CEDA had previously capitalised on the 
victimisation of the Church to win the 1933 general elections. However, the incorporation of 
the Catholic Church into the Pact of blood was not immediate. General Queipo de Llano first 
approached the Church hierarchy nearly a month after the rebellion (8 August) by issuing an 
edict creating the Junta Conservadora del Tesoro Artístico. However, Cardinal Ilundáin 
remained deeply suspicious of the rebel general (in particular his past Republicanism) and did 
not to pay him a visit until mid-August.826 On paper, the official objective of the Junta was the 
preservation/restoration of all buildings of artistic/historical value either damaged or 
destroyed by the “turbas”. However, its real raison d’être was twofold: a) to provide material 
assistance to the Catholic Church in the hope of obtaining the latter’s support so to b) exploit 
antireligious violence for its own political benefit. The Junta’s ‘philanthropic’ work spawned 
two propaganda books (published in 1936 and 1937) on anticlericalism in Seville (volume I: 
capital; volume II: province) translated into English, French, German and Italian. Their objective 
was clearly outlined in the preface to the second volume: “la necesidad de mostrar al mundo 
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hasta qué extremo llega el afán de anular el nombre de España […] por parte de esos 
degenerados”. The English version read:  
“The artistic treasures in the Province of Seville have suffered heavy losses during the 
communistic revolution. The red mob, in its eagerness to destroy whatever stood for religious 
principles, and historical and traditional sentiments, inflicted a heavy damage upon European 
culture.”827  
 
Under pressure from the rebel authorities, and perhaps brainwashed by their propaganda, the 
Archbishop of Seville soon publicised his support for the insurgent cause in the first post-coup 
issue of the Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico del Arzobispado de Sevilla (8 September 1936).828 
Ilundáin’s statement came two days after the Primate of Spain, Cardinal Gomá, announced his 
support for the rebellion in a pastoral letter addressed to Basque Catholics.829 A year later, the 
Archbishop of Seville used the first anniversary of the civil war to bless the rebellion, 
regurgitating a series of Nationalist myths in the process:  
“En el aniversario del Movimiento Nacional para la liberación de España de la anarquía, 
situación en la que se veía sumida, el gravísimo peligro del comunismo y del inminente riesgo 
de completa ruina de todos los valores éticos, religiosos y sociales fundamentales de nuestra 
Patria, debemos los corazones cristianos elevar a Dios fervorosas acciones de gracias por la 
visible y extraordinaria Providencia que ha otorgado a los heroicos esfuerzos del Ejército y de 
Pueblo español, realizados en la defensa de nuestra Patria, para salvar con ellos los bienes de 
la civilización cristiana y procurar el engrandecimiento de España, que es, suma, lo que en la 
presente contienda se pretende conseguir, pues por Dios y por la Patria fue promovida. 
Procuremos hacernos dignos de que Dios, en cuya omnipotentes manos está el porvenir de las 
Naciones, continúe amparándonos y bendiciéndonos hasta obtener el triunfo de los ideales 
supremos de Dios y Patria, Religión y orden, Justicia y paz social, conservación y florecimiento 
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de nuestra civilización cristiana y española, convivencia cordial de la Iglesia católica y el 
Estado.”830 
 
The Catholic Church was soon making itself felt both as a political and a social force. The rebel 
military leadership welcomed this development, for it was in desperate need of the 
collaboration of the myriad of competing anti-Republican forces in the Nationalist zone, whose 
sole common denominator was their Catholicism. This was a mutually beneficial alliance. On 
the one hand, the Church hierarchy regained its long-lost cultural hegemony; while on the 
other, the Nationalists obtained the allegiance of Catholics both in Spain and abroad and an 
ideological structure that legitimised the rebellion.831 As a result, the boundary between 
Church and state became increasingly (and dangerously) blurred.832 For instance, the Town 
Hall of Huelva wrote to General Franco on 23 November 1937, requesting a military decoration 
(Medalla Militar de Sufrimientos por la Patria) for the Archbishop of Seville.833 Already on 13 
August 1936, the Nationalist mayor of Casariche (Seville) informed Cardinal Ilundáin that both 
the Town Hall and the Falange “han creído oportuno iniciar una campaña de resurgimiento de 
nuestras tradicionales costumbres cristianas”, and for that same reason requested 
authorisation to organise an open-air Mass at the Plaza Primo de Rivera on 15 August.834 Nine 
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days later (26 August), the Falange of Espartinas (Seville) asked permission to transfer the 
Vírgen de Loreto to its sanctuary on 8 September. The request was accepted and the 
procession followed by an open-air Mass attended by the Falange, Civil Guard, Aviation Corps, 
and residents from both Espartinas and a number of nearby villages.835 The rebel army also 
cultivated close relations with the Church. On 10 March 1938, the Archpriest of Écija (Seville) 
informed the Dioceses that the local garrison had received regular visits by Catholic clergy 
since 18 July 1936. The priest of Alcalá de Guadaira also reported that all military forces 
stationed in the pueblo attended Sunday Mass.836 That same year (1938), all newspapers in 
Huelva voluntarily submitted themselves to “censura eclesiástica”.837 As a gesture of gratitude, 
the Church hierarchy used religious services to ‘sanctify’ the rebellion. On 24 October 1936, 
the mayor of Villalba del Alcor (Huelva) requested permission to celebrate an open air Mass in 
the main square of the pueblo, scheduled to take place immediately after the much-
anticipated capture of Madrid by the Nationalists. The usually cautious Ilundáin 
enthusiastically accepted the petition.838 
 
The Catholic hierarchy also blessed the other members of the Pact of blood. On 19 November 
1938, Cardinal Segura accepted a request from the Falange to hold a special Mass at the 
Cathedral of Seville in memory of its late leader José Antonio Primo de Rivera.839 The long-term 
consequences of this policy proved disastrous. For the moment, however, the Catholic 
hierarchy basked in glory. The Pact of blood revolutionised the role of the Church in Nationalist 
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Spain, metamorphosing it from the marginalised institution it had been under the Republic 
into a key socio-political actor once more. For instance, membership of a religious 
Brotherhood became a position of immense social prestige (and political power). By 1938, the 
usual troubles in finding devout Catholics to form confessional associations in an 
overwhelmingly irreligious society had miraculously disappeared. All thirty-seven files 
concerning membership of religious Brotherhoods in Seville were approved by Cardinal Segura 
(all high-ranking affiliates were regular churchgoers and received Communion during both Lent 
and Easter). Moreover, a considerable number of Hermanos Mayores were also members of 
the Nationalist military leadership. For instance, Queipo’s eminence grise, Major José Cuesta 
Monereo was elected Censor 2º of the Hermandad y Cofradía de Nazarenos de nuestro padre 
Jesús del Gran Poder.840   
 
Friction within the Pact of blood     
The relationship Church-State was an uneven one from its inception. General Mola excluded 
the Catholic hierarchy from the conspiracy and the latter’s subsequent inclusion into the rebel 
coalition took place only after the insurgent leadership came to appreciate the benefits it 
could extract from such a partnership. As a junior member of the coalition, the Church would 
always have to submit to the new regime, which it did. On several occasions, however, the 
relationship turned sour. This tended to occur whenever one of the parties encroached into 
the other’s sphere of influence. In Seville, tensions flared-up on 3 February 1938, when the 
Archbishop of Seville received a letter notifying him of the call-up for military service of priests 
Manuel Perea Villegas, José Rincón Perea, Luciano Fernández Barba, Domingo Fernández 
Muñoz, Salvador Díaz Luque and Francisco Cruces Martín. Cardinal Segura wrote a caustic 
reply on 10 February. He declared that he could not find any substitutes for three of the 
priests, for which reason they were instructed to ignore the order “mientras no reciban orden 
expresa suya”. Segura’s reply amounted to treason; nevertheless, the Archbishop of Seville 
concluded his letter with a veiled threat: he warned the military of the importance of 
maintaining harmony between the different factions of the coalition.841  
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The most acerbic relationship was that between Church and Falange, both of whom vied for 
control over the cultural sphere in Nationalist Spain. Ironically, both institutions had enjoyed 
only residual support in Republican Seville. Conflict was inevitable. As early as 1 September 
1936, the newspaper FE refuted accusations that the Falange was a laic organisation.842 A year 
later (27 October 1937), the newspaper clarified the party’s position:  
“No se debe confundir el interés clerical, o eclesiástico, con el interés católico que se funde 
con el interés nacional. Los prelados no deben olvidar jamás que además de obispos católicos 
son prelados ciudadanos cuya colaboración leal al engrandecimiento de la Patria, amén de un 
deber, es seguir la tradición de obispos, como Gelmírez, Mendonza o Cisneros.”843 
 
In other words, the Falange supported the establishment of a confessional state where the 
Church would be subordinate to the government; whereas the Catholic hierarchy yearned for a 
return to a medieval theocracy. Both world views were totalitarian and mutually-exclusive, 
leading to an inevitable ideological clash.844 On 20 February 1937, Cardinal Ilundáin wrote a 
protest letter addressed to the Falange of Cádiz denouncing “vejámes y persecuciones que le 
vienen haciendo objeto elementos de la Falange” against the priest of Trebujena (Cádiz). 
Tensions erupted after party militants decided to pin Falangist newspapers on the walls of the 
parish church. The parish priest, a known Carlist sympathiser, demanded their immediate 
removal. The Falange replied by initiating a slander campaign against the priest and covering 
the walls of both the parish church and the rectory with fascist slogans painted in tar. The 
Subjefe provincial de Falange also warned the local residents: “si alguno lo quitaba le pegaba 
un tiro”.845  
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The most serious confrontation occurred in the villages of El Cerro de Andévalo and Calañas, 
after the Falange attempted to solve an identity crisis triggered by its forced fusion with the 
Carlist Party by means of expansion. On 29 April 1937, the exasperated Jefe Local of Cerro de 
Andévalo and Jefe Provincial of Huelva wrote a joint formal complaint addressed to the 
Dioceses of Seville.846 According to the Falange, all attempts to establish a Sección Femenina in 
the pueblo were met with the “resistencia tenaz” of chaplain Nicasio Blanco, who accused the 
party of “falta de catolicismo”. Blanco was equally anxious at the “pérdida de moral y dignidad 
de todas las jóvenes que pertenecen a la Sección Femenina”, and prohibited local Catholics 
from joining the organisation. Conversely, the Falange blamed the priest of the adjacent 
pueblo of Calañas, José Gonzalez Marin, of both “materialismo” and influencing Blanco. 
Indeed, the relationship between the parish priest and the Falange of Calañas was equally 
strained ever since Marin decided to flex his political muscles by refusing to baptise twenty 
orphans sponsored by the party. The Falange made several attempts at mediation, all of which 
failed. On one such occasion, a Sección Femenina delegate visited chaplain Blanco to attempt 
to persuade him of her religiosity only to be insulted and told that female Falangists “no eran 
católicas ni tenían moralidad”. The chaplain also threatened to complain directly to General 
Franco.847  
 
The Falange did eventually establish a Sección Femenina in El Cerro de Andévalo, but only 
managed to enrol nine members. Blanco sabotaged all expansion efforts: the chaplain not only 
expelled all female Falangists from the Hijas de María, but also threatened local females 
employed by the parish with job loss should they join the Falange. The chaplain was clearly in 
no mood for compromise. On 11 May, he delivered a scathing report to Cardinal Ilundáin, 
where he accused the Falange of stirring tensions with both the Catholic Church and the Carlist 
Party and of encouraging immoral behaviour in his pueblo. However, what angered both the 
                                                          
846
The 19 April 1937 Decree of Unification signalled the start of the slow ideological agony of the 
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chaplain and the Archbishop of Seville most were successive Falangist attempts at asserting 
the superiority of the party vis-à-vis the Catholic Church. For instance, the Jefe Local stated 
that the local patron saint was a Falangist and that attendance at Sunday Mass should not be 
regarded as compulsory. In his report of 21 April, the Jefe Local also reached the intriguing 
conclusion that the confrontation: “parece indicar la existencia de una incompatibilidade entre 
el Catolicismo y Falange.”848  
 
Similar incidents continued to destabilise the rebel coalition. A year later (May 1938), Cardinal 
Segura prohibited the Hermandad de la Soledad de San Buenaventura from adding the 
Falangist symbol to its membership cards.849 The Segura-Falange feud climaxed in 1940, when 
a group of Falangists painted the party’s symbol, the words “JOSE ANTONIO”, and the names 
of Falangist war dead in the walls of the archbishop’s palace. Ultimately, the Catholic Church 
emerged victorious from this particular confrontation and conflict between Segura and the 
Franco regime would continue until his death in 1957.850  
 
Rationalising Anticlericalism 
On 3 January 1937, the private secretary of the Bishop of Salamanca, José María Bulart y 
Ferrandiz, Franco’s chaplain, requested from the Dioceses of Seville a report containing 
“elementos destinados a propaganda[…] relativos a la Cruzada Nacional contra el comunismo, 
que se está librando en nuestra España”.851 The original request came directly from the Cuartel 
del Generalíssimo. In other words, General Franco was seeking to exploit the murder of priests 
to reinforce the casus belli for the rebellion. The Church hierarchy acquiesced and seized the 
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opportunity to rewrite History. Later that year, a Nationalist study on antireligious violence in 
the Dioceses of Seville reached the bizarre conclusion that:  
“Sólo son veintisiete las víctimas hispalenses entre sacerdotes seculares y seminaristas; la 
rápidez del glorioso Ejército salvador en ocupar la región no permitió al feroz marxismo llevar 
más adelante entre nosotros la espantosa consigna: aniquilar totalmente a los ministros del 
Evangelio.”852  
 
According to this rationale, the July rebellion forestalled Republican plans to exterminate the 
Catholic Church in Andalucía. The Catholic hierarchy enthusiastically accepted rebel 
propaganda as fact and brushed aside the embarrassing conclusions of the 1928-1932 census. 
Hence, what was a collective manifestation of hatred towards the Church had now become, 
according to Cardinal Segura, a “cruel e inaudita persecución judío-masónica”.853 
 
Furthermore, the Catholic Church laboured tirelessly to transform propaganda into official 
History. The Catholic hierarchy organised commemorative funerals for its martyrs, climaxing in 
a series of religious services held at the Cathedral of Seville between 27 and 30 January 
1938.854 All ceremonies were attended by high-ranking religious and political authorities, as 
well as the families of murdered priests and seminarians.  On 28 January, Cardinal Segura 
addressed the overcrowded Cathedral of Seville: “Que uno de los motivos principales de la 
revolución contra España ha sido el odio contra la fe católica es un hecho indiscutible y, hoy, 
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documentalmente probado. Se odiaba a España, precisamente porque era la nación católica 
pro excelencia.” 855  
 
The Archbishop of Seville formally blamed a mysterious international alliance against the 
Catholic Church (“impiedad internacional”) for the “decadencia” of the Patria. Lastly, Cardinal 
Segura delighted his audience when he regurgitated Nationalist propaganda and affirmed that 
the ‘Communist revolution’ had in fact erupted on the very moment that the II Republic was 
proclaimed in April 1931.856  There was a strong element of retaliation in Segura’s 
inflammatory speech for the Republic’s decision to exile him in 1931. 
 
The ‘miracle’ of Seville   art    
On 10 January 1938, the Mayor of Algamitas wrote the following letter to the Archbishop of 
Seville:  
“Reverendísimo Señor 
Los vecinos de esta villa, fervientes cristianos y entusiastas creyentes en su Santo Patrón de 
este pueblo el Dulce nombre de Jesús, celebran anualmente la tradicional fiesta del mismo, y 
este año tienen proyectada de acuerdo con estas autoridades celebrarla con el mayor 
esplendor posible en agradecimiento del amparo protector y fé que tienen en el Santo que 
velo porque los hijos de esta población salgan victorioso y salvo de la contienda que se 
desarrolla en nuestra Nación como cruzada contra las hordas salvajes que intentaron destruir a 
nuestra Patria, a nuestra Religión, a nuestras tradiciones, a la familia y a la Sociedad honrada. 
Tiene ofrecido en homenaje al Santo Patrón, con asistencias del mayor número de 
combatientes de este pueblo y por este motivo, a instancia de los vecinos de esta me permito 
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249 
 
rogarle a V. Reverendísima Ilma, tenga a bien cooperar con su valiosa ayuda cerca de las 
Autoridades Militares que seguramente lo verán con agrado, para conseguir puedan asistir a 
tan simpática fiesta en honor del Patrón de Algamitas el mayor número de combatientes hijos 
de esta, a cuyo efectos tengo el honor de acompañarle listas de los mismos.”857 
 
The sudden re-Catholicisation of Algamitas amounted to nothing short of a miracle. The parish 
priest had reported in 1932 that there were no regular churchgoers in the pueblo. 
Furthermore, the local church had been assaulted twice before the Nationalists captured 
Algamitas. On 12 May 1936, the ecónomo of Vilanueva de San Juan (Seville) wrote to Cardinal 
Ilundáin enquiring whether he should continue holding religious services in Algamitas after 
receiving a letter containing “insultos y palabras groseras para el sacerdocio y de 
considerarnos culpables de los males que sufre nuestra Patria, me dice si vuelvo más por el 
pueblo, donde me encuentro y que si no ha hecho ya, es porque quiere que sepa por qué me 
mata”. The Archbishop of Seville took the death threats seriously and on 16 May allowed the 
priest to suspend all religious services in the pueblo.858 The case of Algamitas was by no means 
exceptional. In 1932 in the province of Seville, there were no regular worshippers in La Algaba, 
Almaden de la Plata, Bormujos, El Madroño, Mairena del Aljarafe, Martin de la Jara, La 
Muela/Coripe, Navas de la Concepcion, Palomares and San Nicolás del Puerto. Moreover, both 
Guillena and Santiponce possessed a single regular churchgoer. Catholicism was also on the 
verge of extinction in many other localities.859  
 
Astonishingly, by 1938 the residents of Algamitas were all “fervientes cristianos y entusiastas 
creyentes” that no longer perceived the clergy as “culpables de los males que sufre nuestra 
Patria” and enthusiastically endorsed the “cruzada contra las hordas salvajes”. A similar 
process occurred in other pueblos in the province of Seville. In 1932, average church 
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attendance in Constantina and Morón de la Frontera stood at 1.36% and 1.12% respectively. 
By October 1936, the ecónomo of Constantina was so overwhelmed by the flood of new 
converts that he wrote to Cardinal Ilundáin requesting permission to hold extra religious 
services in the pueblo.860 In Morón de la Frontera, the ecónomo of the parish of San Miguel 
also requested permission (10 November) to hold an open-air Mass “por ser insuficiente los 
templos que existen para contener a las multitudes”.861 This represented a social shift of 
miraculous proportions in a province where in 1932 the most faithful pueblo, Estepa, 
possessed an average Sunday Mass attendance rate of 6.35%. 
 
Apparent religious fervour also infected the adjacent province of Huelva. For instance, the 
former “coto cerrado del marxismo y del ateísmo” of Nerva (Huelva) was by 1938 “desechando 
rápidamente tan nefastos errores y recuperando su amor a Dios Nuestro Señor y a su Iglesia”. 
The Catholic Church had apparently succeeded in (re)converting one of the most anticlerical 
regions of Spain: the mining district of Huelva. In March of that same year, the local Town Hall 
unanimously approved the placing of an image of the Sacred Heart of Jesus in the city hall. The 
ceremony (13 March 1938) served as a collective reaffirmation of political unity and was 
attended by the entire Comisión Gestora, the local Military Commander, the municipal judge, 
the leadership of the FET de las JONS and the representatives of several other influential 
organisations (including Catholic associations). The Falange formed a guard of honour and the 
city hall was flooded with local residents who prayed “fervientes preces por los caídos y por el 
pronto triunfo de nuestra Cruzada, entonaron sinceros Vivas a Cristo Rey”.862  
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The Catholic hierarchy presented the explosion in religiosity as a collective catharsis triggered 
by the July 1936 rebellion; however, General Queipo’s former Delegado de Prensa y 
Propaganda provided a more rational explanation for the sudden resurgence of Catholicism in 
rebel-controlled Andalucía:  
“Si el viajero recorre Sevilla, verá el terror, la desolación y el luto, en lo que fueron alegres y 
típicos barrios de Triana y La Macarena. Si es creyente, por poco psicólogo que sea, en las 
iglesias atestadas de fieles, se dará perfecta cuenta que el fervor religioso, demasiado unánime 
para ser sentido, es un marchamo necesario para poder vivir.”863 
 
The education system 
The Nationalist leadership rewarded the Catholic hierarchy for its political loyalty by allowing 
the Church to regain its monopoly over the education system. The Catholic Church swiftly 
resumed its project to re-Catholicise Seville via the indoctrination of the local youth. On 11 
October 1937, the Comisión Gestora Local de Primera Enseñanza of Seville reached the 
following agreement:  
“La Gestora acordó interesar de los Sres. Maestros y Maestras Nacionales procuren por todos 
los medios la asistencia colectiva de los alumnos de sus respectivas escuelas a la Santa Misa, 
todos los domingos y fiestas de precepto y que se dedique la última hora de la tarde, todos los 
sábados laborables al rezo también colectivamente del Santo Rosario y a cantos patrióticos de 
los que más contribuyan a la formación de los alumnos en estos aspectos e Himnos de igual 
carácter.”864 
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In short, the local government functioned as the enforcer of the Church’s educational policy.865 
Already on 6 March 1937, the Comisión released a Circular letter instructing all schools to 
implement an extra hour of religious classes during the “semana pró-santificación de las 
Fiestas”. The directive also ordered the distribution of propaganda among schoolchildren that 
read: “NO SE PUEDE SER BUEN PATRIOTA, si no se es buen católico” and “OBEDECE A LA 
IGLESIA”.866 The Comisión led by example by acceding to all of Cardinal Ilundáin’s many 
requests. For instance, on 22 May 1937 the Archbishop of Seville presented the following 
petition:  
“Deseándonos celebrar el Domingo 30 de Mayo un día de oración con los niños de la Ciudad 
por el triunfo de las armas españolas contra los enemigos de la Religión y de la Patria; y 
conociendo los nobilísimos sentimientos de esa Comisión Gestora de 1ª. Enseñanza que V. tan 
dignamente preside espero, y a si se lo suplico, su decidida cooperación para que dando las 
oportunas instrucciones los niños de las escuelas nacionales asistan a la hora santa mariana a 
las siete y media de la tarde en S.I. Catedral el Domingo 30 Mayo.”  
 
The proposal was endorsed two days later. The Comisión made arrangements for all primary 
schools to visit the Cathedral of Seville between the hours of 11:30-14:30, culminating in a 
grand ceremony scheduled for 19:30 of 20 May 1937 attended by all schoolchildren in Seville. 
As expected, the brainwashed students prayed fervently “por el triunfo de las armas españolas 
contra los enemigos de la Religión y de la Patria”.867  
 
Despite the huge investment in the education system on the part of the Catholic hierarchy, 
piety only increased modestly in Seville. On 13 May 1938, the priest of San Bartolomé y San 
Esteban (Sunday Mass attendance rate of 0.52% in 1932) reported that the number of people 
regularly taking Communion had increased by 500% from the previous year; however, only 
12% of parishioners attended Mass on feast days (8% Easter Sunday attendance rate). 
Regarding the number of people accepting last rites, the parish priest acknowledged the 
existence of “grandes resistencias por parte de las familias de deficiente formación”. The priest 
nevertheless remained sanguine as he reported an overall increase in the number of young 
people attending Mass; an optimism justified by the Church’s absolute monopoly over the 
education system. All schools in San Bartolomé y San Esteban were visited by the priest on a 
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weekly basis. Acción Católica was also active in the parish.868 Furthermore, on 12 May 1938 the 
priest of the former leftist bastion of San Bernardo (church attendance rate of 1.25% in 1932) 
reported that only 20% of parishioners received Communion at Easter and 30% accepted last 
rites (with another 30% “rehusándolos explícitamente”). Still, all schools promoted religious 
education and a multitude of confessional organisations operated in the parish: “En la 
Parroquia se han erigido: Acción Catolica Femenina; Marias Sagrario; Juventud Catolica 
Femenina; Corte Eucaristica; y Conferencias de San Vicente Paul tanto de Señoras como de 
Caballeros.” Indeed, Catholic associations were at the vanguard of the battle for the re-
Catholicisation of Seville. The Damas Catequistas attempted to eradicate “matrimonios civiles” 
that “van desapareciendo” in the working-class neighbourhoods of Amate and Cerro del 
Águila. Also, confessional organisations opened several night-schools to provide basic religious 
education to the local poor. A number of conversions occurred under the threat of violence: 
the euphoric priest of San Bernardo reported that two former masons had publicly recanted 
and embraced the Catholic faith during Easter.869 As it lost the battle to (re)convert Seville, the 




Repression and financial aid initially palliated but ultimately failed to solve the deep economic 
crisis that threatened the very survival of the Dioceses of Seville. Indeed, the spectacular re-
Catholicisation of Seville during the early months of the rebellion temporarily masked the 
structural problems affecting the Catholic Church. By 1937, religious fervour had all but 
evaporated. As a result, the Church’s fundraising capacity returned to normality. For instance, 
the Día de la Buena Prensa of 29 July 1937 only managed to raise 10,336.75 pesetas in the 
Dioceses of Seville; a slight increase from the 9,586.69 pesetas collected in 1936.870 A few days 
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later (2 August), the Dioceses acknowledged a worrying “escasez de medios económicos.”871 
To make matters worse, a flood of urgent requests for material support from parishes that had 
suffered anticlerical attacks in 1936 further strained the already fragile financial health of the 
Dioceses. For instance, the Church of San Juan de Palma in Seville suffered an estimated 
150,000 pesetas worth of damage as a result of its sacking by an anticlerical crowd on 18 July 
1936.872 Consequently, the Archbishop of Seville was regularly forced to turn to the Junta de 
Cultura Histórica y del Tesoro Artístico for financial help.873 By 1938, the Catholic Church was 
on the brink of economic collapse.874 On 9 January 1938, the priest of San Vicente Mártir 
reported that “ha quedado suprimida la Escuela Parroquial por no existir medios economicos 
para ella” since 1 October of the previous year.875 The same priest wrote again on three 
different occasions, petitioning an urgent subsidy of 650 pesetas to perform repair works in 
the sexton’s house.876 A few weeks later (20 January), the priest of Santa Cruz requested a 
grant of 10,000 pesetas to renovate the local church; while the Santa Clara Convent (Seville) 
reported an “enorme deuda de más de veinte mil pesetas” and asked (1 October) permission 
to sell a XVII-Century gold rosary for the sum of 7,000 pesetas.877 The parish of San Bernardo 
was also in need of urgent funding to restore both its church and rectory and applied for a 
subsidy of 30,000 pesetas.878 Finally, on 27 April 1938, a distressed Cardinal Segura forwarded 
a report to the president of the Asociación Sevillana de Caridad that listed all the convents in 
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Seville in need of urgent financial aid. The shocking report concluded that 361 nuns were living 
in abject poverty in the capital of Andalucía.879 
 
The re-apostasy of the masses  
Despite emerging victorious from the ruins of a fratricidal civil war as a member of the Pact of 
blood, the Church ultimately failed to re-Catholicise Andalucía. By the early 1950s, Cardinal 
Segura was deeply frustrated by the prevalence of high-level of religious apathy in his 
Dioceses.880 A decade later, only 13% of the population of the province of Seville were regular 
churchgoers; a sharp increase from a 1.44% average in 1928-32, but nevertheless a bitter 
defeat for an institution that was handed an absolute monopoly over the cultural sphere and 
operated under the aegis of a confessional dictatorship.881 Above all, it contradicted the 
Catholic hierarchy’s claim that the Church was the highest representative of Spanish identity. 
 
Relapse into apostasy started as early as 1937, when Cardinal Segura publicly lamented the 
chronic lack of seminarians in his Dioceses.882 In truth, the reasons for the failure of the 
Church’s proselytizing campaign were twofold: firstly, because evangelism was based on 
coercion; and secondly, because the Catholic hierarchy rejected all calls for doctrinal reform 
and political moderation. In fact, the Church interpreted Nationalist victory in the civil war as a 
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sign of divine endorsement of its Integrist theology. For instance, the parish priest of Cazalla de 
la Sierra, Remigio Vilariño, claimed that the civil war was a form of divine retribution for the 
“apostasy of the masses”. On 8 December 1937, Vilariño wrote:  
“LO PRIMERO en el mundo es la Iglesia, el altar, el sacrificio. Sin esto no puede haber religión. 
Sin religión no puede haber moral. Sin moral no puede haber sociedad. Sin iglesias no puede 
haber nada bueno sólido. […]Si queréis evitar catástrofes como las que hemos sufrido y 
mayores; si queréis no volver a ver esos demonios y esas denias, esas patuleas inmundas de 
canallas, que de repente aparecieron entre nosotros formando esa infernal cabalgata del 
Frente Popular, tenéis que edificar iglesias.”883  
 
Moreover, shortly after the outbreak of the rebellion, Catholics distributed flyers in Seville’s 
city-centre that read: 
“Respuesta de muchos 
- Nunca he ido a Misa el día festivo. 
- Pues por eso ha ocurrido esta tragedia que todos padecemos, porque han sido muchos 
los que, como tú, no se han preocupado de cumplir ese mandamiento de Dios. 
Y si tu deseo es que todos rectifiquen… 
¿Por qué no comienzas por rectificar tú? 
¡Santifica el Día del Señor!”884 
 
In other words, the Catholic Church persisted in following the exact same policy that provoked 
the “apostasy of the masses”; a recipe for disaster. Predictably, the strategy failed again 
following a brief interregnum of artificial religiosity in 1936. In despair, the Spanish Church 
retreated into medieval orthodoxy. As late as 1938, the Seminary of Seville still practised 
corporal punishment.885 Also, Cardinal Segura was obsessed with the minuscule Protestant 
community in Seville, while at the same time ignoring the humanitarian catastrophe that 
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afflicted one in every five inhabitants of the capital of Andalucía.886 Catholic relief 
organisations also focused on strict adherence to orthodoxy: the Apostolado de Enfermos del 
Sagrado Corazón harassed the dying in the working-class districts of Seville to ensure that all 
received last rites. The polemic nature of the Apostolado’s work eventually led to the murder 
of its leader, Rafael Galán Escalante, “vilmente asesinado por los marxistas”.887 Moreover, the 
chaplain of Seville’s Provincial Prison laboured tirelessly to ensure that no mother would 
abandon jail without first baptising her children.888 In March 1938, the priest reported that all 
955 inmates received Easter Communion in an overcrowded prison designed to accommodate 
a maximum of 400 inmates.889 At the same time as it desperately attempted to re-evangelise 
the local population through forced penitence, the Catholic leadership, according to Antonio 
Bahamonde, “Han abierto un abismo, imposible de franquear, entre el clero y el pueblo”.890  
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The Archbishop of Seville showed little, if any, interest in bridging the ‘abyss’ separating the 
Church from its parishioners. Worse, the Church’s ideological retreat into medieval dogmatism 
extended to politics, with the Catholic hierarchy espousing an inquisitorial policy towards the 
Republican defeated, rejecting forgiveness and sanctioning forced penitence. The Integrists’ 
apocalyptic interpretation of the civil war exasperated Catholic moderates, who believed that 
the Church should function as a mediator to help bring about a diplomatic conclusion to the 
civil war.891 On 28 January 1938, Cardinal Segura rejected all attempts at reconciliation in a 
violent sermon delivered at the packed Cathedral of Seville: “no es espíritu cristiano el espíritu 
de los que hoy se compadecen del tirano”.892 Segura was backed by the Primate of Spain, 
Cardinal Gomá, who not only worked frantically to have Franco recognised by the Vatican, but 
also dismissed a peaceful resolution to the conflict at the Budapest Congreso Eucarístico of 
May 1938.893 Hence, both former and current Primate of Spain joined forces to ensure that the 
civil war concluded with the annihilation of the Republic.  
 
As the main cultural institution in Nationalist Spain, the Church sanctified an unholy trinity of 
falsities to support the rebels’ bizarre concept of jus ad bellum: a) the myth of the impending 
Communist coup, b) the legend of General Queipo de Llano and his soldaditos, and c) the tale 
of the miraculous re-Catholicisation of Andalucía. At the same time as the Catholic Church 
legitimised the casus belli for the rebellion, it simultaneously de-legitimised its claim that it 
was the highest representative of Spanish identity, cementing its status as a polarising political 
(and not religious) institution. 
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The coup d’état that both shaped and traumatised contemporary Spain represented the 
violent culmination of the combined efforts of the reactionary anti-democratic forces in 
Spanish political society to destroy the II Republic. Indeed, on the very same day of the 
electoral victory of the Popular Front (16 February 1936), CEDA leader José María Gil Robles 
and the would-be head of the Nationalist faction, General Franco, jointly orchestrated a 
botched coup de main.894 The government resisted; however, the failure of Gil Robles’ tactic to 
dismantle the Republic via the ballot box opened a political void filled by both the extreme-
right – the fascist Falange and the theocratic Carlist Party - and the Africanistas, a reactionary 
military caste brutalised by Spain’s colonial war in Morocco of 1920-27. Unsurprisingly, the 
Director of this politically heterogeneous alliance, General Emilio Mola Vidal, was an 
Africanista. Both groups ensured that the demise of democracy in Spain would conclude amid 
a torrent of blood.  
 
The fragmented Rebel coalition lacked a clear political project, which was compensated by a 
very precise modus operandi. In his First Secret Instruction released in April 1936, General 
Mola stated that “la acción ha de ser en extremo violenta” and called for “castigos ejemplares 
[…] para estrangular los movimientos de rebeldía o huelgas.”895 Mola also established two of 
the founding pillars of Francoism: justicia al revés (“reverse justice”) and the Pacto de Sangre 
(Pact of Blood), the process by which all segments of society were coerced into collaborating in 
the forging of the new state, outlined in his Secret Instruction nº 5 of 20 June, in which the 
Director abolished the concept of neutrality.896 The uprising was to be modelled on the 
Moroccan war: a fight to the death that would conclude, in Mola’s own words, with “el 
exterminio absoluto y total del vencido.”897  
 
It was precisely with this ultimate objective in mind – the “extermination” of the Republic – 
that General Mola handpicked the pathologically violent and military inept Inspector-General 
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of Border Guards, General Queipo de Llano, to govern Seville, the capital and largest city of the 
vast southern region of Andalucía. Queipo de Llano’s military career was marked by 
egocentrism, intellectual shortcomings, several failed military plots and, above all, violence. 
Moreover, his equally tortuous political career, from Monarchism to Republicanism to anti-
Republicanism, revealed that the general was a cynic focused exclusively on his own self-
advancement.898 Aware of all this, the sagacious Mola decided to restrain Queipo by placing 
him nominally in command of an uprising that had already been organised by Major Cuesta 
Monereo.899  
 
The coup d’état of 18 July 1936 in Seville was immediately hijacked by Nationalist propaganda, 
which metamorphosed History into a trilogy of myths that formed the so-called ‘Miracle of 
Seville’, an edifice of lies erected to legitimise the rebellion.900 The first tale, the Legend of 
Queipo de Llano, was symbolically charged: Queipo claimed that at 13:45 on 18 July only 
himself, his aide-de-camp and Major Cuesta Monereo had mutinied in the capital of Andalucía. 
The general added that a mere fifteen minutes later he had single-handedly arrested two 
generals, two colonels, one lieutenant-colonel and two majors. According to Rebel 
propaganda, the cowardice demonstrated by both General Villa-Abrille and Colonel Allanegui 
was symbolic of the wider cowardice of the Republic. The stage was set for a military victory of 
‘miraculous’ proportions: Seville, a political stronghold of the Popular Front, was captured by a 
tiny group of patriotic army officers.901 At the same time, the insurgents failed to clarify why 
the meticulous General Mola, who had recognised the centrality of Andalucía in his Secret 
Instruction of 24 June, decided to gamble the success of his uprising on a lost cause.902 In truth, 
the entire garrison of Seville was undermined by sedition. 
 
The second part of the myth was the tale of the soldaditos, first presented by Queipo de Llano 
only a few days after the outbreak of the rebellion. In short, the general declared that on 18 
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July his 180 soldaditos defeated 600 loyalist assault guards.903 The insurgents explained this 
‘miracle’ with the bizarre claim that their victory was a result of the moral and ideological (and 
not military) superiority of the Rebels over the Republic. On 29 September 1937, the tale of 
the soldaditos was transformed into official Nationalist History when the Medalla Militar 
Colectiva was bestowed on the garrison of Seville.904 However, the eligibility conditions for the 
receipt of the award were extremely restrictive, which triggered a flood of written protests by 
the very same soldaditos that participated in the ‘Miracle of Seville’. 
 
The third and final part of the ‘Miracle of Seville’ consisted of the legend of the ‘red army’, 
complemented by the concluding section of the tale of the soldaditos. In a nutshell, and after 
initially claiming that he had captured the city-centre with a handful of soldaditos, General 
Queipo de Llano now affirmed that he pacified the working-class districts of Seville with 250 
soldiers, defeating a mysterious Marxist militia in the process.905 Queipo’s former Chief of 
Press, Luís Bolín, let his imagination run riot, claiming that “Russian ships had landed arms and 
ammunition along the Guadalquivir River” in preparation for “a Communist putsch”.906 
 
Reality differed considerably from Nationalist propaganda. The ‘’Miracle of Seville’ was a 
carefully-planned coup d’état that involved the participation of the entire garrison of Seville 
and the Civil Guard (numbering 2,550 effectives), the Falange, Requeté and 187 civilian 
volunteers.907 Also, in just a few days Queipo’s soldaditos metamorphosed into an army of 
around 6,000 soldiers that included the élite corps of the Spanish Military, the sadistic Army of 
Africa.908 In despair, the insurgents only awarded the Medalla Miltar Colectiva to 886 
individuals, which nevertheless sufficed to demolish Queipo’s colourful tale.909 In addition, the 
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Legajo 5376, Carpeta 12; Legajo 5381, Carpeta 9. Archivo General Militar (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 
2, Carpeta 9; Armario 18, Legajo 6, Carpeta 2.  
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legend of ‘red army’ was dismantled by a secret report (dated 12 August 1936), in which the 
Rebels concluded that “Nuestra superioridad en armamento y hábil utilización del mismo nos 
permite el alcanzar con contadas bajas los objetivos; la influencia moral del cañón mortero o 
tiro ajustado de ametralladoras es enorme sobre el que no lo poseé o sabe sacarle 
rendimiento.  [… ] muchas veces basta la intimidación y un cañonazo en puertas o ventanas 
para que cesen las resistencias. […] si el enemigo se defiende aislarlo y la labor metódica de 
bombardeo, quena, agujeros en las paredes, etc., darán resuelto el problema sin apenas bajas.  
Al enemigo no conviene acorralarlo sino dejarle abierta una salida para batirle en ella con 
armas automáticas emboscadas.  Puede asegurarse también que la falta de disciplina del 
enemigo y carencia de servicios hará que ninguna concentración pueda sostener dos días de 
combate por falta de municiones.”910 The report was released only weeks after the brutal 
pacification of Seville and two days before the massacre of Badajoz (14 August), carried out by 
the ominously named ‘Column of Death’.911  
 
Unsurprisingly, violent opposition to the uprising in Seville was deliberately exaggerated by the 
Nationalists in order to create the perception of a city besieged by a ‘red army’ and where the 
recourse to extreme violence was justified. Queipo de Llano went ever further: the entire 
working-class population of Seville, including women and children, were treated as legitimate 
military targets.912  Furthermore, he institutionalised terror via the release of a series of 
murderous military edicts and the promotion of extremists to position of political power. For 
instance, the first Nationalist Mayor of Seville, the aristocratic Ramón de Carranza, organised a 
military column named after himself that saw no moral contradiction in slaughtering the very 
same population its leader was supposed to govern.913 Also, on the same day (19 July) as the 
Columna Carranza imposed a “durísimo castigo” on the working-class district of the Gran 
Plaza, the Artillery Corps carried out a “bombardeo de castigo sobre Triana”.914 Three days 
later (22 July), Queipo de Llano unleashed the Army of Africa on the residential neighbourhood 
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 Archivo General Militar (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 18, Carpeta 29. 
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 Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, La columna de la muerte. El avance del ejército franquista de Sevilla a 
Badajoz. 
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 ABC (Seville), 18 July 1937.  
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 For the Columna Carranza see: Medina Vilallonga, Rafael de, Tiempo pasado. 
914
 Montán Luis, "Cómo conquistó Sevilla el General Queipo de Llano" in Episodios de la Guerra Civil 
nº5, page 31; Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 14. 
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of La Macarena, where the Foreign Legion used women and children as human shields, 
stabbed residents to death and randomly tossed grenades inside houses.915  
 
Nationalist violence in Seville was by no means exceptional. The insurgents were merely 
enforcing General Mola’s First Secret Instruction, which called for “castigos ejemplares”. 
Furthermore, the primary objective of Rebel repression was political and not military. 
Consequently, the “castigo” of Seville did not conclude with the military occupation of the city, 
but with the extermination of Republicanism. The success of Cuesta Monereo’s plot meant 
that the capital of Andalucía never experienced a civil war; however, the mass killing of 
loyalists continued until January 1937, claiming at least 3,028 lives in a city living officially in 
peace.916 
 
Physical violence represented merely the opening phase of the Nationalists’ grand repressive 
project, coexisting with other parallel forms of repression: economic and cultural. Hence, the 
early capture of Seville not only did not result in any major saving of life, but was followed by 
the economic rape of the capital of Andalucía, where Queipo de Llano replaced Republican 
democracy with a Kleptocratic regime. The insurgents cynically exploited the myth of the 
imminent Communist putsch to extort the local population, now forever indebted to the 
Rebels, via the establishment of a series of ‘patriotic’ fundraising campaigns.917 The Nationalist 
leadership transformed this political ‘debt’ into a financial one and the population of Seville 
into a mere tool at the service of a totalitarian regime attempting to fund a total war.  
 
Fundraising campaigns also possessed political significance. For instance, the resounding 
success of the Plato Único campaign revealed that the Rebels had effectively paralysed the 
local population by means of terror, which represented the triumph of totalitarianism over civil 
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 El Correo de Andalucía (Seville), 22 July 1936; La Unión (Seville), 1 August 1936; El Liberal (Madrid), 4 
August 1936; Informaciones (Madrid), 7 August 1936; Heraldo de Madrid (Madrid), 25 August 1936; 
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Ortiz de Villajos, Cándido, De Sevilla a Madrid, page 21. 
916
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society. Moreover, the Plato Único was originally a Nazi German fundraising campaign copied 
by Queipo de Llano in Seville, an example of the growing ideological symbiosis between both 
regimes.918 Unsurprisingly, all money collected was later transferred to the Auxilio de Invierno, 
a Nationalist relief organisation modelled on the Nazi Winterhilfe.919  
 
Physical and economic violence triggered a humanitarian catastrophe in the capital of 
Andalucía. A few weeks after the capture of Seville (7 August 1936), General Queipo released 
orden nº 13 establishing a special stamp to provide humanitarian assistance to the many 
orphans of Seville, a direct consequence of the savage pacification of the working-class 
districts, a fact recognised by Mayor Ramón de Carranza.920 Ironically, the humanitarian crisis 
that plagued Nationalist Spain represented a graver threat to the survival of the new regime 
than the prospect of a Republican military victory. Consequently, the Rebel leadership was left 
with no option but to attempt to contain a catastrophe of its own making, which it reluctantly 
did by establishing on 2 August the Junta de Auxilios alimenticios a los necesitados. The stated 
objective of the Junta was to prevent mass starvation by providing charity meals for the 
unemployed; however, the eligibility conditions were extremely restrictive and the local 
population was intimidated into funding the organisation. Furthermore, on 3 November 
Queipo de Llano publicly sentenced 3,000 people to starvation after announcing the Junta’s 
financial inability to expand the number of daily meals given to the local poor. However, a 
report presented by the Junta’s treasurer on 30 November concluded that the organisation 
had amassed a clean profit of 265,640 pesetas, thus revealing that the Junta functioned as 
both a profit-oriented business and an instrument to punish the working-class population of 
Seville for its past Republicanism by means of starvation.921  
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The Rebel leadership transformed the capital of Andalucía into a giant social laboratory to test 
the economic policies of the nascent Nationalist regime, amassing astronomical profits in the 
process. For instance, the Army Fund collected an astonishing 16,625,825.25 pesetas in Seville 
during the civil war.922 Simultaneously, Queipo’s kleptocratic policies triggered a humanitarian 
catastrophe of unimaginable proportions. By 30 September 1936, the Asociación Sevillana de 
Caridad was providing assistance to 47,784 people (out of a total population of 267,192) in the 
capital of Andalucía. Almost one in every five residents depended directly on aid for survival.923  
 
At the same time, the Nationalist leadership used the Catholic Church to enforce cultural 
repression and clinch the Pact of blood, in the same way as the CEDA had formerly capitalised 
on the victimisation of the Church to win the 1933 elections. The insurgents welcomed the 
Catholic Church into the Rebel coalition by granting it absolute control over the cultural 
sphere, for it was in desperate need of the cooperation of the myriad of competing anti-
Republican forces in the Nationalist zone, whose sole common denominator was their 
Catholicism. Above all, the Church provided an ideological framework that legitimised the 
rebellion.924  
 
The Catholic hierarchy justified the violent regaining of its long-lost cultural hegemony by 
claiming that it was the highest representative of Spanish identity.925 Nevertheless, the Church 
census on the Dioceses of Seville of 1928-1932 revealed that average Sunday Mass attendance 
stood at a shockingly low 1.44% in the province of Seville. The figure not only demolished the 
Catholic hierarchy’s claim, but also revealed that the Church was a source of social, political 
and cultural division condemned to certain extinction in Seville.926 In panic, the Catholic 
hierarchy became increasingly politicised, aligning itself with the reactionary right. The 
umbilical nature of the conservative coalition meant that whenever one of its members came 
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under attack the tide could easily turn against its weakest link: the Church.927 Predictably, the 
electoral victory of the Popular Front in the February 1936 elections triggered a wave of 
anticlericalism in southern Spain that resulted in a total of 66 damaged/destroyed religious 
buildings.928 The number of attacks revealed that anticlericalism was a collective manifestation 
of hatred towards the Catholic Church that pre-dated the establishment of the Republic, a fact 
openly recognised by the Archbishop of Seville, Cardinal Ilundáin.929 Already in 1932, the parish 
priest of El Sagrario informed Cardinal Ilundáin that all that was left to do was to pray for a 
miracle.930 According to Nationalist mythology, this was precisely what happened on 18 July 
1936. 
 
The coup d’état signalled a cultural rupture with the past in Nationalist Spain. Anticlericalism 
evaporated overnight and the empty churches were packed with new ‘converts’. Still, a total of 
eleven clergymen were murdered in the province of Seville. Their stories were manipulated in 
order to justify repression: the insurgents now claimed that the lightning conquest of the 
province of Seville thwarted Republican plans to exterminate the personnel as well as the 
property of the Catholic Church.931 Furthermore, the Rebels explained the abnormal explosion 
in religiosity in southern Spain with a ‘miracle’ - the ‘Miracle of Seville’ - which triggered a 
collective catharsis that compelled the local population to embrace Catholicism. As a gesture 
of gratitude, the Catholic Church sanctified the Nationalist war effort.932   
 
The Catholic hierarchy accepted rebel propaganda as fact and ignored the embarrassing 
conclusions of the 1928-1932 census. Ilundáin’s position was revised by the new Archbishop of 
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Seville, the outspoken Cardinal Pedro Segura, who took up the post on 12 October 1937.933 
According to Cardinal Segura, anticlericalism was now the consequence of a “cruel e inaudita 
persecución judío-masónica”.934 Clearly, Segura’s declaration was meaningful only as a piece of 
delusional propaganda or as a reflection of the success of the terror in stimulating religious 
practice, real or simulated. The case of Algamitas (Seville) was symptomatic: In 1932, the local 
priest reported that his parish did not possess a single regular churchgoer. Moreover, on 16 
May of that same year the ecónomo of Vilanueva de San Juan (Seville) suspended all religious 
services in Algamitas after receiving a letter containing death threats.935 Miraculously, in 1938 
the local Mayor reported that all residents were now “fervientes cristianos y entusiastas 
creyentes”.936 Once more, reality differed from Nationalist propaganda. Religious harmony was 
achieved by the same method that brought about political unity: repression. The fact that the 
insurgents succeeded in imposing an alien organisation as the main cultural institution in 
rebel-controlled Andalucía only confirmed the exceptionally violent nature of the new regime. 
The Catholic Church ultimately failed to re-convert Seville and truly become the highest 
representative of Spanish identity, but refused to relinquish its monopoly over the cultural 
sphere.937 In doing so, it played an essential role in Francoist cultural repression, cementing its 
status as a divisive force in Spanish society.  
 
The legitimacy of Francoism was based on a series of myths that were progressively 
transformed into History. The gradual dismantling of these legends exposed the very 
foundations of regime: a totalitarian project encompassing physical, economic and cultural 
repression, and based on a multitude of lies. In the capital of Andalucía, the intricate triangle 
of deceit that was the ‘Miracle of Seville’ was founded on the murder of over 3,000 people, the 
economic misery of one fifth of its residents, and ideologically supported by an institution that 
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 By the 1960s, only 13% of the population of the province of Seville regularly attended Sunday Mass. 
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 Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 559. 
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 Priest reported that a higher percentage of people attended Mass on Easter Sunday (as opposed to 
other Catholic feast days), but failed to provide a figure. 
940
 25% received Easter Sunday Communion. 
941
 60% female; 40% male. Majority of working-class residents did not attend Easter Sunday Mass. 
942
 5% received Easter Sunday Communion. 
943
 33% received Easter Sunday Communion. 
944
 150 in San Ildefonso; 30 in Santiago. 
945
 50% received Easter Sunday Communion. 
946
 10% of female residents attended Church on feast days. Regarding male attendance: “es casi 
insignificante el número de los que cumplen.” 
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 97% female; 96% male. 
948
 30% female; 10% male. 
949
 Parish priest wrote: “El 52% y el 80%”, probably referring to a 52% and 80% absence rate for Easter 
Sunday Mass and Easter Sunday Communion respectively. 
950
 0.6% received Easter Sunday Communion. 
951
 A maximum of 5% of residents received Easter Sunday Communion. 
952
 Parish priest only provided numbers for Easter Sunday Communion (substantially lower than Easter 
Sunday Mass attendance): “La cumplen próximamente 2,500, la comunión pascual la cumplen mucho 
más de los que cumplen con el precepto de oír misa.” 
953
 "Muchas." An irritated Cardinal Ilundáin demanded a more detailed report on 15 October 1932. 
954
 20% received Easter Sunday Communion. 
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Table II: socio-geographic breakdown of parishes955 
Parish Location/predominant social class 
Santa Ana Periphery (Triana); working-class 
San Andrés
956
 y San Martin
957
 West-central; mixed 
San Bartolomé
958
 y San Esteban
959
 Northwest-central; working-class 
San Bernardo y San Sebastián Periphery (San Bernardo); working-class 
La Concepción Inmaculada de la Ssma Virgen 
María 
Periphery (Gran Plaza); working-class 
Santa Cruz City-centre; middle/upper-class 





 West-central (close to La Macarena); mixed 
San Isidoro
962
 West-central; mixed 
San Julián, Santa Marina y San Marcos Periphery (La Macarena); working-class 
Santa María Magdalena
963
 y San Miguel Southwest-central; middle/upper-class 
San Nicolás
964
 y Santa María la Blanca
965
 North-central; mixed 
Nuestra Señora de la O Periphery (Triana); working-class 
Omnium Sanctorum Periphery (La Macarena); working-class 
San Pedro
966
 y San Juan de la Palma
967
 Northwest-central (partly in La Macarena); working-class 
San Román y Santa Catalina Periphery (La Macarena); working-class 
San Roque y San Benito Periphery (north-west); working-class 
El Sagrario City-centre; mixed 
El Salvador City-centre; middle/upper-class 
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 Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 559. 
956
 Calle Daoíz 
957
 Plaza de San Martín 
958
 Calle Virgen de la Alegría 
959
 Calle San Esteban 
960
 Calle Rodríguez Marín 
961
 Plaza Jesús de la Redención 
962
 Calle Augusto Plasencia 
963
 Calle San Eloy 
964
 Calle Muñoz y Pabón 
965
 Calle Santa María la Blanca 
966
 Doña María Coronel 
967
 Calle Feria 
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Table III: Catholic education in Seville (1928-1932)968 
 
Parish 
Does a majority of 
children receive Catholic 
education at home? 
Number of children 
attending Catholic 
schools 
Number of children 
attending Catholic 
associations 
Number of children 
attending state 
schools 
Santa Ana No -
969
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 Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 559. 
969
 No reply, but in question 10(ª) the priest mentioned the existence of a Catholic school in his parish.  
970
 Only middle/upper class families. 
971
 In the state school; however: “la enseñanza laica oficialmente, la maestra muy piadosa.” 
972
 Only middle/upper class families. 
973
 Priest declared that Juventud Católica formerly possessed up to 50 members that had since left 
abandoned organisation. 
974
 “Existe un número de familias que lo cumplen muy bien, si bien en menor número.” 
975
 “Sólo se preocupan[…] de llevarlos a colegios católicos. Muchos ni aún esto.” 
976
 “40 en el Templo Parroquial. Mucho mayor numero en la Iglesia de los Salesianos.” 
977
 “Los alumnos y pocos más.” 
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 “Hoy algunos lamentables descuidos en la instrucción religiosa y en la moral.” 
979
 “Niños pocos; y niñas mucho menos.” 
980
 Includes 200 children enrolled in a local Protestant school. 
981
 With the exception of the Catholic minority. 
982
 “Ordinariamente, sí.” 
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Table IV: Church attendance in the province of Seville (1928-1932)983 
Pueblo Population 
Weekly church attendance 




Aguadulce 3,800 4 0,11% 
Alanís 4,450 25-30 0,67% 
Albaida de Aljarafe 1,014 30-35 3,45% 
Alcalá de Guadaira (Santiago) 6,080 150 2,47% 
Alcalá de Guadaira (San Sebastián) 7,000 30 0,43% 
Alcalá del Rio 3,800 8-10 0,26% 
Alcolea del Rio 2,750 - - 
Algaba (La) 5,120 25 0,49% 
Algamitas (Las) 1,650 0 0,00% 
Almadén de la Plata 4,000 0 0,00% 
Almensilla 1,200 20 1,67% 
Arahal (El) 14,603 24 0,16% 
Aznalcazar (and Quema) 2,177 32 1,47% 
Aznalcóllar 5,200 15 0,29% 
Badolatosa 3,200 14 0,44% 
Benacazón 3,378 6 0,18% 
Bollullos de la Mitación 3,079 10-12 0,39% 
Brenes 3,900 40 1,03% 
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 Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 559. 
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Bormujos 1,500 0 0,00% 
Burguillos 1,000 6-8 0,80% 
Cabezas de San Juan (Las) 8,000 10 0,13% 
Camas 5,307 10 0,19% 
Campana (La) 4,600 30 0,65% 
Cantillana 5,900 100 1,69% 
Carmona (San Bartolomé; San Blas 
and San Felipe) 
5,900 50 0,85% 
Carmona (Santa María; El Salvador 
and Santiago) 
9,200 150 1,63% 
Carmona (San Pedro) 6,783 20-25 0,37% 
Carrión de los Céspedes 5,319 30-40 0,75% 
Casariche 4,761 17 0,36% 
Castilbanco de los Arroyos 3,800 25-30 0,79% 
Castilleja del Campo 589 5-8 1,36% 
Castilleja de la Cuesta 2,500 30 1,20% 
Castillo de las Guardas 4,469 23 0,51% 
Cazalla de la Sierra 11,000 60 0,55% 
Constantina 14,740 200 1,36% 
Coria del Rio 10,500 60 0,57% 
Coripe 3,120 25 0,80% 
El Coronil 8,000 40 0,50% 
Corrales (Los) 1,000 2 0,20% 
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Dos Hermanas 11,500 100-125 1,09% 
Écija (San Gil and San Juan) 4,236 
500 (both parishes) 5,89% 
Écija (Santa María and Santa 
Bárbara) 
4,250 






Estepa (Santa María) 3,900 
500 (both parishes) 6,35% 
Estepa (San Sebastián) 3,980 
Fuentes de Andalucía 8,513 205 2,41% 
Garrobo (El) 752 10 1,33% 
Gelves 1,329 12 0,90% 
Gerena 4,700 40 0,85% 
Gilena 1,972 30 1,52% 
Gines 1,450 30 2,07% 
Guadalcanal 7,523 100 1,33% 
Guillena 4,335 1 0,02% 
Herrera 8,000 30 0,38% 
Huévar 1,728 5 0,29% 
Lentejuela 2,159 4 0,19% 
Lebrija 18,000 30 0,17% 
Lora de Estepa 1,100 6-8 0,73% 
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Lora del Rio 11,373 50 0,44% 
Madroño (El) 1,230 0 0,00% 
Mairena del Alcor 7,750 50-70 0,90% 
Mairena del Aljarafe 1,400 0 0,00% 
Marchena (San Juan) 10,526 200 1,90% 
Marchena (San Sebastián) 7,400 60 0,81% 
Marinaleda 2,500 2 0,08% 
Martin de la Jara 500 0 0,00% 
Molares (Los) 2,300 8-10 0,43% 
Montellano 8,983 80 0,89% 
Morón de la Frontera (San Miguel) 11,500 129 1,12% 
Morón de la Frontera La Victoria) 10,000 200 2,00% 
Muela (La) (and Coripe) 300 0 0,00% 
Navas de la Concepción 4,200 0 0,00% 
Olivares 4,295 40 0,93% 
Los Palacios 8,000 20 0,25% 
Palomares (and Mairena del Aljarafe) 600 0 0,00% 
Paradas 2,325 50 2,15% 
Pedreda 3,000 30 1,00% 
Pedroso (El) 4,800 50 1,04% 
Peñaflor 4,000 40 1,00% 
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Pilas 6,000 200 3,33% 
Pruna 4,100 6 0,15% 
Puebla de Cazalla 9,300 100 1,08% 
Puebla de los Infantes 5,500 3 0,05% 
Puebla del Rio 2,900 15-20 0,69% 
Real de la Jara 3,425 5 0,15% 
Rinconada (La) 2,000 12 0,60% 
Roda de Andalucía (La) 4,210 14-15 0,36% 
Ronquillo 2,020 2 0,10% 
Rubio (El) 5,000 8-10 0,20% 
Salteras 1,100 30 2,73% 
San Juan de Aznalfarache 3,700 50 1,35% 
Sanlúcar la Mayor 5,000 60 1,20% 
San Nicolás del Puerto 1,960 0 0,00% 
Santiponce 2,926 1 0,03% 
Saucejo (El) 5,990 6
986
 0,10% 
Tocina 5,075 24-26 0,51% 
Tomares 1,600 20 1,25% 
Umbrete 2,521 70 2,78% 
Utrera (Santa María) 12,000 100 0,83% 
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Utrera (Santiago) 9,000 50-60 0,67% 
Villanueva del Ariscal 2,541 100 3,94% 
Villanueva de las Minas 10,000 20 0,20% 
Villanueva del Rio 1,200 2
987
 0,17% 
Villanueva de San Juan 2,870 2 0,07% 
Villar (El) 232 4 1,72% 
Villaverde del Rio 2,225 30 1,35% 
Viso del Alcor (El) 8,438 20 0,24% 















                                                          
987









Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville) 
Archivo Catedral de Sevilla (Seville) 
Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Sevilla (Seville) 
Archivo de la Hemeroteca Municipal de Sevilla (Seville) 
Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia (Madrid) 
Archivo del Tribunal Militar Territorial Segundo (Seville) 
Archivo General Militar (Madrid) 
Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid) 
Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur (Seville) 
Archivo Municipal de Sevilla (Seville) 
Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica (Salamanca) 
Fototeca Municipal de Sevilla (Seville) 
 
Newspapers and contemporary journals 
ABC (Madrid), 1931-1936 
ABC (Seville), 1931-1951 
Archivo Hispalense (Seville), 1965-2001 
Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico del Arzobispado de Sevilla (Seville), 1931-1939 
El Correo de Andalucía (Seville), 1936-37 
El Liberal (Madrid), 1936 
El Liberal (Seville), 1936 
FE (Seville), 1936-37 
Heraldo de Madrid (Madrid), 1936 
Informaciones (Madrid), 1936 
La Unión (Seville), 1936-37 
La Vanguardia (Barcelona), 1964 
O Século (Lisbon), 1936 
Revista de Tropas Coloniales (Ceuta), 1924 
 
Diaries, memoirs, speeches, collections of documents and other contemporary or 
eyewitness accounts 
Alcalá-Zamora y Torres, Niceto, Memorias (Barcelona, Planeta, 1977) 
280 
 
Alcalá-Zamora, Niceto, Discursos (Editorial Tecnos, Madrid, 1979) 
Alconchel, Ramiro de, La Novena Cruzada. Poema de la guerra contra los monstruos (Sevilla, 
Imprenta Bergali, 1937) 
Alloucherie, Jean, Noches de Sevilla (Sevilla, Espuela de Plata, 2005) 
Arboleya Martínez, Maximiliano, La apostasía de las masas (Barcelona, Salvatella, 1934)  
Armiñán Odriozola, Luis de, Excmo. Sr. General D. Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, Jefe del Ejército del 
Sur (Avila, 1937) 
Azaña, Manuel, Memorias políticas y de guerra, 2 vols. (Barcelona, Crítica, 1978) 
Azaña, Manuel, Causas de la guerra de España (Barcelona, Crítica, 2002) 
Bahamonde, Antonio, Un año con Queipo de Llano. Memorias de un nacionalista (Sevilla, Espuela 
de Plata, 2005) 
Barbero, Edmundo, El Infierno Azul (Seis meses en el feudo de Queipo) (Sevilla, Espuela de Plata, 
2005) 
Barneto, Saturnino, Cómo luchan bajo la bandera de la I.S.R. los obreros del puerto de Sevilla (n.p., 
n.d.) 
Bolín, Luis, Spain: the vital years (London, Cassell, 1967) 
Borkenau, Franz, The Spanish cockpit (London, Faber & Faber, 1937) 
Bowers, Claude Gernade, My mission to Spain: watching the rehearsal for World War II (London, 
Victor Gollancz, 1954) 
Brenan, Gerald, The Spanish Labyrinth. An Account of the Social and Political Background of the 
Civil War (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1943) 
Brenan, Gerald, Personal record, 1920-1972 (London, Cape, 1974) 
Buckley, Henry, Life and death of the Spanish republic (London, H. Hamilton, 1940) 
Carta colectiva de los obispos españoles con motivo de la guerra en España (Pamplona, 1937) 
Casares Quiroga, Santiago (edited by Grandío Seoane, Emilio), Discursos politicos (1931-1936) 
(Sada, A Coruñam Ediciós do Castro, 2006) 
Castro Albarrán, Aniceto, El derecho a la rebeldía (Madrid, Imp. Gráfica Universal, 1934) 
Castro Albarrán, Aniceto, El derecho al Alzamiento (Salamanca, Cervantes, 1940) 
Copado, Bernabé, Con la columna Redondo. Combates y conquistas. Crónica de guerra (Sevilla, 
Imprenta de la Gavidia, 1937) 
Cuesta Monereo, José, Una figura para la historia : "el General Queipo de Llano, primer locutor de 
radio en la guerra de liberación" (Sevilla, Jefatura Provincial del Movimiento, 1969) 
Ciano, Galeazzo, Ciano’s  iary 1939-43 (London, Heinemann, 1947) 
Dávila, Sancho & Pemartín, Julián, Hacia la historia de la Falange: primera contribución de Sevilla 
(Jerez, Jerez Industrial, 1938) 
Delicado, Manuel, "Cómo se luchó en Sevilla" in Discurso pronunciado en el Pleno ampliado del C. 
C. del Partido Comunista de España, celebrado en Valencia los días 5, 6, 7 y 8 de Marzo de 1937 
(Ediciones del Partido Comunista de España) 
281 
 
Díaz, José, La guerra y el Frente Popular (Madrid, Ediciones Vanguardia Obrera S.A., 1990) 
El Tebib Arrumi, Así se conquistó Sevilla (Madrid, Ediciones España, 1940) 
Escobar, José Ignacio, Así empezó (Madrid, G. del Toro, 1974) 
Espinosa de los Monteros, Narciso; Gómez-Moreno, Manuel (eds.), 139 fotografías del Movimiento 
Nacional en Sevilla (Sevilla, Imp. FE, 1937) 
Esteban Infantes, Emilio, La sublevación del general Sanjurjo. Relato de su ayudante (Madrid, 
Imprenta Sánchez Ocaña, 1933) 
Foltz, Charles, The Masquerade in Spain (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co, 1948) 
Franco, Francisco, Palabras del Caudillo: 19 abril 1937-31 diciembre 1938 (Barcelona, FE, 1939) 
Franco Salgado-Araujo, Francisco, Mis Conversaciones privadas con Franco (Barcelona, Planeta, 
1976) 
Franco Salgado-Araujo, Francisco, Mi vida junto a Franco (Barcelona, Planeta, 1977) 
Gerahty, Cecil, The road to Madrid (London, Hutchinson & Co., 1937) 
Gil Robles, José María, No fué posible la paz (Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana, 1968) 
Goded, Manuel, Un “faccioso” cien por cien (Zaragoza, Heraldo de Aragón, 1938) 
Gomá y Tomás, Isidro, Respuesta obligada: carta abierta al Sr. D. José Antonio Aguirre (Pamplona, 
Gráf. Bescansa, 1937) 
Gomá y Tomás, Isidro, The Spanish bishops Speak: Joint Pastoral Letter To The Bishops Of The 
Whole World On The War In Spain (New York, America Press, 1937) 
Gomá y Tomás, Isidro, Por Dios y por España. Pastorales, instrucciones pastorales y artículos, 
discursos, mensajes, apéndice, 1936-1939 (Barcelona, Rafael Casulleras, 1940) 
Gomá y Tomás, Isidro, Pastorales de la Guerra de España (Madrid, Rialp, 1955) 
Gonzálbez Ruiz, Francisco, Yo he creído en Franco. Proceso de una gran desilusión: dos meses en la 
cárcel de Sevilla (Paris, Ediciones Imprimerie, Coopérative Etoile, 1938) 
González Menéndez-Reigada, Albino, Catecismo patriótico español (Barcelona, Península, 2003) 
Gonzalo Soto, Julio, Esbozo de una síntesis del ideario de Mola en relación con el Movimiento 
Nacional (Burgos, Hijos de Santiago Rodríguez, 1937) 
Guzmán de Alfarache, ¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla (Sevilla, FE, 
1937) 
Hernández Díaz, José; Sancho Corbacho, Antonio, Estudio de los edificios religiosos y objetos de 
culto de la ciudad de Sevilla, saqueados y destruídos por los marxistas (Sevilla, Imprenta de la 
Gavidia, 1936) 
Hernández Díaz, José; Sancho Corbacho, Antonio, Estudio de los edificios religiosos y objetos de 
culto saqueados y destruídos por los marxistas en los pueblos de la provincia de Sevilla (Sevilla, 
Imprenta de la Gavidia, 1937) 
Ibárruri, Dolores, El único camino (Editorial Sendero, Buenos Aires, 1963) 
Infante Pérez, Blas, El ideal Andaluz. Varios estudios acerca del renacimiento de Andalucía (Sevilla, 
Imp. de Joaquín L. Arévalo, 1915) 
282 
 
Infante Pérez, Blas, La verdad sobre el complot de Tablada y el Estado libre de Andalucía (Sevilla, 
Imp. de Alvarez y Zambrano, 1931) 
Jellinek, Frank, The Civil War in Spain (London, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1938) 
Kindelán, Alfredo, La verdad de mis relaciones con Franco (Barcelona, Planeta, 1981) 
Kindelán, Alfredo, Mis cuadernos de guerra (Barcelona, Planeta, 1982) 
Knickerbocker, Hubert Renfro, The siege of Alcazar. A war-log of the Spanish Revolution (London, 
Hutchinson & Co., 1937) 
Knoblaugh, Edward, Correspondent in Spain (London, Sheed and Ward, 1937) 
Koestler, Arthur, Spanish testament (London, V. Gollancz ltd, 1937) 
Lizarza Iribarren, Antonio de, Memorias de la conspiración (1931-1936) (Pamplona, Gómez, 1969) 
Lojendio, Luis María de, Operaciones militares de la guerra de España, 1936-1939 (Barcelona, 
Montaner y Simon, s. a., 1940) 
Loveday, Arthur, World War in Spain (London, Butler & Tanner Ltd., 1939) 
Maíz, B. Félix, Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración (Pamplona, Gómez, 1952) 
Maíz, Félix B., Mola, aquel hombre: diario de la conspiración, 1936 (Barcelona, Planeta, 1976) 
Martínez Barrio, Diego, Memorias (Barcelona, Planeta, 1983) 
McCullagh, Captain Francis, In Franco’s Spain. Being the Experiences of an Irish War-
Correspondent During the Great Civil War Which Began in 1936 (London, Burns Oats & 
Washbourne, 1937) 
Medina Vilallonga, Rafael de, Tiempo pasado (Sevilla, Gráfica Sevillana, 1971) 
Mendizábal Villalba, Alfredo, The Martyrdom of Spain: Origins of a Civil War (London, G. Bles, The 
Centenary Press, 1938) 
Mola Vidal, Emilio, Obras Completas (Valladolid, Librería Santarén, 1940) 
Montán Luis, "Cómo conquistó Sevilla el General Queipo de Llano" in Episodios de la Guerra Civi,l 
nº5 (Valladolid, edit. Santaren, 1939) 
Mora-Figueroa, José de, Datos para la Historia de la Falange gaditana 1934-1939 (Jerez de la 
Frontera, Talleres de Gráficas del Exportador, 1974) 
Moss, Geoffrey MacNeill, The Siege of the Alcázar: A History of the Siege of the Toledo Alcázar, 
1936 (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1937) 
Nicholson, Helen, Death in the morning (London, Lovat Dickson Limited Publishers, 1937) 
Neves, Mário, A chacina de Badajoz. Relato de uma testemunha de um dos episódios mais 
trágicos da Guerra Civil de Espanha (Agosto de 1936) (Lisboa, O Jornal, 1985) 
Nin, Andrés, Los problemas de la revolución española (1931-1937) (Ruedo Ibérico, 1971) 
Olmedo, Antonio, La flecha en blanco (diario de la Guerra) (Cádiz, Cerón, 1937) 
Olmedo, Felix G., El sentido de la guerra española (Bilbao, 1938) 
Ortiz de Villajos, Cándido, De Sevilla a Madrid, ruta libertadora de la columna Castejón (Granada, 
Librería Prieto, 1937) 
283 
 
Patrón de Sopranis, Alfonso, Burlando el bloqueo rojo: el primer salto del estrecho (julio del 1936) 
(Jerez de la Frontera, Tip. Lit. Jerez Industrial, 1940) 
Peers, Allison, The Spanish Tragedy 1930-1936. Dictatorship, Republic, Chaos (London, Methuen & 
Co., 1936) 
Pemán y Pemartín, José María, Arengas y Crónicas de Guerra (Cádiz, Establecimientos Cerón, Cádiz, 
1937)  
Portela, Artur, Nas trincheiras de Espanha (Lisboa, Parceria António Maria Pereira, 1937) 
Portela Valladares, Manuel, Memorias: dentro del drama español (Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1988) 
Prieto, Indalecio, Convulsiones de España: pequeños detalles de grandes sucesos, vol. 1 (Mexico, 
Oasis, 1967) 
Primo de Rivera, José Antonio, Textos inéditos y epistolario (Madrid, Ediciones del Movimiento, 
1956) 
Primo de Rivera, José Antonio, Discursos y escritos. Obras completas (1922-1936) (Madrid, Instituto 
de Estudios Políticos, 1976) 
Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, El General Queipo de Llano perseguido por la dictadura (Madrid, 
Morata, 1930) 
Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, El movimiento reivindicativo de Cuatro Vientos (Madrid, Tip. Yagues, 
1933) 
Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, Bandos y  rdenes dictados por  on alo  ueipo de  lano y Sierra, 
 eneral  efe de la Segunda  ivisi n  rg nica y del   ército del Sur desde la declaraci n del estado 
de guerra, 18 de julio de 1936, hasta fin de febrero de 1937, etc. (Sevilla, Imprenta Municipal, 
1937)  
Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo,  péndice II. Comprende de 1.  de mar o a 31 de diciem re de 193 , etc. 
Bandos y  rdenes dictados por  on alo  ueipo de  lano y Sierra,  eneral  efe de la Segunda 
 ivisi n  rg nica y del   ército del Sur desde la declaraci n del estado de guerra, 1  de  ulio de 
1936, hasta fin de febrero de 1937, etc. (Sevilla, Imprenta Municipal, 1937) 
Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, “Cómo dominamos Sevilla” in Estampas de la guerra, tomo 5, Frentes de 
Andalucía y Extremadura (San Sebastián, 1938) 
Ramón-Laca, Julio de, Bajo la férula de Queipo: como fue gobernada Andalucía (Sevilla, Imprenta 
Comercial del Diario FE, 1939) 
Rogers, Francis Theobald, Spain: a tragic journey (New York, Macaulay, 1937) 
Rosado, Antonio, Tierra y libertad. memorias de un campesino anarcosindicalista andaluz 
(Barcelona, Crítica, 1979) 
Rotvand, Georges, Franco means business (London, The Paladin Press, 1939) 
Ruiz Vilaplana, Antonio, Burgo’s  ustice  a year’s e perience of nationalist Spain (London, 
Constable & Co, 1938) 
Sánchez del Arco, Manuel, El sur de España en la reconquista de Madrid (diario de operaciones 
glosado por un testigo) (Sevilla, Editorial Sevillana, 1937) 
284 
 
Sánchez del Arco, Manuel, Horas y figuras de la Guerra en España (Madrid, Ediciones Españolas, 
1939) 
Saínz Rodríguez, Pedro, Testimonio y recuerdos (Barcelona, Planeta, 1978) 
Sardá y Salvany, Félix, El Liberalismo es Pecado. Cuestiones candentes (Barcelona, 1884) 
Sebastián y Bandarán, José; Tineo Lara, Antonio, La persecución religiosa en la Archidiócesis de 
Sevilla (1936-1938) (Sevilla, Editorial Sevillana, 1938) 
Segura y Sáenz, Pedro, Por la unidad católica de España: cartas pastorales del Emmo. y Rvdmo. 
Señor Pedro, Cardenal Segura y Sáenz, Arzobispo de Sevilla, en defensa del tesoro de la fe (Sevilla, 
Editorial Edelce, 1952) 
Serrano Súñer, Ramón, Entre Hendaya y Gibraltar. Noticia y reflexión, frente a una leyenda, sobre 
nuestra política en dos guerras (Madrid, Ediciones y Publicaciones Españolas, 1947) 
Siurot, Manuel, Mis charlas en el micrófono del General, vol. 1 (Cádiz, Establecimientos Cerón, 
1937) 
Suero Serrano, Luciano, Memorias de un campesino andaluz en la Revolución Española (Madrid, 
Queimada, 1982) 
Vallina, Pedro, Mis memorias (Sevilla, Centro Andaluz del Libro, Libre Pensamiento, 2000) 
Varela Rendueles, José María, Rebelión en Sevilla: memorias de su Gobernador rebelde (Sevilla, 
Servicio de Publicaciones del Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 1982) 
Vegas Latapie, em rias pol ticas. l suicidio de la onar u a y la Segunda  ep  lica, vol. 1 
(Barcelona, Planeta, 1983) 
Vegas Latapie, Eugenio, Memorias políticas 1936-1938. Los caminos del desengaño, vol. 2 (Madrid, 
Tebas, 1987) 
Vila, Enrique, Un año de República en Sevilla. Jornadas de un periodista (Sevilla, Editorial Sevillana, 
1932)  




Articles, chapters, contributions, books and monographs 
“18 de Julio de 1936 en Sevilla” in Archivo Hispalense, Sevilla, nº132-133, 1965 
Acedo Colunga, Felipe, José Calvo Sotelo. La verdad de una muerte (Barcelona, AHR, 1957) 
Alexander, Martin S.; Graham, Helen (editors), The French and Spanish Popular Fronts: Comparative 
Perspectives (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989) 
Almuedo Palma, José, Al este del edén. Estudio demográfico del crecimiento urbano en el sector 
oriental de Sevilla: Nervión, Ciudad Jardín, Cerro del Aguila Águila y Amate (1922-1935) (Sevilla, 
Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, Patronato del Real Alcázar, 2009) 
285 
 
Álvarez Rey, Leandro, “El Carlismo en Andalucía durante la IIa República (1931-1936)” in Braojos 
Garrido, Alfonso; Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, Sevilla, 36: Sublevación 
fascista y represión (Brenes, Sevilla, Muñoz, Moya y Montraveta, 1990) 
Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Ruiz Sánchez, José-Leonardo, “La II República: laicismo y movilización religiosa 
(1931-1936)” in Historia de la Iglesia de Sevilla (Sevilla, Editorial Castillejo, 1992) 
Álvarez Rey, Leandro, Sevilla durante la dictadura de Primo de Rivera, la Unión Patriótica (1923-
1930) (Sevilla, Diputación Provincial, 1987) 
Álvarez Rey, Leandro,  La derecha en la II Republica: Sevilla, 1931-1936 (Sevilla,Secretariado de 
Publicaciones de la Universidad de Sevilla : Servicio de Publicaciones del Excmo. Ayuntamiento de 
Sevilla, 1993) 
Álvarez Rey, Leandro, ““Obreros honrados”: las derechas y el sindicalismo católico en la segunda 
república” in Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Lemus López, Encarnación (ed.), Sindicatos y trabajadores en 
Sevilla: una aproximación a la memoria del siglo XX (Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 2000) 
Álvarez Rey, Leandro, Manuel Giménez Fernández (1896-1968). Epistolario Político (Sevilla, 
Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 2000) 
Álvarez Rey, Leandro, “Del rojo al azul: los inicios de la guerra civil en Sevilla” in Álvarez Rey, Leandro 
(ed.), Andalucía y la guerra civil: estudios y perspectivas (Sevilla, Diputación de Sevilla, Universidad 
de Sevilla, 2006) 
Álvarez Rey, Leandro,  Diego Martínez Barrio: palabra de republicano (Sevilla, ICAS, 2007) 
Álvarez Rey, Leandro (ed.),  Los socialistas en Sevilla duranta la Segunda República (Sevilla, 
Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, Patronato del Real Alcázar, 2009) 
Anderson, Peter Philip. The Francoist Military Trials. Terror and complicity (1939-1945) (London, 
Routledge, 2010) 
Arenas Posadas, Carlos (ed.), La Segunda República en Sevilla (Sevilla, Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 
Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, Patronato del Real Alcázar de Sevilla, 2004) 
Arrarás, Joaquín, Historia de la Segunda Republica Española, 4 vols. (Madrid, Editora Nacional, 
1956-68) 
Arrarás, Joaquín, Historia de la cruzada española,  8 vols. (Madrid, Editora Nacional, 1939-43) 
Aznar, Manuel, Historia militar de la guerra de España, 4 vols., 3rd  ed. (Madrid, Editora Nacional, 
1958-63) 
Aznar, Manuel, Historia militar de la guerra de España, 4th ed. (Madrid, Editora Nacional, 1969) 
Balfour, Sebastian, The end of the Spanish empire, 1898-1923 (Oxford, Clarendon, 1987) 
Balfour, Sebastian  “Spain and the Great Powers in the aftermath of the Disaster of 1898” in Balfour, 
Sebastian, & Preston, Paul, Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century (London, New 
York, Routledge, 1999) 
Balfour, Sebastian, Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to to the Spanish Civil War (Oxford, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 2002) 
Barrios, Manuel, El ultimo virrey. Queipo de Llano (Sevilla, J. Rodriguez Castillejo, 1990) 
286 
 
Barrios, Manuel, La Sevilla del Cardenal Segura (Sevilla, Espuela de Plata, 2004) 
Benavides Gómez, Domingo, Maximiliano Arboleya (1870-1951). Un luchador social entre las dos 
Españas (Madrid, Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 2003) 
Ben-Ami, Shlomo, Fascism from above: the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain, 1923-1930 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983). 
Blaye, Edouard de, Franco and the Politics of Spain (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1976) 
Blázquez Miguel, Juan, Historia Militar de la Guerra Civil Española, vol. 1 (Villanueva del Pardillo, 
María Dolores Tomás, 2003) 
Blinkhorn, Martin (ed), Fascists and Conservatives the Radical Right and the Establishment in 
Twentieth-Century Europe (London, Boston, Unwin Hyman, 1990) 
Blinkhorn, Martin, Carlism and Crisis in Spain 1931-1939 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2008) 
Burgos, Antonio, Guia secreta de Sevilla (Madrid, Al-Borak, 1974) 
Cabanellas, Guillermo, La guerra de los mil días: nacimiento, vida y muerte de la II República 
Española (Buenos Aires, Helliasta, 1975) 
Cabanellas, Guillermo, Cuatro Generales, vol. 1 (Barcelona, Planeta, 1977) 
Cabello Núñez, José, “Persecución religiosa y conflictividad social en la Sierra Sur de Sevilla durante 
la Segunda República: El caso de la Puebla de Cazalla” in Archivo Hispalense, Sevilla, nº267-272, 
2005/2006 
Callahan, William James, Church, Politics and Society in Spain, 1750-1874 (Cambridge, Mass, 
Harvard University Press, 1984) 
Cárcel Ortí, Vicente, La persecución religiosa en España durante la Segunda República: 1931-1939 
(Madrid, Ediciones Rialp, 1990) 
Cardona, Gabriel, El poder militar en la España contemporánea hasta la Guerra Civil  (Madrid, 
Biblioteca Historia 16, 1990) 
Caro Cancela, Diego, La Segunda República en Cádiz. Elecciones y partidos políticos (Cádiz, Editorial 
Diputación Provincial de Cádiz, 1987) 
Caro Cancela, Diego, “La primavera de 1936 en Andalucía: conflictividad social y violencia política” in 
Alvarez Rey, Leandro (ed.), Andalucía y la guerra civil: estudios y perspectivas (Sevilla, Diputación de 
Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 2006) 
Chaves Palacio, Julián, La represión en la provincia de Cáceres durante la guerra civil (1936-1939) 
(Cáceres, Universidad de Extremadura, 1995) 
Chaves Palacio, Julián, La guerra civil en Extremadura. Operaciones militares (Mérida, Editora 
regional de Extremadura, 1997) 
Casanova, Juliá, Anarquismo y revolución en la sociedad rural aragonesa, 1936-38 (Barcelona, 
Crítica, 2006) 
Cenarro Lagunas, Angela, La sonrisa de Falange. Auxilio Social en la guerra y la posguerra 
(Barcelona, Crítica, 2005) 
287 
 
Christian, William A., Moving crucifixes in modern Spain (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1992) 
Cifuentes Chueca, Julia, El asalto a la República. Los orígenes de franquismo en Zaragoza, 1936-39 
(Zaragoza, Institución Fernando el Católico, 2006) 
Comas, Ramón, Isidro Gomá, Francesc Vidal i Barraquer: dos visiones antagónicas de la Iglesia 
española de 1939 (Salamanca: Sígueme, 1977) 
Delgado, Iva, Portugal e a guerra civil de Espanha (Lisboa, Publicações Europa-América, 1980) 
Díaz Arriaza, José, “La represión de Queipo de Llano sobre la administración local sevillana” in Ortiz 
Villalba, Juan, Andalucía: guerra y exilio (Sevilla, Universidad Pablo Olavide, 2005) 
Díaz Arriaza, José; Castejón Fernández, Javier; Utrera 1936: Ocupación militar y represión (Brenes, 
Muñoz Moya, 2007) 
Domingo, Alfonso, Retaguardia. La Guerra Civil tras los frentes (Madrid, Oberon, 2004) 
Domínguez Pérez, Alicia, El verano que trajo un largo invierno. La represión político social durante 
el primer franquismo en Cádiz (1936-1945) (Cádiz, Quórum Editores, 2005) 
Ealham, Chris, Class, Culture, and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898-1937 (London, Routledge, 2004) 
Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, “Sevilla, 1936. Sublevación y represión” in Braojos Garrido, Alfonso; 
Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, Sevilla, 36: Sublevación fascista y represión 
(Brenes, Sevilla, Muñoz, Moya y Montraveta, 1990) 
Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, La columna de la muerte. El avance del ejército franquista de Sevilla a 
Badajoz (Barcelona, Editorial Crítica, 2003) 
Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, “Julio de 1936. Golpe militar  plan de exterminio” in Casanova, Julián 
(ed.); Espinosa Maestre, Francisco; Mir, Conxita; Moreno Gómez, Francisco, Morir, matar, 
sobrevivir. La violencia en la dictadura de Franco (Barcelona, Crítica, 2004) 
Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, El fenómeno revisionista o los fantasmas de la derecha española 
[Sobre la Matanza de Badajoz y la lucha en torno a la interpretación del pasado] (Badajoz, Los 
Libros del Oeste, 2005) 
Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, La Guerra Civil en Huelva (Huelva, Diputación Provincial, 2005) 
Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, La Justicia de Queipo. Violencia selectiva y terror fascista en la II 
División en 1936: Sevilla, Huelva, Cádiz, Córdoba, Málaga y Badajoz (Barcelona, Crítica, 2006) 
Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, Contra el olvido. Historia  memoria de la guerra civil (Barcelona, 
Crítica, 2006) 
Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, La Primavera del Frente Popular: Los campesinos de Badajoz y el 
origen de la guerra civil (marzo-julio de 1936) (Barcelona, Crítica, 2007) 
Fernández-Coppel, Jorge, Queipo de Llano: Memorias de la Guerra Civil (Madrid, La Esfera de los 
Libros, 2008) 
Florencio Puntas, Antonio, Empresariado agrícola y cambio económico, 1880-1936. Organización y 
estrategia de la patronal sevillana en los inicios de la modernización (Sevilla, Diputación Provincial 
de Sevilla, 1994) 
288 
 
Fraser, Ronald, Blood of Spain: the Experience of Civil War, 1936-1939 (London, Allen Lane, 1979) 
García Márquez, José María, "La represión franquista en la provincial de Sevilla. Estado de la 
cuestión" in Ebre 38. Revista Internacional de la Guerra Civil (1936-1939), nº2 (Barcelona, 
Publicacions I Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona, 2004) 
García Márquez, José María, LA UGT de Sevilla. Golpe militar, resistencia y represión (1936-1950) 
Córdoba, Fundación para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos de Andalucía, 2009) 
García Venero, Maximiano,  a Falange en la guerra de  spa a  la unificaci n y  edilla (Paris, Ruedo 
Ibérico, 1967) 
García Venero, Maximiano, Historia de la Unificación (Falange y Requeté 1937) (Madrid, AGESA, 
1970) 
García Venero, Maximiano, Madrid, Julio 1936 (Madrid, Tebas, 1973)  
García Venero, Maximiano, Testimonio de Manuel Hedilla (Barcelona, Ediciones Acervo, 1976) 
Gibson, Ian, La represión nacionalista de Granada en 1936 y la muerte de Federico García Lorca 
(Paris, Ruedo Ibérico, 1971). 
Gibson, Ian, Queipo de Llano: Sevilla, verano de 1936 (Barcelona, Ediciones Grijalbo, 1986) 
Gil Delgado, Francisco, Pedro Segura: un cardenal sin fronteras (Madrid, Biblioteca de Autores 
Cristianos, 2001) 
Gómez Salvago, José, La Segunda República: elecciones y partidos politicos en Sevilla y provincia 
(Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 1986) 
Graham, Helen, Socialism and War: The Spanish Socialist Party in Power and Crisis, 1936-1939 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991) 
Graham, Helen, The Spanish Republic at war, 1936-1939 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2002) 
Gutiérrez-Ravé, José, ¿Como se liberó usted? (Madrid, Talleres Gráficos, 1942) 
Heywood, Paul, Marxism and the Failure of Organised Socialism in Spain, 1879-1936 (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) 
Hijano del Río, Manuel; Ruiz Romero, Manuel, El ideal andaluz en la Segunda República. La 
Asamblea Regional Andaluza de 1.933 (Sevilla, Fundación Blas Infante, 1995) 
Hurtado Sánchez, José, “Curas y obreros contra la dictadura franquista” in Anuario de la Historia de 
la Iglesia Andaluza, vol. II, año 2009 (Sevilla, C.E.T., Cátedra "Beato Marcelo Spínola", 2009) 
Ibn Azzuz Hakim, Mohammad, Actitud de los moros ante el alzamiento. Marruecos, 1936 (Málaga, 
Algazarra, 1997) 
Iniesta Coullaut-Valera, Enrique, Blas Infante. Toda su verdad (Granada, Comares, 2000) 
Jiménez Guerrero, José, Quema de conventos en Málaga, mayo de 1931 (Málaga, Editorial Arguval, 
2006) 
Jiménez Rodríguez, Javier, “La represión franquista en Alcalá de Guadaira” in Archivo Hispalense, 
Sevilla, Tomo 75, nº 229, 1992 
289 
 
Lacomba Avellán, Juan Antonio, Blas Infante. La forja de un ideal andaluz (Sevilla, Fundación Blas 
Infante, 1983) 
Lacomba Avellán, Juan Antonio; Ortiz de Lanzagorta, José Luis; Sanchez, Jose Acosta, Blas Infante. 
Perfiles de un andaluz (Málaga, Diputación Provincial de Málaga, 1985) 
Lannon, Frances, Priviledge, Persecution and Prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875-1975 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987) 
Lannon, Frances, “Ideological tensions, The Social Praxis and Cultural Politics of Spanish Catholicism 
in Graham, Helen, and Labanyi, Jo (eds.), Spanish Cultural Studies. An Introduction: The Struggle for 
Modernity (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995) 
Lazo, Alfonso, Retrato del Fascismo Rural en Sevilla (Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 1997) 
Lazo, Alfonso; Parejo Fernández, La Iglesia, la Falange, y el Fascismo (Un estudio sobre la prensa 
Española de Posguerra) (Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 1998) 
Lazo, Alfonso, “El imaginario católico de un fascismo provinciano” in Arias Castañón, Eloy (ed.), 
Comunicación, historia y sociedad. Homenaje a Alfonso Braojos (Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 
Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, Área de Cultura, 2001) 
Lazo, Alfonso; Parejo Fernández, José Antonio, “La Militancia Falangista en el Suroeste Español” in 
Ayer (n°52, 2005) 
Ledesma, José Luis, Los días de llamas de la revolución. Violencia y política en la retaguardia 
republicana de Zaragoza durante la guerra civil (Zaragoza, Institución Fernando el Católico, 2003)  
Lobo Manzano, Luis, Un barrio de sevilla: El Cerro de Aguila (Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 1974) 
Macarro Vera, José Manuel, La utopía revolucionaria  Sevilla en la Segunda  ep  lica (Sevilla, 
Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Sevilla, 1985) 
Macarro Vera, José Manuel, Socialismo, república y revolución en Andalucía (1931-1936) (Sevilla, 
Universidad de Sevilla, Secretariado de Publicaciones, 2000) 
Macarro Vera, José Manuel, La Sevilla Republicana (Madrid, Silex, 2003) 
Marín Fidalgo, Ana; Martin Burgueño, Manuel, In memoriam. Manuel J. Fal Conde (Sevilla, Ecesa, 
1980) 
Martín Fidalgo, Ana; Roldán González, Enrique; Martin Burgueño, Manuel, El Requeté de Sevilla: 
orígenes, causas e historia (Sevilla, Ecesa, 1982) 
Martín Riego; Manuel; Ruiz Sánchez, José-Leonardo, “Historiografía de la Edad Moderna y 
Contemporánea de la Iglesia en la Andalucía Occidental (1965-2007)” in Anuario de la Historia de la 
Iglesia Andaluza, vol. I, año 2008 (Sevilla, C.E.T., Cátedra "Beato Marcelo Spínola", 2008) 
Martínez Bande, José Manuel, La Marcha sobre Madrid (Madrid, San Martín, 1968) 
Martínez Bande, José Manuel, La Campaña de Andalucía (Madrid, San Martín, 1969) 
Martínez Gálvez, José Carlos, “La represión en el primer franquismo sevillano y su reconstrucción 
desde los archivos” in 20 años con el Archivo Histórico Provincial de Sevilla, Ciclo de Conferencias 
(Sevilla, Consejería de Cultura, 2008) 
290 
 
Merr Lecha-Marzo, Fernando de, La cuestión religiosa en las Cortes constituyentes de la II 
República Española (Pamplona, Ediciones Unversidad de Navarra, 1975) 
Montero, Enrique, “Intellectual and Power. Reform Idealized: The intellectual and Ideological Origins 
of the Second Republic” in Graham, Helen, and Labanyi, Jo (eds.), Spanish Cultural Studies. An 
Introduction. The Struggle for Modernity (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995) 
Montero, José Ramón, La CEDA: el catolicismo social y político en la II República, 2 vols., (Madrid, 
Ediciones de la Revista de Trabajo, 1977) 
Montero Gómez, Félix, Alcalá de Guadaira, 21 de julio de 1936. Historias de una venganza (Alcalá 
de Guadaira, Ayuntamiento de Alcalá de Guadaira, 2006) 
Montero Moreno, Antonio, Historia de la persecución religiosa en España, 1936-1939 (Madrid, 
Biblioteca de autores cristianos, 1961) 
Moreno Gómez, Francisco, 1936: el genocidio franquista en Córdoba (Barcelona, Crítica, 2008) 
Núñez Beltrán, Miguel Angel, “El Cardenal Segura y su acción sinódico-conciliar en Sevilla” in Anuario 
de la Historia de la Iglesia Andaluza, vol. II, año 2009 (Sevilla, C.E.T., Cátedra "Beato Marcelo 
Spínola", 2009) 
Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia 
(Barcelona, A.H.R., 1958) 
Ordóñez Márquez, Juan, La apostasía de las masas y la persecución religiosa en la provincia de 
Huelva, 1931-1936 (Madrid, CSIC, 1968) 
Ortiz de Lanzagorta, José Luis, Blas Infante. Vida y muerte de un hombre andaluz (Sevilla, 
Fernández-Narbona, 1979) 
Ortiz Villalba, Juan, Del golpe militar a la guerra civil: Sevilla 1936 (Sevilla, RD Editores, 2006) 
Parejo Fernández, José Antonio, “Nuevos datos sobre la afiliación Falangista en Andalucía” in  Arias 
Castañón, Eloy (ed.), Comunicación, historia y sociedad. Homenaje a Alfonso Braojos (Sevilla, 
Universidad de Sevilla, Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, Área de Cultura, 2001) 
Parejo Fernández, José Antonio, La Falange en la Sierra Norte de Sevilla (1934-1956) (Sevilla, 
Universidad de Sevilla, 2004) 
Parejo Fernández, José Antonio, Señoritos, jornaleros y falangistas (Sevilla, Bosque de Palabras, 
2008) 
Pascual Ceballos, Fernando, Luchas agrarias en Sevilla durante la Segunda República (Sevilla, 
Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1983) 
Payne, Stanley G., Fascism in Spain 1923-1977 (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1999) 
Payne, Stanley G., The Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933-36: Origins of the Civil War (New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 2006) 
Peirats, José (edited by Ealham, Chris), The CNT in the Spanish Revolution (Hastings, East Sussex, 
Meltzer Press, 2001) 
Pérez Calero, Alberto Máximo, Aire de Libertad (Sevilla, Diputación de Sevilla, 1996) 
291 
 
Pettenghi Lachambre, José Aquiles, Detrás del silencio: el trágico destino de los gobernadores 
civiles de Cádiz en la II República (Jerez de la Frontera, Artepick TM, 2009) 
Ponce Alberca, Julio,  ol tica, instituciones y provincias  la  iputaci n de Sevilla durante la 
dictadura de  rimo de  ivera y la IIa  ep  lica, 19 3-1936 (Sevilla, Diputación de Sevilla, 1999) 
Ponce Alberca, Julio, “La represión de las organizaciones obreras durante la guerra civil y la 
posguerra” in Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Lemus López, Encarnación (ed.), Sindicatos y trabajadores en 
Sevilla: una aproximación a la memoria del siglo XX (Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 2000) 
Ponce Alberca, Julio, Cien Años de Socialismo. el PSOE en la Puebla de Cazalla (1899-1999) (Sevilla, 
Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 2000) 
Ponce Alberca, Julio, “Política y administración local en la Sevilla de Queipo (julio-diciembre 1936)” in 
Archivo Hispalense, Tomo 84, nº 256-57, Sevilla, 2001. 
Preston, Paul, Franco: A Biography (London, Fontana, 1993) 
Preston, Paul, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and Revolution in the Second 
Republic (London, Routledge, 1994) 
Preston, Paul, The Politics of Revenge: Fascism and the Military in Twentieth-Century Spain 
(London; New York, Routledge, 1995) 
Preston, Paul, Comrades! Portraits from the Spanish Civil War (London, HarperCollins, 1999) 
Preston, Paul, Doves of War. Four Women of Spain (London, HarperCollins, 2002) 
Preston, Paul, We Saw Spain Die: Foreign Correspondents in the Spanish Civil War (London, 
Constable, 2008) 
Prieto, Tomás, Héroes y gestas de la Cruzada. Datos para la Historia (Salamanca, Ediciones Tormes, 
1966) 
Quevedo y Queipo de Llano, Ana, Queipo de Llano. Gloria e infortunio de un general (Barcelona, 
Editorial Planeta, 2001) 
Raguer I Suñer, Hilari, “La prensa vaticana en la Guerra Civil” in Tuñon de Lara, Manuel (ed), 
Comunicación, Cultura y Política durante la II República y la Guerra Civil, 2 vols. (Bilbao, 
Universidad del País Vasco, 1990) 
Raguer, Hilari, El general Batet. Franco contra Batet: crónica de una venganza (Barcelona, 
Península, 1996)  
Rager Suñer, Hilario, Gunpowder and incense: the Catholic Church and Spanish Civil War (London, 
Routledge, 2007) 
Redondo, Luis; Zavala, Juan de, El requeté (la tradición no muere) (Barcelona, AHR, 1957) 
Richards, Michael, A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco’s Spain, 
1936-1945 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
Robinson, Richard, The Origins of Franco’s Spain  The  ight, the  epu lic and Revolution, 1931-36 
(Newton Abbot, David & Charles, 1970) 
Rodríguez Aisa, María Luisa, El Cardenal Gomá y la Guerra de España. Aspectos de la gestión 
pública del Primado 1936-1939 (Madrid, Instituto Enrique Flórez, 1981)     
292 
 
Romero, Luis Tres días de Julio. (18, 19 y 20 de 1936) (Barcelona, Esplungues de Llobregat, 1968) 
Romero Romero, Fernando, Guerra Civil y represión en Villamartín (1931-1946) (Cádiz, Diputación 
Provincial de Cádiz, 1999). 
Ruiz Sánchez, José Leonardo, “Cien años de propaganda católica: las missiones parroquiales en al 
archidiócesis hispalense (1848-1952)” in Hispania Sacra, vol. L, Madrid, CSIC, 1998. 
Ruiz Sánchez, José Leonardo, “Del movimiento Católico a la Acción Católica en el Arzobispado de 
Sevilla” in Montero, Feliciano (ed.), La Acción Católica en la II República (Alcalá de Henares, 
Universidad de Alcalá, 2008) 
Salas, Nicolás, Morir en Sevilla (Barcelona, Planeta, 1986) 
Salas, Nicolás, Joaquín Benjumea Burín: 1878-1963 (Sevilla, Guadalquivir Ediciones, 1990) 
Salas, Nicolás, El Moscú Sevillano. Sevilla la ro a, feudo del comunismo espa ol durante la 
 ep  lica y s m olo triunfal del frente popular en 1936 (Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 1990) 
Salas, Nicolás, Sevilla fue la clave. República, Alzamiento, Guerra Civil (1931-39), 2 vols. (Sevilla, 
Editorial Castillejo, 1992) 
Salas, Nicolás, Bienvenido a Sevilla, camarada Alexis! (Sevilla, Editorial Castillejo, 1993) 
Salas, Nicolás, Sevilla en tiempos de los anti-Dios (Sevilla, Castillejo, 1997) 
Salas, Nicolás, La otra memoria histórica.     testimonios gr ficos y documentales de la represi n 
mar ista en  spa a (1931-1939) (Córdoba, Almuzara, 2006) 
Salas, Nicolás, La Guerra Civil en Sevilla: antecedentes, frente popular y 18 de julio del 36, las 
represiones de ambos bandos (1931-1959) (Sevilla, Guadalturia, 2009) 
Sánchez, José Mariano, The Spanish Civil War as a religious tragedy (Notre Dame, University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1987) 
Soria Medina, Enrique, Sevilla: elecciones 1936 y 1977 (Sevilla, Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 
1978) 
Shubert, Adrian, The Road to Revolution in Spain: The Coal Miners of Asturias 1860-1934 (Urbana, 
Chicago, University of Illinois Press , 1987) 
Simões, Maria Dulce Antunes, Barrancos na encruzilhada da Guerra Civil de Espanha. Memórias e 
Testemunhos, 1936 (Barrancos, Camara Municipal de Barrancos, 2007) 
Southworth, Herbert Rutledge,  ntifalange  estudio cr tico de  Falange en la guerra de  spa a, la 
unificaci n y  edilla  de a imiano  arc a  enero (Paris, Ruedo Ibérico, 1967) 
Southworth, Herbert Rutledge, Guernica! Guernica!: a Study of Journalism, Diplomacy, 
Propaganda, and History (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977) 
Southworth, Herbert Rutledge, Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War: The Brainwashing of 
Francisco Franco (New York, Routledge, 2001)  
Southworth, Herbert Rutledge, El mito de la cruzada de Franco (Barcelona, Debolsillo, 2008) 
Stuart, Christie, We, the Anarchists! A study of the Iberian Anarchist Federation (FAI) 1927-1937 
(Hastings, Meltzer Press, 1996) 
Tuñon de Lara, Manuel, La España del Siglo XX (Librería Española, Paris, 1973) 
293 
 
Tuñón de Lara, Manuel, Luchas obreras y campesinas en la Andalucía del siglo XX: Jaén (1917-
1920), Sevilla (1930-1932) (Madrid, Siglo Veintiuno, 1978) 
Tusell, Javier, Las elecciones del Frente Popular en España, 2 vols. (Madrid, Cuadernos para el 
Diálogo, 1971) 
Ullman, Joan Connelly, The Tragic Week : a Study of Anticlericalism in Spain, 1875-1912 
(Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Pr., 1968) 
Vega Viguera, Enrique, Sevilla y la artillería (historia del regimiento militar número 14) (Sevilla, 
Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 1974) 
Vega Viguera, Enrique, Historia del Regimiento de Artillería (Sevilla, 1981) 
Vilaplana Montes, Manuel, “Nota biográfica sobre monsenhor Ilundain. Actividad y magistério hasta 
su nombramiento como arzobispo de Sevilla” in Archivo Hispalense, Tomo 72, nº 219, Seville, 1989 
Vincent, Mary, Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic: Religion and Politics in Salamanca, 
1930-1936 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996) 
Vincent, Mary, “Spain” in Buchanan, Tom, Conway, Martin, Political Catholicism in Europe 1918-
1965 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996) 
